Filed: Aug. 26, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: v. No. 13-2005, (D.C. No. 2:11-CV-00854-LAM), CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting (D. N.M.of the past jobs. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1063 (10th Cir.letter postdated the administrative law judges decision by over a month.the July 2009 bladder surgery was successful, or (2) request medical records.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 26, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
AMBROSIO VILLALOBOS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 13-2005
(D.C. No. 2:11-CV-00854-LAM)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting (D. N.M.)
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,*
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT1
Before HOLMES, HOLLOWAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Ambrosio Villalobos claims a disability and seeks insurance benefits and
supplemental security income. The Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration denied Mr. Villalobos’s applications; and Mr. Villalobos appeals,
arguing that the agency failed to develop the record, to recontact a treating physician,
and to incorporate urinary or mental limitations into the assessment of residual
functional capacity. We hold that the administrative law judge adequately developed
*
The Court has substituted Carolyn W. Colvin as the defendant-appellee.
See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
1
This order and judgment does not constitute precedent. See 10th Cir. R.
32.1(A).
the record, had no duty to recontact the physician, and adequately assessed
Mr. Villalobos’s residual functional capacity. But we also hold that the
administrative law judge erred by failing to make findings on the demands of
Mr. Villalobos’s past relevant work. Thus, we reverse and remand for further
findings.
Failure to Develop the Record
Mr. Villalobos contends that the agency failed to adequately develop the
record regarding evidence of incontinence and mental impairments. These
contentions are rejected.
I. Duty to Develop the Record
In disability proceedings, the Social Security Administration bears a duty to
develop the record. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1062-63 (10th Cir. 2009). But to
trigger this duty, the claimant must raise the issue to be developed and that issue
must be substantial on its face.
Id. at 1063. As a result, the claimant must ensure
that the record contains evidence suggesting a reasonable possibility of a severe
impairment.
Id. In deciding whether the record is sufficient, we must consider
whether objective evidence suggests a condition which could materially affect the
disability decision and require further investigation. Hawkins v. Chater,
113 F.3d
1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 1997).
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II. Incontinence
Mr. Villalobos argues that: (1) the administrative law judge failed to develop
the record, and (2) the Appeals Council should have remanded to the administrative
law judge for further development of the record. We reject both arguments.
A. Duty of the Administrative Law Judge
As a matter of law, the administrative law judge adequately developed the
record on Mr. Villalobos’s complaints of incontinence.
Mr. Villalobos testified that he remained incontinent and required an adult
diaper, even after undergoing bladder contracture surgery. The administrative law
judge confirmed that the treatment was ongoing, but she did not have a record for the
surgery. The judge said she would obtain this record, and she did.
The judge also obtained testimony from Mr. Villalobos concerning his daily
activities. That testimony did not mention any day-to-day problems relating to
incontinence.
Nonetheless, Mr. Villalobos asserts a duty for further inquiry because he
testified that he was “going in diapers all the time” and needed an additional bladder
surgery to resolve his incontinence. Aplt. App. Vol. 1, at 98. We do not believe
further development was necessary for three reasons: (1) The record reflects
consideration of the bladder contractive surgery; (2) the record does not contain
evidence of functional limitations from incontinence; and (3) the vocational expert
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testified that Mr. Villalobos’s need for adult diapers would not prevent performance
of the past jobs.
First, the judge considered the bladder contracture surgery, but found that it
resulted in only minimal limitations on Mr. Villalobos’s ability to engage in basic
work-related activities.
Second, Mr. Villalobos testified that he had to wear adult diapers, but he did
not say that his incontinence had hindered employment. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d
1048, 1063 (10th Cir. 2009) (no duty to develop the record when the claimant did not
argue that the alleged impairment had contributed to a disability). And there is no
objective evidence of functional limitations resulting from Mr. Villalobos’s
incontinence.
Third, the vocational expert testified that Mr. Villalobos would have no
difficulty performing his past relevant work even though he had to wear adult
diapers.
Viewing these three factors in combination, we hold that the administrative
law judge adequately developed the record on incontinence.
B. Duty of the Appeals Council
Mr. Villalobos also contends that the Appeals Council should have remanded
the case for further development of the record. This contention is based on a letter by
Dr. Lugo, a treating physician, who said that Mr. Villalobos had severe urinary
incontinence in August 2010 notwithstanding corrective surgery over a year earlier.
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Aplt. App. Vol. 2, at 601. But Dr. Lugo did not state that his diagnosis was
retroactive. In the absence of a retroactive diagnosis, the Appeals Council had no
duty to remand for further development of the record. See Flaherty v. Astrue,
515 F.3d 1067, 1072 (10th Cir. 2007) (a diagnosis, made four months after the end of
the relevant period, did not trigger a duty to develop the record).
III. Mental Impairments
Mr. Villalobos also contends that the Social Security Administration failed to
develop the record regarding his fatigue, anxiety, mania, memory problems, and
sleeping problems. No error took place.
A. Duty of the Administrative Law Judge
The administrative law judge did not violate the duty to develop the record on
mental impairments because: (1) she could reasonably assume that mental
impairments would not bear on the disability claim, and (2) the isolated record
references to anxiety or depression would not have triggered a duty to further
develop the record on these problems.
First, Mr. Villalobos did not claim an inability to work because of mental
impairments. In his disability application, Mr. Villalobos was asked to identify the
conditions that limited his ability to work. Aplt. App. Vol. 1, at 233. He answered
that he had a seizure disorder, with no mention of mental limitations. Id. Then, at
the hearing, the administrative law judge asked Mr. Villalobos whether anything else
would prevent him from working.
Id. at 104. Mr. Villalobos did not mention mental
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limitations. Id. Under these circumstances, the administrative law judge “could
reasonably assume” that the alleged mental impairments did not bear on the disability
claim. Wall v. Astrue,
561 F.3d 1048, 1063 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Second, the record contains only brief references to mental symptoms. These
isolated references do not suggest a reasonable possibility of impairment and are
insufficient to trigger the agency’s duty to further develop the record. See, e.g.,
Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1327 (10th Cir. 2011) (no duty to develop the
record when there was no diagnosis or treatment and only isolated, passing references
to depression).
B. Duty of the Appeals Council
Mr. Villalobos also argues that the Appeals Council failed to remand for
additional development of the record based on newly-submitted evidence. This
evidence consists of a letter by Dr. Lugo, who stated on August 20, 2010, that
Mr. Villalobos “now has Depression with Anxiety and is followed by a mental health
provider.” Aplt. App. Vol. 2, at 601 (emphasis added).
This letter does not trigger a duty for the agency to solicit further evidence.
Dr. Lugo’s letter supplied the only evidence of treatment for depression, and the
letter postdated the administrative law judge’s decision by over a month. And in the
letter, Dr. Lugo did not retroactively diagnose a condition predating the
administrative law judge’s decision. Under these circumstances, the letter did not
create a need to further develop the record. See Flaherty v. Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067,
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1072 (10th Cir. 2007) (a diagnosis, made four months after the end of the relevant
period, did not trigger a duty to develop the record).
Failure to Recontact a Treating Physician
Mr. Villalobos also claims the agency should have developed the record
further by recontacting his treating physician, Dr. Lugo, to: (1) determine whether
the July 2009 bladder surgery was successful, or (2) request medical records. See
Aplt. Opening Br. at 14. According to Mr. Villalobos, the Appeals Council also
erred by failing to remand for further development based on newly-submitted
evidence. Because these arguments were not presented in the district court, they are
waived. See Aplt. App. Vol. 1, at 13-27, 42-47; Chambers v. Barnhart, 389 F.3d
1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2004).
Assessment of Residual Functional Capacity
According to Mr. Villalobos, the agency should have considered his
incontinence and mental impairments when assessing residual functional capacity.
We consider this argument based on the evidence presented to both the administrative
law judge and the Appeals Council. Based on this evidence, we reject
Mr. Villalobos’s argument.
The administrative law judge had no evidence of functional limitations from
the alleged incontinence or mental impairments. As a result, the administrative law
judge did not err by assessing the residual functional capacity without incorporating
limitations from incontinence. See Gregory v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 664, 666 (9th Cir.
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1988) (upholding a finding that incontinence did not render the claimant disabled
notwithstanding evidence of bladder leakage and possible need for a second
operation); see also SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (1996) (“The RFC
assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result from an
individual’s medically determinable impairment . . . including the impact of any
related symptoms.”).
Unlike the administrative law judge, the Appeals Council had the benefit of a
letter by Dr. Lugo, stating in August 2010 that Mr. Villalobos then had depression
and anxiety. See Aplt. App. Vol. 2, at 601. But this assessment was not retroactive.
See id. As a result, the Appeals Council did not err in declining to reassess
Mr. Villalobos’s mental capacity in light of Dr. Lugo’s letter. See Krauser v. Astrue,
638 F.3d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Appeals Council did not err
by failing to find a medically determinable impairment based on a physician’s
diagnosis of major depression 2½ months after the administrative law judge had
issued a decision).
Findings on the Demands of the Past Relevant Work
Mr. Villalobos contends that the administrative law judge failed to make
required findings about the physical and mental demands of his past relevant work.
We agree.
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The administrative law judge bears an obligation to determine the physical and
mental demands of past relevant work. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1023
(10th Cir. 1996).
Though the judge obtained evidence about the job demands, she did not make
findings on the subject. Instead, the judge: (1) noted the vocational expert’s
testimony that Mr. Villalobos could perform his past jobs, and (2) stated that he
could perform his past jobs as they had generally been performed. Aplt. App. Vol. 1,
at 89. These remarks suggest a finding on the ultimate issue of Mr. Villalobos’s
ability to perform his past relevant work. But the administrative law judge also had
to make findings on a narrower subject: the physical and mental demands of the past
jobs. The judge failed to make these findings, and the omission constitutes error. As
a result, we reverse and remand with instructions to make findings on the demands of
the past relevant work and to reassess Mr. Villalobos’s ability to perform his past
relevant work.
Conclusion
The agency’s decision is reversed. With the reversal, we remand for further
findings on the demands of the past relevant work. The additional findings, in turn,
may require reassessment of Mr. Villalobos’s ability to return to his past relevant
work.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
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