Filed: Mar. 30, 2011
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MARCH 30, 2011 No. 09-15417 JOHN LEY CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 07-01263-CV-TWT-1 DOUG BURCHFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant-Appellee, THE ANDERSONS, INC., Defendant- ThirdParty-Plaintiff, STAR OF THE WEST MILLING COMPANY, Third Party Defendant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (March 30, 20
Summary: [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS _ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MARCH 30, 2011 No. 09-15417 JOHN LEY CLERK _ D. C. Docket No. 07-01263-CV-TWT-1 DOUG BURCHFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant-Appellee, THE ANDERSONS, INC., Defendant- ThirdParty-Plaintiff, STAR OF THE WEST MILLING COMPANY, Third Party Defendant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (March 30, 201..
More
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 30, 2011
No. 09-15417 JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-01263-CV-TWT-1
DOUG BURCHFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee,
THE ANDERSONS, INC.,
Defendant-
ThirdParty-Plaintiff,
STAR OF THE WEST MILLING COMPANY,
Third Party Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(March 30, 2011)
Before MARTIN, COX and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Doug Burchfield sued CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”)
seeking damages for injuries that he sustained in an accident involving a railcar
CSX delivered to his employer. After a jury trial, judgment was entered in CSX’s
favor. Burchfield now challenges a number of the district court’s evidentiary
rulings and refusal to give jury instructions that he requested. After thorough
review, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
I.
A.
On June 3, 2005, CSX delivered a railcar identified as “AEX 7136” to
General Mills’ cereal processing plant in Covington, Georgia. The railcar was
loaded with grain. Two days later, Plaintiff Doug Burchfield and a coworker,
Rodney Turk, moved the AEX 7136 from one track to another at the plant. Turk
operated a Trackmobile railcar mover.1 Burchfield worked on the ground.
After moving the AEX 7136, Burchfield and Turk began working downhill
from the railcar. A short time later the AEX 7136 rolled down the track and
1
A railcar mover attaches to a railcar and is used to transfer a railcar from one location
to another. Trackmobile is a manufacturer of railcar movers. See Trackmobile, Mobile Railcar
Movers, http://www.trackmobile.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
2
crashed into two other railcars. All three railcars ran over Burchfield. Burchfield
suffered a number of injuries in the accident, including loss of the use of his legs.
In June 2007, Burchfield filed suit against The Andersons, Inc.
(“Andersons”), the owner of the AEX 7136, and CSX. Burchfield sought to
recover general and special damages under theories of negligence and negligence
per se. He also asserted a claim for punitive damages. Burchfield alleged that his
injuries were caused by the defendants’ failure to deliver the AEX 7136 to General
Mills’ Covington plant with an efficient hand brake, in violation of the Federal
Safety Appliance Act and Federal Railroad Administration regulations. Before
trial, Burchfield entered into a settlement agreement with Andersons, which was
therefore dismissed from the action with prejudice.
Burchfield’s case went to trial with a jury in October 2009. At trial, CSX
introduced into evidence, over Burchfield’s objection, a video made for General
Mills by Gary Wolf, a railroad expert, for purposes of an Occupational Safety and
Health Administration investigation of Burchfield’s accident. The video had no
sound. It purported to show the AEX 7136 railcar involved in Burchfield’s
accident at two different locations at General Mills’ Covington plant. The first
location was the site where the AEX 7136 railcar was alleged to be located before
Burchfield’s accident. The second location was a site with a greater slope. At both
3
locations, the video depicted the railcar with an activated hand brake. The railcar
was then separated from the Trackmobile railcar mover and stayed in place for
more than twenty minutes. The video also purported to show seven other instances
in which the AEX 7136's hand brake was applied and released.
In addition to the video, CSX also introduced the video deposition testimony
of Bryan Nutt, an expert hired by Andersons, who performed a “brake shoe force
test” on the AEX 7136 railcar’s hand brake system. In response to an objection by
Burchfield, the district court only allowed CSX to introduce portions of Nutt’s
deposition testimony that involved his factual observations during testing. The
district court barred CSX from introducing Nutt’s expert testimony.
As part of its defense, CSX also introduced the video deposition testimony
of Charles Jobes. Jobes was the designated Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) corporate
representative for Barloworld Handling, a company hired by General Mills to train
its employees how to properly operate and maintain a Trackmobile rail car mover.
After the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict for CSX.
Burchfield now challenges a number of the district court’s evidentiary rulings and
its refusal to give jury instructions that he requested. Specifically, Burchfield
argues on appeal that the district court erred by admitting: the video created by
Gary Wolf; Bryan Nutt’s video deposition testimony; and Charles Jobes’ video
4
deposition testimony. Burchfield also challenges the district court’s refusal to give
his requested jury instruction on negligence per se and instructions involving the
exercise of reasonable care by CSX.
B.
“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”
Proctor v. Fluor Enters., 494 F.3d 1337, 1349 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007). “[W]hen
employing an abuse of discretion standard, we will leave undisturbed a district
court’s ruling unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of
judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” Corwin v. Walt Disney Co.,
475 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quotation marks
omitted). Moreover, “we will not overturn an evidentiary ruling unless the moving
party establishes a substantial prejudicial effect.” Perera v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.,
544 F.3d 1271, 1274–75 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008). The moving party makes that
showing by demonstrating that the error “probably had a substantial influence on
the jury’s verdict.”
Proctor, 494 F.3d at 1352 (quotation marks omitted).
A district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction is also reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Beckford v. Dep’t of Corrs., 605 F.3d 951, 957 (11th Cir.
2010). An abuse of discretion is committed only when “(1) the requested
instruction correctly stated the law, (2) the instruction dealt with an issue properly
5
before the jury, and (3) the failure to give the instruction resulted in prejudicial
harm to the requesting party.” Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261,
1287 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).
II.
We will first address Burchfield’s argument that the district court erred in
admitting a video made by Gary Wolf, a consulting expert, for General Mills.2 He
argues that the video depicted a recreation of his accident. In order for the video to
be admissible, Burchfield asserts that CSX was required to prove that the testing on
the video was performed under substantially similar conditions as those
surrounding his accident. To make that showing, Burchfield maintains that expert
testimony from Gary Wolf was necessary. CSX argues in response that the video
was not a recreation such that it would be subject to a heightened foundational
standard. Rather, CSX contends that the video was properly admitted because it
was authenticated under Fed. R. Evid. 901(a), which requires a lesser showing
2
General Mills, Burchfield’s employer, has never been a party to this litigation. Gary
Wolf made the video for General Mills for purposes of an Occupational Safety and Health
Administration investigation. CSX filed a motion to compel General Mills to produce the video.
The district court granted CSX’s motion in part. The court ordered CSX to produce the video
but denied “any request by CSX to depose Gary Wolf or to obtain from Mr. Wolf any opinions,
data concerning testing, or other matters [that the court believed were] covered by the work
product privilege as incorporated into Rule 26.” Burchfield filed a motion before trial to exclude
the video. He argued that it was impossible for CSX to lay a proper foundation for the video in
light of the court’s earlier ruling preventing CSX from deposing or otherwise obtaining
information from Wolf. The district court denied Burchfield’s motion without a written order on
October 2, 2009.
6
from a witness laying a foundation for a photograph or motion picture. See United
States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 819 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v Clayton,
643
F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981).3
Building on this argument that the video was not offered as a recreation of
the accident, CSX goes on to assert that it was unnecessary to establish substantial
similarity of conditions between the testing on the video and Burchfield’s accident.
In making this argument, CSX relies on case law suggesting that the
demonstrations of mere “general scientific principles” do not require a showing of
substantial similarity. See Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 566 (5th Cir.
2006) (“When the demonstrative evidence is offered only as an illustration of
general scientific principles, not as a reenactment of disputed events, it need not
pass the substantial similarity test.”); McKnight ex rel. Ludwig v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.,
36 F.3d 1396, 1401 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[W]here the experimental tests
do not purport to recreate the accident, but instead the experiments are used to
demonstrate only general scientific principles, the requirement of substantially
similar circumstances no longer applies.”). To resolve the issue, we examine the
3
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before
October 1, 1981.
7
way in which CSX used the video at trial.4
Our review of the record demonstrates that CSX used the video to discredit
Burchfield’s theory of the case: that Burchfield applied the hand brake on the AEX
7136 but it was inefficient5 and failed to hold the railcar in place. Although CSX
contends that the video was not offered as a recreation of Burchfield’s accident,
CSX’s statements at trial belie that assertion. CSX repeatedly emphasized the
purported similarities between the events depicted on the video and the
circumstances surrounding Burchfield’s accident. During opening statements,
CSX told the jury:
You are going to see during the course of this case a video that was
made of this railcar after this accident occurred. The car’s in the same
condition. It weighs the same. It has essentially all the same
mechanical stuff. It was placed back in the area where Mr. Burchfield
left it before this accident happened. And you will see that it does
[meet] the definition of efficient. It holds the railcar in place. It’ll
hold the railcar in place on seven different tests of whether the car
would roll or not in this area. It was an efficient hand brake, and it
simply had not been applied [by Burchfield]. . . .
During closing arguments, CSX stated: “[T]his video utilized the same car with the
4
Because the purpose of the Wolf video is central to the parties’ dispute, we include a
lengthy discussion of the way it was used at Burchfield’s trial by CSX.
5
The Federal Safety Appliance Act provides that: “[A] railroad carrier may use or allow
to be used on any of its railroad lines . . . a vehicle only if it is equipped with . . . efficient hand
brakes.” 49 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(1)(B). The Supreme Court has explained that “[e]fficient means
adequate in performance; producing properly a desired effect.” Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S.
477, 483,
67 S. Ct. 1334, 1338 (1947).
8
same load and the same mechanical condition at two locations.”
While we recognize that opening statements and closing arguments are not
in themselves evidence, their purpose “is to assist the jury in analyzing the
evidence.” United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). Here,
CSX highlighted the video as proof that Burchfield did not apply the hand brake on
the AEX 7136. CSX did not characterize the video’s contents as establishing
merely the way in which a hand brake is properly applied. See Four Corners
Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca, S.A.,
979 F.2d 1434, 1442 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[I]f
the evidence is offered to merely show physical principles, the experiment should
be conducted without suggesting that it simulates actual events.”).
CSX also used the video during its cross examination of David Engle, one of
Burchfield’s expert witnesses. CSX instructed Engle:
I want you to assume that a railcar, an Andersons railcar loaded, a
286,000-pound railcar that is loaded with precisely the same load that
it had on June 5th of 2005 [the date of Burchfield’s accident], that the
brake rigging and all of the mechanical aspects of the car are identical
[to] the way they were on June 5th, 2005. And I want you to assume
that the car has been placed in a position as steep or steeper than the
position it was in before this car rolled away on June 5, 2006 [sic].
I’m now going to show you a video of those assumptions . . . .
After playing the video, CSX asked Engle whether the railcar on the video
appeared to have an efficient hand brake. Engle responded: “Based on what I see
9
there, yes.”6
During its cross examination of General Mills safety manager John
Henderson, CSX asked about the circumstances surrounding the video’s creation.
Henderson testified that he witnessed the video being made and stated that the
AEX 7136 railcar depicted in the video was in the same condition “mechanically
and load-wise” as on the date of Burchfield’s accident. He also testified that the
AEX 7136 railcar was filmed at two different locations at General Mills Covington
plant: (1) where Burchfield allegedly left the railcar before the accident; and (2) a
location further down the track with a steeper slope.
In addition to what was quoted from the closing argument above, CSX
showed the video to the jury and summarized its contents as follows:
[T]his video utilized the same car with the same load and the same
mechanical condition at two locations. One was a location where they
best thought Mr. Burchfield left the car and [the hand brake] held [it]
there. And then they moved it down the slope where the slope was
greater. And they did it a second number of times and it held there.
That, ladies, is an efficient handbrake. Again, same load, same
mechanical condition.
6
CSX also referred to the Wolf video during its cross examination of Michael O’Brien, a
safety consultant hired by Burchfield. CSX asked O’Brien: “You were shown a videotape at
your deposition. And you at that time, I believe, opined that what you saw with the hand brake
being applied and released, the car rolling when released, stopping when the hand brake was
applied, you believe that showed an efficient hand brake, correct?” O’Brien replied: “Yeah. But
that’s minus a lot of information. . . . That was my original opinion. But, again, I think that
there are other factors that were unknown to me and I think they’re relevant.”
10
Thus, at various points throughout the trial, CSX expressly argued that the
video recreated the incident at issue in this case, and proved that Burchfield did not
properly apply the hand brake. Thus, this was not a case of “evidence . . . offered
to merely show physical principles.” Four Corners Helicopters, Inc., 979 F.2d at
1442; see also
Muth, 461 F.3d at 566;
Ludwig, 36 F.3d at 1401. Rather, it is one in
which “[t]he results of the experiment purported to coincide with [CSX’s] theory
of how the accident occurred.” Barnes v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 547 F.2d at 275,
277–78 (5th Cir. 1977); see
Muth, 461 F.3d at 566 (explaining that “resemblance
[to the disputed accident] . . . gives rise to the requirement of substantial
similarity”) We therefore conclude that the substantially similar conditions
standard the former Fifth Circuit announced in Barnes applies to the video’s
admission. See
Barnes, 547 F.2d at 277–78.
Under that precedent, a district court generally has “wide discretion to admit
evidence of experiments conducted under substantially similar conditions.”
Barnes, 547 F.2d at 277; see also Bish v. Emp’rs. Liab. Assurance Corp.,
236 F.2d
62, 70 (5th Cir. 1956) (explaining that evidence of an out of court experiment is
admissible “provided it will enlighten and assist, rather than confuse the jury, by
directly illustrating and tending to establish or to disprove a material issue, and
provided the experiment was fairly and honestly made under circumstances and
11
conditions substantially similar to those attending the alleged occurrence”). The
burden is on the party offering the evidence to lay a proper foundation establishing
a similarity of circumstances and conditions. Barnes, 547 F.2d at 277. For the
experiment to be admissible, “it is not required that all the conditions shall be
precisely reproduced, but they must be so nearly the same in substantial particulars
as to afford a fair comparison in respect to the particular issue to which the test is
directed.” Id.; see also United States v. Gaskell,
985 F.2d 1056, 1060 (11th Cir.
1993) (explaining that the conditions of the experiment and the event at issue must
be sufficiently similar to provide a fair comparison). “Further, experimental or
demonstrative evidence, like any evidence offered at trial, should be excluded ‘if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.’”
Gaskell, 985 F.2d at 1060
(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403).
We conclude that CSX failed to satisfy the Barnes substantially similar
conditions test. To be sure, CSX attempted to lay a proper foundation for the
admission of the video through John Henderson’s testimony. That testimony,
however, did not establish a similarity of conditions between the testing on the
video and Burchfield’s accident. Although Henderson provided specifics about the
AEX 7136 used in the tests and where the tests were conducted, he provided no
12
specifics about the actual tests themselves. For example, when asked about the
way that the hand brake was applied on the video and, specifically, whether it was
“torqued to higher than a normal human being can do,” Henderson replied: “I
don’t know.” Because he only witnessed the testing, Henderson’s testimony was
limited to his visual observations. Cf. United States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236,
1249–50 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting videos of pipe bombs exploding where the government offered
testimony of the explosives expert who constructed the pipe bombs stating that the
devices on the video were virtually identical to those used by the defendant).
The scope of Henderson’s testimony made it impossible to assess whether
the video “was fairly and honestly made under circumstances and conditions
substantially similar to those attending” Burchfield’s accident. Bish, 236 F.2d at
70 (quotation marks omitted). We need not decide whether, as Burchfield
contends, Gary Wolf’s testimony was necessary for the video to be properly
admitted. Because Henderson’s testimony did not lay a proper foundation for the
video’s admission, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting it under the specific facts present here.
We must next inquire as to whether the district court’s erroneous admission
of the video was prejudicial. We well recognize that no trial is ever perfect, and
13
acknowledge that there are likely circumstances in which the erroneous admission
of a video could be harmless. But this circumstance is not one of harmless error.
Burchfield’s theory of liability was premised entirely upon a defective hand break.
The video depicted events which the jury was repeatedly told were the same as the
accident resulting in Burchfield’s injuries. Thus the video spoke directly to the
ultimate disputed issue in the case, even though it had not been subject to the
standards required for such a reenactment. CSX used the video to argue to the jury
that Burchfield’s accident resulted from his own negligence in failing to apply the
hand brake. CSX’s repeated references to the video underscore its centrality to
CSX’s defense of the case, and the important role assigned to the video in rebutting
Burchfield’s theory of the case. By showing the AEX 7136 staying in place when
the hand brake was applied, the video purported to rebut Burchfield’s theory that
the brake was defective. As we have recognized, “demonstrative exhibits tend to
leave a particularly potent image in the jurors’ minds.” Gaskell, 985 F.2d at 1061
n.2; see also United States v. Wanoskia,
800 F.2d 235, 237–38 (10th Cir. 1986)
(explaining that a court “must take special care to ensure that [a] demonstration
fairly depicts the events at issue” because demonstrative evidence is highly
persuasive). As in Barnes, the video was “calculated to cause the jury to accept
[CSX’s] theory over [Burchfield’s]
evidence.” 547 F.2d at 278. By unfairly
14
prejudicing the jury on the pivotal issue in the case, it is likely that the video’s
admission had a substantial prejudicial effect, warranting reversal. See Gaskell,
985 F.2d at 1061–62 (finding reversible error where the erroneously admitted
evidence went to the key issue in the case).
Having concluded that the district court committed reversible error by
admitting the Wolf video, we need not address Burchfield’s other points of error.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case remanded for a new
trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
15
