PER CURIAM:
On August 20, 2004, Patsy Croom was seized by law enforcement and detained for up to two hours while officers
In August of 2004, Croom, a 63-year old retiree and Arkansas resident, came to Sarasota, Florida to visit her son whose wife had recently committed suicide.
In June 2004, a confidential informant alerted the Sarasota County Sheriff's Office that three men, including Croom's son and Dinev, were selling ketamine
Detective Frank Bybee, the defendant in charge of the investigation, obtained an anticipatory search warrant for the Premises and arranged for a controlled delivery of the package. The validity of the warrant was conditioned upon the receipt of the package by an occupant of the premises. Bybee classified the warrant as "high hazard," pursuant to Sheriff's Office policy, because the search was for narcotics and required entry into a house. Law enforcement personnel were divided into two teams: a entry/search team and a perimeter team. After rehearsing the execution of the warrant, the teams departed for the Premises on the afternoon of August 20th in separate, unmarked vehicles.
Sometime between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., United States Postal Inspector John Crockett, dressed as an ordinary mailman and wearing a one-way transmitter,
The package was equipped with a sensor to alert law enforcement when it had been opened. Law enforcement waited for approximately thirty minutes for a signal from the sensor. When none came, defendant Sergeant Clifford Legg decided to proceed with the warrant's execution.
Croom was seated on a "timber" when people wearing masks, dressed in black, and carrying guns ran up screaming for her to "hit the ground." Appellant's Brief at 13. She was approached by a female member of the group,
Eventually, Croom was ordered to "get up." She was unable, and defendant Graham and two others had to help her to her feet. Croom was brought into the house. It was only at this juncture that Croom learned that her detainors were law enforcement personnel.
At some point during this period, the officers woke Dinev. He promptly admitted to importing and distributing the ketamine, was arrested, and was removed from the scene.
Croom was detained for up to two hours while the officers conducted their search of the property. Initially, she was placed on the couch and given a glass of water. At some point she was moved to the dining room table. Although each defendant's deposition testimony varies somewhat, it seems clear that the defendants ceased harboring any suspicions that Croom was involved in the criminal activity after they spoke with both her and Dinev.
In the wake of the incident, Croom alleges she suffered medical problems caused by the manner of her seizure and detention by the defendants.
Croom argues that the district erred by granting defendants' motions for summary judgment. We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the non-movant below. Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848 (11th Cir.2010).
It is undisputed that the defendants are law enforcement officers who were acting in their official capacities at the time of the incident. Consequently, the defendants enjoy a qualified immunity from suit that protects government officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
The district court answered the first question in the negative, concluding that the facts alleged by Croom, even if proven to be true, did not establish a Fourth Amendment violation. Though we are sympathetic to Croom's plight and frustration, after careful consideration, we must agree.
The Fourth Amendment protects "the people" from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Traditionally, seizures by law enforcement have been reasonable under the Fourth Amendment only if justified by probable cause to believe that the detainee committed a crime, see Summers, 452 U.S. at 696, 699-700, 101 S.Ct. 2587; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209-16, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101-03, 80 S.Ct. 168, 170, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959). However, beginning with Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court has recognized that certain types of limited detentions—i.e. seizures lacking the essential attributes of full, custodial arrests—may be constitutional even in the absence of probable cause. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 ("The exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the person recognized in Terry and its progeny rests on a balancing of the competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the type of seizure involved within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In such cases, the Court has "balance[d] the nature and quality of
This case involves one such class of seizures: temporary detentions by law enforcement of a premises' occupants while those premises are being searched pursuant to a search warrant. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (holding that "for Fourth Amendment purposes,. . . a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted" (footnote omitted)); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-02, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (holding law enforcement acted reasonably by detaining non-suspect occupant of residence in handcuffs for up to three hours).
In Summers, the Supreme Court considered whether it was lawful for law enforcement officers executing a warrant on Summers's residence to seize him on the sidewalk outside his house, require him to re-enter the home, and detain him therein during the course of the search. 452 U.S. at 693-94, 101 S.Ct. 2587. Weighing the "character of the official intrusion and its justification," the Court determined that a temporary detention incident to a validly issued search warrant did not run afoul the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 701-05, 101 S.Ct. 2587.
Of paramount importance to the Court was the fact that a detached and neutral magistrate had found probable cause to search the home. Id. at 701, 101 S.Ct. 2587. Given that constitutionally authorized intrusion into Summers's privacy, the Court determined the additional imposition caused by his seizure, while substantial, "was surely less intrusive than the search itself." Id.
Importantly, though its decision in Summers was driven by a careful balancing of factors and facts, the Court clarified that their rule thus established did not call for a repetition of that balancing in each of its
In Mena, the Court confirmed that Summers had established a categorical rule. Mena, 544 U.S. at 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465. There, the Court reviewed a decision by the Ninth Circuit that police officers violated Mena's Fourth Amendment rights by detaining her, handcuffed, for three hours during a warranted search of her residence. Id. at 95-97, 125 S.Ct. 1465. Mena was an innocent bystander, and the Ninth Circuit ruled that law enforcement was not entitled to continue detaining her after "it became clear to officers that she posed no immediate threat." Mena, 544 U.S. at 97, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (citing Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 332 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.2003)). The Supreme Court disagreed, describing Summers as having established a "categorical" rule that justified "Mena's detention for the duration of the search . . . because a warrant existed to search [the premises] and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the search." Id. at 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465.
It is through this lens that we must analyze Croom's claim.
Our analysis of Croom's Fourth Amendment challenge breaks naturally into three pieces: (1) Was her seizure lawful at its inception? (2) Was it lawful in its scope and duration? (3) And, finally, was it lawful in its manner?—to wit, was the force used to effect the seizure lawful? We address each question in turn.
Croom argues that her initial seizure was unconstitutional because of defects in the warrant. For example, she argues that the warrant provided only the authority "to search the [Premises], and all persons found therein who are reasonably believed to be involved in the criminal activity, as well as any vehicles or any detached structures that are within the curtilage of the property . . ."; however, she was seized in the non-curtilage front yard. Appellant's Brief at 24 (emphasis added). Or, the anticipatory warrant was conditioned on "the delivery of [the] package by [sic] an occupant within the residence"; yet, the package was actually delivered to a non-occupant (Croom) outside the residence. Id. at 28-29 (original emphasis removed and new emphasis added).
These warrant-based arguments fail because they focus on the wrong Fourth Amendment event. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 695 n. 4, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (distinguishing
The essence of Croom's argument is captured by this claim from her brief: "Because the condition precedent/triggering event never occurred, the search warrant was rendered a legal nullity, and all law enforcement activity related to the warrant was unauthorized, illegal, and clearly unconstitutional." Appellant's Brief at 31. This is simply an mistaken interpretation of constitutional law.
When evaluating a limited seizure under an exception to the probable-cause requirement, we look to the "objective reasonableness" of the law enforcement officer's actions, asking: "would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (footnote omitted). Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1051, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) ("In evaluating the validity of an officer's investigative or protective conduct under Terry, the `[t]ouchstone of our analysis. . . is always the reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular governmental intrusion of a citizen's personal security.'" (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Croom is quite correct that the Supreme Court's analysis in Summers relied heavily on the existence of a valid warrant. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 703, 101 S.Ct. 2587 ("We have already noted that the detention represents only an incremental intrusion on personal liberty when the search of a home has been authorized by a valid warrant."). However, in analyzing the constitutionality of Croom's seizure, our concern is simply whether the actions taken by the officers were objectively reasonable in light of the facts known to them at the time. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Therefore, so long as the warrant and its execution were sufficient to justify the reliance of an objectively reasonable officer in the defendants' positions, any technical defect in its execution is irrelevant. Cf. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85-86, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (concluding Garrison's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when law enforcement erroneously and illegally searched his apartment while executing a search warrant later discovered to be overbroad, because the mistake was reasonable in light of the information known to the officers at the time).
Our constitutional inquiry does not end there. When dealing with limited seizures not subject to the probable-cause requirement, a seizure that is reasonable at its inception may quickly become unreasonable if it extends beyond its unique justification. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."). Croom thus argues that, even if her detention was constitutional at the outset, it ceased to be so once law enforcement concluded she posed no threat and was not involved in the crime. We disagree.
Summers itself was less than explicit regarding the outer bounds of police authority to detain occupants of a premises during a warranted search, including the permissible length of Summers detentions. A fair reading of that opinion, however, implies that law enforcement officers are entitled to detain occupants of a premises for the whole length of most warranted searches. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (acknowledging possible exceptions to the Summers rule for "special circumstances" and "prolonged detention[s]," implying that the general rule of "routine detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant" confers the power to detain occupants for the length of such "routine" searches); id. at 701 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (acknowledging
On the facts of this case, we hold the scope and duration of Croom's detention was constitutional. After being fully restrained for up to ten minutes while the house was being secured, Croom was transferred to the couch (and then the dining room table), where she remained—unrestrained—for up to two hours. In light of the three-hour detention of an innocent bystander deemed "plainly permissible" by the Supreme Court in Mena, id., we cannot conclude that Croom's seizure here became unconstitutional over time.
Croom also argues that the defendants used excessive force to effect her seizure. In short, Croom argues that—because she is an elderly woman, who at the time of the seizure was wearing only a one-piece bathing suit and was known by the officers to be infirm—any use of force whatsoever, however small, was objectively unreasonable.
"Inherent in Summers' authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention." Mena, 544 U.S. at 98-99, 125 S.Ct. 1465.
Though we are skeptical that the force alleged was truly necessary under the circumstances, we cannot find a constitutional violation based on its usage. Even if unnecessary, the force used against Croom was de minimus. In light of the holding of Nolin, we must affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. We note, however, that the de minimus-force exception preserved by Nolin in the wake of Graham may not sweep as broadly as it once did. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 & n. 9, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (rejecting this Circuit's "rigid gloss" on the qualified immunity standard represented by cases such as Suissa v. Fulton Cnty., 74 F.3d 266-70 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam); Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., Bd. of Trs., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 1994); Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1185 (11th Cir.1994)—cases representing doctrine relied upon by this Court in its Nolin decision); Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1277-78 (11th Cir.2004) (recognizing the impact of Hope on this Circuit's doctrine).
The force here at issue consists of Deputy Graham pushing Croom to the ground from her squatting position and holding her there with a foot (or knee) in the back for up to ten minutes.
Because the facts alleged by Croom would fail to establish a Fourth Amendment violation even if they were proven to be true at trial, we affirm the judgment of the district court in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.
The Court did acknowledge, however, that "special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention, might lead to a different conclusion in an unusual case . . . ." Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. 2587.
Additionally, we find no constitutional significance in the fact that Croom accepted the package in the yard and carried it into the house herself, as opposed to being handed it while she was physically within the structure.
Furthermore, like the Supreme Court in Summers, we find nothing persuading us that this was not a "routine detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant . . . ." 452 U.S. at 705 n. 21, 101 S.Ct. 2587. Therefore, the potential exceptions to the Summers rule for "special circumstances" or "prolonged detentions" referred to in that opinion's footnote twenty-one are not implicated here. See note 12, supra.
As recounted by Croom in her deposition, the facts show only that Croom heard a "click" that she believed to be a gun at the beginning of her seizure. That Graham may have possessed a drawn weapon while approaching the Premises to serve a warrant and known drug location is not objectively unreasonable. Croom does not allege that the weapon was, in fact, pointed at her at any time. Additionally, she does not allege that the defendants used their weapons in a threatening manner at any time after the house was secured. Consequently, even assuming the "click" heard by Croom was made by Graham's weapon, without some further indication of misconduct, that fact does not bolster her excessive force claim.
Having reviewed the district court's ruling, we conclude it did not abuse its discretion in determining that the inconsistencies between Graham's affidavit and her deposition were more appropriately considered "variations of testimony" or "instances of failed memory" going to the weight and credibility of the evidence, as opposed to falsehoods rendering the affidavit a disregardable "sham." See Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953-55 (11th Cir. 1986) ("A definite distinction must be made between discrepancies which create transparent shams and discrepancies which create an issue of credibility or go to the weight of the evidence.").
