Filed: Sep. 23, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit September 23, 2010 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT DONALD R. GONZALES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 10-1250 WARDEN HARTLEY; THE (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-01090-ZLW) ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE (D. Colo.) STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents-Appellees. ORDER Before MURPHY, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. This matter is before the court on appellant’s motion to amend. Upon consideration, the request is granted.
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit September 23, 2010 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT DONALD R. GONZALES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. No. 10-1250 WARDEN HARTLEY; THE (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-01090-ZLW) ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE (D. Colo.) STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents-Appellees. ORDER Before MURPHY, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. This matter is before the court on appellant’s motion to amend. Upon consideration, the request is granted. ..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 23, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
DONALD R. GONZALES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 10-1250
WARDEN HARTLEY; THE
(D.C. No. 1:09-CV-01090-ZLW)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
(D. Colo.)
STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER
Before MURPHY, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on appellant’s motion to amend. Upon
consideration, the request is granted. Accordingly, we have amended the Order
Denying Certificate of Appealability we originally filed on September 8, 2010.
The newly amended version is attached to this order. The clerk is directed to file
the amended order nunc pro tunc to the original filing date.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 8, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
DONALD R. GONZALES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 10-1250
WARDEN HARTLEY; THE
(D.C. No. 1:09-CV-01090-ZLW)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
(D. Colo.)
STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before MURPHY, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
On December 1, 2004, a Colorado jury convicted Donald Gonzales of
second-degree assault and violation of a protective order. He was sentenced to
consecutive terms of sixteen years’ imprisonment on the assault conviction and
two years’ imprisonment for violating the protective order. The Colorado Court
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
of Appeals affirmed the convictions, People v. Gonzales, No. 05CA0551 (Colo.
Ct. App. June 19, 2008), and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari.
While his direct appeal was pending, Mr. Gonzales pursued multiple
collateral attacks on his convictions under Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c). Mr. Gonzales
also brought a state habeas corpus petition. This petition was denied, and Mr.
Gonzales did not appeal.
Mr. Gonzales subsequently filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The
district court denied his petition, Gonzales v. Hartley, 2009 WL 3048450
(D. Colo. 2009) (unpublished), ruling that Mr. Gonzales failed to exhaust his state
remedies, was procedurally barred from bringing his current claims in any future
postconviction proceedings, and had not overcome procedural default by
demonstrating cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.
We granted a certificate of appealability (COA) and reversed. Gonzales v.
Hartley, 361 F. App’x 955 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). We remanded to the
District Court to consider: 1) whether Mr. Gonzales’s habeas petition had
satisfied the exhaustion requirement and 2) whether ineffectiveness of Mr.
Gonzales’s appellate counsel excused Mr. Gonzales’s procedural default.
In a fourteen-page opinion, the District Court answered both these
questions in the negative and again denied Mr. Gonzales’s petition. Mr. Gonzales
now requests a COA to appeal the district court’s ruling on remand. Construing
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Mr. Gonzales’s pro se petition with the solicitude it deserves, see Van Deelen v.
Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n. 1 (10th Cir.2007), we decline to issue a COA for
substantially the same reasons as those stated by the district court.
A COA may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). We have held that
under this standard an applicant must show “that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” United States v. Taylor, 454 F.3d 1075, 1078
(10th Cir.2006) (internal quotation omitted). When a district court has dismissed
a habeas petition on procedural grounds, a COA will issue only when “jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The district court correctly held that it was barred from reviewing Mr.
Gonzales’s habeas petition because Mr. Gonzales has never subjected his claims
to one complete round of Colorado’s established appellate review process. See
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Although Mr. Gonzales
presented some of these claims in his 35(c) motion, he failed to appeal them after
that motion was denied. Meanwhile, he presented a different subset of the instant
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claims in his 35(c) appeal, without first having presented them in his original
motion. Because he did not present and appeal any one of these claims, none has
been subjected to a complete round of Colorado’s established review process.
Because Colorado law now prevents him from presenting these claims, see Colo.
R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII), all of Mr. Gonzales’s current objections are
procedurally defaulted. See Smith v. Workman, 550 F.3d 1258, 1274 (10th Cir.
2008).
Mr. Gonzales can overcome procedural default only by demonstrating
“cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. For a
petitioner to show cause he must demonstrate that “some objective factor external
to the defense impeded [his] efforts to comply” with the state law. Murray v.
Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). And for a petitioner to show prejudice, he
must show that he suffered “actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of
federal law.” Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). The fundamental
miscarriage of justice exception, meanwhile, is “a narrow exception to the cause
requirement where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent of the substantive offense.” Dretke v.
Haley,
541 U.S. 386, 393 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Gonzales appears to allege that his procedural default was caused by
ineffective assistance of counsel. It is surely true that ineffective assistance of
counsel can constitute the “cause” necessary to excuse procedural default at trial
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or on direct appeal. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. Mr. Gonzales cannot, however,
invoke ineffective counsel as cause for any procedural default that occurred in his
35(c) motions, 35(c) appeal, or state habeas petition, because there is no Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in these proceedings. See
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-
54. And before Mr. Gonzales can use ineffective assistance of trial or appellate
counsel to establish cause for his procedural default, he must first present this
argument as an independent claim to the state court. See
Murray, 477 U.S. at
488-89.
Mr. Gonzales has not done this. If, as he claims, he is now procedurally
barred from alleging the ineffectiveness of his appellate counsel, he must show
cause and prejudice excusing this default. In other words, Mr. Gonzales would
need to show cause and prejudice for failing to attack the effectiveness of his
appellate counsel in his prior postconviction proceedings, in order to show cause
and prejudice for failing to exhaust state remedies for the objections he now
makes before us. The district court correctly noted that Mr. Gonzales has not
offered such a showing.
Neither has Mr. Gonzales demonstrated that failure to review his claim
would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Mr. Gonzales argues that
the withheld evidence would have supported his heat of passion defense and
called into doubt the seriousness of his wife’s injuries. But these defenses
challenge the legal classification of his conduct, not Mr. Gonzales’s factual
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innocence. As we have previously explained, arguments premised on legal
mitigation alone do not satisfy the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception.
See Ellis v. Hargett, 302 F.3d 1182, 1186 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
miscarriage of justice argument because it merely “assert[s] that [petitioner] is
legally innocent because his conduct is justified or mitigated by the doctrines of
self-defense or heat of passion”); Beavers v. Saffle,
216 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir.
2000) (“Mr. Beavers does not claim that he is innocent of killing Raymond
Matthews. Rather, he claims that he is not guilty of first degree murder because
he was intoxicated and acted in self defense. However, these arguments go to
legal innocence, as opposed to factual innocence.”).
Because Mr. Gonzales has failed to excuse his various procedural defaults,
the district court's decision is not reasonably debatable. Accordingly, we are
obliged to deny his request for COA and to dismiss his appeal. We grant his
motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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