Filed: Aug. 18, 2020
Latest Update: Aug. 18, 2020
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 18, 2020 _ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court DELANO MEDINA, Petitioner - Appellant, No. 20-1193 v. (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-01307-LTB) (D. Colo.) DEAN WILLIAMS, Respondent - Appellee. _ ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY* _ Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _ Applicant Delano Medina seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the dismissal by the United St
Summary: FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 18, 2020 _ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court DELANO MEDINA, Petitioner - Appellant, No. 20-1193 v. (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-01307-LTB) (D. Colo.) DEAN WILLIAMS, Respondent - Appellee. _ ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY* _ Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _ Applicant Delano Medina seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the dismissal by the United Sta..
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 18, 2020
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
DELANO MEDINA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 20-1193
v. (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-01307-LTB)
(D. Colo.)
DEAN WILLIAMS,
Respondent - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Applicant Delano Medina seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the
dismissal by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado of his
application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Montez v. McKinna,
208 F.3d 862, 869
(10th Cir. 2000) (28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) requires COA for state prisoner to appeal
denial of relief under § 2241). We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Applicant is a state prisoner incarcerated at the Colorado Territorial Correctional
Facility (CTCF). On May 8, 2020, he filed an application for relief under § 2241
contending (1) that his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments are being
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
violated because he is being denied access to the prison law library as a result of a
lockdown related to the COVID-19 pandemic, and (2) that his confinement during the
pandemic violates his rights under the Eighth Amendment.
The district court construed the application as challenging only conditions of
Applicant’s confinement, rather than its fact or duration. It therefore ruled that a § 2241
application was not the proper vehicle for Applicant’s claims, dismissed the application
without prejudice to the refiling of a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
denied a COA. Applicant now seeks a COA from this court.
A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires “a
demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other
words, the applicant must show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional
claim was either “debatable or wrong.”
Id. If the application was denied on procedural
grounds, as was the case here, the applicant faces a double hurdle. Not only must the
applicant make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, but he must
also show “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.”
Id.
In this court Applicant contends that his claims are properly raised through habeas
proceedings. At the same time, though, he seems to concede that “the issue of denying a
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law library is properly brought under . . . 1983.” Aplt. Br. at 2. As for his Eighth
Amendment claim, Applicant urges that habeas relief should be available to protect
inmates from the health risks posed by COVID-19.
Applicant’s law-library claim clearly relates to the conditions of his confinement,
not the fact or duration of his sentence, and the district court thus correctly concluded that
this claim cannot be brought in federal habeas proceedings. See Standifer v. Ledezma,
653 F.3d 1276, 1280 (10th Cir. 2011) (“It is well-settled law that prisoners who wish to
challenge only the conditions of their confinement, as opposed to its fact or duration,
must do so through civil rights lawsuits filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971)—not through federal habeas
proceedings.”); Gonzales v. Warden, 55 F. App’x 879, 880 (10th Cir. 2003) (“To the
extent Mr. Gonzales attempts to raise his claim regarding denial of access to a law
library, we agree with the district court that he must file a § 1983 action. . . .”).
Applicant’s Eighth Amendment claim is more complicated. For the most part it
appears to object only to conditions of confinement, not the legality of custody, and
therefore was properly dismissed. See
Standifer, 653 F.3d at 1280. But the claim could
be construed as also contending that in light of the pandemic he should be released from
custody because there are no conditions of confinement that could adequately prevent an
Eighth Amendment violation. At least one circuit court has held that such a claim can be
raised through federal habeas proceedings. See Wilson v. Williams,
961 F.3d 829, 837–
38 (6th Cir. 2020).
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But even assuming that Applicant is making such a claim, the dismissal was still
clearly correct. An applicant for relief under § 2241 has the burden of showing that he
has exhausted available state remedies. See Magar v. Parker,
490 F.3d 816, 818 (10th
Cir. 2007) (requiring exhaustion for § 2241 claim); Miranda v. Cooper,
967 F.2d 392,
398 (10th Cir. 1992) (prisoner has burden of showing exhaustion). To have exhausted
state remedies, the applicant “must have first fairly presented the substance of his federal
habeas claim to state courts,” Hawkins v. Mullin,
291 F.3d 658, 668 (10th Cir. 2002),
which includes presentation of the federal claim to the state’s highest available court, see
Brown v. Shanks,
185 F.3d 1122, 1124 (10th Cir. 1999).
Applicant did not establish exhaustion during the district-court proceedings. He
said that he had filed a state habeas petition that was denied by the Colorado district court
(although we do not know what specific relief he sought), and that he had appealed that
decision. But he said that the notice of appeal had been filed only on May 1, 2020,
merely a week before he filed his § 2241 application. He has made no claim that state
appellate review has been completed. His failure to show that he exhausted available
state remedies bars him from seeking federal habeas relief.
No reasonable jurist would dispute the propriety of the dismissal of Applicant’s
§ 2241 application.
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We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal. We also DENY Applicant’s motion
to proceed in forma pauperis.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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