Filed: Sep. 13, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 13, 2018 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 18-4089 (D.C. Nos. 4:18-CV-00009-TS and TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, 2:13-CR-00128-TS-1) (D. Utah) Defendant - Appellant. _ ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * _ Before BRISCOE, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. _ Federal prisoner Terry Messer, proceeding pro se, moved in distr
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 13, 2018 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 18-4089 (D.C. Nos. 4:18-CV-00009-TS and TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, 2:13-CR-00128-TS-1) (D. Utah) Defendant - Appellant. _ ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY * _ Before BRISCOE, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. _ Federal prisoner Terry Messer, proceeding pro se, moved in distri..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 13, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 18-4089
(D.C. Nos. 4:18-CV-00009-TS and
TERRY ARNOLD MESSER, 2:13-CR-00128-TS-1)
(D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Federal prisoner Terry Messer, proceeding pro se, moved in district court
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The court
dismissed the motion as untimely filed. Mr. Messer seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to challenge this ruling. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)
(requiring a COA to appeal an order denying a § 2255 motion). Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter.1
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Because Mr. Messer is pro se, we liberally construe his filings but do not act as
his advocate. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Messer pled guilty to one count of distribution of methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Before he was sentenced, the United States
Probation Office prepared a Presentence Report (“PSR”). It recommended that Mr.
Messer be considered a career offender under United States Sentencing Guideline
(“U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.1(a) based on three previous controlled substance convictions
listed in the PSR. The district court agreed and sentenced him to 240 months in
prison. Judgment was entered on November 13, 2013. Mr. Messer did not appeal.
Unbeknownst to the Probation Office and the district court, one of Mr.
Messer’s drug convictions, a State of Utah conviction in 2001 for Unlawful
Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, had been incorrectly listed in the
PSR as a conviction for Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory.2 This error underlies
Mr. Messer’s request for a COA.
On June 18, 2014, Mr. Messer filed a Petition for Writ of Coram Nobis in the
federal district court. On June 19, 2014, he filed a § 2255 motion and asked the court
to construe his coram nobis petition as a § 2255 motion. He later moved to dismiss
his § 2255 motion. On October 21, 2014, the court granted this request and
dismissed the § 2255 motion without prejudice.
2
It is not clear whether the Probation Office relied on state court records, the
National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database, or both for this information. The
PSR states that “[c]ourt records report an offense date of January 14, 1999.” ROA, Vol.
III at 18.
2
On April 2, 2018, the district court received Mr. Messer’s instant § 2255
motion, dated March 20, 2018. The motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. In particular, it alleged that his counsel should have objected to his
classification as a career offender when the sentencing court relied on his PSR’s
erroneous listing of a conviction for Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory as a
predicate offense to enhance his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). He alleged that
he was actually innocent of this offense because he had instead been convicted of
Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies.
Mr. Messer attached to his § 2255 motion a March 31, 2017 order from the
Fifth District Court of the State of Utah directing that steps be taken to change the
listing of his conviction in the NCIC database from Operation of a Clandestine
Laboratory to reflect that he was actually convicted of Unlawful Possession of
Laboratory Equipment or Supplies. In the same order, the state court denied his
“Motion to Reduce the Severity of Offense,” a first degree felony, finding “no legal
basis in reducing the degree of offense in this matter.” ROA, Vol. I at 82.
The district court dismissed Mr. Messer’s § 2255 motion because he had not
filed it within one year after his federal conviction became final, as 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(f)(1) requires. The court rejected Mr. Messer’s argument that the limitations
period began when he received the state court’s order on March 31, 2017, “the date
on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4). It found
that Mr. Messer knew long before March 31, 2017, that he had not been convicted of
3
Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory. To support this finding, the court cited Mr.
Messer’s initial § 2255 motion, filed in June 2014, which included his declaration
that he told counsel of this fact in June or July of 2013, before he was sentenced.
The court also noted that his initial § 2255 motion argued that his conviction for
Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies was not a predicate crime
for a career offender sentencing enhancement. The court further said that Mr. Messer
had failed to show or even address how any of the other claims in his § 2255 motion
were timely.
The district court also rejected Mr. Messer’s argument that, because he was
actually innocent of Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory, he should receive
equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. The court stated that (1) Mr.
Messer did not contend he was actually innocent of the federal crime of conviction—
distribution of methamphetamine—and (2) he did not contest that he had previously
been convicted for Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies. It
said the latter is a predicate controlled substance offense for career offender
enhancement under U.S.S.G § 4B1.1(a), citing U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) and Application
Note 1.
The district court therefore denied the § 2255 motion. It also denied a COA.
Judgment was entered on April 11, 2018. Mr. Messer filed a motion for
4
reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which the district court
denied.3
II. DISCUSSION
When a district court dismisses a § 2255 motion on procedural grounds, we
will issue a COA only if the movant shows it is “debatable whether the petition states
a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and . . . whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
“Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it
to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district
court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to
proceed further.”
Id.
Mr. Messer asserts in his brief that “none of the three offenses relied on by the
District Court qualify for the Career Offender predicates under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.”
Aplt. Br. at 3d. We do not consider the merits of that argument here because the
district court dismissed the § 2255 motion as untimely and Mr. Messer seeks a COA
to appeal that ruling. As to that issue, we discern two main arguments in Mr.
Messer’s request for COA. First, he argues that his § 2255 motion was timely filed
under § 2255(f)(4). Second, he contends that he should receive equitable tolling of
3
On June 11, 2018, Mr. Messer filed a timely notice of appeal from the April 11,
2018 judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C). Because the district court denied the
motion to reconsider within the 60 days to appeal, and because the notice of appeal does
not include the denial of the motion to reconsider, and because Mr. Messer does not
address the denial of the motion to reconsider in his brief, we conclude that only the
original judgment is properly before this court. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B).
5
the statute of limitations because (1) he asked in 2014 for dismissal without prejudice
of his first § 2255 motion to enable him to develop facts to support his claim and (2)
he is actually innocent of the offense of Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory.
A. Section 2255(f)(4)
The district court held that Mr. Messer’s § 2255 motion was untimely under
§ 2255(f), which provides:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this
section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from
making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by
the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.
The court determined that § 2255(f)(1) applied to Mr. Messer’s motion—the
date of the final judgment of conviction. Because Mr. Messer did not file a direct
appeal, his conviction became final when the time expired to file his direct appeal—
14 days after judgment was entered on November 13, 2013, which was November 27,
2013. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i); Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1307
(11th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen a defendant does not appeal his conviction or sentence, the
6
judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review expires.”);
United States v. Plascencia, 537 F.3d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2008) (same). Mr. Messer filed
his § 2255 motion on March 20, 2018, four and one-half years past the deadline.
Mr. Messer has not contested the untimeliness of his motion under
§ 2255(f)(1). He instead contended in district court and argues again here that his
motion should be considered under § 2255(f)(4) because he filed it within one year
after “the facts supporting the claim . . . could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.” But that is not so because he not only could have
discovered the error in the PSR listing but actually did discover it years before he
filed his § 2255 motion.
First, Mr. Messer was aware that he was convicted in 2001 of Unlawful
Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies long before November 2013 when
he was sentenced in his federal case as a career offender, and even longer before he
filed his § 2255 motion in 2018. Documents regarding the state conviction, attached
as Exhibit A to his appellate brief and Exhibit D to his § 2255 motion, make this
clear. Although these exhibits show that the state court’s initial judgment of
December 20, 2001 stated that Mr. Messer pled guilty to Operation of a Clandestine
Laboratory, Attach. Aplt. Br. at 35-37, they also show the court filed amended
judgments on February 5, 2002, and again on March 1, 2005, both stating that he had
7
been convicted of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies. ROA,
Vol. I at 77-80; ROA, Vol. I at 73-76.4
In addition, his declaration, attached as Exhibit C to his § 2255 motion, states
that he told his attorney in this case sometime in June or July of 2013 that he “was
not convicted for Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory, but for Unlawful Possession
of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies.” ROA, Vol. I at 69. Mr. Messer therefore
knew the true nature of his 2001 conviction before he was sentenced as a career
offender.
Second, the record supports that Mr. Messer was aware at the time of his
sentencing that the PSR incorrectly listed his 2001 conviction as Operation of
Clandestine Laboratory rather than Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or
Supplies. At the sentencing hearing on November 7, 2013, the following colloquy
occurred:
THE COURT: Did you have a chance to review and discuss [the
PSR] in detail with Mr. Messer?
MR. BRIDGE: Yes, I did.
THE COURT: Mr. Messer, did you have a sufficient amount of
time to discuss the presentence report with Mr. Bridge?
4
In his brief, Mr. Messer “contends that he did not discover the ‘fact’ to prove via
‘documentation’ that he was not convicted by the State of Utah for ‘Operation of a
Clandestine Laboratory’ . . . in that case, until March 17, 2017, when he received from
the State Court for the first time both an Order to correct the court’s record to reflect the
correct conviction information, along with a few ‘All’ of its judgments and amended
judgments.” Aplt. Br. at 3o. We disagree. The state court’s amended judgments in 2002
and 2005 document that Mr. Messer was convicted of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory
Equipment or Supplies and not for Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory.
8
MR. MESSER: Yes, Your Honor.
ROA, Vol. II at 20. And despite Mr. Messer’s statement in his aforementioned
declaration that he previously had told him otherwise, his counsel referred at the
sentencing hearing to a prior “conviction for operation of a clandestine lab.” Id. at
31.
At that point, Mr. Messer had the information he needed to allege his
ineffective assistance claim. He was on notice that his 2001 conviction was for
Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies; that the PSR instead had
listed the offense as Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory; and that his counsel had
failed to correct, much less object to, the erroneous listing in the PSR. This much
was reflected in his June 2014 § 2255 motion, the one that was dismissed without
prejudice. It alleged that his conviction for Possession of Laboratory Equipment or
Supplies was not a predicate crime for a career offender sentencing enhancement.
Third, further corroborating that Mr. Messer knew of the factual basis for his
ineffective assistance claim for much longer than the statute of limitations period
were his efforts to correct the NCIC database regarding his 2001 conviction. The
Fifth District Court for the State of Utah docket for the case resulting in that
conviction shows that on May, 6, 2016, Mr. Messer filed a “Motion to Correct
Invalid Conviction Information Submitted to The National Crime Information
Center.” Attach. Aplt. Br. at 64. This motion and an accompanying motion to reduce
his sentence resulted in the state court’s March 31, 2017 ruling denying a sentence
9
reduction and stipulating that the conviction in the NCIC database should be changed
to Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies.
Mr. Messer seems to suggest that because the state court did not order a
correction of the NCIC database until its order of March 31, 2017, he lacked the
factual basis for his § 2255 motion until then. Aplt. Br. at 3l, 3o. But the record—
the state court amended judgments, his declaration, his federal court sentencing
transcript, and his motion to correct the NCIC database—shows he had the
information he needed to allege his ineffective assistance claim long before the state
court issued its March 31, 2017 order and years before he filed his § 2255 motion.5
This conclusion is not reasonably debatable. Mr. Messer’s § 2255(f)(4) argument
does not merit a COA.
B. Equitable Tolling
Mr. Messer also argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably
tolled. First, he claims that the one-year deadline should be excused because he filed
a § 2255 motion in June 2014 and asked to have it dismissed without prejudice so he
could develop the facts to support his claim. Second, he contends that he should
receive equitable tolling because he is actually innocent of Operation of a
Clandestine Laboratory.
5
Mr. Messer recounts his diligence under § 2255(f)(4) in trying to obtain
documents to support his § 2255 motion. Aplt. Br. at 3p-3r. But he had knowledge of
the facts underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, including the amended
judgments in the Fifth District Court stating that he was convicted in 2001 of Unlawful
Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, to file his motion in a timely manner.
10
Dismissal of 2014 Motion Without Prejudice
“[W]e review the district court's decision on equitable tolling of the limitation
period for an abuse of discretion.” Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1138 (10th Cir.
2003). To qualify for equitable tolling, Mr. Messer must show “(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in
his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida,
560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)
(quotations omitted). He has not made this showing.
The dismissal of Mr. Messer’s first § 2255 motion without prejudice in 2014
does not rescue his 2018 motion from § 2255(f)’s time bar. As previously explained,
he had in hand more than adequate information to file a timely § 2255 motion
alleging that his counsel was ineffective for failure to object to the sentencing court’s
reliance on the erroneous listing in the PSR of his 2001 conviction. His efforts to
obtain documents to support his claim, however diligent, were not necessary to
establish a factual basis to assert his claim. Rather than seeking dismissal without
prejudice of his § 2255 motion to pursue additional fact investigation, he could have
asked for a stay to do so or have requested the district court to allow him “to conduct
discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal or Civil Procedure” pursuant to Rule 6
of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District
Courts.
Actual innocence
Equitable tolling also is appropriate when a prisoner is actually innocent.
Burger, 317 F.3d at 1141. To establish a credible claim of actual innocence, an
11
applicant must support his claim with “new reliable evidence—whether it be
exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical
evidence—that was not presented at trial,” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995),
and show “that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him in the light of the new evidence,”
id. at 327. Mr. Messer seeks to
apply this standard to his 2001 conviction.
Mr. Messer recognizes that the PSR’s listing of the 2001 offense “was a
clerical error,” Aplt. Br. at 3e, but he argues that because he is actually innocent of
Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory, the district court should have equitably tolled
the one-year statute of limitations. When a clerical error results in the imposition of a
sentence that is longer than the sentence would have been without the error, an argument
based on actual innocence and the need to avoid a miscarriage of justice may justify
lifting the procedural bar caused by failure to timely file a § 2255 motion. See Mobley v.
United States, 974 F. Supp. 553, 558 (E.D. Va. 1997). But that is not the case here.
The district court rejected Mr. Messer’s actual innocence argument because he
does not contend that he was factually innocent of Unlawful Possession of
Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, and because this offense would have qualified as
a predicate for Mr. Messer’s career offender status. Mr. Messer disagrees with the
district court’s analysis of whether his 2001 conviction should qualify as a career
offender predicate offense, but we reject his actual innocence equitable tolling
argument for two additional reasons. See Davis v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830, 834 (10th
12
Cir. 2005) (COA may be denied on a ground supported by the record even if the district
court did not rely on it.).
First, Mr. Messer’s actual innocence argument lacks merit in light of the record of
the state court proceedings underlying his 2001 conviction. His conviction for Unlawful
Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies required proof that the defendant
“possess[ed] laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine
laboratory operation.” Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(1)(b) (1999).6 Drawing from this
statute, Jury Instruction 14-A at Mr. Messer’s trial provided that, before the jury could
find him “guilty of the offense of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or
Supplies, the State must prove . . . beyond a reasonable doubt . . . :
1. That the Defendant acted knowingly and intentionally;
2. That the Defendant did:
(a) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to
engage in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory
operation; or
(b) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to
engage in a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory
operation.”
Attach. Aplt. Br. at 52. A violation of § 58-37d-4(1)(b) is a second degree felony.
6
The Utah Legislature amended this section after Mr. Messer’s conviction but left
paragraph (1)(b) unchanged. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(1)(b) (1999), with
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(1)(b) (2018). We cite the 1999 Code.
13
Instruction 14-A then said that if the jury found Mr. Messer guilty of Unlawful
Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies, it should consider “whether or not said
acts took place under the following conditions, to wit:
(a) The Defendant illegally possessed, transported, or disposed of
hazardous or dangerous material while transporting, or causing to
be transported, materials in furtherance of a clandestine
laboratory operation, that created a substantial risk to human
health or safety or danger to the environment.
(b) The intended methamphetamine laboratory operation take [sic]
place within 500 feet of a residence.
(c) Said clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of
methamphetamine base.”
As set forth in Utah Code § 58-37d-5, “[a] person who violates Subsection 58-37d-
4[(1)(b)] is guilty of a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the
following conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation.” The conditions listed
in the statute—§58-37d-5(1)(c), (d), and (g)—correspond to the conditions listed in the
jury instruction.7
The state court amended judgments in 2002 and 2005 said that a jury had
convicted Mr. Messer of Unlawful Possession of Laboratory Equipment or Supplies and
that his conviction was enhanced to a first degree felony because the jury also found
“beyond a reasonable doubt” the three conditions listed above. ROA, Vol. I at 77-80;
ROA, Vol. I at 73-76. Accordingly, considering the listing of Operation of a
7
The Utah Legislature amended this section after Mr. Messer’s conviction; the
amendment deleted a paragraph not at issue here, causing paragraph (1)(g) to be
renumbered as paragraph (1)(f). Compare Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (1999), with Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (2018).
14
Clandestine Laboratory in the PSR in the context of the state court record of Mr.
Messer’s 2001 conviction, we conclude that any error in the PSR’s description of Mr.
Messer’s offense was not material, and his claim of actual innocence rings hollow.
Second, Mr. Messer’s argument suffers from an additional fundamental
problem. Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), “[a] defendant is a career offender if . . . the
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense.” As the district court stated in its order denying the
§ 2255 motion, “[t]he [PSR] determined that Petitioner qualified as a career offender
based on three prior convictions.” Even if the 2001 conviction were excluded from
consideration, two predicate convictions remain. Mr. Messer would like to challenge
whether they were valid predicates, but he filed his § 2255 motion too late, and he
lacks a viable equitable tolling argument to allow an untimely challenge to his
sentence based on those offenses.
Because reasonable jurists would not debate that the district court acted within
its discretion to deny equitable tolling, we deny a COA.
III. CONCLUSION
We deny a COA and dismiss this matter.
Entered for the Court
Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
Circuit Judge
15
