Filed: Dec. 29, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of PUBLISH Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 29, 2015 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker _ Clerk of Court TSUTOMU SHIMOMURA, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 14-1418 KENDRA CARLSON, an agent of the Transportation Security Administration, in her individual capacity; WADE DAVIS, a Denver Police Department officer, in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellees, and TERRY CATES, an agent of the Transportation Security Administration, i
Summary: FILED United States Court of PUBLISH Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 29, 2015 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker _ Clerk of Court TSUTOMU SHIMOMURA, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 14-1418 KENDRA CARLSON, an agent of the Transportation Security Administration, in her individual capacity; WADE DAVIS, a Denver Police Department officer, in his individual capacity, Defendants - Appellees, and TERRY CATES, an agent of the Transportation Security Administration, in..
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FILED
United States Court of
PUBLISH Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 29, 2015
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
_________________________________ Clerk of Court
TSUTOMU SHIMOMURA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-1418
KENDRA CARLSON, an agent of
the Transportation Security
Administration, in her individual
capacity; WADE DAVIS, a Denver
Police Department officer, in his
individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
TERRY CATES, an agent of the
Transportation Security
Administration, in her individual
capacity; PATTI ZELLER, an agent
of the Transportation Security
Administration, in her individual
capacity,
Defendants.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-00462-RBJ-MJW)
_________________________________
Ty Gee, Haddon, (Laura G. Kastetter, with him on the briefs) Haddon,
Morgan, and Foreman, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Paul Farley, Assistant United States Attorney, (John F. Walsh, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief) Office of the United States
Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Kendra Carlson, Defendant-Appellee.
Andrew J. Carafelli, Pryor Johnson Carney Karr Nixon, P.C., Denver,
Colorado, for Wade Davis, Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, MURPHY, and BACHARACH,
Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
Mr. Tsutomu Shimomura claims that an officer with the Denver
Police Department (Wade Davis) and an agent with the Transportation
Security Administration (Kendra Carlson) made an arrest without probable
cause and conspired to fabricate grounds for the arrest. For these claims,
Mr. Shimomura invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
alleging that Officer Davis and Agent Carlson violated the Fourth, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. 1 On the Fourth Amendment claims, the
district court granted two motions: (1) Officer Davis’s motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity and (2) Agent Carlson’s motion to
dismiss based on failure to state a valid claim. On the causes of action
involving the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the court granted the
1
In the complaint, Mr. Shimomura also invoked the First Amendment.
But the First Amendment claim is not involved in this appeal.
2
defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a valid claim. Mr.
Shimomura appeals; to decide his appeal, we address four issues:
1. Did Officer Davis have qualified immunity (arguable
probable cause) for the arrest? Officer Davis arrested Mr.
Shimomura for assault after seeing him push his roller bag
toward Agent Carlson. Mr. Shimomura contends that Officer
Davis lacked qualified immunity in determining that probable
cause existed. Thus, we must decide whether Officer Davis
enjoys qualified immunity.
We conclude he does. Even if probable cause had been absent,
Officer Davis would enjoy qualified immunity if probable
cause had been at least arguable. In our view, probable cause
was arguable because Officer Davis saw Mr. Shimomura push
his roller bag toward Agent Carlson, observed her reaction by
trying to avoid contact, and watched Mr. Shimomura move
rapidly away. These observations could reasonably lead Officer
Davis to believe there was probable cause involving an assault
under a Denver city ordinance. Thus, Officer Davis enjoys
qualified immunity on the claim of unlawful arrest.
2. Did Mr. Shimomura plead a plausible claim against Agent
Carlson for fabrication and withholding of evidence to
justify the arrest? Mr. Shimomura claims that Agent Carlson
violated the Fourth Amendment by fabricating evidence and
withholding exculpatory evidence to justify the arrest. On these
claims, we must decide whether the allegations plausibly
implicate Agent Carlson in the decision to arrest Mr.
Shimomura.
We conclude they do not. Agent Carlson’s conduct could not
have caused the arrest because it would have taken place after
the arrest. Accordingly, we conclude that Agent Carlson is
entitled to dismissal of the unlawful arrest claim.
3. Did Mr. Shimomura plead a plausible claim of a conspiracy
preceding the arrest? According to Mr. Shimomura, Officer
Davis and Agent Carlson conspired to violate the Fourth
Amendment by making the arrest without probable cause. We
must decide whether this claim was plausible based on the
factual allegations in the complaint.
3
In our view, the claim fails under this test because Officer
Davis arrested Mr. Shimomura within seconds of the alleged
assault. Mr. Shimomura has not pleaded facts showing a
plausible opportunity for Officer Davis and Agent Carlson to
conspire in those few seconds.
4. Did Mr. Shimomura plead a plausible claim involving
deprivation of procedural due process? Mr. Shimomura
claims that the false arrest, initiation of false charges, and
conspiracy deprived him of procedural due process under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We must decide whether the
allegations in the complaint state a viable claim.
In our view, they do not. The Fourth Amendment—not the Fifth
or Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of procedural due
process—generally governs pre-trial deprivations of liberty.
Because the sole source of protection is the Fourth Amendment,
we uphold dismissal of the claim involving deprivation of
procedural due process.
I. Officer Davis arrested Mr. Shimomura after seeing him push his
roller bag toward Agent Carlson.
In February 2011, Mr. Shimomura was going through security at the
Denver International Airport, trying to catch a flight. At the security
checkpoint, Mr. Shimomura presented his belongings for screening. When
he did, a TSA agent conducted a test on Mr. Shimomura’s medication,
using a sampling strip. Mr. Shimomura was afraid that the test would
contaminate his medication. Based on this fear, Mr. Shimomura asked
about the sterility and toxicity of the sampling strip. The TSA agent’s
response did not satisfy Mr. Shimomura. So he asked for the agent’s
supervisor.
4
Agent Carlson was the TSA supervisor who responded. She stated
that the sampling strips were sterile for screening purposes. But Mr.
Shimomura remained unsatisfied, and the conversation grew heated while
Officer Davis watched from nearby.
Eventually, Mr. Shimomura was told to leave the screening area. He
complied and began walking away with his roller bag, with Agent Carlson
and Officer Davis following closely behind. After taking a few steps, Mr.
Shimomura stopped, and Officer Davis believed that the roller bag had hit
Agent Carlson. A few seconds later, Officer Davis arrested Mr.
Shimomura. Following Mr. Shimomura’s arrest, Officer Davis, Agent
Carlson, and other TSA agents conferred for approximately 90 minutes.
Officer Davis then served Mr. Shimomura with a summons and complaint,
charging him with assault for pushing his roller bag into Agent Carlson.
See Rev. Mun. Code of Denver § 38-93. After reviewing the evidence, the
prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint against Mr. Shimomura.
This suit followed.
II. Officer Davis was entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth
Amendment claim because he had arguable probable cause for the
arrest.
Mr. Shimomura claims that he was arrested without probable cause.
On this claim, the district court granted summary judgment to Officer
Davis based on qualified immunity. This ruling was correct.
5
A. We engage in de novo review based on our two-part test for
qualified immunity.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1278 (10th Cir. 2003). The
court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
We apply this standard against the backdrop of our case law on
qualified immunity. This immunity protects all government employees
except those who are “plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.” Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). To overcome this assertion of
qualified immunity, Mr. Shimomura must show that (1) Officer Davis
violated a federal statute or the U.S. Constitution and (2) the underlying
rights were “clearly established at the time of their alleged violation.”
Id.
To decide whether Mr. Shimomura made this showing, we view all
evidence in the light most favorable to him as the nonmoving party. Estate
of B.I.C. v. Gillen,
710 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2013).
Framed under these standards, “the salient Fourth Amendment
questions presented are (1) whether [Officer Davis] possessed probable
cause to arrest [Mr. Shimomura for assault]; and (2) whether extant clearly
established law in [February 2011] would have placed a reasonable,
6
similarly situated police officer on notice that no probable cause existed.”
Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1007 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in
original).
B. Probable cause was at least arguable based on Officer
Davis’s observation of the events.
For the sake of argument, we can assume that probable cause was
lacking. Even with this assumption, however, Officer Davis would enjoy
qualified immunity if probable cause had been at least “arguable.”
Kaufman v. Higgs, 697 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2012). In our view,
probable cause would have been at least arguable.
To determine whether probable cause was arguable, we must begin
with the standard for “probable cause.” Under this standard, probable cause
would exist if Officer Davis had reasonably trustworthy information that
would lead a prudent person to believe that Mr. Shimomura had committed
an offense. Jones v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 854 F.2d 1206, 1210 (10th
Cir. 1988).
The threshold question involves identification of the alleged offense.
On this question, Officer Davis identified Mr. Shimomura’s conduct as a
third-degree assault under the Denver Municipal Code. Thus, we must
determine what constituted a third-degree assault in February 2011.
The municipal code defined third-degree assault to include the
intentional or reckless commission of an assault. Rev. Mun. Code of
7
Denver, § 38-93. Rather than define the word “assault,” the municipal code
referred to Colorado law. Under that law, third-degree assault required
“bodily injury.” Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-204(1)(a) (2011). The term
“bodily injury” referred to physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical or mental condition. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-901(3)(c)
(2011). This definition was “broadly inclusive” and included physical
injuries even when they might have been considered only “slight.” People
v. Hines, 572 P.2d 467, 470 (Colo. 1977) (“broadly inclusive”); United
States v. Paxton,
422 F.3d 1203, 1206 (10th Cir. 2005) (“slight”).
In applying the municipal ordinance for assault, a reasonable police
officer could have viewed probable cause as arguable. Mr. Shimomura
relies largely on a video of the incident. The parties agree that this video is
accurate, and Officer Davis acknowledged that it was consistent with what
he had seen. 2 But we also note that Officer Davis’s vantage point of the
incident differs from ours as we watch the video. From our vantage point,
we can see that Officer Davis walked behind both Agent Carlson and Mr.
Shimomura. Officer Davis saw the same events from a different angle. See
Appellant’s App’x at 116 (TSA surveillance video at 2:03-2:06). Thus,
when we watch the video, we see the events from in front of Mr.
2
Mr. Shimomura points out that the video does not show the earlier
argument in the TSA screening area, does not contain audio, does not show
Mr. Shimomura’s or Agent Carlson’s face, and Officer Davis is “barely
visible.” But Mr. Shimomura does not contest the accuracy of the video.
8
Shimomura; Officer Davis saw the events more closely from only a few
feet behind Agent Carlson:
Though our vantage point differs from Officer Davis’s, we can
identify at least four facts that Officer Davis would have known:
1. Mr. Shimomura was pulling his roller bag, which was between
Mr. Shimomura and Agent Carlson.
2. Mr. Shimomura stopped and moved his roller bag in Agent
Carlson’s direction.
9
3. Agent Carlson moved suddenly after the roller bag was pushed
in her direction.
4. Mr. Shimomura walked away more rapidly after he pushed the
roller bag in Agent Carlson’s direction.
Mr. Shimomura suggests we add a fifth undisputed fact: that he and Agent
Carlson had engaged in a heated disagreement.
Based on these five facts, Officer Davis could reasonably believe
that Mr. Shimomura had intentionally or recklessly pushed his roller bag
into Agent Carlson and caused her at least some slight physical injury.
From our vantage point in watching the video, we cannot see the actual
contact between Agent Carlson and the roller bag. But our view of the
contact is impeded by the camera angle. Officer Davis had a different
angle. See Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating
that “any . . . film shows only one perspective on a scene, so that
additional perspectives, such as eyewitness testimony . . . , might reveal
additional facts that would change the legal analysis”). And from his angle,
Officer Davis had only a momentary opportunity to see what had taken
place. (We have the luxury of watching the video repeatedly.) Officer
Davis could then see Mr. Shimomura walking away more quickly after
Agent Carlson had made a sudden movement. In these circumstances, a
reasonable officer could believe that Mr. Shimomura had intentionally or
recklessly caused at least some slight physical injury to Agent Carlson. As
a result, probable cause was at least arguable.
10
C. Probable cause would have remained arguable
notwithstanding Mr. Shimomura’s explanation for his
quickened pace and challenges to Agent Carlson’s
credibility.
Mr. Shimomura argues that his quickened pace did not suggest guilt,
for he might simply have had to hurry to catch his flight. But probable
cause could have existed even if his conduct might also be interpreted as
innocent. See United States v. Muñoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1144 (10th Cir.
2008) (“[S]imply because an activity has an innocent connotation does not
mean that it is excluded from the court’s totality of the circumstances
analysis.”).
Mr. Shimomura also argues that Officer Davis should have
discounted Agent Carlson’s description of the events, giving three reasons:
1. A heated argument had just taken place between Agent Carlson
and Mr. Shimomura.
2. Mr. Shimomura denied pushing his roller bag into Agent
Carlson.
3. Other witnesses did not say that Agent Carlson had been
injured.
But these arguments would not preclude Officer Davis from reasonably
believing that probable cause existed.
Agent Carlson and the other witnesses made their statements after
Mr. Shimomura’s arrest; thus, these statements could not have affected the
decision to arrest. And Officer Davis could see for himself what had taken
place when Mr. Shimomura pushed his roller bag toward Agent Carlson. In
11
observing the incident and Mr. Shimomura accelerating his pace afterward,
Officer Davis could reasonably conclude that Mr. Shimomura had
intentionally or recklessly pushed his roller bag into Agent Carlson to
create at least some slight physical injury.
That push might not have created probable cause for third-degree
assault. But probable cause would have been at least arguable even if (1)
Mr. Shimomura had an innocent explanation for walking away more
quickly and (2) Officer Davis had discounted Agent Carlson’s description
of events.
D. Mr. Shimomura’s characterization of the video recording
does not create a fact issue on arguable probable cause.
Mr. Shimomura argues that Officer Davis is not entitled to qualified
immunity because the video recording is inconsistent with the defendants’
statements regarding the alleged assault. According to Mr. Shimomura, the
video recording shows that Mr. Shimomura did not push his roller bag into
Agent Carlson. But from where Officer Davis was positioned, he could
reasonably believe that (1) he had seen Mr. Shimomura push his roller bag
into Agent Carlson and (2) the contact resulted in at least slight physical
injury. 3 The reasonableness of that belief made probable cause at least
3
Mr. Shimomura relies on Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252
(10th Cir. 1998), to oppose qualified immunity for Officer Davis. In
Baptiste, a police officer searched the plaintiff for stolen merchandise after
watching surveillance video of a suspected theft.
Baptiste, 147 F.3d at
12
arguable. Thus, even when we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to Mr. Shimomura, we conclude that Officer Davis is entitled to
qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim of unlawful arrest.
E. Probable cause would have remained arguable
notwithstanding Mr. Shimomura’s allegations in the
complaint and uncertainty about what Officer Davis could
see.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the partial dissent points to
Mr. Shimomura’s allegation in the complaint “that [Officer
Davis] could not reasonably perceive evidence of bodily injury,
such as pain” and
uncertainty about what Officer Davis would have seen from his
angle.
Dissent at 1-2. In our view, these two points do not create a genuine fact-
issue on whether probable cause was at least arguable.
Because the issue involves summary judgment, we must rely on the
summary judgment record rather than Mr. Shimomura’s allegations in the
complaint. In support of the summary judgment motion, Officer Davis
stated under oath that he had seen the roller bag strike Agent Carlson in
the legs. Appellant’s App’x at 112. Mr. Shimomura responded to the
motion, presenting affidavits by himself and Agent Carlson. Agent
1254-55. We concluded that the police officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity because the video did not suggest that a theft had occurred. Id. at
1259-60. Mr. Shimomura’s circumstances are different, for the video
recording does not preclude a reasonable belief that a crime (assault) had
been committed. Thus, Baptiste does not preclude qualified immunity for
Officer Davis.
13
Carlson’s affidavit said that Officer Davis had seen the contact between
the roller bag and Agent Carlson. Id. at 176. Mr. Shimomura’s affidavit
was silent about what Officer Davis could see. Thus, for purposes of
summary judgment, we have undisputed evidence that Officer Davis was
able to see the contact between Agent Carlson and Mr. Shimomura’s roller
bag.
Mr. Shimomura denies that Agent Carlson was physically injured,
and Officer Davis believed there was physical injury. Neither individual
could know for certain, but the sole issue on qualified immunity is whether
Officer Davis could reasonably believe the contact resulted in at least some
slight physical injury to Agent Carlson. Even if Officer Davis’s belief was
wrong, he would have enjoyed qualified immunity as long as his belief was
reasonable. See Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir.)
(“Arguable probable cause is another way of saying the officers’
conclusions rest on an objectively reasonable, even if mistaken, belief that
probable cause exists.”), cert. denied, __ U.S. __,
135 S. Ct. 881 (2014).
In our view, Officer Davis’s belief was reasonable notwithstanding
Mr. Shimomura’s contrary allegations in his complaint. In Mr.
Shimomura’s affidavit, there is nothing casting doubt on Officer Davis’s
belief that Agent Carlson had suffered at least some slight injury. As a
result, Officer Davis would enjoy qualified immunity even if we fully
credit everything in Mr. Shimomura’s affidavit.
14
III. Agent Carlson could not incur liability under the Fourth
Amendment for an unlawful arrest because her alleged
misconduct would have taken place after the arrest.
Mr. Shimomura argues that Agent Carlson violated the Fourth
Amendment by withholding and fabricating evidence to justify the arrest. 4
The district court dismissed this claim, concluding that Mr. Shimomura had
not adequately pleaded causation between Agent Carlson’s conduct and the
arrest. In a later order, the district court declined to vacate this dismissal.
In our view, the court did not err in dismissing the claim against Agent
Carlson.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d
1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2009). Like the district court, we must determine
whether the complaint contains sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state a
plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A
claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Id. In determining whether the claim is plausible, we
view all factual allegations in the light most favorable to Mr. Shimomura
4
Mr. Shimomura also contends that Agent Carlson incurred liability as
an arresting officer because she had “acted in concert with Officer Davis to
effect the illegal arrest lacking in probable cause.” Appellant’s Opening
Br. at 35. This argument is identical to Mr. Shimomura’s argument
underlying his conspiracy claim, which we reject below in Part IV.
15
as the nonmoving party. Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504,
510 (10th Cir. 1998).
As was previously stated, a warrantless arrest without probable cause
violates the Fourth Amendment. Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d
1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2008). But nothing in the complaint would plausibly
suggest Agent Carlson’s participation in the arrest.
Mr. Shimomura disagrees, arguing that Agent Carlson caused the
arrest by withholding exculpatory evidence and fabricating a sworn
statement that she had suffered pain from her contact with the roller bag.
Officer Davis allegedly relied on Agent Carlson’s fabricated account.
This contention fails as a matter of law because Agent Carlson’s
alleged misdeeds would have taken place after Officer Davis had already
arrested Mr. Shimomura. Agent Carlson allegedly withheld exculpatory
evidence and fabricated a sworn statement, but only after Officer Davis
had already initiated Mr. Shimomura’s 90-minute detention. That detention
constituted an arrest as a matter of law. See Manzanares v. Higdon, 575
F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir. 2009) 5; see also Appellant’s App’x at 152-53
(Mr. Shimomura’s argument that Officer Davis made an arrest by detaining
5
In Manzanares we stated: “As the Supreme Court has noted, it has
never held a detention of 90 minutes or longer to be anything short of an
arrest. [The defendant] points us to no case, and our independent research
reveals none, construing a detention of 90 minutes or longer as an
investigative detention.” Manzanares, 575 F.3d at 1148 (citation omitted).
16
Mr. Shimomura in the screening area). Thus, Agent Carlson’s misconduct
could not have caused the arrest. In these circumstances, we conclude that
Agent Carlson is entitled to dismissal on the unlawful arrest claim. 6
IV. Mr. Shimomura has not pleaded a plausible conspiracy claim
based on the Fourth Amendment.
Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Shimomura also claims that Officer
Davis and Agent Carlson violated the Fourth Amendment by conspiring
(1) to make the arrest without probable cause and (2) to fabricate their
accounts for the initiation of criminal charges. We affirm the district
court’s dismissal of these causes of action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 7
A. We engage in de novo review, considering the plausibility of
the allegations in the complaint.
In reviewing the dismissal, we engage in de novo review. See p. 15,
above. The ultimate question is whether Mr. Shimomura had alleged
specific facts showing (1) an agreement and concerted action between
6
On the cause of action under the Fourth Amendment for unlawful
arrest, Agent Carlson also asserts qualified immunity and unavailability of
a Bivens claim. We need not reach these contentions.
7
On the conspiracy claim, Agent Carlson denies the availability of a
Bivens cause of action and invokes qualified immunity. We need not
address these arguments. The conspiracy claim against Officer Davis and
Agent Carlson was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not Bivens. Therefore,
we need not reach Agent Carlson’s Bivens argument. And because the
conspiracy claim is facially deficient, we need not decide whether Agent
Carlson is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
17
Officer Davis and Agent Carlson and (2) an actual deprivation of
constitutional rights. Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533
(10th Cir. 1998); Snell v. Tunnell,
920 F.2d 673, 701 (10th Cir. 1990).
Conclusory allegations of conspiracy would not suffice.
Tonkovich, 159
F.3d at 534.
B. For the arrest, Mr. Shimomura has not pleaded facts
creating a plausible claim of conspiracy prior to the arrest.
The conspiracy allegations in the complaint involve conduct before
the arrest. Thus, on the claims involving conspiracy to justify the arrest,
we confine our review to the allegations involving conduct preceding the
arrest. These allegations involve six facts 8:
1. Officer Davis saw Agent Carlson communicate with Mr.
Shimomura in an “increasingly hostile and intimidating
manner.” This conduct included Agent Carlson’s refusal to
contact her supervisor or provide her supervisor’s name, angry
threats to remove Mr. Shimomura from the airport, order for
Mr. Shimomura to “get the hell out” of the TSA screening area,
and statement that Mr. Shimomura had accused Agent Carlson
of stealing. Appellant’s App’x at 11-12 ¶¶ 18-20.
2. Officer Davis refused to put Mr. Shimomura in contact with
Agent Carlson’s supervisor. Id. at 12 ¶ 21.
8
In his appeal briefs, Mr. Shimomura alleges that Officer Davis failed
to deescalate the increasingly hostile situation. But we decline to consider
this argument because it had not been raised in district court. See United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Or. Steel Mills, Inc., 322 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir.
2003) (noting that we will decline to consider factual arguments that had
not been raised in district court).
18
3. Officer Davis and Agent Carlson threatened to have Mr.
Shimomura arrested if he did not leave the screening area “in
two seconds.” Id.
4. Officer Davis and Agent Carlson “crowded Mr. Shimomura in a
threatening manner” and followed him “closely and
aggressively” as he left the screening area. Id. at 12 ¶¶ 21-22.
5. Officer Davis and Agent Carlson “knew” that (1) Mr.
Shimomura had not committed a crime, (2) there was no
probable cause for Mr. Shimomura’s arrest, (3) Agent Carlson
had been following Mr. Shimomura “too closely,” and
(4) Agent Carlson had become even “further enraged” when she
walked into the roller bag. Id. at 14 ¶ 28.
6. Officer Davis and Agent Carlson believed that Mr. Shimomura
should be criminally punished for questioning TSA screening
procedures. As a result, Officer Davis and Agent Carlson took
“joint and concerted action” to arrest Mr. Shimomura. Id. at 15
¶ 29;
Id. at 13 ¶ 24.
For the sake of argument, we can assume that Mr. Shimomura has
pleaded facts reflecting an agreement and concerted action by Officer
Davis and Agent Carlson. But the alleged agreement could not plausibly
have preceded Mr. Shimomura’s arrest. The video reflects the incident,
which unfolded only a few seconds before Officer Davis detained Mr.
Shimomura (constituting an arrest).
It might have been theoretically possible for Officer Davis and Agent
Carlson to conspire to arrest Mr. Shimomura without probable cause.
Perhaps Officer Davis and Agent Carlson decided to arrest Mr. Shimomura
even before his belongings were screened; or maybe Officer Davis and
Agent Carlson conspired in the few seconds between the roller bag contact
19
and Mr. Shimomura’s arrest; or perhaps Officer Davis and Agent Carlson
knew and understood one another so well that they immediately formed an
unspoken agreement to unlawfully arrest Mr. Shimomura. But Mr.
Shimomura does not allege facts that could plausibly explain how Officer
Davis and Agent Carlson might have conspired in the moments preceding
the arrest.
Accordingly, Mr. Shimomura has not pleaded a plausible § 1983
claim for conspiracy to arrest without probable cause in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. We affirm the dismissal of this claim.
C. The district court did not err in disallowing amendment of
the Fourth Amendment claim.
In responding to Agent Carlson’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Shimomura
included a footnote requesting “leave to amend should the Court find his
Complaint deficient.” Id. at 121 n.1. Though the district court suggested
that Mr. Shimomura might amend the complaint, the court ultimately
prevented amendment by making the dismissal with prejudice.
Id. at 218,
229.
Mr. Shimomura alleges that the district court abused its discretion by
preventing amendment of the complaint. We disagree. Mr. Shimomura
alleges in the complaint that he was taken into custody by Officer Davis,
not Agent Carlson. See id. at 12. Thus, amendment of the complaint would
have been futile. In these circumstances, we conclude that the district court
20
had discretion to make the dismissal with prejudice. See Brereton v.
Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A dismissal
with prejudice is appropriate where a complaint fails to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) and granting leave to amend would be futile.”).
V. Mr. Shimomura has not pleaded a viable claim for deprivation of
procedural due process.
Finally, Mr. Shimomura claims deprivation of procedural due process
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fifth Amendment
prohibits the federal government from depriving a person of “life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law,” and the Fourteenth Amendment
extends this prohibition to the states. U.S. Const. amend. V; Id. amend.
XIV, § 1.
On these claims, Mr. Shimomura alleges that Officer Davis and
Agent Carlson withheld exculpatory evidence, fabricated inculpatory
evidence, and engaged in a conspiracy. The district court dismissed these
claims, reasoning that they “effectively mirror[]” Mr. Shimomura’s claims
under the Fourth Amendment. Appellant’s App’x at 220. For this ruling,
we engage in de novo review. See p. 15, above. In exercising de novo
review, we uphold the district court’s dismissal because the Fourth
21
Amendment applies rather than the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due
Process Clauses. 9
Mr. Shimomura is correct in asserting the constitutional requirement
for probable cause before he could be arrested or charged. Wilkins v.
DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 805 (10th Cir. 2008). But this right is protected by
the Fourth Amendment, not by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments’ rights
to procedural due process. The Supreme Court has held that “[b]ecause the
Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection against . . . physically intrusive governmental conduct, that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’
must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S.
386, 395 (1989); see Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1994)
(plurality opinion) (stating that the right to be free of arrest and
prosecution without probable cause is governed by the Fourth Amendment,
not the constitutional protections for substantive due process). We have
applied this holding when the alleged denial of due process is procedural
rather than substantive. See Becker v. Kroll,
494 F.3d 904, 919 (10th Cir.
9
Agent Carlson also makes four other arguments: (1) an adequate
post-deprivation remedy exists; (2) Agent Carlson is not subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment because she is not a state actor; (3) a Bivens action
does not exist for claims involving airport screening or violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) Agent Carlson is entitled to qualified
immunity. We need not address these arguments because the claim against
Agent Carlson is deficient on other grounds.
22
2007) (“[W]e find Albright’s reasoning regarding substantive due process
equally persuasive with regard to the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural
component. . . . The more general due process considerations of the
Fourteenth Amendment are not a fallback to protect interests more
specifically addressed by the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
It is true that “at some point in the prosecutorial process, due process
concerns can be sufficient to support claim under § 1983.” Id. at 920; see
also Pierce v. Gilchrist,
359 F.3d 1279, 1285-86 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A]t
some point after arrest, and certainly by the time of trial, constitutional
analysis shifts to the Due Process Clause.”). But Mr. Shimomura’s factual
allegations do not cross into the due-process realm.
In Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 2007), we
“acknowledge[d] that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections encompass
harms to liberty outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s concern with
freedom from restraint.”
Becker, 494 F.3d at 920. But Mr. Shimomura has
confined his allegation of injury to the deprivation of his physical liberty.
Thus, his claim is governed by the Fourth Amendment rather than the Due
Process Clauses.
Because the Fourth Amendment provides the sole source of
constitutional protection, Mr. Shimomura has not asserted a valid claim of
procedural due process. As a result, the district court properly dismissed
the claims involving procedural due process.
23
VI. Conclusion
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
24
No. 14-1418, Shimomura v. Carlson
TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join the majority except as to its holding that Officer Davis is entitled to
qualified immunity.
In concluding that a reasonable officer with Officer Davis’s vantage point
could have thought there was probable cause, the majority decides a factual
dispute that should be submitted to a jury. Shimomura alleges that Officer Davis
could not reasonably perceive evidence of intent or recklessness. He also alleges
that the officer could not reasonably perceive evidence of bodily injury, such as
pain. If that version of the facts is true, then there was neither actual nor arguable
probable cause to believe Shimomura had committed assault within the agreed-
upon meaning of the ordinance. That satisfies Shimomura’s initial burden to
allege a clearly established violation of a constitutional right. See Fogarty v.
Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1158–59 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In the context of an
unlawful arrest our analysis is simple, for the law was and is unambiguous: a
government official must have probable cause to arrest an individual.” (brackets
and internal quotation marks omitted)). It also places a new burden on Officer
Davis, on his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, to show
that Shimomura’s version of the facts is wrong—that is, that an officer could have
reasonably perceived evidence of bodily injury and intent or recklessness.
Officer Davis has not met that burden.
The majority concludes that a person standing at Officer Davis’s vantage
point could have perceived the requisite evidence, but that is not beyond dispute.
Recently, in Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014), the Supreme Court reversed
a finding of qualified immunity because the appellate court had resolved disputed
factual propositions in favor of the moving officer. Most notably, the Court
indicated that disputed questions about what facts an officer should have
perceived are appropriate for a jury:
The court noted, and the parties agree, that while Cotton
was grabbing the arm of his mother, Tolan told Cotton,
“[G]et your [f***ing] hands off my mom.” But Tolan
testified that he “was not screaming.” And a jury could
reasonably infer that his words, in context, did not amount
to a statement of intent to inflict harm.
Id. at 1867 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This illustrates the divide
between determining whether there was probable (or arguable probable) cause and
determining the facts that support probable cause. Just as a jury in Tolan should
have decided whether the undisputed words, in context, seemed threatening, a
jury here should decide whether the undisputed contact, in context, seemed
intentional or capable of causing bodily injury.
We do not know what Officer Davis saw from his angle. All we have is the
video, Shimomura’s complaint, and affidavits presented on summary judgment.
Those materials do not definitively settle the facts in Officer Davis’s favor. A
jury could find that even given his angle and how little time he had to process
2
what had happened, it was unreasonable to think the contact was intentional or
reckless. And a jury most certainly could find that there was no evidence of
bodily injury. Having watched the video, I find it dubious that anyone viewing
the contact from any angle could have reasonably thought that Agent Carlson felt
pain. Although she later reported pain, it appears that this was not until after
Shimomura’s arrest.
For those reasons, I respectfully dissent as to the conclusion that Officer
Davis is entitled to qualified immunity.
3
