Filed: Aug. 20, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 09-15534 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AUGUST 20, 2010 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 08-00206-CR-ODE-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus AGHEDO PIUS IYAMU, a.k.a. Amit Chopra, a.k.a. Peter Charles Davis, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (August 20, 2010) Before EDMONDSON, MARTIN
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 09-15534 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AUGUST 20, 2010 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 08-00206-CR-ODE-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus AGHEDO PIUS IYAMU, a.k.a. Amit Chopra, a.k.a. Peter Charles Davis, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (August 20, 2010) Before EDMONDSON, MARTIN a..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-15534 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 20, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00206-CR-ODE-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
AGHEDO PIUS IYAMU,
a.k.a. Amit Chopra,
a.k.a. Peter Charles Davis,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(August 20, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Aghedo Pius Iyamu appeals his fraud and identity theft convictions and his
70-month total sentence. Iyamu argues that the district court (1) erred by denying
his motion for a mistrial based on the government’s violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 16;
(2) the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated identity theft
convictions, because the government failed to prove that he knew his victims were
real people; (3) the district court erred in applying a two-level U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c)
enhancement, because he did not play a managerial or supervisory role in the
offense; and (4) his 70-month sentence is unreasonable. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.
I.
Iyamu pled not guilty and proceeded to trial on four counts of credit card
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029, (Counts 1, 3, 5, and 7); four counts of
aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (Counts 2, 4, 6,
and 8); two counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, (Counts 9 and
10); and one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1349 (Count 11).
The relevant facts established at trial are as follows. Chase Bank approved
an online credit card submitted on September 30, 2007, in the name of Pam R.
Rollins. Pamela Rollins Henritze, formerly known as “Pamela Rollins,” testified
2
that she did not submit the application, which listed her correct social security
number. A Chase Bank employee testified that the application most likely would
have been declined if the social security number on the application did not
correspond to other identifying information. Chase also approved an online credit
card application in the name of Bhavesh Amin. Amin testified that he did not
submit the Chase application, although his social security number was correctly
listed on the application.
Amit Chopra submitted an online credit card application to American
Express. American Express approved the application and mailed Chopra’s credit
card on December 4, 2007. On December 21, 2007, Chopra reported to American
Express that he never received the card. American Express mailed a second card to
Chopra, but failed to terminate the first credit card. The account number on the
first Chopra credit card ended in 1009. At 1:47 p.m. on December 19, 2007, the
Chopra card ending in 1009 was used to make a $10,940 purchase from a Louis
Vuitton store. Amit Chopra testified that he did not recognize any of the charges
or the signature on the card ending in 1009.
Robert Benjamin, a loss prevention manager for Donna Karan International,
testified that, in January 2008, he traveled to the Atlanta Louis Vuitton store to
review video surveillance footage corresponding to the December 19, 2007
3
purchase. Based on his experience with the videotaping system used at the Atlanta
Louis Vuitton store, Benjamin was aware that the time stamp on the surveillance
video was not always accurate. Benjamin discovered that the time stamp on the
Louis Vuitton surveillance video was not correct, but he was able to calculate the
time differential and locate the transaction for which he was searching. Benjamin
acknowledged that the time stamp on a Louis Vuitton receipt indicated that the
December 19, 2007, purchase was made at a different time than was indicated by
the time stamp on the surveillance video. The government played the surveillance
video clip, which, according to Benjamin, showed Iyamu speaking with store
employees Jennifer Agrippa and Carlton Maxey.
On cross-examination, Benjamin testified that he believed the Louis Vuitton
receipt reflected the actual time of the purchase, although he did not check the
register to make sure its time stamp was accurate. Benjamin noted that there was a
little over three hours difference between the time on the receipt and the time
stamp on the video.
Iyamu moved for a mistrial, arguing that the government had violated
Fed.R.Crim.P. 16, which provides that the government must permit the defendant
to inspect tangible objects within its custody if it intends to use the item in its
case-in-chief. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(E)(ii). Iyamu noted that the government
4
had disclosed the Louis Vuitton surveillance video during discovery, but had not
disclosed that a witness would testify that the time stamp on the video was
inaccurate. The government responded that it provided Iyamu with the Louis
Vuitton receipt documenting the purchase in question, as well as the American
Express records, which listed a time consistent with the receipt but inconsistent
with the video time stamp. It argued that it did not have a duty to point out that the
times on the receipt, the American Express records, and the videotape were all
different. The court determined that the government “made appropriate disclosures
under Rule 16” and denied Iyamu’s motion for a mistrial.
The evidence also showed that Bank of America approved a credit card
application in the name of DeAngelo Hall. Hall testified that he never applied for a
Bank of America credit card, even though the application submitted in his name
accurately listed his social security number.
Bank of America also issued a credit card to Harris B. Ray. Bobby Ray
Harris, Jr. testified that the Ray credit card application listed his social security
number, although he did not submit the application. A Bank of America employee
testified that, to open an account, an applicant had to provide a social security
number and some information corresponding with the social security number so
that the bank could check the individual’s credit history.
5
Carlton Maxey, a former Louis Vuitton employee, testified that he had
agreed to purchase Louis Vuitton luggage for one of Iyamu’s colleagues using his
store discount. On October 9, 2007, Iyamu gave Maxey a $10,700 check for the
purchase. Maxey deposited the check, but a hold was placed on it. Before Maxey
could purchase the luggage, Iyamu informed Maxey that the check had cleared and
asked Maxey to return the money. Maxey withdrew the money from the bank, met
Iyamu, and gave him the money in an envelope. Maxey paid Iyamu $10,000 and
Iyamu gave him a $700 tip. Iyamu later asked Maxey to deposit into Maxey’s
account a check for $74,600. Iyamu did not explain to Maxey why he wanted the
check deposited. Maxey deposited the check, which was made out to him, into a
bank account that he had opened a month earlier. A hold was placed on the check
for 14 days and the check never cleared because of insufficient funds. When
Maxey opened the bank account, he received a “starter kit” containing starter
checks, deposit slips, an ATM card, and a PIN number. At Iyamu’s request,
Maxey gave the starter kit to Iyamu.
Maxey stated that he did not make a December 6, 2007, deposit of $2,500,
or a January 16, 2008, deposit of $2,400 into his bank account. He also denied
depositing a $48,200 check from Pam Rollins into his account. Maxey testified
that he did not make any of the check card transactions listed on his account
6
statement between December 7 and December 14, 2007. When Maxey informed
Iyamu of these transactions, Iyamu told Maxey that his business partner had
probably made the deposits and that he would take care of it.
At one point, Iyamu introduced Maxey to a man Iyamu identified as having
the last name Chopra. Iyamu wished to put Chopra on consignment, meaning that
Louis Vuitton would retain Chopra’s credit card information on file. Under this
method, the merchandise would be sent to a customer and the credit card
information would be entered manually. Maxey stated that, on December 14,
2007, Iyamu made a purchase using Chopra’s credit card. On December 19, 2007,
using the same credit card, Iyamu purchased an $18,000 watch from Louis Vuitton.
Iyamu used two gift cards so that he only had to pay $10,940 for the watch. Iyamu
came into the store to pick up the watch. The government played the Louis
Vuitton surveillance video, which, according to Maxey, depicted the watch
purchase. Maxey testified that he had pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
commit bank fraud for his participation in the instant offense. He acknowledged
that he had also been arrested in 1998 for fraud.
After the testimony had concluded, Iyamu moved for a directed verdict of
acquittal as to all counts of the indictment. The court denied Iyamu’s motion and
the jury found him guilty on all 11 counts.
7
According to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), the applicable
statutory penalty of at least two years’ imprisonment became the guideline range
for Counts 2, 4, 6, and 8. Iyamu’s total offense level for Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10,
and 11, was 23. This included a two-level increase, pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A),
because his offense involved more than ten victims. Iyamu also received a
two-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), because he “enrolled
Carlton Maxey to participate in the offense and directed him to provide the account
access information, pin number and debit card to him when the fraudulent bank
account was established.” Iyamu’s total offense level of 23 combined with his
criminal history category of I to yield a guideline imprisonment range of 46 to 57
months.
Iyamu objected to the two-level increase he received under
§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A), arguing that his offense did not involve more than ten victims.
He also objected to the two-level increase he received under § 3B1.1(c), arguing
that he did not recruit or enroll Maxey as a participant in the offense. He
contended that Maxey’s testimony, which was the only evidence on this point, did
not support the enhancement because it was not credible.
At sentencing, the government conceded that it could not prove that Iyamu’s
offense involved at least ten victims and the court determined that it would not
8
apply the two-level § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement. Iyamu also argued against
applying the two-level § 3B1.1(c) aggravating role enhancement, because Maxey’s
testimony was not credible. The government responded that the jury’s guilty
verdict indicated that it had found Maxey’s testimony to be credible. It noted that
Maxey testified that Iyamu provided him with checks, directed him to deposit the
checks into his account, and directed him to withdraw money from his account.
Based on the trial testimony, the court found that “while . . . Iyamu and . . . Maxey
were partners in crime, . . . it is fair to characterize . . . Iyamu as the leader between
the two of them.” It therefore applied the two-level aggravating role enhancement.
Based on the court’s findings, Iyamu was subject to a total offense level of
21, a criminal history category of I, and a guideline range of 37 to 46 months’
imprisonment. The court asked Iyamu for his sentencing recommendation. Iyamu
responded that a sentence of 37 months’ imprisonment, followed by the mandatory
24 months imprisonment for the aggravated identity theft counts, would be
reasonable. Iyamu noted that he had been in the country for 12 ½ years before his
offense conduct began; he had no criminal history; he had four young children, all
of whom were United States citizens; and he would be deported after serving his
sentence. Iyamu also contended that, after he was convicted, he had offered to
cooperate with the government.
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The court sentenced Iyamu to a term of 46 months’ imprisonment on each of
Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11, to run concurrently with each other, and to be
followed by 24 months’ imprisonment on Count 2, to run consecutively with the
other counts. The court also imposed a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment on
Counts 4, 6, and 8, to run concurrently with each other and with the other counts.
II.
A. Denial of Motion for Mistrial
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 782 (11th Cir. 2007).
Rule 16 provides, in relevant part, that:
Upon a defendant’s request, the government must permit the
defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers,
documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or
places, or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is
within the government’s possession, custody, or control and . . .
(ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at
trial.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(E). Rule 16(a)(2) specifically provides that “this rule [does
not] authorize the discovery or inspection of statements made by prospective
government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.” Fed.R.Crim.P.
16(a)(3); see 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (providing that the defendant may be entitled to a
government witness’s statements and reports after the witness has testified on
10
direct examination).
The government’s failure to disclose Benjamin’s testimony regarding the
inaccuracy of the time stamp, or to inform Iyamu that the time stamp was
inaccurate, did not violate Rule 16. With respect to Benjamin’s testimony, Rule
16(a)(3) specifically states that the discovery or inspection of statements by
prospective government witnesses is not authorized by the Rule. Fed.R.Crim.P.
16(a)(3). The government also had no duty to inform Iyamu that the date stamp on
the video was inaccurate, because Rule 16(a)(1)(E) simply required the
government to allow Iyamu to inspect the video it intended to use in its case-in-
chief. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(E). Thus, because Iyamu was provided with the
video prior to trial, no Rule 16 violation occurred.
Iyamu relies on United States v. Lee, 573 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2009), in support
of his contention that the government’s failure to disclose the inaccuracy of the
time stamp constituted a Rule 16 violation. In Lee, the government provided to the
defendant a photocopy of the front of a hotel registration card, which indicated that
the defendant had rented a hotel room for one night.
Id. at 158. At trial, the jury
examined the actual card and discovered writing on the back of the card indicating
that the defendant had extended his stay.
Id. at 159-60. The Third Circuit found
that the government had committed a Rule 16 violation.
Id. at 165. The facts of
11
the instant case are materially different than those involved in Lee. In Lee, the
government violated Rule 16 by failing to provide an accurate copy of the hotel
registration card that it presented at trial. See id. at 161. In contrast, Iyamu does
not dispute that the video he was provided prior to trial was the actual video that
was shown to the jury and, therefore, an accurate copy of the exhibit presented at
trial. Thus, unlike the defendant in Lee, who had no opportunity to discover the
writing on the back of the hotel registration card prior to trial, Iyamu had an
opportunity to discover the time stamp discrepancy prior to trial by comparing it to
other evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Iyamu’s
motion for a new trial, because the government did not commit a Rule 16
discovery violation.
B. Identity Theft Convictions – Sufficiency of the Evidence
We review de novo “the denial of a motion for acquittal and the sufficiency
of the evidence to sustain a conviction, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility
choices in favor of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291,
1297-98 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). We will affirm “if a reasonable
juror could have concluded that the evidence established [the defendant’s] guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. at 1298.
12
To establish the crime of aggravated identity theft, the government must
show that a defendant, in relation to certain felonies, “knowingly transfer[red],
possesse[d], or use[d], without lawful authority, a means of identification of
another person . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The Supreme Court has held that
Ҥ 1028A requires the Government to show that the defendant knew that the means
of identification at issue belonged to another person.” Flores-Figueroa v. United
States, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1894,
173 L. Ed. 2d 853 (2009). “[T]he
government can rely on circumstantial evidence about an offender’s misuse of a
victim’s identity to prove the offender knew the identity belonged to a real
person.” United States v. Gomez-Castro,
605 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2010).
We have upheld an aggravated identity theft conviction where the defendant
used a victim’s social security card to obtain a driver’s license, identity card,
passport, and line of credit. United States v. Holmes, 595 F.3d 1255, 1256-58
(11th Cir. 2010). In Holmes, we rejected Holmes’s argument that the government
failed to explain how she obtained the victim’s identification information, and that
she was unaware of the rigorous verification procedures government officials use
when issuing drivers licenses, identification card, and passports. See
id. at 1258.
We held that “a reasonable jury could have found that, after Holmes successfully
used [the victim’s] birth certificate to obtain a passport, Holmes knew that the birth
13
certificate and corresponding social security card belonged to a real person.” Id.
Similarly, “a reasonable jury could have found that Holmes would not have sought
credit using [the victim’s] personal information if Holmes were not confident that
[the victim] likely had an actual credit history.” Id.; see also
Gomez-Castro, 605
F.3d at 1249 (holding that the defendant’s use of the victim’s birth certificate and
social security card to successfully obtain a driver’s license, two credit cards, and a
bank card, was sufficient to show that the defendant knew the birth certificate and
social security card belonged to a real person).
Here, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to infer that
Iyamu knew that the victims of his identity theft offenses were real people.
Rollins, Amin, and Hall all testified that the credit card applications submitted in
their names listed their correct social security numbers. Furthermore, employees
of Chase Bank and Bank of America testified that a credit card application would
not be approved unless the social security number on the application matched other
identifying information listed on the application, so that an individual’s credit
history could be examined. Based on the fact that Iyamu used the victims’ correct
social security numbers to obtain credit cards in their names, the jury reasonably
could have inferred that Iyamu was confident that the victims “likely had an actual
credit history” and, therefore, were real persons. See Holmes, 494 F.3d at 1258;
14
Gomez-Castro, 605 F.3d at 1249. When the Rollins, Amin, and Hall credit card
applications were approved, and when the Chopra card was activated, Iyamu
should have known that Rollins, Amin, Hall, and Chopra were real people with
credit histories. See
Holmes, 595 F.3d at 1258. Furthermore, when Iyamu began
using the Chopra card at Louis Vuitton, he introduced Maxey to an individual who
he identified as Chopra. Accordingly, viewing the evidence presented at trial in
the light most favorable to the government, see
Tampas, 493 F.3d at 1297-98,
reasonable jurors could have concluded that Iyamu knew that the victims of his
identity theft offenses were real people.
C. Application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) Enhancement
“A district court’s upward adjustment of a defendant’s Guidelines offense
level due to his status as a leader or organizer under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 is a finding
of fact reviewed only for clear error.” United States v. Phillips, 287 F.3d 1053,
1055 (11th Cir. 2002). Under the Guidelines, a two-level role enhancement is
applied if the defendant “was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” of an
offense involving more than one participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). An offense
participant is an individual who is criminally responsible for the commission of the
offense even if he is not convicted. United States v. Holland,
22 F.3d 1040, 1045
(11th Cir. 1994); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.1).
15
In determining the defendant’s role in the offense, the district court should
consider:
the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of
participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment
of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits
of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or
organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal
activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over
others.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4). “[T]he assertion of control or influence over
only one individual is enough to support a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement.” United
States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2000).
The district court did not err in applying the three-level § 3B1.1(c)
enhancement, because Maxey’s testimony established that Iyamu was an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor of the bank fraud offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).
According to Maxey’s testimony, at Iyamu’s request, Maxey (1) deposited a
$10,700 check into his bank account, (2) withdrew the money and returned it to
Iyamu, (3) deposited a $74,600 check into his bank account, and (4) gave Iyamu
his ATM card and PIN number. Providing the ATM card and PIN number to
Iyamu allowed Iyamu to make several additional fraudulent transactions using
Maxey’s account. This testimony indicates that Iyamu recruited Maxey and
exercised decision-making authority, while Maxey simply followed Iyamu’s
16
instructions. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4). Iyamu also had a larger role
in planning and organizing the offense, as he obtained the fraudulent checks that
were deposited into Maxey’s account, told Maxey what to do with the checks and
the proceeds, and eventually made the deposits himself after obtaining Maxey’s
ATM and PIN number. See id. Finally, Iyamu received a larger share of the
offense proceeds, as Maxey testified that Iyamu received $10,000 of the proceeds
from the first fraudulent check Maxey deposited, while Maxey received a $700 tip.
See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4). Thus, based on Maxey’s testimony, the
district court did not err in applying the enhancement.
Iyamu argues that the district court erred in relying on Maxey’s testimony,
because his testimony was not credible. However, “[t]he credibility of a witness is
in the province of the factfinder and this court will not ordinarily review the
factfinder’s determination of credibility.” United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412,
413 (11th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Garcia,
405 F.3d 1260, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2005) (holding that “uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may be
enough to support a conviction if the testimony is not on its face incredible or
otherwise insubstantial”). There is nothing in the record that would render
Maxey’s testimony incredible on its face. In fact, although Iyamu argues that
Maxey testified falsely about his prior fraud conviction and about his own role in
17
the offense, he cites no evidence in support of these arguments. Accordingly,
based on Maxey’s trial testimony, the district court did not err in applying the
two-level § 3B1.1(c) enhancement.
D. Reasonableness of the 70-Month Sentence
We review the final sentence imposed by the district court for
reasonableness. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262-64,
125 S. Ct. 738,
766-67,
160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005). Specifically, the district court must impose a
sentence that is both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Gall v. United
States,
552 U.S. 38, 51,
128 S. Ct. 586, 597,
169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). After
Booker, we established a two-step process for district courts to use in sentencing:
first, the district court must consult the Sentencing Guidelines and correctly
calculate the sentencing range; second, the district court must consider the factors
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in arriving at a reasonable sentence. United States v.
Talley,
431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005).
A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the district court improperly
calculates the guideline range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory
rather than advisory, fails to consider the appropriate statutory factors, selects a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately explain the chosen
sentence. Gall, 522 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597.
18
Substantively, “the district [court] should . . . consider all of the § 3553(a)
factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 49-50, 128 S.Ct. at 596. The factors in § 3553(a) that the court must
consider are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available;
(7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy
statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid
unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
restitution to victims.
Talley, 431 F.3d at 786 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). “[W]e may find that a district
court has abused its considerable discretion if it has weighed the factors in a
manner that demonstrably yields an unreasonable sentence.” United States v.
Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). Normally, however, the decision of
how much weight to accord particular factors in devising a sentence is within the
discretion of the district court. United States v. Clay,
483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir.
2007).
Here, the district court did not err by failing to consider Iyamu’s sentencing
arguments, because the district court specifically asked Iyamu what he felt would
19
be a reasonable sentence and allowed him an opportunity to present arguments in
support of his recommendation. Iyamu informed the court that he had worked
consistently in the United States, had four United States children, no prior arrests,
and had offered to cooperate. Since the district court specifically asked for
Iyamu’s opinion regarding a reasonable sentence, there is no indication that the
court did not consider the statements Iyamu offered in response. Iyamu also argues
that his sentence was unreasonable because the court erred in finding that he was a
manager or supervisor of the offense. However, as discussed above, the district
court did not err in making this determination.
Iyamu’s sentence is also substantively reasonable. Although his sentence
was at the high end of the applicable guideline range, the nature and circumstances
of the offense, the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense and promote
respect for the law, and the need to protect the public, all support a sentence at the
high end of the applicable guideline range. See Talley, 431 F.3d at 786; 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). The offenses for which Iyamu was convicted spanned several months,
involved numerous fraudulent purchases at luxury retail stores, and caused seven
banks to incur significant losses. In addition to the banks that suffered losses,
Iyamu stole the identities of four individuals. Based on the significant amount of
loss caused by Iyamu’s conduct, the duration of the offense, and the number of
20
victims affected, Iyamu’s 70-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm Iyamu’s convictions and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
21
