Filed: Nov. 16, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 10-10441 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT NOVEMBER 16, 2010 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 1:06-cv-20418-WJZ LORING N. SPOLTER, Interested Party- Appellant, versus SUNTRUST BANK, a Georgia Company, Defendant-Appellee. _ No. 10-10445 _ D.C. Docket No. 0:08-cv-60565-WJZ LORING N. SPOLTER Interested Party- Appellant, versus JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. a foreign profit corporation,
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 10-10441 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT NOVEMBER 16, 2010 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 1:06-cv-20418-WJZ LORING N. SPOLTER, Interested Party- Appellant, versus SUNTRUST BANK, a Georgia Company, Defendant-Appellee. _ No. 10-10445 _ D.C. Docket No. 0:08-cv-60565-WJZ LORING N. SPOLTER Interested Party- Appellant, versus JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. a foreign profit corporation, D..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10441 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 16, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 1:06-cv-20418-WJZ
LORING N. SPOLTER,
Interested Party-
Appellant,
versus
SUNTRUST BANK,
a Georgia Company,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
No. 10-10445
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:08-cv-60565-WJZ
LORING N. SPOLTER
Interested Party-
Appellant,
versus
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO.
a foreign profit corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
No. 10-10446
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:06-cv-80334-WJZ
LORING N. SPOLTER
Interested Party-
Appellant,
versus
TOYS “R” US - Delaware, Inc.
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
No. 10-10449
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:09-cv-60259-WJZ
LORING N. SPOLTER
Interested Party-
Appellant,
versus
D & B TILE OF HIALEAH, INC.,
a Florida Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
2
__________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 16, 2010)
Before BLACK, CARNES and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Loring N. Spolter appeals the district court’s order issuing sanctions against
him pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (Rule 11), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court’s
inherent powers.1 Spolter contends the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed monetary and non-monetary sanctions2 in response to his filing of
multiple, successive motions for reconsideration and recusal. Specifically, he
claims that the motions were within the bounds of the law, and further that the
questioning of the impartiality of a district court judge does not render the motions
improper. After review, we affirm the district court’s order.3
1
This appeal originates from a consolidation of four cases, three motions for sanctions,
and the district court’s own imposition of sanctions.
2
Spolter was ordered to pay attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $99,124.40 and a
total fine of $10,000. The order also included suspension from practice in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida for a period of 42 months and a referral to the
Florida Bar.
3
We review a court’s decision to order sanctions under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and
the court’s inherent power for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., In re Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc.,
456 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006); Cordoba v. Dillard’s Inc.,
419 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir.
2005).
3
A review of the record, including the 68-page district court order, shows
Spolter has been intensely persistent in seeking the recusal of Judge Zloch because
of a perceived bias he believes the judge has against him. It is clear from the
record that Spolter has repeatedly attempted to create the appearance of
impropriety to further his requests for the recusal and reassignment of cases by
Judge Zloch. Spolter has repeatedly attacked Judge Zloch’s faith and political
affiliations, and has also called into question the credentials of some of his former
law clerks. Spolter has further impugned the dignity of the court by alleging that
both Judge Zloch and the Clerk’s Office have manipulated the case assignment
system of the entire Southern District of Florida for the sole purpose of ensuring
Judge Zloch receives a disproportionate number of Spolter’s cases. However,
Spolter has failed to provide even a mere scintilla of evidence supporting his
claims of misconduct against Judge Zloch or the Clerk’s office.
“When a district court cites multiple sources of authority for issuing
sanctions, [our] basic task in reviewing the sanctions is to determine whether the
sanctions were permissible under at least one of those sources of authority.”
Amlong & Amlong P.A. v. Denny’s, Inc., 500 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2007).
“If any one of the sources of authority invoked by the district court provides a
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sound basis for the sanctions, we must affirm the sanctions order.” See id. at
1239.
Rule 11 sanctions are proper “(1) when a party files a pleading that
has no reasonable factual basis; (2) when the party files a pleading
that is based on a legal theory that has no reasonable chance of
success and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to
change existing law; and (3) when the party files a pleading in bad
faith for an improper purpose.”
Jones v. Int’l Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 694 (11th Cir. 1995). Further,
“[i]n filing a pleading in federal court, an attorney certifies that he or she has
conducted a reasonable inquiry and that the pleading is well-grounded in fact,
legally tenable, and is not presented for any improper purpose.” Baker v.
Alderman,
158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). “This court
requires a two-step inquiry as to (1) whether the party’s claims are objectively
frivolous; and (2) whether the person who signed the pleadings should have been
aware they were frivolous.”
Id. “Rule 11 sanctions are warranted when a party
files a pleading that (1) has no reasonable factual basis; (2) is based on legal
theory that has no reasonable chance of success and that cannot be advanced as a
reasonable argument to change existing law; and (3) is filed in bad faith or for an
improper purpose.”
Id.
5
28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides “[a]ny attorney . . . who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” “We have consistently held that an
attorney multiplies proceedings ‘unreasonably and vexatiously’4 within the
meaning of the statute only when the attorney’s conduct is so egregious that it is
‘tantamount to bad faith.’” See
Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1239. “[F]or purposes of
§ 1927, bad faith turns not on the attorney’s subjective intent, but on the attorney’s
objective conduct.”
Id. Three essential requirements must be satisfied with
respect to an award of sanctions under § 1927:
First, the attorney must engage in “unreasonable and vexatious”
conduct. Second, that “unreasonable and vexatious” conduct must be
conduct that “multiplies the proceedings.” Finally, the dollar amount
of the sanction must bear financial nexus to the excess proceedings,
i.e. the sanction may not exceed the “costs, expenses, and attorneys’
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”
Peterson v. BMI Refractories, Inc., 124 F.3d 1386, 1396 (11th Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, “[i]n order for § 1927 to be applicable, there must be a causal
4
“The term ‘unreasonably’ necessarily connotes that the district court must compare the
attorney's conduct against the conduct of a ‘reasonable’ attorney and make a judgment about
whether the conduct was acceptable according to some objective standard. The term
‘vexatiously’ similarly requires an evaluation of the attorney's objective conduct.” Amlong, 500
F.3d at 1239-40.
6
connection between the objectionable conduct of counsel and multiplication of the
proceedings. . . . objectionable conduct-- even ‘unreasonable and vexatious’
conduct-- is not sanctionable unless it results in proceedings that would not have
been conducted otherwise.” Id.
Federal courts have the inherent power to impose sanctions on parties and
lawyers. In re Walker,
532 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008). To impose
sanctions under the court's inherent power, the court must find bad faith. See
id.
(explaining “a finding of bad faith is warranted where an attorney knowingly or
recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the
purpose of harassing an opponent.”). Further, the inherent power of a court can be
invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct.
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991).
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it:
(1) imposed attorney’s fees against Spolter and his firm for the fees and costs of
the Appellees, the Clerk of Court, and the Assistant United States Attorneys; and
(2) fined Spolter for a total amount of $10,000 pursuant to Rule 11. Spolter’s
conduct in filing multiple recusal and reconsideration motions without providing a
good faith basis supports the district court’s imposition of sanctions. Even though
Spolter claims he had a good faith belief the case assignment system operated on a
7
blind random basis before filing his motion for reconsideration, his claims are
unpersuasive. The record shows he was notified by a letter from the court
explaining how the case assignment system operates in the Southern District of
Florida. If Spolter reviewed the case assignment rules cited in this letter, he would
have known the Southern District of Florida does not operate on a pure blind,
random basis. Instead, Spolter enlisted the services of an expert five days after
receiving notification from the court, and provided him with inaccurate
information in an attempt to try and prove the case assignment system had been
manipulated and that Judge Zloch was behind it. Further, Spolter even admits that
prior to filing his motion for reconsideration, he should have investigated the
Court’s internal operating procedure and that he mistakenly directed the expert to
assume facts that he knew were not true. Although Spolter claims he made a good
faith mistake, we believe Spolter’s actions were done in bad faith and for an
improper purpose. See Jones, 49 F.3d at 694. Accordingly, we hold the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed sanctions against Spolter
pursuant to Rule 11.
Next, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
imposed attorneys fees and costs against Spolter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
Despite his contention to the contrary, the record is clear that Spolter has filed
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numerous motions in bad faith and for an improper purpose. Further, the filing of
these motions “multiplied the proceedings” both unreasonably and vexatiously
based on the objective conduct of Spolter. See Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1239.
Although Spolter argues the motions filed were made in subjective good faith,
based on the information then known to him, the totality of the circumstances
supports a finding of objective unreasonableness.
Lastly, for the same reasons the district court determined Spolter’s actions
to be sanctionable under Rule 11 and § 1927, we conclude the district court did
not abuse its discretion when it (1) referred Spolter to the Florida Bar; (2) assessed
attorney’s fees and costs against Spolter and his firm; (3) fined Spolter and his
firm $10,000; and (4) suspended Spolter from practice in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida for a period of 42 months pursuant to its
inherent powers. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
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