Filed: Oct. 03, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT OCT 3, 2008 No. 08-10335 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ Agency Nos. A95-551-636 A95-551-637 GILBERTO ANTONIO LONDONO, AURA MARINA HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals _ (October 3, 2008) Before BIRCH, DUBINA and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Gilberto
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT OCT 3, 2008 No. 08-10335 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ Agency Nos. A95-551-636 A95-551-637 GILBERTO ANTONIO LONDONO, AURA MARINA HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals _ (October 3, 2008) Before BIRCH, DUBINA and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Gilberto A..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 3, 2008
No. 08-10335 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
Agency Nos. A95-551-636
A95-551-637
GILBERTO ANTONIO LONDONO,
AURA MARINA HERNANDEZ,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(October 3, 2008)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gilberto Antonio Londono, and his wife, Aura Marina Hernandez, natives
and citizens of Colombia, petition this Court for review of the decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals that denied Londono’s application for asylum and
withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Board
found that Londono failed to prove that he suffered “past prosecution” or has a
well-founded fear of future persecution. We dismiss in part and deny in part
Londono’s petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Londono entered the United States on February 4, 2000 as a nonimmigrant
visitor. On September 30, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued
a notice to appear and charged Londono for staying in the country past the
authorized period. INA § 237(a)(1)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Londono
conceded removability and filed an application for asylum and withholding of
removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.
At his removal hearing, Londono testified about the incidents that led him to
leave Colombia. Londono was an independent contractor in Medellin and
performed several civic activities to benefit the youth and the disadvantaged in the
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community. Londono was also a member of the Agamzada Liberal Party and
campaigned actively for Antonio Serpas in the 1998 presidential election.
In November 1999, Londono received a telephone call from a person who
identified himself as a member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(“FARC”). The person insulted Londono and stated, “you are getting involved in
matters you should not be getting involved in.” Londono testified at the hearing
that the caller did not identify the “matters” in which Londono was no longer to
participate.
A month later, Londono awoke to a sound he attributed to firecrackers. The
next day, Londono observed that bullets had riddled the front of his house.
Londono received a second telephone call and the caller, who identified himself as
a member of FARC, stated that Londono knew that he could not “play with
FARC,” and cautioned that he or a member of his family would receive the “next
one.” Londono reported the incident to the police. Prosecutors told Londono that
they could not provide security and instructed Londono to hide.
Londono quit work and moved a mile away to the home of his sister-in-law,
but Londono continued to receive calls at the new residence from people who
identified themselves as members of FARC. Londono then moved to the home of
another relative. At the urging of family, Londono entered New Jersey on a tourist
visa in February 2000. Londono’s visa expired on August 3, 2000.
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Two months after Londono entered the United States, Londono’s wife,
Hernandez, received calls from the FARC. Hernandez and her daughters feared for
their lives. The women joined Londono in New Jersey in September 2000. The
family later relocated to Massachusetts.
In November 2000, Londono contacted attorney Linda Cristello regarding
his immigration status. Cristello gave Londono a receipt which stated that their
meeting was a “consultation” and did “not create a contractual relationship for
legal representation.” Londono testified that Cristello told him that he did not
occupy a position of sufficient authority or leadership in Colombia to obtain
asylum in the United States.
Later, Londono and his family moved to Miami. Londono consulted with an
attorney who advised him to file an application for asylum. A friend prepared an
application for Londono that he filed in May 2002. Londono sought a waiver of
the one-year deadline and a grant of asylum based on his political opinion.
Londono testified that he did not seek a second opinion after he spoke with
Cristello because he was “disarmed” and feared the family would be deported.
Londono acknowledged that he and his family were threatened, but not harmed.
Londono also acknowledged that the callers never explained which of his activities
prompted them to threaten him. At the conclusion of the hearing, Londono
withdrew his request for relief under the Convention.
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The immigration judge denied Londono’s application. The judge found that
Londono’s application was untimely and Londono did not establish extraordinary
circumstances to except him from the deadline. The judge credited Londono’s
testimony about the threats and damage to his home in Colombia, but found that
the acts were not attributed to Londono’s political activities and were not
persecution. The judge concluded that Londono did not establish a well-founded
fear of persecution. The judge found that civil unrest had subsided in Colombia
and, because members of Londono’s family had remained in Colombia without
incident, there was no evidence that Londono faced persecution if he returned
home.
Londono appealed and the Board dismissed the appeal. The Board found
that Londono did not challenge the conclusion of the immigration judge that
Londono did not establish changed or extraordinary circumstances that would
except him from the one-year deadline to seek asylum, and the Board affirmed that
conclusion. The Board “agree[d]” that Londono did not establish that he was
targeted “on account of [his] political opinion or another ground protected by the
Act” and affirmed the decision to deport Londono.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006). We
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review the decision of the Board to determine whether it is “supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a
whole.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft,
257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). “To reverse
[those] fact findings, we must find that the record not only supports reversal, but
compels it.” Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
327 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003)
III. DISCUSSION
Londono and Hernandez challenge the decision of the Board on two
grounds. First, the couple argue that Londono has established that extraordinary
circumstances excuse his untimely application for asylum. Second, the couple
challenge the denial of Londono’s application for withholding of removal. We
address each issue in turn.
A. We Lack Jurisdiction to Consider the Timeliness of Londono’s Application for
Asylum.
Londono argues that his reliance on Cristello’s erroneous legal advice
constitutes extraordinary circumstances to excuse the one-year deadline to file his
application for asylum. The government argues that we lack jurisdiction to hear
this claim. We agree with the government.
We are “‘obligated to inquire into subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte
whenever it may be lacking.’” Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
427 F.3d 954,
956 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cadet v. Bulger,
377 F.3d 1173, 1179 (11th Cir.
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2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). An alien must file his asylum
application within one year after arrival in the United States, 8 U.S.C. §
1158(a)(2)(B), but he may obtain review after that deadline if he establishes “either
the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect . . . eligibility for
asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing [the]
application . . . .”
Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D). Application of that deadline “is left
exclusively to the Attorney General,” and we do not have jurisdiction to disturb
that decision.
Id. § 1158(a)(3); Chacon-Botero, 427 F.3d at 956. We also lack
jurisdiction to consider an issue when an alien has not “exhausted all
administrative remedies available . . . as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).
We lack jurisdiction to review the application of the one-year deadline.
Londono asks this Court to consider Cristello’s alleged ineffectiveness, but we lack
jurisdiction to entertain that argument. Even if we had jurisdiction to consider the
issue, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (allowing judicial review of “constitutional
claims or questions of law”), Londono did not present that argument to the Board.
“[A]bsent a cognizable excuse or exception, we lack jurisdiction to consider claims
that have not been raised before the [Board].’”
Amaya-Artunduaga, 463 F.3d at
1250. We dismiss this part of Londono’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.
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B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Decision to Deny Withholding of Removal.
Londono and his wife allege that he established a well-founded fear of future
persecution. He argues that he was persecuted by FARC based on his political
activities and this creates a presumption of future persecution that the government
failed to rebut. Londono’s argument fails.
Londono’s burden is well-established. To qualify for withholding of
removal, an alien must prove that his “life or freedom would be threatened in [his
country of nationality] because of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.” INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(A). The alien must show that he “more likely than not . . . will be
persecuted or tortured upon being returned to her country.” Sepulveda v. U.S.
Att’y Gen .,
401 F.3d 1226, 1232 (11th Cir. 2005).
Substantial evidence supports the decision that Londono did not suffer
political persecution. The anonymous telephone calls Londono received constitute
harassment but do not rise to the level of persecution. See Silva v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
448 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir. 2006);
Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231. Londono did
not see who shot his home and could not identify the individuals involved or
establish that the attack was politically motivated. See
Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at
1231. Although Londono was threatened, he was not harmed. See
Silva, 448 F.3d
at 1234, 1238.
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Londono is not entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future
persecution because he failed to establish that he suffered past persecution and he
offered no proof that he would be singled out due to his political beliefs if he
returned to Colombia. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1);
Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231.
Because Londono was not threatened while he was active in the Agamzada Liberal
Party and the callers never identified whether they sought to end Londono’s
welfare or political activities, the record does not compel the conclusion that
Londono was targeted because of his political opinion. Londono suggests that the
immigration judge should have considered a pattern of persecution against persons
who were similarly situated, but he does not identify a group that was targeted and
did not present that argument below. See
Amaya-Artunduaga, 463 F.3d at 1250.
There is no evidence that Londono will be targeted when he returns because he left
family members in Colombia who have not been threatened or harmed. See Ruiz
v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
440 F.3d 1247, 1259 (11th Cir. 2006).
IV. CONCLUSION
We DISMISS the portion of Londono’s petition challenging the timeliness
of his application for asylum and DENY the portion of the petition challenging the
denial of withholding of removal.
PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
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