BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves personal jurisdiction. A Utah company, Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI (6)-1, LLC, was asked to loan money. In considering the request, Rockwood required the borrower to obtain an opinion letter from its New Hampshire law firm, Devine, Millimet & Branch. Devine provided the letter, which was picked up by someone (Todd Enright) and forwarded to Rockwood's owner in Utah. But Rockwood subsequently concluded that the opinion letter contained falsehoods and sued Devine in Utah federal court. The district court dismissed the suit based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Rockwood appeals, and we must decide whether Devine had sufficient contacts with Utah to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction. We conclude that Devine's contacts with Utah were insufficient under two precedential decisions: Walden v. Fiore, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014), and Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir.1996). Thus, we affirm.

Personal jurisdiction can be general or specific. Rambo v. Am. S. Ins. Co., 839 F.2d 1415, 1418 (10th Cir.1988). Rockwood relies on specific jurisdiction, which exists only when the suit relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Id.; see Oral Arg. at 3:28-3:32 (Rockwood's disavowal of an argument involving general jurisdiction).

Because the court considered the complaint and affidavits, we engage in de novo review, assuming the truth of Rockwood's allegations that are "plausible, non-conclusory, and non-speculative." Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir.2008).

In engaging in this review, we determine:

See Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1506-07 (10th Cir.1995).

Utah law authorizes service to the extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-201(3) (2013) (stating that the Utah long-arm statute "should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"). The resulting question is whether service of process would have deprived Devine of due process. The answer depends on whether Devine purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1071.

For this inquiry, Rockwood bears the burden. See Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1295 (10th Cir.1999) (stating that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction). To satisfy this burden, Rockwood need only make a prima facie showing that the facts alleged, if true, would support personal jurisdiction over the defendant. OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir.1998).

Rockwood focuses on seven factual allegations in the complaint:

These allegations involve three basic connections to Utah:

These connections are insufficient for personal jurisdiction in Utah. Rockwood's strong connection to Utah does not suffice under Walden v. Fiore, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014), and Devine's opinion letter and telephone call do not suffice under Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir.1996).

Walden teaches that personal jurisdiction cannot be based on interaction with a plaintiff known to bear a strong connection to the forum state. Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1122-26. Walden involved a Georgia police officer's seizure in Georgia of money held by individuals with strong connections to Nevada. See id. at 1119-20. The Georgia officer knew about these connections. See id. at 1124. But the Supreme Court held that this knowledge was not enough to subject the Georgia police officer to jurisdiction in Nevada. Id. at 1122-26. The Court reasoned that the jurisdictional analysis cannot be driven by "a plaintiff's contacts with the defendant and forum." Id. at 1125. Thus, the Georgia officer "did not create sufficient contacts with Nevada" simply by directing "his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada connections." Id.

Under Walden, Rockwood's reliance on its own Utah connections is misguided. Like the Georgia officer in Walden, Devine interacted with the plaintiff after learning of its strong connections to the forum state. In Walden, this interaction was insufficient for personal jurisdiction. The same is true here.

The remaining connections are: (1) Devine's issuance of an opinion letter addressed to a Utah location, and (2) a telephone call with the Rockwood owner while he was in Utah. These contacts are insufficient under Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir.1996). There a Colorado law firm issued an opinion letter, which eventually went to the lender in Michigan. See Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1534. In connection with the opinion letter, the Colorado law firm once spoke by telephone with the lender's attorney while he was in Michigan. See id. Afterward, the lender sued the Colorado law firm in Michigan, claiming negligence in preparing the opinion letter. See id. at 1531-32. We held that the Michigan court lacked personal jurisdiction over the law firm notwithstanding the opinion letter and telephone call. Id.

Rockwood tries to distinguish Trierweiler, focusing on Devine's decision to address its opinion letter to Rockwood at a Utah address. The Trierweiler opinion does not say how the opinion letter was addressed,2 but notes an allegation by the plaintiff that the attorney writing the opinion letter understood that it would go to someone in Michigan.3 Id. In these circumstances, Rockwood's distinction is immaterial: Regardless of how the opinion letter was addressed in Trierweiler, the plaintiff's allegation was that the letter was going to end up in Michigan (the forum state) and the Colorado law firm knew that. As a result, Trierweiler applies notwithstanding the Devine firm's act of addressing the opinion letter to a place in Utah (the forum state).

Rockwood focuses on Devine's intention for its opinion letter to end up in Utah. To Rockwood, this fact distinguishes Trierweiler because there the Colorado recipient forwarded the opinion letter to Michigan. Oral Arg. at 9:24-10:48.4 This distinction proves illusory upon examination of why and how the Trierweiler and Devine opinion letters ended up in the forum states.

In both cases, the opinion letters were delivered to the lender through an intermediary: in Trierweiler, the intermediary was the client, whom the plaintiff alleged was in Colorado;5 in our case, the intermediary was Todd Enright, who picked up the opinion letter in New Hampshire. Appellant's Reply Br. at 3. In both cases, the intermediary lacked any decisionmaking role: in Trierweiler, the decisionmaker was Mr. Trierweiler (in the forum state), who required the guarantor to "provide him" with the opinion letters;6 in our case, the loan decision would be made by Rockwood's owner, who was also in the forum state. In these circumstances, we cannot distinguish Trierweiler based on the fact that Devine addressed the opinion letter to a Utah location, while the law firm in Trierweiler presumably sent its opinion letter to a Colorado address.

Under Walden and Trierweiler, personal jurisdiction in Utah cannot be based on Rockwood's strong connection to Utah, Devine's opinion letter addressed to a place in Utah, or the telephone call involving Rockwood's owner while he was in Utah. Thus, we affirm the dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction.