Filed: Aug. 31, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 31, 2018 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 18-6118 (D.C. No. 5:17-CR-00140-M-1) DREW BLANTON, (W.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _ Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HARTZ and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. _ Drew Blanton pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery. In his plea agreement, he waived his right to app
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 31, 2018 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 18-6118 (D.C. No. 5:17-CR-00140-M-1) DREW BLANTON, (W.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _ Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HARTZ and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. _ Drew Blanton pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery. In his plea agreement, he waived his right to appe..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 31, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 18-6118
(D.C. No. 5:17-CR-00140-M-1)
DREW BLANTON, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HARTZ and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Drew Blanton pleaded guilty to one count of bank robbery. In his plea
agreement, he waived his right to appeal his sentence and the manner in which it was
determined, unless it was above the advisory guideline range determined by the court
to apply. Mr. Blanton was sentenced to 78 months in prison, which was the bottom
of the guideline range of 78 to 97 months the district court determined applied to his
case. Despite the appellate waiver in his plea agreement, he filed a notice of appeal.
His docketing statement indicates he wants to challenge his sentence. The
government has filed a motion to enforce the appellate waiver in the plea agreement
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
pursuant to United States v. Hahn,
359 F.3d 1315, 1328 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(per curiam). We grant the motion and dismiss this appeal.
Mr. Blanton first argues that the motion to enforce should be denied because it
was not timely filed. While the motion appears to have been submitted one day late,
see 10th Cir. R. 27.3(A)(3)(b), we accept it for consideration. See 10th Cir. R. 2.1
(permitting the court to “suspend any part of these rules in a particular case on its
own or on a party’s motion”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 2 (permitting court of appeals
to suspend any provision of the rules in a particular case to expedite its decision or
for other good cause).
We now turn to the substance of the motion. In reviewing a motion to enforce
an appeal waiver, we conduct the following three-prong analysis: “(1) whether the
disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether
the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether
enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice[.]”
Hahn, 359 F.3d at
1325. Mr. Blanton concedes that his appeal falls within the scope of his waiver of
appellate rights and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights.
He argues, however, that enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of
justice. We disagree.
In Hahn, we held that enforcement of an appellate waiver does not result in a
miscarriage of justice unless one of four situations exist: (1) “the district court relied
on an impermissible factor such as race”; (2) “ineffective assistance of counsel in
connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid”; (3) “the
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sentence exceeds the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is otherwise unlawful.”
Id. at 1327 (internal quotation marks omitted). To satisfy the fourth situation, “the
error must seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.”
Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Blanton contends that his appeal waiver “is ‘otherwise unlawful’ because
the district court’s error in applying the Guidelines and denying [his] Motion for
Downward Variance was so egregious that it affected the fairness, integrity, and
reputation of the proceedings.” Resp. to Mot. to Enforce at 4. But this argument has
to do with whether his sentence is unlawful, not whether the appeal waiver is
unlawful, and that is the wrong inquiry. See United States v. Sandoval,
477 F.3d
1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Our inquiry is not whether the sentence is unlawful,
but whether the waiver itself is unlawful because of some procedural error or because
no waiver is possible.”).
Mr. Blanton has not offered any argument as to how his appeal waiver is
unlawful. Instead, his arguments all relate to alleged errors the district court
committed in sentencing him; he asserts that the district court erred in overruling his
objection to a four-level increase and in denying his request for a downward
variance. See Resp. at 4-7. But, as we have explained, the “otherwise unlawful”
exception to an appeal waiver “looks to whether the waiver is otherwise unlawful,
not to whether another aspect of the proceeding may have involved legal error.”
United States v. Smith,
500 F.3d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and
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quotation marks omitted). Mr. Blanton has therefore failed to show that enforcing
the appellate waiver in his plea agreement will result in a miscarriage of justice.
Accordingly, we grant the motion to enforce and dismiss this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
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