Filed: Jul. 17, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: No. 13-4018, v. (D.C. No. 2:12-CV-01112-TC), (D. Utah), SPENCER TODD MAYNARD; However, in response to the district courts order to, show cause as to why th[e] action should not be dismissed for lack of subject, matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff argued there was federal question jurisdiction.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 17, 2013
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
INSHALLAH DRAGNA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 13-4018
v. (D.C. No. 2:12-CV-01112-TC)
(D. Utah)
SPENCER TODD MAYNARD;
PATRICIA OSTLER,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. **
Plaintiff-Appellant Inshallah Dragna, proceeding pro se, appeals from the
district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. In the complaint, Plaintiff made general tort allegations regarding an
automobile accident that occurred in Salt Lake City, Utah, in 2008. I R. 4–7.
Exercising our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that diversity jurisdiction is
lacking. Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that “[t]his is not a [d]iversity case.” I R. 10.1
Additionally, we reject Plaintiff’s argument that federal question jurisdiction
exists. The complaint only alleges state tort claims. See
id. at 4–7. Further, to
the extent Plaintiff argues the Utah state courts violated Plaintiff’s Due Process
rights, see, e.g.,
id. at 10; Aplt. Br. 2–4, that argument also fails to provide a basis
for the district court’s jurisdiction, see Johnson v. De Grandy,
512 U.S. 997,
1005–06 (1994) (The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a losing party in state court
“from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment
in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state
judgment itself violates the loser’s [constitutional] rights.”).
AFFIRMED. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) is moot
as the district court already approved the IFP application.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
1
It is not clear from the record whether Plaintiff ever argued there was
diversity jurisdiction. Initially, Plaintiff cited “U.S. Government Plaintiff” as the
basis of jurisdiction. I R. 7. However, in response to the district court’s order to
show cause as to “why th[e] action should not be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction,” Plaintiff argued there was federal question jurisdiction.
Id.
at 9–10.
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