Filed: Sep. 19, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 19, 2019 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 19-7027 (D.C. No. 6:09-CR-00030-RAW-1) GIOVANNI MARTINEZ, (E.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _ Before HOLMES, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _ After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 19, 2019 _ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. No. 19-7027 (D.C. No. 6:09-CR-00030-RAW-1) GIOVANNI MARTINEZ, (E.D. Okla.) Defendant - Appellant. _ ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _ Before HOLMES, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _ After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would n..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 19, 2019
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 19-7027
(D.C. No. 6:09-CR-00030-RAW-1)
GIOVANNI MARTINEZ, (E.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
In 2010, Appellant Giovanni Martinez was convicted of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and of
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He
was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment on the drug charge and 120 months’
imprisonment on the firearm charge, both sentences to be served concurrently.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
On March 29, 2019, Martinez filed a motion seeking a reduction in his
sentence based on the First Step Act of 2018 (the “Act”). See Pub. L. 115-391, 132
Stat. 5194. The district court dismissed Martinez’s motion, concluding Martinez’s
crime of conviction is not a covered offense under the Act and, thus, a sentence
reduction was not authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B). See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(B) (permitting a district court to modify an imposed term of
imprisonment only “to the extent . . . expressly permitted by statute”). Proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis, Martinez appeals and we exercise jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
Section 404 of “[t]he First Step Act of 2018 . . . permits a district court to
reduce a sentence based on the lower statutory sentencing ranges of the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010.” United States v. Whittaker, No. 19-7014,
2019 WL
3381788, at *1 (10th Cir. July 26, 2019) (unpublished disposition). Retroactive
sentencing relief is available under the Act only if the defendant was sentenced for
violating “a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified
by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 that was committed before
August 3, 2010.” Pub. L. No. 115-391 § 404(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. Relevant to
the matter before this court,1 section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act amended 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 841(b)(1)(B) by increasing “the drug amounts triggering
1
Section 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act eliminated the mandatory minimum
sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine. Pub. L. No. 111-220 § 3, 124 Stat.
2372, 2372.
2
mandatory minimums for crack [cocaine] trafficking offenses from 5 grams to 28
grams in respect to the 5–year minimum [mandatory sentence] and from 50 grams to
280 grams in respect to the 10–year minimum.” Dorsey v. United States,
567 U.S.
260, 269 (2012); Pub. L. No. 111-220 § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372. Martinez,
however, was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), a statutory provision
that criminalizes possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, irrespective of
quantity. The Fair Sentencing Act had no effect on § 841(b)(1)(C) and, thus,
Martinez’s crime of conviction is not a “covered offense” under the Act. See Pub. L.
No. 115-391 § 404(a), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (defining “covered offense”).
Accordingly, the district correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to reduce
Martinez’s sentence under the Act. See United States v. Green,
405 F.3d 1180, 1184
(10th Cir. 2005) (“A district court is authorized to modify a [d]efendant’s sentence
only in specified instances where Congress has expressly granted the court
jurisdiction to do so . . . .” (quotation omitted)).
The district court’s dismissal of Martinez’s § 3582(c)(1)(B) motion for lack of
jurisdiction is affirmed. Having concluded the Act does not authorize the
modification of Martinez’s sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(B), this court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the other challenges to his sentence raised by Martinez for the
3
first time in this appeal. See United States v. Spaulding,
802 F.3d 1110, 1121 & n.11
(10th Cir. 2015).
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
4