Filed: Mar. 16, 2021
Latest Update: Mar. 17, 2021
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 16, 2021
Christopher M. Wolpert
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ALVIN PARKER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 20-5117
(D.C. No. 4:20-CV-00125-GKI-JFJ)
SCOTT CROW, Director, Oklahoma (N.D. Okla.)
Department of Corrections,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
After examining Alvin Parker’s written submissions and the appellate
record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Parker appeals from an order of the district court imposing on him targeted
filing restrictions. 1 Parker’s appeal is frivolous. In an order dated May 18, 2020,
the district court dismissed as successive Parker’s assertion he had discharged his
199-year Oklahoma sentence for second-degree murder after a former felony
conviction. The district court discussed at length Parker’s history of raising in
28 U.S.C. § 2241 petitions the meritless assertion his sentence was discharged by
operation of Oklahoma’s never-in-effect Truth In Sentencing Act. Furthermore,
the district court specifically warned Parker that if he filed another § 2241
petition he would be subject to the imposition of filing restrictions. When Parker
sought to appeal from the district court’s order of dismissal, this court denied him
the necessary COA and dismissed his appeal. Parker v. Crow, 822 F. App’x 716
(10th Cir. 2020). In so doing, this court concluded Parker failed to identify a
non-frivolous federal constitutional claim. Id. at 719.
Despite the district court’s warning and this court’s definitive statement
that his Truth In Sentencing Act claim was indisputably meritless, Parker filed in
the district court a motion in the nature of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (“Motion to
1
Also before this court is Parker’s request for a certificate of appealability
(“COA”). This court concludes, however, that Parker does not need a COA to
appeal from the district court’s imposition of filing restrictions. United States v.
Akers, 807 F. App’x 861, 865 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished disposition cited
solely for its persuasive value). Accordingly, Parker’s request for a COA is
dismissed as moot.
-2-
Vacate Void Judgment”). The district court concluded Parker’s Rule 60(b)
motion was nothing more than a disguised § 2241 motion and denied it on the
ground it was meritless. 2 When Parker then filed a motion to reconsider, the
district court denied the motion and ordered Parker to show cause why he should
not be subject to restrictions on his ability to file further § 2241 petitions.
Finding Parker’s response lacking, the district court imposed targeted restrictions
on Parker’s ability to file future pro se § 2241 petitions.
This court reviews the imposition of filing restrictions for an abuse of
discretion. Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 354 (10th Cir. 1989). “[T]he right
of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional, and there is no
constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous
or malicious.”
Id. at 353 (citation omitted). Federal courts have statutory
authority “to enjoin litigants who abuse the court system by harassing their
opponents.”
Id. at 352 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)). That is, federal courts may
“regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored
restrictions under the appropriate circumstances.”
Id. (quotation omitted). Filing
restrictions “are proper where a litigant’s abusive and lengthy history is properly
2
In an order filed coterminously with the instant order, this court has denied
Parker’s request for a COA and dismissed his appeal from the district court’s
dismissal of his Rule 60(b) motion. Parker v. Crow, No. 20-5107 (10th Cir.
March __, 2020).
-3-
set forth,” the court provides guidelines as to what the litigant “must do to obtain
the court’s permission to file an action,” and the litigant receives “notice and an
opportunity to oppose the court’s order before it is instituted.” Id. at 354.
The district court here complied with all the requirements necessary for
imposing filing restrictions. It recounted Parker’s lengthy, abusive filing history;
provided Parker with detailed guidelines for obtaining the court’s permission to
file an action; and provided Parker with an opportunity to oppose the restrictions.
Parker’s sole argument on appeal is that because his motion for reconsideration
was a true Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion, it was improper for the district court to
impose filing restrictions based on the filing of that motion. Parker’s assertion is
beside the point. By filing yet another indisputably meritless challenge to his
Oklahoma state sentence based on the Truth In Sentencing Act, Parker continued
a blatant practice of abusing the judicial process and wasting judicial resources.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing filing restrictions.
The order of the district court imposing upon Parker filing restrictions is
hereby AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
-4-
