Filed: Jul. 20, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 10-14957 JULY 20, 2011 JOHN LEY Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-01518-WCO H. KEITH ALEXANDER, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant, versus COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (Jul
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED _ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 10-14957 JULY 20, 2011 JOHN LEY Non-Argument Calendar CLERK _ D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-01518-WCO H. KEITH ALEXANDER, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant, versus COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (July..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-14957 JULY 20, 2011
JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-01518-WCO
H. KEITH ALEXANDER,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(July 20, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
H. Keith Alexander appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
Security Commissioner’s (Commissioner’s) denial of disability insurance benefits,
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner determined that Alexander was not
eligible for disability benefits because he failed to demonstrate his insured status
at the time he became disabled. To show that he met the insured status, Alexander
must have had sufficient quarters of coverage, in this case 20 quarters during the
40-quarter period ending with the quarter in which he became disabled (the 20/40
requirement). 20 C.F.R. § 404.130. Both the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
and the district court agreed with the Commissioner’s determination that
Alexander lacked the necessary quarters of coverage. After a thorough review of
the record, we affirm.
I. Background
On August 12, 2003, Alexander applied for disability benefits, alleging a
disability onset date of April 30, 2003. When he filed for disability, his earnings
record showed no quarters of coverage in 2001 or 2002. On the same day,
Alexander and his wife Monique submitted statements claiming that they owned a
business together and that the total earnings from their business for 2001 and 2002
should have been split between them. A few months later, the Commissioner
notified Alexander that it credited him with $7,713 in self-employment earnings
for 2001, but did not credit him with any earnings for 2002. The Commissioner
then denied Alexander’s application for benefits. On reconsideration in 2007, the
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Commissioner informed Alexander that he did not meet the insured status required
for disability benefits and that the $7,713 posted to his earnings record for 2001
was in error and would be removed and reposted to Monique’s record.
At a subsequent hearing before an ALJ, Alexander’s attorney indicated that
Alexander wanted to amend the alleged onset date of disability to March 25, 2002,
when his doctor started treating Alexander regularly for pain. The ALJ informed
Alexander that there was a “technical problem” with his case because he would
not qualify for benefits without quarters of coverage for 2001 and 2002.
Alexander testified that he met Monique in 1999 and began to work at her
company in 2001, the year they were married. Although Alexander was never
paid, he and Monique shared a joint bank account. Alexander worked between 25
and 35 hours per week doing computer-related work and bookkeeping for the
business. But by the end of 2002, Alexander could no longer work due to his
medical limitations.
Monique then testified that Alexander set up and maintained the computer
systems, ran reports, and did the bookkeeping. His assistance depended on how
his health was at the time and he stopped working entirely in early 2003. Monique
never issued a W2 Form to Alexander showing employee income because she
considered him a co-owner of the business. According to the record, none of the
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tax forms, banking records, or state certificates of registration for the business
listed Alexander as co-owner.
Alexander’s earnings record reflected that he had four quarters of coverage
in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996. He had no quarters of coverage in 1997,
1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, or 2003. In his disability report, Alexander indicated that
he had stopped working on April 30, 2003. An agency worksheet indicated that
without 2001 earnings, Alexander would not have insured status if his disability
onset date was April 30, 2003. But with earnings in 2001, Alexander’s last
insured date would have been December 31, 2002.
The ALJ concluded that, based on the records and tax documents submitted,
Alexander’s and Monique’s testimony concerning his co-ownership of the
business lacked credibility. The ALJ found that, although it was reasonable to
expect that Alexander helped with bookkeeping and computing activities from
time to time, there was no evidence that the two owned the business together or
intended to create a partnership. Accordingly, the ALJ calculated that Alexander
only had 15 quarters of coverage in the 40 quarters immediately preceding the
quarter of his onset of disability on April 30, 2003.1 The ALJ stated that the
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The ALJ determined that Alexander had three quarters of coverage in 1993; four
quarters in 1994; four quarters in 1995; four quarters in 1996; and no coverage from 1997
through 2002 and the first quarter of 2003.
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“documentary record and testimony [did] not support the claimant’s contention
that work activities he performed in 2001 and 2002 resulted in covered earnings
sufficient to confer additional quarters of coverage necessary to establish insured
status . . . as of his alleged onset date of disability.” The ALJ additionally found
that Alexander last met the insured status requirement on December 31, 2001,
before his alleged onset date of disability. The ALJ determined that, due to his
lack of disability insured status, Alexander had not been under a disability at any
time from his alleged onset date through the date of the decision. Alexander
appealed and the Appeals Council denied review.
Alexander then filed a complaint in district court. The magistrate judge
found that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that the 2001 earnings
should have been attributed to Monique rather than to Alexander. The magistrate
judge also noted that the Appeals Council’s failure to consider Alexander’s
amended onset date in 2002 was harmless error because, without the 2001 quarters
of coverage, Alexander would not have been eligible for benefits based on either
onset date. Adopting these findings, the district court entered judgment in favor of
the Commissioner.
On appeal, Alexander first argues that he met the insured requirement
before his alleged disability onset date based on his earnings from 2001.
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Specifically, Alexander asserts that in 2003 the agency added four quarters of
coverage to his 2001 earnings record, and that this decision was conclusive
because the appeal window and time limitation for revising the Commissioner’s
records passed and no time-limitation exception applied. Second, Alexander
argues that the ALJ misidentified his disability onset date as April 30, 2003
because Alexander had amended his onset date to March 25, 2002.
II. Standard of Review
We review the decision of the ALJ as the Commissioner’s final decision
when the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of the ALJ’s
decision. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). “Our review in
a Social Security case is the same as that of the district court.” Miles v. Chater,
84
F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). The standard of review is “demarcated by a
deferential reconsideration of the findings of fact and exacting examination of the
conclusions of law.” Martin v. Sullivan,
894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
The Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive if “supported by substantial
evidence,” but the “[Commissioner’s] conclusions of law, including applicable
review standards, are not presumed valid.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
III. The 20/40 Requirement
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To qualify for disability benefits, Alexander must have 20 quarters of
coverage during the 40-quarter period ending with the quarter in which he became
disabled. “[I]nsured status is a basic factor in determining if [a claimant is]
entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits or to a period of disability . . . .
If [a claimant is] neither fully nor currently insured, no benefits are payable based
on [the claimant’s] earnings.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.101(a). In this case, Alexander
must establish both earnings coverage from 2001 and an amended disability onset
date of March 2002 to meet the 20/40 requirement.
A. Earnings Coverage from 2001
Although the Commissioner in this case originally determined that
Alexander had income from his wife’s business in 2001, the Commissioner later
corrected this finding and concluded that Alexander had no income in 2001.
Generally, the Commissioner may correct any entry of wages or self-employment
income before the expiration of the “time limitation.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(4). The
time limitation is a period of 3 years, 3 months, and 15 days after the individual
received earnings. Id. at § 405(c)(1)(B). “Before the time limit ends for any year,
[the Commissioner] will correct the record of [an individual’s] earnings for that
year for any reason if satisfactory evidence shows SSA records are incorrect. [He]
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may correct the record as the result of a request filed under § 404.820 or [he] may
correct it on [his] own.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.821.
After the time limit expires, the Commissioner’s records generally are
conclusive evidence of the individual’s wages or self-employment income. 42
U.S.C. § 405(c)(4)(A). But the statute and regulations permit the Commissioner
to correct an individual’s earnings records after the time limit under certain
circumstances. Id. at § 405(c)(5); 20 C.F.R. § 404.822. One of those
circumstances is when “an application for monthly benefits . . . was filed within
the time limitation following such year; except that no such change, deletion, or
inclusion may be made pursuant to this subparagraph after a final decision upon
the application for monthly benefits.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
This is known as the pending-application exception.
In this case, we conclude that the Commissioner could amend Alexander’s
earnings record in 2007 under the pending-application exception because
Alexander had filed an application for benefits within the time limit for correcting
his earnings record and there was not yet a final decision on his application. 42
U.S.C. § 405(c)(5)(A) . Nothing in the statute or regulations prohibits the agency
from revisiting its earlier earnings record decision if there is a pending application.
42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(5)(A), (B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.822(c). Accordingly, the agency
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did not err when it addressed his 2001 earnings after the time limitation expired
and determined that he had no coverage that year.
B. Alexander’s Disability Onset Date
Social Security Rules define the onset date of disability as “the first day an
individual is disabled as defined in the Act and the regulations.” SSR 83-20.
Relevant factors in determining the onset date include a claimant’s allegations,
work history, and medical and other evidence related to the severity of the
impairment. Id.
Here, the ALJ did not explain which disability onset date he applied,
although it appears from the opinion that he applied the April 2003 date.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the ambiguity as to Alexander’s disability onset
date is immaterial. Even if the ALJ relied on the amended March 2002 date,
Alexander would not be eligible for disability benefits without earnings coverage
in 2001.
Accordingly, the Commissioner properly determined that Alexander did not
qualify for benefits.
AFFIRMED.
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