refore, 
its subsequent holding that the

abductors were not operators of the uninsured motor vehicle was not, as Mr. Pollard

asserts, the dispositive issue that prevented UM coverage in Sanders.

       We conclude that the transportation-use requirement adopted by the Oklahoma

Supreme Court in Sanders applies to a UM claim alleging an injury that arose out of

the use of a motor vehicle, including when the injury also arose out of the ownership

and/or maintenance of the vehicle, as Mr. Pollard alleged. And the requirement

applies regardless of whether the insured is legally entitled to recover damages from

the owner or the operator of the uninsured motor vehicle under § 3636(B). To be

entitled to coverage under the UM Endorsement, Mr. Pollard was therefore required

to show (1) that a use of the workover rig was connected to his injury and (2) that use

was related to the transportation nature of the workover rig. See 
Sanders, 803 P.2d at

692
.




                                          - 14 -
       2.     Did the District Court Err in Concluding that the Workover Rig
              Was Not Being Used in a Transportation Mode at the Time of the
              Accident?

       Mr. Pollard contends that the workover rig was being used in a transportation

mode at the time of the accident because the winch portion of the rig was being used

for its inherent function. We disagree. The steps taken by Mr. Pollard and his crew

to transform the workover rig from a motor vehicle into a fixed derrick severed any

causal connection between the transportation nature of the workover rig and

Mr. Pollard’s injury. Accordingly, his injury was not within the coverage mandated

by § 3636, and he was not covered under the UM Endorsement.

              a.     The Transportation-Use Requirement in Sanders and Mayer

       The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated in Sanders that “‘transportation use’

cannot be conclusively defined,” and “whether a use of an uninsured motor vehicle is

related to the transportation nature of the vehicle is necessarily a question of fact to

be determined in each 
case.” 803 P.2d at 693
. But the court nonetheless concluded,

as a matter of law, that “the acts of cutting the fuel line and igniting the fuel after the

car was parked, which caused the car to burn, are so contrary to [the] transportation

nature of the vehicle that . . . these events are not related to its transportation nature.”

Id. at 695.

       The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court reached a similar holding in Mayer v. State

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
944 P.2d 288 
(Okla. 1997). In that case, the

plaintiff was injured by the truck bomb detonated adjacent to the Alfred P. Murrah


                                           - 15 -
Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. See 
id. at 289. He 
sought UM coverage

under his own automobile policy on the theory that the truck containing the bomb

was an uninsured motor vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor

of the insurer, and the plaintiff appealed. See 
id.

       Citing Sanders’ two-prong 
causal-connection test, the Oklahoma Supreme

Court explained in Mayer that “[s]ubsection B of § 3636 has been understood to give

indication of an intent that there be a causal connection between the vehicle’s

inherent function as a means of transportation and the accidental injuries which are

the subject of suit.” 
Id. at 290 & 
n.7 (italics omitted). The plaintiff argued that the

criminal act of using a truck as a launching pad for a bomb was “inextricably

connected to the ‘use’ of the uninsured truck. But for the vehicle (which the assailant

drove to the site) [the plaintiff’s] injuries would not have occurred.” 
Id. at 290. The
court disagreed, stating that this contention “utterly ignores the law’s requirement

that the uninsured vehicle be in use as a motor vehicle at the time of injury.” 
Id. at

291 (italics 
omitted).

       In applying the transportation-use requirement to the facts presented in Mayer,

the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed that, at the time of the explosion, the criminal

actor had ceased driving and had parked the truck. 
Id. Moreover, “[t]he only
claimed transportation connection [was] the uninsured vehicle’s antecedent use to

transport the explosive materials close to the chosen target.” 
Id. The court also
noted that the “intentional act of the perpetrator did not call for the use of


                                          - 16 -
transportation during the commission of the crime,” and the vehicle’s employment as

a weapon was “completely incongruous with its transportation function and without a

causal link to locomotion.” 
Id. (italics omitted). The 
court concluded that “[t]he

site’s destruction by the truck’s contents occurred after the vehicle’s transportation

use had been abandoned.” 
Id. And, similar to 
its holding in Sanders, the court held

that the criminal act of using the truck as a bomb “severed from the ensuing

explosion the requisite transportation nexus to the vehicle.” 
Id. The Mayer court
held that the “causal connection between the injuries and the truck’s function as a

method of transport [was] absent.” 
Id.

      The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court concluded in Sanders and Mayer that criminal

acts involving motor vehicles were wholly contrary to the transportation nature of the

vehicles. Our task is to predict how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would rule on the

issue presented here. See 
Lampkin, 286 F.3d at 1210
. We conclude it would hold

that the workover rig was not being used in a transportation mode at the time of

Mr. Pollard’s injury.

             b.     Mr. Pollard’s Accident and Transportation Mode

      After Mr. Pollard drove the workover rig to the well site and parked it, he

switched the vehicle’s transmission so that it powered only the hydraulics for the

derrick and winch drum rather than the truck’s wheels. The workover rig was then

converted from a motor vehicle into a stationary 96-foot derrick. It was held in place

by leveling jacks on the back of the truck that were lowered to the ground and by


                                         - 17 -
guide wires extending from the top of the derrick that were fastened to steel anchors

in the ground. The parties stipulated that when the workover rig was fully “rigged

up” in this manner, it was not just a momentarily stationary vehicle. When

Mr. Pollard was injured, the workover rig could not be moved. Cf. Willard v. Kelley,

803 P.2d 1124
, 1131 (Okla. 1990) (noting that a car in gear with the engine running

was in transportation mode even though it was not moving when the injury occurred).

The workover rig was therefore not “in use as a motor vehicle at the time of injury.”

Mayer, 944 P.2d at 291 
(italics omitted).

      Mr. Pollard argues that because the workover rig was being used for one of its

inherent and intended functions at the time of the accident, the district court erred in

concluding that it was not being used in a transportation mode. He maintains that the

use of the workover rig to service a well is part of its transportation nature because

the vehicle must be driven from location to location for that purpose. He cites

Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Waggoner Drilling Co., 
340 P.2d 490 
(Okla. 1959).

In Waggoner, a trucking company was hired to dismantle, move, and reassemble an

oil well drilling rig. 
Id. at 492. An 
accident occurred after the rig was transported to

and unloaded at the new location about a quarter of a mile off of the highway. 
Id.

More specifically,

      [t]he 
substructure of the rig was in place. The mast was in position to
      be raised. A line was run from the mast over an A-frame and to a winch
      on a . . . truck. . . . While the mast was being raised by the . . . winch
      into an upright position . . . , the drive chain on the . . . truck . . . broke,
      and the mast fell to the ground resulting in the property damages in
      question.

                                           - 18 -

Id.

      The truck’s liability 
insurer appealed a judgment against it for the property

damages. See 
id. at 492-93. The 
insurer argued that the accident, which occurred off

of the highway, “did not result from an operation or use of the truck on the highway,”

as required by the applicable statute and policy terms. 
Id. at 493. The 
Oklahoma

Supreme Court disagreed, finding

      that the trucking company was employed to and did transport an oil well
      drilling rig and that the disassembling, loading, unloading, and
      reassembling of the oil rig and transporting it from one lease to another
      constituted one continuous act of transportation, and though the vehicle
      was off the highway at the time of the resulting damage, the operation
      or use of the vehicle in reassembling the oil well rig was incident to the
      transportation of the rig and had a proximate and necessary connection
      with the operation and use of the vehicle upon the highway within the
      meaning of [the applicable statute].

Id. at 494 (emphasis 
added).

      Mr. Pollard contends that the use of the workover rig in this case was likewise

“one continuous act of transportation,” 
id., but Waggoner is 
distinguishable. First,

the case involved property-damage liability rather than UM coverage. Second, the

court construed a statutory requirement that is different from the terms of § 3636.

Third, and most important, the facts regarding the use of the truck in Waggoner are

distinguishable. In that case, the reassembly of the oil well drilling rig off of the

highway “was incident to the transportation of the rig” and therefore had a

“proximate and necessary connection with the operation and use of the vehicle upon

the highway.” 
Waggoner, 340 P.2d at 494
. Here, in contrast, the conversion of the

                                          - 19 -
workover rig into a fixed derrick to service a well was not incidental to the rig’s

previous use as a motor vehicle. As the court explained in Mayer, the pertinent

question for UM coverage is not whether a vehicle was being used for any intended

function, but whether there was a causal connection between the accidental injury

and “the vehicle’s inherent function as a means of 
transportation.” 944 P.2d at 290
(additional italics omitted). Once the workover rig was rigged up and immovable,

the crew’s work involving the rig did not call for the use of transportation, and the

rig’s antecedent function as a means of transportation had therefore ceased. See 
id. at

291. Consequently, 
there was no causal connection between Mr. Pollard’s injuries

and the workover rig’s function as a method of transport. See 
id.

      Because transportation use 
of the uninsured vehicle is a necessary element of

Mr. Pollard’s claim for UM coverage, and because he failed to satisfy that

requirement, we need not address the district court’s alternative basis for granting

summary judgment in favor of Bituminous on the coverage issues. Accordingly, we

do not decide whether Mr. Pollard was “occupying” the workover rig at the time of

the accident. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Bituminous because the workover rig was not in a transportation mode when

Mr. Pollard was injured. He is therefore not entitled to coverage under the UM

Endorsement.




                                         - 20 -
      3.     Did the District Court Err in Granting Summary Judgment in
             Favor of Bituminous on Mr. Pollard’s Bad-Faith Claim?

      Oklahoma law recognizes an insurer’s implied duty “to act in good faith and

deal fairly with its insured.” Brown v. Patel, 
157 P.3d 117
, 121 (Okla. 2007).

“Whether an insurer’s actions reasonably give rise to an inference of bad faith must

be determined in light of all facts known or knowable concerning the claim at the

time [the claimant] requested the company to perform its contractual obligation.”

Oulds v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
6 F.3d 1431
, 1439 (10th Cir. 1993) (quotation

omitted). “A jury question arises only where the relevant facts are in dispute or

where the undisputed facts permit differing inferences as to the reasonableness and

good faith of the insurer’s conduct.” Timberlake Constr. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.

Co., 
71 F.3d 335
, 344 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). To avoid summary

judgment on his bad-faith claim, Mr. Pollard was required to present evidence

sufficient to establish “what might reasonably be perceived as tortious conduct on the

part of the insurer.” Flores v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 
620 F.3d 1248
, 1256

(10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).

      The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated the elements of a bad-faith claim

against an insurer as follows:

      (1) claimant was entitled to coverage under the insurance policy at
      issue; (2) the insurer had no reasonable basis for delaying payment;
      (3) the insurer did not deal fairly and in good faith with the claimant;
      and (4) the insurer’s violation of its duty of good faith and fair dealing
      was the direct cause of the claimant’s injury.

Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 
221 P.3d 717
, 724 (Okla. 2009).

                                         - 21 -
       Bituminous argues that Mr. Pollard’s bad-faith claim fails on the first element

because he cannot show that he was entitled to coverage under the UM Endorsement.

Citing Brown, Mr. Pollard counters that a court’s determination that no UM payment

is owed does not foreclose a bad-faith claim. In Brown, the claimant brought an

action against the alleged tortfeasor and put his UM carrier on notice. 
See 157 P.3d

at 120
. The insurer adopted a fence-sitting position, neither denying nor paying the

UM claim, and it intervened in the claimant’s action against the tortfeasor, asserting

inconsistent positions supportive of both parties’ positions. See 
id. The claimant

then 
asserted a bad-faith claim against the insurer. See 
id. at 120-21. The 
insurer

argued on appeal that the claimant’s bad-faith claim failed because the jury had

returned a verdict in favor of the alleged tortfeasor. See 
id. at 129. The 
Oklahoma

Supreme Court disagreed and reversed a grant of summary judgment against the

claimant, holding that “[a] substantial question of material fact exist[ed]” regarding

the insurer’s reasons for intervening in the claimant’s action. See 
id. at 130. The
court stated that “a subsequent judgment for the tortfeasor does not relieve the insurer

of all possible bad-faith claims based upon the insurer’s handling of the UM claim.”

Id. at 120.

       The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court has not decided whether to apply the holding in

Brown beyond the facts presented in that case. See Oldenkamp v. United Am. Ins.

Co., 
619 F.3d 1243
, 1249 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010). We need not determine the reach of




                                         - 22 -
Brown because we conclude that the district court correctly entered summary

judgment in favor of Bituminous on Mr. Pollard’s bad-faith claim. See 
id.

             a.     Was There 
a Legitimate Dispute Regarding Bituminous’s
                    Grounds for Denying Mr. Pollard’s UM Coverage Claim?

      “The critical question in a bad faith tort claim is whether the insurer had a

good faith belief, at the time its performance was requested, that it had a justifiable

reason for withholding or delaying payment under the policy.” 
Ball, 221 P.3d at 725
(quotation and brackets omitted). “If there is a legitimate dispute concerning

coverage or no conclusive precedential legal authority requiring coverage,

withholding or delaying payment is not unreasonable or in bad faith.” 
Id.

       Mr. Pollard put 
Bituminous on notice of his UM claim in August 2009.

Bituminous denied the claim via a letter from its counsel to Mr. Pollard’s counsel on

February 19, 2010. Bituminous initially asserted in that letter that Mr. Pollard was

not an insured under the UM Endorsement.4 As we indicated earlier, the UM

Endorsement defined “[i]nsured” to include anyone “occupying” a “covered auto,”

Aplt. App. at 10 (quotations omitted), and it defined “occupying” to mean “in, upon,


      4
         Mr. Pollard contends that this was Bituminous’s sole basis to deny his claim,
but the letter reflects that Bituminous stated a second and third bases for denial: that
Mr. Pollard was not legally entitled to recover from an owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle, and that his injury did not result from the ownership,
maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle. The third basis cited by
Bituminous may have encompassed the transportation-use requirement, although
Bituminous did not specifically refer in its letter to the workover rig not being in a
transportation mode. We need not resolve that issue because Bituminous’s denial of
Mr. Pollard’s claim on the first basis was reasonable.


                                          - 23 -
getting in, on, out or off,” 
id. at 12. Mr. 
Pollard’s theory is that “occupying” should

be broadly construed. And because he was holding a winch line attached to the

workover rig at the time of the accident, he maintains that he was “on” or “upon” the

vehicle and therefore “occupying” it. Bituminous argues that Mr. Pollard’s

construction of “occupying” is strained because it is undisputed that he was standing

on, working on, and injured by, the pump jack. Bituminous disagrees with his

assertion that he was “on” or “upon” the workover rig simply by virtue of holding a

winch line that was attached to the vehicle located some distance away.

      Mr. Pollard must show there was no legitimate dispute with respect to this

issue. He has not. First, no Oklahoma Supreme Court case clearly resolves the issue.

See 
Ball, 221 P.3d at 730 
(holding there was no controlling legal authority where the

Supreme Court had not specifically addressed the relevant coverage issue).5 Second,

the question is not resolved by the clear reading of any statute, existing case law, or

the provisions of the UM Endorsement. Cf. Barnes v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.

Co., 
11 P.3d 162
, 174 (Okla. 2000) (upholding jury verdict in favor of insured on

bad-faith claim where UM insurer’s legal position based on counsel’s advice “was

contrary to the unmistakable meaning of the relevant provision(s) of § 3636”; was “at




      5
         In his supplemental brief, Mr. Pollard invited this court to certify to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court the question whether he was “occupying” the Workover
Rig at the time of the accident, implicitly acknowledging the lack of controlling
precedent from that court on the issue.


                                         - 24 -
odds with existing case law”; and was “inconsistent with a provision of the insurance

policy”).

      Mr. Pollard relies primarily on Wickham v. Equity Fire & Casualty Co.,

889 P.2d 1258 
(Okla. App. 1994), in which the Oklahoma Court of Appeals

addressed the meaning of similar policy language defining “[o]ccupying” as “in, on,

getting in or on, or getting off or out of.” 
Id. at 1260 (quotations 
omitted). It held

the term “occupying” was “broad enough to include a person . . . who had looked

through the trunk [of the covered vehicle] for tools, who was performing repairs on

the vehicle, and who was situated next to the vehicle, tightening a lug nut on the

wheel.” 
Id. at 1261. Although 
that court concluded that “occupying” should be

broadly construed, it “decline[d] to adopt any bright-line test to determine whether

someone occupied a vehicle for purposes of UM coverage.” 
Id. It held instead 
“that

the determination of whether the policy definition of ‘occupying’ is satisfied should

be left to a case-by-case analysis, depending on the circumstances of the accident, the

use of the vehicle, the relevant terms of the coverage at issue, and any underlying

public policy considerations.” 
Id.

      The parties disagree 
whether the facts of Wickham are distinguishable from the

facts presented here. But it is not necessary for us to resolve whether Mr. Pollard

was “occupying” the workover rig to conclude that he has failed to show the absence

of a legitimate dispute. See 
Ball, 221 P.3d at 724 
n.40 (“Where the tort claim is

factually based on a coverage dispute as to which no controlling legal authority


                                          - 25 -
provides an indisputable resolution, a determination of the coverage dispute is

unnecessary because the elements of unreasonableness and bad faith are not present

as a matter of law.”). We are not persuaded that resolution of the question of

Mr. Pollard’s status as an insured under the UM Endorsement “was so obvious and

inevitable” that Bituminous acted unreasonably in denying his claim. 
Flores,

620 F.3d at 1256
.

             b.     Was There Other Evidence of Bad Faith Sufficient to Avoid
                    Summary Judgment?

      Apart from whether there was a legitimate dispute about coverage, Mr. Pollard

maintains that Bituminous’s conduct was nonetheless indicative of bad faith. “An

insured may pursue a claim of bad faith even when the insurer has a legitimate

defense to coverage.” Timberlake Constr. 
Co., 71 F.3d at 343 
(stating that “a

legitimate dispute as to coverage will not act as an impenetrable shield against a valid

claim of bad faith”). But “to pursue such a claim, the insured must present sufficient

evidence reasonably tending to show bad faith.” 
Id. (quotation omitted).

      Mr. 
Pollard maintains that Bituminous’s investigation of his claim was

unreasonable because the insurer denied coverage without interviewing him or any of

the eye witnesses to the accident, relying instead on the limited information about the

accident in its WC claim file.6 He also points to evidence that Bituminous’s adjusters


      6
         The district court held that Bituminous’s investigation of Mr. Pollard’s
claim—specifically its reliance on the WC claim file—was reasonable because the
file notes reflected an adjuster’s telephone call to Mr. Pollard’s home two days after
                                                                            (continued)
                                          - 26 -
lacked knowledge of Oklahoma’s claims-handling standards and its substantive law

on UM claims. He further argues that, although Bituminous determined immediately

that it would deny his claim, it delayed communicating its decision for several

months while conducting no further investigation. These contentions lack merit.

      First, to sustain a claim of bad faith based on a failure to investigate,

Mr. Pollard must show “that material facts were overlooked or that a more thorough

investigation would have produced relevant information.” Timberlake Constr. 
Co.,

71 F.3d at 345
. He asserts that a reasonable investigation would have put Bituminous

on notice, before denying his claim, that he was holding and working with the winch

line connected to the workover rig at the time of the accident. He also argues that

Bituminous would have learned of his contention that North Star was negligent in

instructing him on how to use the vehicle. But neither the fact of his using the winch

line nor his contention regarding North Star’s negligence would have altered

Bituminous’s reasonable basis for denying coverage: that he was not “occupying”

the workover rig. Mr. Pollard has not shown that a reasonable insurer, proceeding

under facts and circumstances that a proper investigation would have revealed, would

not have denied payment. See 
Oulds, 6 F.3d at 1442
.


the accident as well as Mr. Pollard’s own description of the accident, and because
Bituminous had promptly begun payments on his WC claim. We affirm the district
court’s decision on other grounds, which we are free to do where the record is
sufficient to permit conclusions of law. See Gillogly v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Assur. Co.,
430 F.3d 1284
, 1294 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005).



                                         - 27 -
      Mr. Pollard’s contention that Bituminous acted in bad faith based upon its

adjusters’ lack of knowledge regarding the specifics of Oklahoma UM law is also

unavailing due to this court’s precedent. See 
Flores, 620 F.3d at 1256 
(rejecting

bad-faith claim premised on insurer’s failure to train its employees on the specifics of

Oklahoma insurance law); 
Oldenkamp, 619 F.3d at 1249 
(rejecting claim that

insurer’s coverage position based on the policy terms was not reasonable because its

representative was unaware of a relevant regulation).

      Nor does the lapse between Mr. Pollard’s notice of his UM claim and

Bituminous’s denial support a finding of bad faith. He contends that Bituminous

delayed its response based on a need for further investigation, when in fact it did no

further investigation. But Bituminous informed him that its investigation involved

determining whether the UM coverage was applicable, and there is no dispute that

Bituminous did proceed to seek a coverage opinion from its counsel. Moreover, he

“must show that the alleged violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing was

the direct cause of damages.” 
Id. at 1250. We 
note that Mr. Pollard did not submit

his UM claim until more than a year after the accident. He fails to show that he was

damaged by any delay in Bituminous’s communication of its denial of his claim.

      Because Mr. Pollard failed to present evidence sufficient to establish “what

might reasonably be perceived as tortious conduct on the part of the insurer,” 
Flores,

620 F.3d at 1256 
(quotation omitted), we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Bituminous on Mr. Pollard’s bad-faith claim.


                                         - 28 -
                         III.   CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

                                           ENTERED FOR THE COURT


                                           Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
                                           Circuit Judge




                                  - 29 -