Filed: Jan. 30, 2009
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JAN 30, 2009 No. 08-10846 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 07-00071-CR-FTM-29-DNF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MATTEO DEGENNARO, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (January 30, 2009) Before ANDERSON, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: M
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JAN 30, 2009 No. 08-10846 THOMAS K. KAHN Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 07-00071-CR-FTM-29-DNF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MATTEO DEGENNARO, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (January 30, 2009) Before ANDERSON, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Ma..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 30, 2009
No. 08-10846 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00071-CR-FTM-29-DNF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MATTEO DEGENNARO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 30, 2009)
Before ANDERSON, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Matteo DeGennaro appeals his convictions for possessing materials
depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2), and distributing materials depicting minors engaged in
sexually explicit activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1).
DeGennaro contends the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal because the government failed to prove that he downloaded and shared
child pornography. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.
I. Background
The evidence presented at trial demonstrated the following: A police officer
patrolling a “peer-to-peer file-sharing network” downloaded at least six files
containing child pornography from an internet protocol address (“IP address”)
traced to an account owned by DeGennaro. Officers obtained a search warrant for
DeGennaro’s house to which the bills for the account were sent. When officers
arrived at the house at approximately 7:30 a.m. on March 30, 2007 to execute the
warrant, they found DeGennaro, his then-girlfriend Stacey DeGennaro (“Stacey”),
and their baby at the home. An officer overheard DeGennaro say that Stacey was
inside sleeping. Stacey later told the officer that DeGennaro lived at the house
alone, but that she had spent the previous night, March 29, there. DeGennaro
admitted that he had used the file-sharing network to download music and adult
pornography, but stated that he always deleted child pornography when he saw it.
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During the search, officers seized, among other evidence, two computers
containing a file-sharing network that had been downloaded onto each computer,
with several files of child pornography that had been downloaded and saved. The
last of the files selected from the file-sharing network had been downloaded at 2:06
a.m. on March 30 - about five hours before the search warrant was executed.
In his opening statement, DeGennaro had argued that, although he owned
the house, he lived with Stacey and their baby at her house. He claimed his
brother, Luciano DeGennaro (“Luciano”), occupied the bedroom in the house
where the computer was found and was “the one responsible for the child
pornography.” At the close of the government’s case-in-chief, DeGennaro moved
for judgment of acquittal, asserting that the government failed to prove he was
responsible for downloading the images. The court denied the motion.
Stacey testified that she, DeGennaro, and their baby had spent the night of
March 29 at her house and had stopped by DeGennaro’s house the morning of
March 30 to pick up some materials for a construction project at her house. She
asserted that DeGennaro lived with her in her home and Luciano lived at the home
police searched. She also denied telling officers that she and DeGennaro had
stayed at the house the night of March 29. DeGennaro testified in his own defense.
He admitted that he paid all the bills for the home except the electricity bill. He
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claimed that Luciano lived in the home and often used the computer. DeGennaro
presented two other witnesses: a friend who stated she visited DeGennaro and
Stacey at Stacey’s house on March 29, and another friend who used to visit
Luciano at the house and saw Luciano download pornography.
DeGennaro did not renew his motion for judgment of acquittal either at the
close of the defense’s case or after the government’s rebuttal. The jury convicted
DeGennaro on both counts, and the court sentenced DeGennaro to 120 months’
imprisonment.
II. Discussion
Under § 2252(a)(4)(B), it is unlawful to, inter alia, (1) knowingly possess, or
access with intent to view, by any means, including computer; (2) material that
contains a visual depiction that has traveled by any means in or affecting interstate
commerce; (3) if the producing of such visual depiction involved the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and such visual depiction is of such
conduct.1 Under § 2252(a)(2), it is unlawful to, inter alia, (1) knowingly distribute;
(2) a visual depiction that has traveled by any means in or affecting interstate
commerce; (3) if the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
1
DeGennaro stipulated that the materials in question constituted child pornography or
depicted real children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and that the images had traveled in
interstate commerce.
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engaging in sexually explicit conduct and such visual depiction is of such conduct.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a), a defendant may move the district court for
a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s evidence or at the close of
all of the evidence. If the defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal at the close
of the government’s case-in-chief, the motion is denied, and the defendant
thereafter presents evidence, his presentation of evidence generally “operates as a
waiver of his objection to the denial of his motion for acquittal.” United States v.
Jones,
32 F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1994). In that case, to preserve his objection,
the defendant must renew his motion at the close of all of the evidence. See
id.
Because DeGennaro presented evidence after the district court denied his
motion for acquittal and did not renew the motion at the close of all of the
evidence, DeGennaro failed to preserve his motion for judgment of acquittal.
Accordingly, we review all of the evidence presented at trial and will affirm absent
a manifest miscarriage of justice.
Jones, 32 F.3d at 1516. Reversing for manifest
injustice requires finding that “the evidence on a key element of the offense is so
tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” United States v. Tapia,
761 F.2d
1488, 1492 (11th Cir. 1985). In our review, we must accept all credibility
determinations made by the jury. United States v. Garcia,
447 F.3d 1327, 1334
(11th Cir. 2006).
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Here, we conclude that the district court properly denied the motion for
judgment of acquittal. The government established more than a “tenuous”
connection between DeGennaro and the downloaded images, such that the jury’s
conviction of DeGennaro on this evidence is not “shocking.” See
Tapia, 761 F.2d
at 1492. DeGennaro stipulated that the materials in question constituted child
pornography and had traveled in interstate commerce. And the evidence
demonstrated his knowledge of the materials. DeGennaro admitted downloading
images, although he explained that he would delete any child pornography.
Moreover, the evidence demonstrated that DeGennaro and Stacey, rather
than Luciano, were at the house in the early morning of March 30 mere hours after
child pornography was downloaded onto one of the computers. And, on March 30
at 7:30 a.m., an officer overheard DeGennaro indicate that Stacey was inside
asleep. Stacey told the officer that DeGennaro lived at the house and that she had
spent the night at the house on March 29. In light of this evidence, the jury’s
verdict is not shocking. See
Tapia, 761 F.2d at 1492.
Although at trial, DeGennaro and Stacey both testified that they had not
spent the night of March 29 at the house, the jury was free to disbelieve this
testimony, and we see no reason to disturb the jury’s credibility findings. See
Garcia, 447 F.3d at 1334. Importantly, by testifying, DeGennaro ran the risk that
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the jury would believe the opposite of his testimony. United States v. Brown,
53
F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[A] defendant whose motion for acquittal at the
close of the Government’s case is denied must decide whether to stand on his
motion or put on a defense, with the risk that in so doing he will bolster the
Government case enough for it to support a verdict of guilty.”) (citation omitted).
III. Conclusion
Because DeGennaro failed to renew his motion for judgment of acquittal at
the close of all the evidence, and the evidence linking DeGennaro to the child
pornography was not tenuous, and because the jury rejected DeGennaro’s and
Stacey’s testimony, we affirm DeGennaro’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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