Filed: Mar. 12, 2009
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Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MAR 12, 2009 No. 08-10969 THOMAS K. KAHN _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 06-01258-CV-CAP-1 IRIS NORWOOD JOHNSTON, Executrix of the Will of Richard H. Johnston, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, versus COMPANION PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee. _ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (Marc
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MAR 12, 2009 No. 08-10969 THOMAS K. KAHN _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 06-01258-CV-CAP-1 IRIS NORWOOD JOHNSTON, Executrix of the Will of Richard H. Johnston, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant, versus COMPANION PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant Cross-Appellee. _ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (March..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 12, 2009
No. 08-10969 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-01258-CV-CAP-1
IRIS NORWOOD JOHNSTON,
Executrix of the Will of Richard H. Johnston,
Plaintiff-Appellee
Cross-Appellant,
versus
COMPANION PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant
Cross-Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(March 12, 2009)
Before MARCUS, KRAVITCH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case involves an insurance dispute between the late Richard H.
Johnston1 and Companion Property & Casualty Insurance Company
(“Companion”). Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict against Companion
and in favor of Johnston, awarding $117,551.30 for breach of contract, plus a bad
faith penalty and attorney’s fees. The district court vacated the award of a bad
faith penalty and attorney’s fees, but left undisturbed the jury’s verdict and award
for breach of contract. Companion appeals the breach of contract verdict, arguing
that the district court gave an improper jury instruction, the insurance policy did
not cover the roof collapse, and damages were not adequately proven. Johnston
cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred in vacating the bad faith penalty
and attorney’s fees. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. Facts
The insured property at issue in this appeal is a flat-roofed commercial
building located in College Park, Georgia, that houses offices, a laundromat, and a
warehouse. The warehouse portion of the building is seventy-nine feet long and
contains a small staircase leading to a twenty-four-foot long mezzanine. The
mezzanine is located in the front portion of the warehouse and is used for storing
boxes of documents. Following a period of heavy rain, on June 15, 2004,
Johnston’s son discovered that a portion of the warehouse’s roof had collapsed. At
1
Johnston died during the pendency of this appeal and the executrix of his will, Iris
Norwood Johnston, was substituted as a party.
2
the time of the collapse, the building was insured with Companion. The insurance
policy states, in relevant portion:
We will pay for direct physical loss or damage to Covered Property,
caused by collapse of a building or any part of a building . . . if the
collapse is caused by one or more of the following:
...
b. Decay that is hidden from view, unless the presence of such
decay is known to an insured prior to the collapse . . .
Johnston filed an insurance claim with Companion and retained a contractor,
Sherman Neal Brown, to evaluate the damage and suggest repairs. Brown
recommended that temporary repairs be conducted to prevent further damage to the
warehouse’s structure and contents. At Johnston’s request, Brown made $20,619
in temporary repairs.2 Johnston submitted a copy of the invoice for these repairs to
Companion.
Companion retained an engineer, David Hildebrand, who examined the
warehouse, took pictures of the damage, spoke with Brown, and reported his
findings to Companion. Based on Hildebrand’s investigation, Companion sent a
letter to Johnston on September 1, 2004, denying the entire claim on the grounds
that the collapse was not covered under the insurance policy.
Johnston sent a demand letter on November 30, 2004, indicating that if
Companion did not pay for all necessary repairs within sixty days, he would bring
2
As of the date of trial, permanent repairs still had not been conducted.
3
suit seeking damages under the contract, as well as a bad faith penalty and
attorney’s fees.3 Companion did not respond and the instant suit was filed in
Georgia state court on April 12, 2006. Companion thereafter removed the action to
federal court based on diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The case was tried before a jury in September 2007. Four witnesses
testified: (1) Richard Johnston, plaintiff; (2) Neal Brown, plaintiff’s contractor; (3)
Robert Clein, plaintiff’s expert; and (4) David Hildebrand, defendant’s expert. The
witnesses agreed that the damage to the warehouse was caused by a collapse and
that the collapse was at least partially the result of decay to the warehouse’s roof
trusses.4 The parties’ primary dispute was whether the decay to the roof trusses
was “hidden from view.” If the decay that caused the collapse was not “hidden
from view,” Johnston was precluded from recovering under the policy.
At the close of Johnston’s case, Companion moved for a directed verdict on
the grounds that Johnston failed to prove: (1) that the decay was “hidden from
view”; (2) his damages; and (3) that Companion acted in bad faith. This motion
was denied. At the close of the defense, Companion brought a motion for
3
Georgia law requires that as a prerequisite to a claim for bad faith damages, the insured
must make a demand for payment at least sixty days prior to commencing suit against the
insurer. O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6(a).
4
At trial, the lawyers and witnesses sometimes referred to the decayed portions of the
ceiling as “roof trusses” and other times as “roof joists.” For the sake of consistency, we will
refer to the decayed wood collectively as “roof trusses.”
4
judgment as a matter of law on all three grounds, which was also denied.
The jury returned a verdict in Johnston’s favor on September 12, 2007,
awarding $117,551.30 for breach of contract, $11,755 as a bad faith penalty, and
$40,000 in attorney’s fees. Companion thereafter renewed its motion for judgment
as a matter of law on the same three grounds as before, as well on the ground that
the district court erred by charging the jury on ambiguity and contract construction.
Companion argued that, in the alternative, it was entitled to a new trial on those
grounds. On January 30, 2008, the district court entered an order granting
Companion’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the bad faith claim,
vacating the jury verdicts as to both the bad faith penalty and attorney’s fees. The
district court denied the motions for a new trial and judgment as a matter of law on
the breach of contract claim. Both parties now appeal.
II. Discussion
A. Jury charge
Companion argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the district court
committed reversible error by instructing the jury on ambiguity and principles of
contract construction.
1. Standard of review
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of
5
discretion. Bianchi v. Roadway Express, Inc., 441 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir.
2006). We review jury instructions to determine “whether the jury charges,
considered as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so that the jurors understood
the issues and were not misled. If jury instructions accurately reflect the law, the
trial judge is given wide discretion as to the style and wording employed in the
instruction.” Johnson v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc.,
437 F.3d 1112, 1115
(11th Cir. 2006) (citations and quotations omitted). We will only grant a new trial
based on inadequate jury instructions in cases in which “the instructions did not
accurately reflect the law in such a way that we are left with a substantial and
ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations.”
Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc.,
369 F.3d 1189, 1196 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citation and quotations omitted). This court reviews the jury instructions de novo
to determine whether they misstate the law or mislead the jury to the detriment of
the objecting party. Tran v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
420 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir.
2005). Jury instructions must, however, be considered as a whole and are subject
to harmless error analysis. Cistola v. Daniel,
598 S.E.2d 535, 540 (Ga. Ct. App.
2004).
2. Merits
Companion argues that the district court improperly charged the jury by
6
giving the following jury instructions: (1) the ambiguity charge – “[t]he plaintiff
contends that the language, hidden from view, . . . is ambiguous . . .”; and (2) the
contract construction charge – “[i]nsurance policies are to be construed in favor of
the insured and against the insurance company where the policy language is
ambiguous and the insurer has been the drafter of the contract.” Companion argues
that under Georgia law, a court should not charge a jury on principles of ambiguity
and contract construction unless the court has already found that a contractual term
is ambiguous. Companion argues that because the district court made no such
finding, it erred by instructing the jury on how to interpret ambiguous contractual
terms.5
“The construction of a contract is a question of law for the court. Where any
matter of fact is involved, the jury should find the fact.” O.C.G.A. § 13-2-1.6
Where a contract is unambiguous, it is “improper for the court to give the jury any
instruction with regard to the manner in which the contract should be construed.”
5
Companion objected to the district court’s ambiguity charge at the charge conference,
but did not object to the contract construction charge. “We review alleged errors in jury
instructions only for plain error where the aggrieved party failed to raise an objection prior to
jury deliberations.” Wilbur v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 393 F.3d 1192, 1203 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004); see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1). In any event, the standard of review is immaterial because even if we
were to review the contract construction charge de novo, we would still conclude that the district
court did not commit error that warrants reversal.
6
In the instant case, subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, so
state substantive law applies. See McMahan v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120, 1131 (11th Cir. 2001).
7
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Thrift-Mart, Inc., 285 S.E.2d 566, 571 (Ga. Ct. App.
1981) (quotations and citation omitted). Georgia law requires that before
submitting a contract construction charge to a jury, the trial court should conduct
the following inquiry:
First, if no ambiguity appears, the trial court enforces the contract
according to its terms irrespective of all technical or arbitrary rules of
construction. Thus, where the terms of the contract are clear and
unambiguous, the court looks only to the contract to find the parties’
intent. Second, if the potential for ambiguity appears, the existence or
non-existence of an ambiguity is itself a question of law for the court,
unless an ambiguity remains even after the court has applied the
pertinent rules of contract construction. Finally, issues of contract
construction will be submitted to the jury only when there appears to
be an ambiguity in the contract which cannot be resolved by the
court’s application of the statutory rules of construction.
Ga. Ass’n of Educators, Inc. v. Paragon Prod., Inc., 520 S.E.2d 37, 39 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1999). Failure to properly apply this test can constitute reversible error. See
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blakey,
342 S.E.2d 308 (Ga. 1986).
The district court did not find an ambiguity in the contract, as required
under step one of the test enunciated in Georgia Association of Educators. In fact,
during the charge conference the district court expressly stated that “hidden from
view,” as used in the contract, “isn’t ambiguous to me.” It was therefore improper
for the district court to instruct the jury on how to interpret an ambiguous
contractual term.
8
This error, however, is harmless when construed in light of the charge as a
whole. Shortly after the ambiguity and contract construction charges, the district
court told the jury that decay is not “hidden from view” if it is “exposed and open
to plain sight.” The court further explained that simple “failure of an insured to
observe decay” does not render otherwise exposed decay “hidden from view.”
Because the court defined “hidden from view,” the jury would have understood
that despite the previous contract construction charge, it was not authorized to
apply its own meaning to this term. Given this charge, the jury could not have
believed that it was authorized to alter the interpretation of this term. The errors in
the jury charge are therefore harmless in light of subsequent portions of the jury
instructions.
Because the errors in the charge were harmless, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial based on the jury
instructions.
B. Breach of contract claim
Companion argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or in the
alternative a new trial, on the breach of contract claim because there was
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict and damages award.
9
1. Standard of review
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a
matter of law. Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1275 (11th
Cir. 2008). “We will reverse only if the facts and inferences point overwhelmingly
in favor of one party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary
verdict. We consider all the evidence, and the inferences drawn therefrom, in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Id. (quotations and citations
omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).7
2. “Hidden from view”
Companion concedes that Johnston was subjectively unaware of the decay,
but argues that all of the witnesses, including Johnston and his expert,
acknowledged that the decay was apparent and visible from inside the warehouse.
Companion argues that if Johnston “took the time to look,” he would have seen the
decay. As such, it contends that Johnston failed to prove that the decay on the
building was “hidden from view,” as required for coverage under the insurance
policy.
Under Georgia law, “[w]ords in an insurance contract must be given their
7
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. Bianchi, 441
F.3d at 1282. We need not separately review this issue under the more lenient standard because
we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict under the more
stringent de novo standard.
10
usual, ordinary, and common meaning.” Bold Corp., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 454 S.E.2d 582, 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). In its ordinary
usage, something is considered “hidden” if it is “out of sight.” Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 1065 (1986).
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we
conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the decay
was “hidden from view.” The evidence presented at trial established that the
warehouse was dimly lit, containing only a few fluorescent fixtures. The decayed
roof trusses were located approximately sixteen feet above the warehouse’s floor.
Johnston, Brown, and Clein all testified that when standing underneath the
mezzanine, view of the decayed trusses was obscured by a beam and boxes stacked
on top of the mezzanine. Companion’s expert, Hildebrand, agreed that “[i]f one
were standing underneath the mezzanine, you could not see the decay on the roof
structure.” The witnesses only viewed the decayed trusses after the collapse. The
witnesses therefore could not speak definitively as to how apparent the decay was
prior to the collapse.
Companion has not met the weighty burden of showing that “reasonable
people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1275. A
reasonable jury could have found that the poor lighting, the beam, and the boxes
11
stacked on the mezzanine rendered the decay “out of sight,” and thus “hidden from
view.”
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying the
motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial on the grounds that the
decay was not “hidden from view.”
3. Damages
The jury awarded Johnston a total of $117,551.30 on the breach of contract
claim, which encompassed both the actual cost of temporary repairs and the
estimated cost of future repairs. Companion does not challenge the award of
$20,619 for the temporary repairs conducted by Brown, but argues that the jury
was not provided with sufficient evidence from which it could assess the cost of
future repairs.
At trial, Johnston presented Brown’s February 2006 estimate for permanent
repairs, which totaled $96,982.30. Brown testified that the estimate was accurate
when given, but admitted that those figures had become outdated and that the
present cost of repair was likely higher. Companion argues that because this figure
was outdated and no other witnesses testified as to the present cost of repairs, the
jury should not have been permitted to include the cost of permanent repairs in its
jury verdict.
12
“It is axiomatic that damages cannot be left to speculation, conjecture, or
guess-work and must be proven with reasonable certainty.” Kroger Co. v. U.S.
Foodservice of Atlanta, Inc., 607 S.E.2d 177, 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). When
considering the costs of repair, the plaintiff is only entitled to those expenses
“which would have been incurred had the repairs been undertaken upon the
discovery of the damage . . . not the cost of repairs as incurred [at a later date.]”
Getz Services, Inc. v. Perloe,
327 S.E.2d 761, 765 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
Companion’s argument is flawed because the award should be based on the
cost of repairs at the time of discovery of the damage. It is of no consequence that
the actual cost of repair may have changed by the time of trial.8 The jury’s verdict
did not exceed Brown’s estimate. We therefore conclude that the district court did
not err in finding the jury’s award of damages was supported by sufficient
evidence.
C. Bad faith penalty and attorney’s fees
Johnston cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred in granting
Companion’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the bad faith verdict. In
8
The collapse occurred in 2004, but Brown did not prepare an estimate for permanent
repairs until 2006. Companion, however, has not argued that the 2006 estimate inaccurately
reflects the 2004 cost of repairs. We therefore will not consider this issue. See Doe v. Dekalb
County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1445 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998) (issues not raised in a party’s brief
are considered abandoned).
13
the alternative, Johnston argues that even if judgment as a matter of law was
appropriate, the district court erred in vacating the attorney’s fees award.
1. Standard of review
We review a district court’s order granting a motion for judgment as a matter
of law de novo. Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004).
2. Bad faith
Johnston argues that the district court erred in vacating the award of a bad
faith penalty. He asserts that Companion’s initial denial of his claim was in bad
faith because the damage to the warehouse was clearly within the parameters of the
policy, Companion failed to investigate the claim in a timely manner, Companion
implied to Johnston and Brown that the damage would be covered under the
policy, and that in reliance on Companion’s implication that the damages would be
covered, Brown engaged in temporary repairs that resulted in spoliation of
evidence.
Most of the facts that Johnston points to are irrelevant to proving a claim for
bad faith failure to pay. Under Georgia law, a court may impose a bad faith
penalty against an insurer and require it to pay the insured’s attorney’s fees in the
following situation:9
9
Johnston argues that Companion engaged in what he refers to as both “normal” and
“abnormal” bad faith. “Abnormal” bad faith is a creature of Alabama caselaw, see In re
14
In the event of a loss which is covered by a policy of insurance and
the refusal of the insurer to pay the same within 60 days after a
demand has been made by the holder of the policy and a finding has
been made that such refusal was in bad faith, the insurer shall be liable
to pay such holder, in addition to the loss, not more than 50 percent of
the liability of the insurer for the loss . . .
O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6. “To prevail on a claim for an insurer’s bad faith under
O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6, the insured must prove: (1) that the claim is covered under the
policy, (2) that a demand for payment was made against the insurer within 60 days
prior to filing suit, and (3) that the insurer’s failure to pay was motivated by bad
faith.” Lavoi Corp., Inc. v. Nat’l Fire Ins. of Hartford, 666 S.E.2d 387, 391 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2008). These requirements are strictly construed. BayRock Mortgage
Corp. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co.,
648 S.E.2d 433, 435 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). “The
insured bears the burden of proving bad faith, which is defined as any frivolous
and unfounded refusal in law or in fact to comply with the demand of the
policyholder to pay according to the terms of the policy.” Ga. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Williams,
597 S.E.2d 430, 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). A penalty for bad
faith is not permissible “where the insurance company has any reasonable ground
to contest the claim and where there is a disputed question of fact.” S. Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Nw. Ga. Bank,
434 S.E.2d 729, 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (quotation
Simmons v. Cong. Life Ins. Co. & Insurers Admin. Corp.,
791 So. 2d 371, 379 (Ala. 2000), and
has not been recognized by any Georgia courts. We therefore will only examine the facts in
light of what Johnston refers to as “normal” bad faith, which is recognized under Georgia law.
15
omitted).
In the present case, the first two elements of a § 33-4-6 bad faith claim were
satisfied because the jury found that the insurance claim was covered under the
policy and it is undisputed that Johnston sent a demand, to which Companion did
not respond within 60 days. We agree with the district court, however, that
Johnston failed to prove the third element of a bad faith claim. Companion had a
legitimate, although ultimately unsuccessful, challenge to Johnston’s claim.
Johnston argues that he was deceived by Companion as to the purpose of its
investigation, but he does not allege that Companion’s subsequent denial of
payment was done in bad faith, as required for a bad faith claim under Georgia
law. See Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 597 S.E.2d at 432.
We conclude that the evidence does not support the jury’s conclusion that
Companion engaged in a bad faith failure to pay. Although the jury ultimately
found that the decay was not “hidden from view,” Companion’s theory at trial was
not so unreasonable as to be considered “frivolous and unfounded.” Because
Companion’s reason for denying coverage was not so unbelievable as to sink
below the minimal threshold of “any reasonable ground to contest the claim,”
S. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 434 S.E.2d at 730 (emphasis added), the district court did
not err in granting judgment as a matter of law on the bad faith claim.
16
3. Attorney’s fees
Having concluded that the district court did not err in granting judgment as a
matter of law on the bad faith penalty, Johnston may not collect attorney’s fees
under O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 because that statute only applies to cases in which the
insurer acted in bad faith. Johnston argues, however, that he was also entitled to
attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 allows the jury to award attorney’s fees “where the
plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made prayer therefor and where the
defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the
plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense.” Georgia courts have explicitly stated
that in cases where a plaintiff alleges that an insurer engaged in bad faith by
refusing to pay a claim, an action “for attorney fees and expenses of litigation
under OCGA § 13-6-11 is not authorized.” Howell v. Southern Heritage Ins. Co.,
448 S.E.2d 275, 276 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
Johnston is precluded under Georgia law from availing himself of O.C.G.A.
§ 13-6-11 because “[t]he penalties contained in OCGA § 33-4-6 are the exclusive
remedies for an insurer’s bad faith refusal to pay insurance proceeds.” Id. The
district court therefore did not err in vacating the jury’s attorney’s fees award.
17
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
18
