The principal issue on this appeal involves the interpretation of the statute of limitations in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq. Because the district court properly found that the plaintiff's claim was not time-barred, we affirm as to that issue. However, because the district court used an improper interest rate in figuring the prejudgment interest, we vacate and remand as to that issue.1I. FACTS

Defendant Metal Container Corporation ("Metal Container") fired plaintiff Lynn McKelvy from his job as a shift superintendent at Metal Container's plant in Jacksonville, Florida on April 27, 1981. McKelvy was fifty-one years old at the time. Believing that he had been discriminated against because of his age, McKelvy sought to file a charge against Metal Container.

McKelvy first went to the Jacksonville Equal Opportunity Commission ("JEOC"), a local agency, on September 14, 1981, 140 days after his firing. The JEOC referred him to the Miami District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), a federal agency. He called the Miami office and was told that the appropriate forms would be mailed to him. When he received no forms, McKelvy returned to the JEOC office on October 27, 1981, 183 days after his firing.

During the October 27 visit, McKelvy filed his charge. The JEOC forwarded it to the Miami EEOC office which received it on October 30, 186 days after McKelvy's firing. The Miami EEOC office forwarded the charge to the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") on December 30, 1981, and FCHR received it on January 6, 1982, 254 days after McKelvy's firing. Under the worksharing agreement between EEOC and FCHR, EEOC investigated the age discrimination charges which were initially filed with EEOC.2

McKelvy was not represented by counsel during any of the foregoing events. McKelvy eventually retained an attorney and filed suit. Prior to trial, Metal Container moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The district court denied the motion in relevant part, and the case proceeded to trial.3

At trial, the jury found that age was a determining factor in McKelvy's firing. The court then awarded McKelvy back pay, reinstatement, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees, and costs.4 674 F. Supp. 827. Metal Container then brought this appeal, and McKelvy cross-appealed.

To begin our inquiry, we set out the relevant portions of the statute. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d) reads in relevant part:

No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a charge shall be filed--

(1) Within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred; or

(2) In a case to which Sec. 633(b) of this Title applies, within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, or within 30 days after receipt by the individual of notice of termination of proceedings under State law, whichever is earlier....

In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be brought under section 626 of this Title before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated: provided, That such sixty-day period shall be extended to one hundred and twenty days during the first year after the effective date of such State law. If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings is imposed by a State authority other than a requirement of the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State authority.

(Emphasis in original).

Florida has an age discrimination law which establishes FCHR to investigate and act upon age discrimination charges. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 760.01 et seq. See Thomas v. Florida Power & Light Co., 764 F.2d 768 (11th Cir.1985) (treating Florida as a deferral state under nearly identical provisions of Title VII). McKelvy's EEOC charge and his state charge were both filed within the 300-day limit.5 Nonetheless, Metal Container contends that McKelvy's suit is barred by the statute of limitations for two reasons.

Metal Container's first argument is that McKelvy did not "commence" state proceedings as Sec. 633(b) requires. We find that when FCHR received McKelvy's charge from EEOC, he had commenced state proceedings for purposes of Sec. 633(b). EEOC sent McKelvy's written and signed statement of the facts to FCHR by mail. It is undisputed that FCHR received the statement. The plain wording of the statute indicates that this suffices to commence state proceedings. The maximum that a state may require for commencement is "the filing of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the proceeding is based...." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 633(b).

The case law holds that it does not matter if EEOC, rather than the complainant, forwards the charge. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526, 92 S. Ct. 616, 618, 30 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1972) ("Nothing in [the identical language of Title VII] suggests that the state proceedings may not be initiated by the EEOC acting on behalf of the complainant rather than by the complainant himself...."); EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., --- U.S. ----, 108 S. Ct. 1666, 1669, 100 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1988) ("The EEOC's referral of a charge initially filed with the EEOC to the appropriate state or local agency properly institutes the agency's proceedings within the meaning of [Title VII]....").6 See also Anderson v. Ilinois Tool Works, Inc., 753 F.2d 622, 624 n. 2 (7th Cir.1985) (applying the same logic in the ADEA context).7B. Waiver of Jurisdiction

Metal Container's second argument is that Florida does not qualify for the 300-day limitations period in this case because FCHR waived jurisdiction in advance through its worksharing agreement with EEOC.8 We reject this argument because of the language of the agreement and recent Supreme Court precedent.

The text of the agreement provides several indications that FCHR did not waive its jurisdiction. First, the agreement was, by its own terms, drawn to meet the mandate of Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 99 S. Ct. 2066, 60 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1979), that the state agency have some opportunity to consider every age discrimination charge. Second, under the agreement, FCHR waived only its right to investigate claims filed with EEOC. The agreement does not indicate waiver of any other rights, including the right to reopen proceedings and grant relief if EEOC's resolution is unsatisfactory. Third, with respect to charges that EEOC initially investigates, the agreement requires that EEOC forward to FCHR a copy of the charge and also requires that EEOC advise FCHR of the results of EEOC action with respect to the charge. If FCHR had completely waived jurisdiction, the forwarding of charges and results of EEOC action would be a wasted effort. Finally, it appears that the general practice followed under worksharing agreements in the related Title VII context is for states to retain jurisdiction. See Commercial Office Products, --- U.S. at ---- n. 6, 108 S. Ct. at 1674 n. 6 (1988).9

The Supreme Court's decision in Commercial Office Products further strengthens our conclusion. In that case, the Court considered a slightly different aspect of the numerous worksharing agreements between EEOC and state agencies. The precise question decided was whether a state deferral agency's notification to EEOC that it waived the mandatory 60-day deferral period under Title VII pursuant to a worksharing agreement was a "termination" of state proceedings which would allow the immediate filing of the EEOC charge.10 The Court held that such a notification was a termination of state proceedings. Although Commercial Office Products does not explicitly answer the question presented here, it leaves little doubt as to what our result should be.

The worksharing agreement in Commercial Office Products closely resembled the present one in that the state agency waived the 60-day mandatory deferral period and presumably its right to investigate the claim initially, but it retained the right to review the EEOC's decision. Although there is no indication that the precise argument made by Metal Container was presented to the Supreme Court in Commercial Office Products, the holding in that case would necessarily have been different if Metal Container's argument were valid. As in this case, the charge was filed with EEOC after 180 days, but before 300 days. As here, there was a worksharing agreement with the state agency. As in this case, the only institution of state proceedings was accomplished when EEOC sent to the state agency a copy of the charge. If there were validity to Metal Container's argument that the worksharing agreement constitutes an advance waiver of all state jurisdiction so that the extended 300-day period does not apply, then the complainant in Commercial Office Products would not have been entitled to the 300-day limitations period, and the result in the case would have been different. We think that Commercial Office Products implicitly rejects Metal Container's argument.

Given the language of the agreement and the decision in Commercial Office Products, we find that the worksharing agreement between EEOC and FCHR did not affect the applicability of Sec. 633(b) to this case. Accord Edmunds v. Ryder/P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 341, 342-43 (S.D.Fla.1987); Kaczor v. City of Buffalo, 657 F. Supp. 441, 444-45 (W.D.N.Y.1987).11 Accordingly, we hold that McKelvy's charge was timely filed.

Metal Container challenges the district court's use of Florida's twelve percent rate for prejudgment interest. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 55.03. This court recently decided that the interest rate for prejudgment interest on back pay awards under Title VII depends on the IRS prime rates calculated in accordance with 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961. EEOC v. Guardian Pools, Inc., 828 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir.1987).12 We see no reason that the rate should differ under ADEA, and indeed the plaintiff has conceded that Guardian Pools controls. Thus, we vacate the district court's award of prejudgment interest and remand for the calculation and application of the appropriate interest rate.IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.