Filed: Feb. 04, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 98-8228 02/04/99 Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 4:97-CR-33-JRE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ARTHUR MILLER, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia _ (February 4, 1999) Before ANDERSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and FAY, Senior Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM: Art
Summary: [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 98-8228 02/04/99 Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 4:97-CR-33-JRE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ARTHUR MILLER, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia _ (February 4, 1999) Before ANDERSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and FAY, Senior Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM: Arth..
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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-8228 02/04/99
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 4:97-CR-33-JRE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ARTHUR MILLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(February 4, 1999)
Before ANDERSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and FAY, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Arthur Miller appeals his 63-month sentence for transporting computer visual depictions of
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and possession of computer disks containing depictions
of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252.
On appeal, Miller contends that the district court erred in applying the cross-reference contained
in § 2G2.2(c)(1). He argues that it should “only be applied where the offense of conviction involved
causing, transporting, permitting, or seeking by notice or advertisement a minor to participate in the
production of the child pornography.” Miller further asserts that his postings on the Internet were
not part of the offense of conviction.
Miller pled guilty to the charges alleged in the indictment: (1) transporting computer visual
depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and (2) possession of computer disks
containing depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
Miller stipulated in the plea agreement that he had used electronic mail to solicit teenage boys
to engage in sexual activity. The agreement includes exhibits of two such electronic messages sent
to Internet newsgroups. The first message described the sexual activities Miller was allegedly
willing to perform on teenage boys. The message concluded with the statement, “[e]-mail me at
Dad4Lad@Hotmail.com for immediate sucking. Let me satisfy you.” The second message read,
in part:
[I]’m a 35 yo wm, seeking young teens for friendship, possibly more ...[I] can travel
to surrounding areas of [C]olumbus to pick you up and spend time with you...[I]f you
like to show yourself off, have your picture taken, be video taped alone or with a
friend e-mail me even sooner. [I]f you’re interested in making a buck well, we can
discuss that when we come to it. [H]ope to hear from as many of you as soon as
possible.
Exhibit B at R.1. This message also contained a return electronic mail address.
The probation officer determined that the guideline for Miller’s offense is found in § 2G2.2,
which provides for a base offense level of 17. In light of the electronic mail messages, however, the
probation officer applied the cross-reference in § 2G2.2(c)(1), which provides that “[i]f the
offense involved causing, transporting, permitting, or offering or seeking by notice or advertisement,
a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of
such conduct, apply [the base offense level in] § 2G2.1.” As a result, Miller’s base offense level
rose from 17 to 27.
Miller objected to the application of the cross-reference, arguing that (1) the electronic mail
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messages only constituted mail, rather than a notice or advertisement and (2) no reasonable nexus
connected the electronic messages and the counts of conviction.
The district court summarily overruled Miller’s objection and adopted the findings and
guideline application in the Pre-Sentence Investigation. Based on a guideline range of 63 to 78
months, the court sentenced Miller to a total of 63 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Miller contends that the district court erred in applying the cross-reference
contained in § 2G2.2(c)(1). He argues that it should “only be applied where the offense of
conviction involved causing, transporting, permitting, or seeking by notice or advertisement a minor
to participate in the production of the child pornography” (emphasis in original). Miller asserts that
the electronic mail messages were not part of the offenses of conviction, nor were they relevant
conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1) as they did not occur during the commission of, or in preparation for,
the offense of conviction. Miller further points out that the offenses of conviction were not grouped
under § 3D1.2; thus, they could not be considered relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(2). Miller also
argues, for the first time, that the “postings” on the Internet newsgroups are not electronic mail
messages, the listed newsgroups are not normally accessed by children, and the “postings” do not
include a method to respond to the author. The government responds that the district court
properly applied the cross reference in calculating Miller’s offense level. It argues that the
transmission of electronic messages by Miller, an act to which he stipulated in the plea agreement,
qualifies as “relevant conduct” under the sentencing guidelines. As such, the government asserts that
the court correctly considered conduct not covered by the counts of conviction in determining
Miller’s offense level.
In reply, Miller “acknowledges having posted two [electronic mail messages] to
newsgroups.” He argues, however, “[t]his activity does not set forth a new, more serious offense,
as the government alleges.” Further, Miller asserts that nowhere in the plea agreement did he
stipulate that the return electronic mail addresses belonged to him.
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Sentencing Guideline § 2G2.2, which pertains to “Trafficking in Material Involving the
Sexual Exploitation of a Minor,” carries a base offense level of 17, compared to a base offense level
of 27 under § 2G2.1, which pertains to “Sexually Exploiting a Minor by Production of Sexually
Explicit Visual or Printed Material.” The cross-reference provision provides, “[i]f the offense
involved causing, transporting, permitting, or offering or seeking by notice or advertisement, a minor
to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such
conduct, apply [the base offense level in] § 2G2.1.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c)(1). Under the sentencing
guidelines, “[a] plea agreement ... containing a stipulation that specifically establishes the
commission of additional offense(s) shall be treated as if the defendant had been convicted of
additional count(s) charging those offense(s).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(c).
This Court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error, but de novo review
applies to the court’s application of the sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Pompey, 17 F.3d
351, 353 (11th Cir. 1994).
In this case, the district court did not err in applying the cross-reference in § 2G2.2 to adjust
Miller’s base offense level from 17 to 27. Contrary to Miller’s argument, the term “offense,” as
used in the cross-reference, includes both charged and uncharged offenses. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3,
comment., backg’d; see also United States v. Maxwell, 34 F.3d 1006, 1010 (11th Cir. 1994).
Although the government did not charge Miller with any offenses arising out of the use of electronic
mail, Miller did acknowledge in the plea agreement that he had used electronic mail to solicit
teenagers to engage in sexual activity. See United States v. Moore,
6 F.3d 715, 718-19 (11th Cir.
1993) (uncharged offenses stipulated in the plea agreement “are treated as if they were additional
counts of conviction for sentencing purposes”). Thus, the district court properly used the uncharged
conduct in determining Miller’s base offense level.
Moreover, the transmission of messages on the Internet satisfied the criteria of the cross-
reference provision, which “is to be construed broadly.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, comment, n.3. Miller
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(1) induced minors, (2) by “notice or advertisement,” (3) “to engage in sexually explicit conduct for
the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(c)(1). First,
Miller’s messages were aimed at “young teens.” Second, by posting information on Internet
newsgroups, Miller’s messages amounted to a notice or advertisement. Cf. Zeran v. America
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (“‘The Internet is an international network of
interconnected computers,’ currently used by approximately 40 million people worldwide.”)
(quoting Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844,
117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334,
138 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1997)), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 2341 (1998). Third, the messages invited teenagers to engage in sexual activity, “have
[their] picture taken, [and] be video taped.” He also offered to pay those teenagers “interested in
making a buck.” Clearly, the district court did not err in applying the cross-reference in §
2G2.2(c)(1).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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