Filed: Oct. 24, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 09-11071 OCTOBER 24, 2011 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 08-00088-CR-FTM-29-DNF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus GURMERCINDO BELTRAN, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (October 24, 2011) ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT Before DUBINA, Chie
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 09-11071 OCTOBER 24, 2011 Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 08-00088-CR-FTM-29-DNF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus GURMERCINDO BELTRAN, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (October 24, 2011) ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT Before DUBINA, Chief..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-11071 OCTOBER 24, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-00088-CR-FTM-29-DNF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GURMERCINDO BELTRAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(October 24, 2011)
ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge.*
*
Judge Birch was a panel member of the original Opinion. Since then, Judge Birch
retired from the bench and is no longer a member of the court. Pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 34-2, the
remaining two judges may proceed by quorum.
PER CURIAM:
In United States v. Beltran, 367 F. App’x 984 (11th Cir. 2010), we affirmed
Appellant Gurmercindo Beltran’s enhanced sentence as a career offender pursuant
to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4b1.1 following his conviction for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The United States Supreme Court vacated our judgment,
Beltran v. United States, ___ U.S. ___ ,
131 S. Ct. 899 (2011), and remanded the
case to us for further consideration in light of its decision in Johnson v. United
States, 559 U.S. ___ ,
130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010). Having considered the parties’
briefs in the initial appeal and the record, we remand this case to the district court
for further consideration of Beltran’s sentence in light of Johnson.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered whether the defendant’s prior
Florida battery conviction was a “violent felony” under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”) 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), one with an element of “use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
The Johnson Court determined that in order for a crime to be a violent felony, it
must involve “violent force,” further defined by the Court as “force capable of
causing physical pain or injury to another.” Johnson, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S. Ct.
at 1271.
2
Under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4b1.1, a defendant qualifies as
a career offender if he has “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime
of violence or a controlled substance offense.” A crime of violence is defined as it
is in the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), the provision at issue in Johnson.
Thus, in addition to certain enumerated offenses not relevant here, a “crime of
violence” for purposes of § 4B1.1 is “any other offense under federal, state, or
local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another.”
To decide whether a prior conviction constitutes a crime of violence, the
sentencing court ordinarily employs a “categorical approach.” Taylor v. United
States,
495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). Under this approach, the court may “look only
to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.”
Taylor,
495 U.S. at 602. In a limited class of cases, however, where the definition of the
underlying crime encompasses both violent and non-violent conduct, a sentencing
court may look beyond the statutory definition. Johnson, 559 U.S. at ___, 130 S.
Ct. at 1273. In such cases, “the modified categorical approach . . . permits a court
to determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction by consulting
the trial record—including charging documents, plea agreements, [and] transcripts
of plea colloquies[.]”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
3
In this case, the district court relied on Beltran’s felony conviction under
Fla. Stat. § 843.01 as one of the predicate offenses for the career offender
enhancement under § 4B1.1(a).1 At the time of Beltran’s conviction, Fla. Stat. §
843.01 made it a felony offense to “knowingly and willfully” resist, obstruct, or
oppose “any officer . . . in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or
doing violence to the person of such officer.” Fla. Stat. § 843.01 (2002). The
district court exclusively employed the categorical approach in reaching its
conclusion and did not consider if Beltran’s conviction under Fla. Stat. § 843.01
qualified as a violent felony under the modified-categorical approach discussed in
Johnson.2 Thus, we vacate Beltran’s enhanced sentence and remand this case for
the district court to consider the enhancement anew in light of Johnson v. United
States, 559 U.S. ___ ,
130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010).
VACATED and REMANDED.
1
Beltran does not dispute that he has one qualifying prior felony conviction.
2
The government alluded to potentially useful information regarding the nature of
Beltran’s Florida offense, but the record on appeal is not complete enough for us to determine
whether the modified-categorical approach may be applied to find Fla. Stat. § 843.01 is a violent
felony. See Sentencing Transcript, statements by government’s counsel, R. 85 at 17 (“The
crimes, the acts that Mr. Beltran committed, were crimes of violence. We believe that, quite
possibly, [defense counsel] may even be right categorically, but there is no dispute as to what Mr.
Beltran did, and they were violent acts.”).
4