Filed: Jul. 17, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit July 17, 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court ALVIN PARKER, Petitioner - Appellant, No. 17-5107 v. (D.C. No. 4:17-CV-00134-JED-FHM) (N.D. Okla.) JANET DOWLING, Warden, Respondents - Appellees. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Alvin Parker seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s denial of his §
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit July 17, 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court ALVIN PARKER, Petitioner - Appellant, No. 17-5107 v. (D.C. No. 4:17-CV-00134-JED-FHM) (N.D. Okla.) JANET DOWLING, Warden, Respondents - Appellees. ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Alvin Parker seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 17, 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ALVIN PARKER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 17-5107
v. (D.C. No. 4:17-CV-00134-JED-FHM)
(N.D. Okla.)
JANET DOWLING, Warden,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Alvin Parker seeks a certificate of appealability to appeal the
district court’s denial of his § 2241 habeas corpus petition.
In 1990, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced
to 199 years of imprisonment. Since then, he has filed numerous post-conviction
motions in both the federal and state courts. In 2016, he filed a motion for an
order nunc pro tunc in the state court, arguing that his sentence exceeds the
maximum allowed by law and that he has discharged his sentence. Specifically,
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
he argued that a sentence of 199 years is essentially a life sentence, a life
sentence was defined by the legislature in 1997 to be between 18 to 60 years, and
thus he has completed his 199-year sentence already. He alleges that the state
court refused to file or rule on this motion.
Petitioner then filed the instant § 2241 motion, raising two claims for relief:
(1) the state court’s refusal to rule on his motion for an order nunc pro tunc
denied him his constitutional right of access to the courts, and (2) he was denied
his right to equal protection because a white prisoner received post-conviction
relief, but when Petitioner submitted the identical application, with just the name
changed, he did not receive relief. The district court held that neither of these
claims stated a cognizable claim for habeas relief, since they were premised on
the post-conviction proceedings, not the underlying conviction. The court also
held that even if these claims were cognizable in habeas, Petitioner had not
demonstrated that he was entitled to relief on the merits of either claim.
Petitioner seeks a certificate of appealability as to both of these claims. He
also argues that the district court erred in failing to address an argument he raised
in his briefing, although not in his habeas petition, regarding the underlying
merits of the sentencing argument he raised in the state post-conviction motion.
We have thoroughly reviewed Petitioner’s brief, the record on appeal, and
the relevant cases. We are persuaded that reasonable jurists would not debate the
correctness of the district court’s decision. See Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473,
-2-
484 (2000). The district court correctly explained why Petitioner was not entitled
to relief on either of the claims raised in his habeas petition. As for the third
claim that Petitioner argues the district court should have read into his habeas
petition, even assuming for sake of argument that the district court should have
addressed this alleged claim, we are not persuaded that “jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right.”
Id. We therefore DENY Petitioner’s request for a
certificate of appealability and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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