Filed: Jan. 16, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit January 16, 2013 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT RAYMOND H. GRUZINSKY, Petitioner - Appellant, No. 12-5179 v. (N.D. Oklahoma) TERRY MARTIN, Warden, (D.C. No. 4:12-CV-00053-TCK-PJC) Respondent - Appellee. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges. Raymond H. Gruzinsky, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in order to
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit January 16, 2013 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT RAYMOND H. GRUZINSKY, Petitioner - Appellant, No. 12-5179 v. (N.D. Oklahoma) TERRY MARTIN, Warden, (D.C. No. 4:12-CV-00053-TCK-PJC) Respondent - Appellee. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges. Raymond H. Gruzinsky, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) in order to a..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 16, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
RAYMOND H. GRUZINSKY,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 12-5179
v. (N.D. Oklahoma)
TERRY MARTIN, Warden, (D.C. No. 4:12-CV-00053-TCK-PJC)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Raymond H. Gruzinsky, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) in order to appeal the dismissal of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We deny Mr. Gruzinsky a COA and
dismiss this matter.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
It appears that Mr. Gruzinsky was initially taken into custody by Oklahoma
County officials on February 12, 2009, pursuant to a bench warrant which was
issued following an application to revoke Mr. Gruzinsky’s suspended three-year
sentence in Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CF-2000-5529 (“Okla.
County Case”). He was placed in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections (“ODOC”) on May 26, 2009, to serve that now-revoked three-year
suspended sentence.
Subsequently, on January 8, 2010, Mr. Gruzinsky received a four-year
sentence in Logan County District Court Case No. CF-2008-127 (“Logan County
Case”), to be served concurrently with the three-year sentence imposed in the
Okla. County Case. 1 Mr. Gruzinsky discharged his sentence in the Okla. County
Case on October 22, 2010, and he discharged his sentence in the Logan County
Case on November 7, 2011.
1
We note, without comment on its merits or its impact, if any, on Mr.
Gruzinsky’s arguments about his state sentences, that the Oklahoma County
district court stated in the denial of Mr. Gruzinsky’s petition for a mandamus in
Case No. CV-2010-1116 that “the Logan County Court improperly ordered that
Petitioner be awarded credit against his Logan County conviction for time served
in Oklahoma County jail for his revoked Oklahoma County conviction. DOC
Sentence Administrator Jim Rabon recognized that the portion of the Logan
County Judgment and Sentence awarding Petitioner credit for jail time served on
an Oklahoma County case was improper.” Order at 2 (attached to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 petition).
-2-
Meanwhile, on June 7, 2010, Mr. Gruzinsky pled guilty to aggravated
assault and battery, after former convictions for two or more felonies. He was
sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment, with all but the first fifteen years
suspended. He began serving his sentence on that case on November 7, 2011.
That is the case for which Mr. Gruzinsky is currently in custody. Mr. Gruzinsky
did not appeal that sentence.
Additionally, while in custody for the two earlier state sentences (the Okla.
and Logan County Cases), Mr. Gruzinsky, on February 23, 2010, filed a request
to prison staff regarding his sentences. He then filed an administrative grievance.
After the denial of relief, Mr. Gruzinsky appealed that denial, but his
administrative appeal was returned unanswered as untimely.
On September 7, 2010, Mr. Gruzinsky filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in the Oklahoma County District Court, assigned Case No. CV-10-
1116. The court denied relief on March 4, 2011. Mr. Gruzinsky appealed that
denial to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”). On May 13, 2011
(in Case No. MA-2011-215), the OCCA cited the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals Rules 10.1(C)(2) and 10.5(5) to deny mandamus relief, finding that
because Mr. Gruzinsky had failed to provide a copy of either his petition as filed
in the district court or a copy of the response filed by the state, the OCCA was
“unable to determine if the District Court improperly denied Petitioner a writ of
mandamus and whether this Court should now grant him the writ.” Mr.
-3-
Gruzinsky thereafter filed a petition on May 5, 2011, in the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, Case No. 109,431, which was transferred to the OCCA where, on
January 25, 2012, the OCCA cited Rule 10.1(C) to decline jurisdiction and
dismiss the matter as untimely. 2
2
While the federal district court did not mention them, there were other
state court proceedings involving Mr. Gruzinsky. According to an order of the
OCCA, recently filed with this court, on October 28, 2010, Mr. Gruzinsky filed a
“Request for Order Nunc Pro Tunc,” alleging, inter alia, that the order of
judgment and sentence in his case failed to stipulate that he was to receive credit
for time served and that his sentence was to be served concurrently with the
sentences imposed in the other state court cases (the Okla. and Logan County
cases). In a decision announced by court minute entry on December 10, 2010,
and memorialized in an order filed on December 30, 2010, the state court judge
denied Mr. Gruzinsky’s request for an order “Nunc pro Tunc.” It appears that
Mr. Gruzinsky was not present during the proceedings.
On March 24, 2011, Mr. Gruzinsky filed another “Motion for Order Nunc
Pro Tunc” again requesting the correction of his judgment and sentence because it
did not “properly reflect the terms of the plea agreement” relating to concurrent
sentences and time served. A different state court judge denied this motion on
June 17, 2011.
Mr. Gruzinsky was able to establish, however, that he did not receive
notice of this last order denying his motion within thirty days of its issuance, as
required. The OCCA then gave Mr. Gruzinsky “leave to commence out of time in
this Court such original or appellate proceedings that might properly lie in
challenge or review of that written order filed on June 17, 2011.” Order Issuing
Writ of Mandamus at 2 (quoting Gruzinsky v. State, No. PC-2011-1023 at 4
(Okla. Crim. App. April 6, 2012) (unpublished)). In accordance with that April 6
order, Mr. Gruzinsky filed, on May 7, 2012, a “Petition in Error” and a “Brief in
Support of Petition in Error,” raising a number of challenges to the proceedings
leading up to his conviction. The OCCA construed that petition as an original
proceeding for a writ of mandamus, and ultimately granted that writ, permitting
Mr. Gruzinsky to proceed with his request for an order “Nunc Pro Tunc,” and
directed the lower court to consider that issue on its merits. Our record contains
no information about the current status, if any, of any proceedings relating to this
last directive.
-4-
Mr. Gruzinsky filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on February 8, 2012. He
claimed that the ODOC officials failed to administer his sentence in the Logan
County case concurrently with his sentence in the Okla. County case: “The
Oklahoma Department of Corrections is refusing to administer the sentence in
Logan County Case No. CF-2008-127 in the manner proscribed [sic] on the
Judgment and Sentence, in violation of Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process.” Petition at 3.
In response, the Warden filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that, even if it stated
a cognizable constitutional violation, the petition would be procedurally barred.
The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that the petition
concerned the application of state law only and, as such, did not involve the
denial of a constitutionally protected right. The court also determined,
alternatively, that the petition was procedurally barred. The district court then:
denied Mr. Gruzinsky’s motion for reconsideration; denied his request for a COA;
and granted his request to proceed in forma pauperis.
-5-
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a prisoner seeking a COA must make a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). He may do so by “showing that reasonable
jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000); United States v. Moya,
676 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2012). Thus,
when the district court has ruled on the merits of the prisoner’s claims, he must
show that “reasonable jurists could find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Where the
district court ruled on procedural grounds, a COA may be granted when the
petitioner shows “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and . . . whether
the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”
Id.
The district court’s decision was thorough and precise. We cannot improve
on its analysis. Accordingly, for substantially the reasons set forth in that
decision, we agree that a COA should not issue and this matter should be
dismissed.
-6-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY a COA and DISMISS this matter. 3
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
3
Appellant’s second motion titled, “Request for Interventionism for Court
Imposed Rules” is denied.
-7-
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 16, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
RAYMOND H. GRUZINSKY,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 12-5179
v. (N.D. Oklahoma)
TERRY MARTIN, Warden, (D.C. No. 4:12-CV-00053-TCK-PJC)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Raymond H. Gruzinsky, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) in order to appeal the dismissal of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We deny Mr. Gruzinsky a COA and
dismiss this matter.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
It appears that Mr. Gruzinsky was initially taken into custody by Oklahoma
County officials on February 12, 2009, pursuant to a bench warrant which was
issued following an application to revoke Mr. Gruzinsky’s suspended three-year
sentence in Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CF-2000-5529 (“Okla.
County Case”). He was placed in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections (“ODOC”) on May 26, 2009, to serve that now-revoked three-year
suspended sentence.
Subsequently, on January 8, 2010, Mr. Gruzinsky received a four-year
sentence in Logan County District Court Case No. CF-2008-127 (“Logan County
Case”), to be served concurrently with the three-year sentence imposed in the
Okla. County Case. 1 Mr. Gruzinsky discharged his sentence in the Okla. County
Case on October 22, 2010, and he discharged his sentence in the Logan County
Case on November 7, 2011.
1
We note, without comment on its merits or its impact, if any, on Mr.
Gruzinsky’s arguments about his state sentences, that the Oklahoma County
district court stated in the denial of Mr. Gruzinsky’s petition for a mandamus in
Case No. CV-2010-1116 that “the Logan County Court improperly ordered that
Petitioner be awarded credit against his Logan County conviction for time served
in Oklahoma County jail for his revoked Oklahoma County conviction. DOC
Sentence Administrator Jim Rabon recognized that the portion of the Logan
County Judgment and Sentence awarding Petitioner credit for jail time served on
an Oklahoma County case was improper.” Order at 2 (attached to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 petition).
-2-
Meanwhile, on June 7, 2010, Mr. Gruzinsky pled guilty to aggravated
assault and battery, after former convictions for two or more felonies. He was
sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment, with all but the first fifteen years
suspended. He began serving his sentence on that case on November 7, 2011.
That is the case for which Mr. Gruzinsky is currently in custody. Mr. Gruzinsky
did not appeal that sentence.
Additionally, while in custody for the two earlier state sentences (the Okla.
and Logan County Cases), Mr. Gruzinsky, on February 23, 2010, filed a request
to prison staff regarding his sentences. He then filed an administrative grievance.
After the denial of relief, Mr. Gruzinsky appealed that denial, but his
administrative appeal was returned unanswered as untimely.
On September 7, 2010, Mr. Gruzinsky filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus in the Oklahoma County District Court, assigned Case No. CV-10-
1116. The court denied relief on March 4, 2011. Mr. Gruzinsky appealed that
denial to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”). On May 13, 2011
(in Case No. MA-2011-215), the OCCA cited the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals Rules 10.1(C)(2) and 10.5(5) to deny mandamus relief, finding that
because Mr. Gruzinsky had failed to provide a copy of either his petition as filed
in the district court or a copy of the response filed by the state, the OCCA was
“unable to determine if the District Court improperly denied Petitioner a writ of
mandamus and whether this Court should now grant him the writ.” Mr.
-3-
Gruzinsky thereafter filed a petition on May 5, 2011, in the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, Case No. 109,431, which was transferred to the OCCA where, on
January 25, 2012, the OCCA cited Rule 10.1(C) to decline jurisdiction and
dismiss the matter as untimely. 2
2
While the federal district court did not mention them, there were other
state court proceedings involving Mr. Gruzinsky. According to an order of the
OCCA, recently filed with this court, on October 28, 2010, Mr. Gruzinsky filed a
“Request for Order Nunc Pro Tunc,” alleging, inter alia, that the order of
judgment and sentence in his case failed to stipulate that he was to receive credit
for time served and that his sentence was to be served concurrently with the
sentences imposed in the other state court cases (the Okla. and Logan County
cases). In a decision announced by court minute entry on December 10, 2010,
and memorialized in an order filed on December 30, 2010, the state court judge
denied Mr. Gruzinsky’s request for an order “Nunc pro Tunc.” It appears that
Mr. Gruzinsky was not present during the proceedings.
On March 24, 2011, Mr. Gruzinsky filed another “Motion for Order Nunc
Pro Tunc” again requesting the correction of his judgment and sentence because it
did not “properly reflect the terms of the plea agreement” relating to concurrent
sentences and time served. A different state court judge denied this motion on
June 17, 2011.
Mr. Gruzinsky was able to establish, however, that he did not receive
notice of this last order denying his motion within thirty days of its issuance, as
required. The OCCA then gave Mr. Gruzinsky “leave to commence out of time in
this Court such original or appellate proceedings that might properly lie in
challenge or review of that written order filed on June 17, 2011.” Order Issuing
Writ of Mandamus at 2 (quoting Gruzinsky v. State, No. PC-2011-1023 at 4
(Okla. Crim. App. April 6, 2012) (unpublished)). In accordance with that April 6
order, Mr. Gruzinsky filed, on May 7, 2012, a “Petition in Error” and a “Brief in
Support of Petition in Error,” raising a number of challenges to the proceedings
leading up to his conviction. The OCCA construed that petition as an original
proceeding for a writ of mandamus, and ultimately granted that writ, permitting
Mr. Gruzinsky to proceed with his request for an order “Nunc Pro Tunc,” and
directed the lower court to consider that issue on its merits. Our record contains
no information about the current status, if any, of any proceedings relating to this
last directive.
-4-
Mr. Gruzinsky filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on February 8, 2012. He
claimed that the ODOC officials failed to administer his sentence in the Logan
County case concurrently with his sentence in the Okla. County case: “The
Oklahoma Department of Corrections is refusing to administer the sentence in
Logan County Case No. CF-2008-127 in the manner proscribed [sic] on the
Judgment and Sentence, in violation of Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process.” Petition at 3.
In response, the Warden filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petition
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that, even if it stated
a cognizable constitutional violation, the petition would be procedurally barred.
The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that the petition
concerned the application of state law only and, as such, did not involve the
denial of a constitutionally protected right. The court also determined,
alternatively, that the petition was procedurally barred. The district court then:
denied Mr. Gruzinsky’s motion for reconsideration; denied his request for a COA;
and granted his request to proceed in forma pauperis.
-5-
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a prisoner seeking a COA must make a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). He may do so by “showing that reasonable
jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000); United States v. Moya,
676 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2012). Thus,
when the district court has ruled on the merits of the prisoner’s claims, he must
show that “reasonable jurists could find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Where the
district court ruled on procedural grounds, a COA may be granted when the
petitioner shows “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and . . . whether
the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”
Id.
The district court’s decision was thorough and precise. We cannot improve
on its analysis. Accordingly, for substantially the reasons set forth in that
decision, we agree that a COA should not issue and this matter should be
dismissed.
-6-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY a COA and DISMISS this matter. 3
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
3
Appellant’s second motion titled, “Request for Interventionism for Court
Imposed Rules” is denied.
-7-
