Filed: Jun. 01, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 08-16488 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JUNE 1, 2009 Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 08-00099-CR-KD UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DONALD WAYNE RAY, JR., Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama _ (June 1, 2009) Before CARNES, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Donald Wa
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 08-16488 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT JUNE 1, 2009 Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 08-00099-CR-KD UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DONALD WAYNE RAY, JR., Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama _ (June 1, 2009) Before CARNES, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Donald Way..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-16488 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 1, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00099-CR-KD
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DONALD WAYNE RAY, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(June 1, 2009)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Donald Wayne Ray, Jr. appeals his sentence for conspiracy with intent to
distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Ray argues
that (1) the government breached the plea agreement by advocating a 10-year
statutory minimum term of imprisonment at sentencing, despite the plea
agreement’s provision that a 5-year statutory minimum applied, and (2) his
decision to proceed with sentencing, rather than withdraw his guilty plea, was
involuntary because it was influenced by (a) the government’s threat to withdraw
its U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion and (b) the district court’s participation in the plea
negotiations in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1).
I. Breach of Plea Agreement
Ray does not wish to withdraw his guilty plea; rather, he seeks to enforce the
5-year mandatory minimum set forth in the plea agreement. Ray notes that the
government and the district court both stated, at the Rule 11 proceeding, that his
applicable statutory mandatory minimum sentence was 5 years. He contends that
the five-year mandatory minimum penalty “was a material part of the consideration
for [his] guilty plea” and notes that, until the sentencing hearing, the government
had consistently asserted that the applicable statutory minimum was five years’
imprisonment. Thus, Ray contends that the government’s advocacy, at sentencing,
of a ten-year mandatory minimum breached the plea agreement, because it was
“fundamentally incompatible” with the provisions of the plea agreement.
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Although there was a misrepresentation at the plea hearing that the statutory
mandatory minimum was 5 years, the trial judge corrected that error at sentencing
and gave the defendant and his counsel the opportunity to defer sentencing and
hold a hearing addressing whether Ray would be permitted to withdraw his guilty
plea. Ray declined, choosing instead to proceed with sentencing. Further, Ray did
not object to the sentence after it was imposed.
Since his claims that the government breached the plea agreement were
unpreserved by an objection during the sentencing, plain error review applies. See
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. __,
129 S. Ct. 1423, 1443,
173 L. Ed. 2d 266
(2009). Under plain error review, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3)
that affects substantial rights. United States v. Shelton,
400 F.3d 1325, 1328-29
(11th Cir. 2005). When a defendant challenges the government’s breach of a plea
agreement and the breach relates to the defendant’s rights at sentencing, the
defendant cannot show that he suffered prejudice unless he shows that his sentence
would have been different in the absence of the breach. Puckett, 556 U.S. at __,
129 S.Ct. at 1433 n.4.
In this case, the district court stated that it would have sentenced Ray to 120
months’ imprisonment, even if it applied the 5-year mandatory minimum set forth
in the plea agreement. Thus Ray has failed to show that the alleged breach affected
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his substantial rights because he suffered no prejudice as a result of the alleged
breach. Accordingly, he has failed to show plain error.
II. Decision to Continue With Sentencing
Ray argues that he did not effectively waive his right to withdraw his guilty
plea, because the waiver was not voluntary, in light of the government’s threat to
withdraw its U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion if he withdrew his plea. He contends that it
is unconstitutional for the government to refuse to file a § 5K1.1 motion as
punishment for exercising his Sixth Amendment rights. Ray secondly contends
that his decision to persist in his guilty plea was unduly influenced by that court’s
statement that it had “every intention of giving [Ray] 120 months today.” He
asserts that this statement violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)’s prohibition on courts
participating in plea negotiations. Ray argues that the combination of the breach of
the plea agreement, the government’s improper threat to withhold its § 5K1.1
motion, and the court’s involvement in plea negotiations constituted plain error.
First, we do not construe the government’s observation at sentencing that
withdrawing the guilty plea might preclude the possibility of a future § 5K1.1
motion as a threat. Moreover, because Ray does not contend that he would have
withdrawn his guilty plea in the absence of the government’s “threat,” Ray has
failed to establish any prejudice to his substantial rights and thus failed to show
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plain error.
Second, we find no merit to Ray’s argument that the district court
impermissibly participated in the plea negotiations. Because Ray bases his Rule 11
challenge solely on comments the district court made during sentencing, rather
than during the plea bargaining process, and because we have never applied Rule
11 to a district court’s post-plea comments, Ray has failed to establish plain error.
Accordingly, we affirm Ray’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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