Filed: Sep. 20, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit September 20, 2011 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 11-6101 v. (W.D. Oklahoma) MARK EDWARD BROWN, (D.C. No. 5:06-CR-00153-R-1) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral ar
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit September 20, 2011 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 11-6101 v. (W.D. Oklahoma) MARK EDWARD BROWN, (D.C. No. 5:06-CR-00153-R-1) Defendant - Appellant. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral arg..
More
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 20, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 11-6101
v. (W.D. Oklahoma)
MARK EDWARD BROWN, (D.C. No. 5:06-CR-00153-R-1)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this matter. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant and appellant Mark Edward Brown was convicted by a jury of
attempted armed robbery and using a firearm during and in relation to an
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
attempted robbery. Our court affirmed those convictions and the Supreme Court
denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. United States v. Brown,
592 F.3d 1088
(10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1917 (2010).
Because his petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was
denied on March 22, 2010, Mr. Brown had one year (i.e., until March 22, 2011) to
file his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition to “vacate, set aside or correct [his] sentence.” 1
On March 25, 2011, Mr. Brown filed a letter with the district court asking for
additional time to file his § 2255 petition, on the ground that the prison was on
lockdown and he could therefore not finish his petition. 2 The district court
denied his request, explaining that it lacked the statutory authority to extend the
one-year deadline and, to the extent it had the power to toll the one-year time
period, Mr. Brown’s letter did not show or even attempt to show that he met the
requirements for obtaining a tolling of the limitation period.
Ultimately, Mr. Brown never filed a § 2255 motion. Instead, on April 14,
2011, he filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s order denying him an
extension of time. The government has argued that we lack jurisdiction over this
1
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), a petition must be filed within one year of
“the date on which the judgment becomes final.” A judgment becomes final on,
inter alia, the date when the Supreme Court “denies certiorari.” United States v.
Prows,
448 F.3d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006).
2
His handwritten letter was actually dated March 17, 2011, but it was not
filed until March 25. Mr. Brown did not explain why the lockdown status
prohibited him from completing and/or writing his petition.
-2-
purported appeal because Mr. Brown is appealing from a non-final order. 3
Alternatively, the government argues that Mr. Brown must obtain a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) in order to be able to appeal the district court’s order.
We could dismiss this appeal on either ground. Thus, even assuming we
have jurisdiction over this appeal, Mr. Brown must obtain a COA before
presenting a § 2255 petition to our court. In order to obtain a COA, a prisoner
must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Furthermore, “[w]hen the district court denies a habeas
petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying
constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). There is no
debate on whether Mr. Brown’s request for an extension was timely filed, or
whether that constituted a § 2255 petition, or whether the district court erred in
any procedural way in denying his request for an extension of time. 4
3
The argument is that, rather than asking the district court for an extension,
which it is unable to grant, a defendant must file a § 2255 petition out of time
and, in that filing, ask the court to excuse his lateness based upon the factors
listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1)-(4), or on the basis of equitable tolling.
4
Appellant’s motion to dismiss is denied as moot. The appellant has filed a
reply brief which is untimely. It does not alter the result.
-3-
We accordingly DENY Mr. Brown a COA and DISMISS this matter.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-4-