Filed: May 12, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT May 12, 2008 No. 07-15023 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 06-00397-CV-CG RAYFIELD SNOWDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus CITY OF DAPHNE, AL, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama _ (May 12, 2008) Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Appellant, Rayfield S
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT May 12, 2008 No. 07-15023 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 06-00397-CV-CG RAYFIELD SNOWDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus CITY OF DAPHNE, AL, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama _ (May 12, 2008) Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Appellant, Rayfield Sn..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 12, 2008
No. 07-15023 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00397-CV-CG
RAYFIELD SNOWDEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF DAPHNE, AL,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(May 12, 2008)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant, Rayfield Snowden, appeals from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of his employer, the City of Daphne (“the City”), as to
his complaint alleging retaliation, raised pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983. Snowden
filed a complaint alleging that he was demoted after he complained to his
supervisor and the City Council that an employee had used a racial slur at work.
Snowden argues that the district court erred in granting the City’s motion for
summary judgment on his retaliation claim 1 because the City’s articulated reasons
for demoting him, that he failed to improve communication with his staff and that
the City’s right-of-ways deteriorated under his management, are a pretext for
discrimination.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standards utilized by the district court. S.E.C. v. Adler,
137 F.3d 1325,
1332 (11th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is only proper if there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the non-moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating “against any of his
1
The district court also granted summary judgment to the City on Snowden’s claims of
race discrimination under Title VII and age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 622. Snowden conceded below that he could not make out a
prima facie case in either instance and does not challenge the entry of summary judgment as to
these claims on appeal. Accordingly, any issue in this respect is abandoned. See Greenbriar,
Ltd. v. City of Alabaster,
881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that arguments not
raised on appeal are deemed abandoned).
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employees . . . because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S.
53, __,
126 S. Ct. 2405, 2410, 2412,
165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006) (noting that the
anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on their
conduct).
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff
relying on circumstantial evidence to support a claim first must show an inference
of discriminatory intent, and thus carries the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802,
93 S. Ct. 1817,
1824,
36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); see Wright v. Southland Corp.,
187 F.3d 1287,
1305 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding the McDonnell Douglas analytic framework applies
to retaliation claims) .
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the employer then has an
opportunity to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged
employment action. Pennington v. City of Huntsville,
261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th
Cir. 2001). If the employer proffers such an explanation, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's explanation is merely a pretext. Lubetsky
v. Applied Card Sys., Inc.,
296 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations
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omitted).
To show that the employer's reasons were pretextual, the plaintiff must
demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a
reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Jackson v. State of
Alabama State Tenure Comm’n,
405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations
and citations omitted). If “the proffered reason is one that might motivate a
reasonable employer, an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and
the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that
reason,” or showing that the decision was based on erroneous facts. Chapman v.
AI Transport,
229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations
omitted). A claimant cannot establish pretext by simply demonstrating facts that
suggest retaliatory animus but must specifically respond to the explanation of the
defendant. Crawford v. City of Fairburn, Ga.,
482 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied
128 S. Ct. 495 (2007). Importantly, the pretext inquiry is concerned
with the employer's perception of the employee's performance, not the employee's
own beliefs. Holifield v. Reno,
115 F.3d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
when an employer produces negative performance reviews, an employee's
assertion of his own good performance is insufficient to defeat summary
4
judgment). To show pretext, the plaintiff must show that the movant’s explanation
is both false “and that discrimination was the real reason” for the decision. Brooks
v. County Comm’n of Jeffereson County, Ala.; St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 515,
113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752,
125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993).
After concluding that Snowden had established a prima facie case, the
district court properly concluded that Snowden failed to show that the City’s
articulated reasons for demoting him were false. Specifically, evidence showed
that Snowden’s supervisors had consistently and repeatedly expressed concerns
regarding Snowden’s communication skills and his supervisors were dissatisfied
with the maintenance of the City’s right-of-ways. Moreover, although Snowden
presented evidence that the City’s mayor and his supervisors wanted him removed
from his position and, indeed, made and instituted plans to that effect, he did not
present evidence which rebutted their stated, legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for his demotion. Because Snowden did not demonstrate that the City’s
articulated, legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for demoting him were a pretext
for retaliation, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the City.
AFFIRMED.
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