Filed: Jul. 16, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit July 16, 2014 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT EARL JACKSON, Petitioner - Appellant, v. No. 14-5041 (N.D. Oklahoma) ANITA TRAMMELL, (D.C. No. 4:13-CV-00198-JHP-FHM) Respondent - Appellee. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Before GORSUCH, MURPHY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. This matter is before the court on Robert Earl Jackson’s pro se request for a certificate of appealability (“C
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit July 16, 2014 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT EARL JACKSON, Petitioner - Appellant, v. No. 14-5041 (N.D. Oklahoma) ANITA TRAMMELL, (D.C. No. 4:13-CV-00198-JHP-FHM) Respondent - Appellee. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY Before GORSUCH, MURPHY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. This matter is before the court on Robert Earl Jackson’s pro se request for a certificate of appealability (“CO..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 16, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT EARL JACKSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 14-5041
(N.D. Oklahoma)
ANITA TRAMMELL, (D.C. No. 4:13-CV-00198-JHP-FHM)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE
OF APPEALABILITY
Before GORSUCH, MURPHY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on Robert Earl Jackson’s pro se request for a
certificate of appealability (“COA”). Jackson seeks a COA so he can appeal the
district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A). Because Jackson has not “made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,”
id. § 2253(c)(2), this court denies his request for
a COA and dismisses this appeal.
Jackson filed the instant § 2254 habeas petition challenging his Oklahoma
conviction in Tulsa County District Court, No. CF-1995-4408. The district court
concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Jackson’s § 2254
petition, no matter how that petition was construed. To the extent Jackson was
challenging his conviction in No. CF-1995-4408, the district court concluded it
lacked jurisdiction because Jackson was not “in custody” on that conviction. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Maleng v. Cook,
490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989).
Alternatively, to the extent Jackson’s § 2254 petition could be generously
construed as challenging the Oklahoma state prison sentences imposed on him in
Tulsa County District Court, No. CF-2000-1569, 1 the district court concluded it
lacked jurisdiction because Jackson had already litigated the validity of No. CF-
2000-1569 in a previous § 2254 habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)
(providing a district court cannot consider a second or successive habeas petition
unless the petitioner has obtained authorization from this court to file such a
petition); In re Cline,
531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding
that in the absence of § 2244(b)(3) authorization from this court, a district court
lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of a second or successive § 2254 habeas
petition). 2 Furthermore, because Jackson’s instant § 2254 petition did not present
any claim that appeared remotely likely to fall within the parameters of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2), the district court declined to transfer the petition to this court under
28 U.S.C. § 1631.
Cline, 531 F.3d at 1252 (“When a second or successive § 2254
1
See generally Anderson-Bey v. Zavaras,
641 F.3d 445, 453-54 (10th Cir.
2011) (discussing extraordinarily narrow circumstances in which a petitioner can
challenge the validity of a current sentence by asserting that sentence was
enhanced by a previous, constitutionally defective conviction).
2
For this reason, it was unnecessary to determine whether Jackson’s § 2254
claims were of the type described as permissible in Anderson-Bey.
-2-
. . . claim is filed in the district court without the required authorization from this
court, the district court may transfer the matter to this court if it determines it is
in the interest of justice to do so under § 1631, or it may dismiss the motion or
petition for lack of jurisdiction.”).
The granting of a COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to Jackson’s appeal
from the denial of his § 2254 petition. Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003). To be entitled to a COA, Jackson must make “a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where a district
court denies a petition on procedural grounds, a COA may issue only if “the
prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists
of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Having undertaken a review of Jackson’s appellate filings, the district
court’s order, and the entire record before this court pursuant to the framework
set out by the Supreme Court in Miller-El, we conclude Jackson is not entitled to
a COA. The district court’s procedural determination that it lacked jurisdiction to
review the merits of Jackson’s § 2254 petition, no matter how construed, is not
remotely, let alone reasonably, subject to debate. Likewise, given its obvious
failure to satisfy the requirements of § 2244(b)(2), the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it declined to transfer Jackson’s petition to this court. Cline,
-3-
531 F.3d at 1252 (“Where there is no risk that a meritorious successive claim will
be lost absent a § 1631 transfer, a district court does not abuse its discretion if it
concludes it is not in the interest of justice to transfer the matter to this court for
authorization.”). Accordingly, this court DENIES Jackson’s request for a COA
and DISMISSES this appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
-4-