Filed: Feb. 02, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT February 2, 2007 No. 06-11163 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 05-00394-CR-T-26-TGW UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus FELICIANO FUNEZ, a.k.a. Feliciano Funez-Aguiriano, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (February 2, 2007) Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and DUBIN
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT February 2, 2007 No. 06-11163 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 05-00394-CR-T-26-TGW UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus FELICIANO FUNEZ, a.k.a. Feliciano Funez-Aguiriano, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (February 2, 2007) Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and DUBINA..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
February 2, 2007
No. 06-11163 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00394-CR-T-26-TGW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FELICIANO FUNEZ,
a.k.a. Feliciano Funez-Aguiriano,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(February 2, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Felicia Funez appeals the district court’s denial of a minor-role
reduction in his sentence. Funez asserts that he should receive a minor-role
reduction because he was “a mere crew member, he had no say as to either the
planning, supplying, nor the destination of the drugs.” Funez also argues that he
“had no decision making power within the context of the overall conspiracy.”
We review a district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in the
offense for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez De Varon,
175 F.3d 930, 937
(11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Further explaining this standard, we have stated,
. . . a trial court’s choice between two permissible views of the
evidence is the very essence of the clear error standard of review. . . .
So long as the basis of the trial court’s decision is supported by the
record and does not involve a misapplication of a rule of law, we
believe that it will be rare for an appellate court to conclude that the
sentencing court’s determination is clearly erroneous.
Id. at 945 (citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). “The proponent
of the downward adjustment . . . always bears the burden of proving a mitigating
role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Id. at 939. According to
U.S.C.G. § 3B1.2, a district court may decrease a defendant’s offense level by two
levels if it finds the defendant was a “minor participant” in the criminal activity. A
“minor participant” is a defendant “who is less culpable than most other
participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2,
comment. (n.5).
In determining whether a minor-role adjustment applies, the district court
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should consider the following two principles: “first, the defendant’s role in the
relevant conduct for which [he] has been held accountable at sentencing, and,
second, [his] role as compared to that of other participants in [his] relevant
conduct.” De
Varon, 175 F.3d at 940. As to the first prong of the De Varon
analysis, we have explained that, “[only if the defendant can establish that [he]
played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which [he] has already been held
accountable - not a minor role in any larger criminal conspiracy - should the
district court grant a downward adjustment for minor role in the offense.”
Id. at
944. Further, “in the drug courier context, that the amount of drugs imported is a
material consideration in assessing a defendant’s role in [his] relevant conduct . . .
[and] may be dispositive - in and of itself - in the extreme case.”
Id. at 943.
With regard to the second prong of the De Varon analysis, we have
determined that a district court should look to other participants only to the extent
that they (1) “are identifiable or discernable from the evidence,” and (2) “were
involved in the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant.”
Id. at 944. We have
recognized, however, that the first prong set forth in De Varon may, in many cases,
be dispositive.
Id. at 945.
In this case, the record demonstrates that the district court held Funez
accountable for the smuggling of 2,012 kilograms of cocaine, in which he
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participated. The district court did not hold him accountable for any broader
conspiracy.
Funez’s assertions that he had no equity interest in the cocaine, no
knowledge of either the origin or ultimate destination of the cocaine, and no
decision-making or planning authority, do not establish that his role in transporting
the cocaine was minor. If anything, these assertions tend to support the fact that
Funez did not have a large role in the overall drug smuggling scheme. However,
as we have explained in De Varon, a defendant’s role in a larger conspiracy is not
the relevant inquiry when determining whether the defendant played a minor role
in his relevant conduct. See De
Varon, 175 F.3d at 944. Funez pled guilty to
transporting 2,012 kilograms of cocaine, and the district court held him
accountable for only this amount at sentencing. Such a large amount of cocaine,
moreover, is properly a material consideration for the district court in determining
whether a minor-role adjustment is warranted. See
Id. at 943.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not clearly
err in denying Funez’s request for a minor-role reduction to his offense level.
Accordingly, we affirm Funez’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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