The attorney for the United States informed plaintiffs' attorney by telephone on the morning of November 28, 1986, that the settlement had received final approval. Plaintiffs' attorney immediately dispatched a speed memo to the government's attorney confirming approval. The government's attorney prepared a "Stipulation for Compromise Settlement" and sent it to plaintiffs' attorney for signature by letter dated December 1, 1986. The accompanying cover letter confirmed that final approval had been obtained.

Benjamin Reed died during the evening of November 28, 1986. Over the government's opposition, plaintiffs sought to enforce the settlement reached between the parties before Benjamin's death. The government contended that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. The government first argued that under Florida law the personal injury action abated on Benjamin's death. Second, the government contended that the dispute now involved a claim against the government grounded in contract and that consequently under the Tucker Act the United States Claims Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2) and 1491. The district court rejected both of these contentions. The court found that the parties had reached a final settlement before Benjamin's death and granted plaintiffs' motion to approve and enforce the settlement agreement. 717 F. Supp. 1511. The government appealed and we now affirm.II. DISCUSSION

The government contends that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. In the government's view, the motion to enforce the settlement agreement after Benjamin's death converted the action into a breach of contract claim. The government correctly states that federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain breach of contract claims in which the government is a party and the claims exceed $10,000. The Tucker Act vests exclusive jurisdiction over these claims in the United States Claims Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1491. In this case, however, the district court properly assumed jurisdiction under the FTCA. We hold that under these circumstances the jurisdiction of the district court includes the power to enforce a settlement resulting from the claim that provided the basis for jurisdiction.

Our conclusion is supported by this court's decision in Kent v. Baker, 815 F.2d 1395 (11th Cir.1987). In that case the parties to a suit involving an age discrimination claim informed the court on the third day of trial that they had agreed to settle the case and would later seek dismissal of the suit. Before the case was dismissed one party refused to abide by the settlement agreement and the other party requested the court to enforce the settlement agreement or, in the alternative, to resume trial. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the settlement agreement mooted the age discrimination action. We reversed, holding that a district court has jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement prior to dismissal of the action. The rule the government urges that we adopt would create a result inconsistent with Kent. Under the government's proposed rule a district court would never retain jurisdiction to enforce an agreement settling a claim of over $10,000 involving the government because, once the action providing the initial basis of jurisdiction was settled, any attempt to enforce the settlement would be deemed a breach of contract claim required to be brought under the Tucker Act.

Appellant seeks to distinguish Kent by contending that after Benjamin died his tort action was no longer pending and therefore the court no longer had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The government contends that under Florida law appellees' personal injury action abated on the death of Benjamin and that, because the original basis of jurisdiction was destroyed, appellees' only viable cause of action would be a suit for wrongful death. The government relies on Florida Stat. § 768.20, which provides in part as follows:

When a personal injury to the decedent results in his death, no action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action pending at the time of death shall abate.

We conclude that this statute does not apply under the circumstances of this case. The district court found that the parties intended to be bound and that a final settlement had been reached between the parties on November 26, 1986, two days before Benjamin's death. We have reviewed the record in this case and conclude that these findings are not clearly erroneous.2 A settlement is as conclusive of the rights between the parties as a judgment. See Cia Anon Venezolana De Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir.1967); Crisp County v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 73 F.2d 327, 329 (5th Cir.1934); Gunn Plumbing, Inc. v. Dania Bank, 252 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla.1971); Wallace v. Townsell, 471 So. 2d 662, 664 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) ("The parties to a civil action have the right to settle the controversy between them by agreement at any time and an agreement settling all issues in the case is binding not only upon the parties but also upon the court."). Because the action had been settled, no personal injury action existed at the time of Benjamin's death that could have abated. The court's jurisdiction to enforce the settlement thus was unaffected by Benjamin's death.

Even if the Florida doctrine of abatement did apply, we would conclude that there was no abatement in this case. While no Florida court yet has been confronted with this precise issue, we are persuaded by the case of Variety Children's Hosp. Inc. v. Perkins, 382 So. 2d 331 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980), that a Florida Court would find no abatement under the circumstances of this case. In Variety, final judgment had been entered on plaintiff's personal injury claims but the appeal had not yet been ruled upon when the plaintiff died. On appeal the defendant moved to remand the case with directions to the trial judge to abate the action under section 768.20. Defendant argued that the case was subject to abatement because it was pending when the plaintiff died. The court held that section 768.20 does not apply in this situation. In declining to adopt defendant's strict interpretation of an action "pending" at the time of the plaintiff's death, the court stated the following:

With specific relation to the facts before us, the rule that death does not effect an extinguishment of a judgment applies when the party dies while an appeal is pending, while post-trial motions remain undisposed of; and even during the period between the return of a verdict and the entry of a judgment.

Id. at 336 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In this case the settlement agreement conclusively resolved the dispute. At the time of Benjamin's death all that remained for final judgment to obtain was for the court to approve the settlement and enter judgment.3 This is similar to the period between the return of a verdict and the entry of judgment. As the Variety court noted, the death of the plaintiff during such a period will not abate the action. We thus are convinced that a Florida court would conclude that the appellees' cause of action did not abate because the action already had been settled when Benjamin died.

The final issue is appellees' cross-appeal from the district court's denial of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, for appellees' efforts to enforce the settlement agreement. The Act provides that "a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United State fees and other expenses ... unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the government's position was substantially justified, especially in light of the difficult issues of law involved in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.