Filed: Apr. 27, 1992
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 959 F.2d 211 Ivan GONZALEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. No. 91-5738 Non-Argument Calendar. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. April 27, 1992. Stephen Finta, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., for petitioner-appellant. Dexter Lehtinen, Linda Collins Hertz, U.S. Attys., Dawn Bowen, and Carol Herman, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, Fla., for respondent-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Before TJOFLAT,
Summary: 959 F.2d 211 Ivan GONZALEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. No. 91-5738 Non-Argument Calendar. United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. April 27, 1992. Stephen Finta, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., for petitioner-appellant. Dexter Lehtinen, Linda Collins Hertz, U.S. Attys., Dawn Bowen, and Carol Herman, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, Fla., for respondent-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Before TJOFLAT, ..
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959 F.2d 211
Ivan GONZALEZ, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 91-5738
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
April 27, 1992.
Stephen Finta, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.
Dexter Lehtinen, Linda Collins Hertz, U.S. Attys., Dawn Bowen, and Carol Herman, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, Fla., for respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
1
This appeal concerns denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus because petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. We affirm.
2
Petitioner Ivan Gonzalez was convicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute three kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On December 29, 1988 he was sentenced pursuant to pre-guidelines law to five years imprisonment and four years of supervised release.
3
The U.S. Parole Commission calculated a presumptive parole date of May 30, 1990. The U.S. Bureau of Prisons did not, however, release petitioner on this date, and he remains incarcerated.
4
In February 1991 Gonzalez filed in the district court a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He asserted that because his presumptive release date had passed, he need not exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking relief from the district court.
5
Courts have original jurisdiction over imposition of a sentence. The Bureau of Prisons is, however, responsible for computing that sentence and applying appropriate good time credit. U.S. v. Martinez, 837 F.2d 861, 865-66 (9th Cir.1988). The Bureau of Prisons has established regulations that set forth the procedures that a prisoner must follow before seeking relief from a district court. U.S. v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir.1990). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is jurisdictional. Id.
6
Petitioner relies upon cases in which the court resentenced a defendant. Those cases do not deal with computation of sentences by administrative agencies. See e.g., U.S. v. Whittington, 918 F.2d 149 (11th Cir.1990); U.S. v. Jones, 722 F.2d 632 (11th Cir.1983).
