Filed: Sep. 11, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: Case: 12-11263 Date Filed: 09/11/2012 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 12-11263 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00001-RS-EMT JAVEED ATTIQUE QAMAR, lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll ll lPlaintiff-Appellant, versus CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BAY COUNTY JAIL, BAY COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, TOM WEBBER, Former PCBPD Officer, RONALD LIPPMANN, MD Jail DO, lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll lDefendants-Appellees.
Summary: Case: 12-11263 Date Filed: 09/11/2012 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 12-11263 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00001-RS-EMT JAVEED ATTIQUE QAMAR, lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll ll lPlaintiff-Appellant, versus CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, BAY COUNTY JAIL, BAY COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, TOM WEBBER, Former PCBPD Officer, RONALD LIPPMANN, MD Jail DO, lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll lDefendants-Appellees. _..
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Case: 12-11263 Date Filed: 09/11/2012 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-11263
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00001-RS-EMT
JAVEED ATTIQUE QAMAR,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll ll lPlaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
BAY COUNTY JAIL,
BAY COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
TOM WEBBER,
Former PCBPD Officer,
RONALD LIPPMANN,
MD Jail DO,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll lDefendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(September 11, 2012)
Case: 12-11263 Date Filed: 09/11/2012 Page: 2 of 6
Before MARCUS, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Javeed Qamar appeals pro se the dismissal of his complaint against the
Central Intelligence Agency; employees of the Bay County Jail; officers of
Sheriff’s Office of Bay County; Dr. Ronald Lippmann; James Lee Spann, a former
cellmate; and Tom Webber, a former investigator for the Beach Police Department
of Panama City, Florida. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed
Qamar’s complaint as frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I). We affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand.
Qamar complained that the defendants engaged in misconduct that violated
principles governing the treatment of individuals in the Geneva Convention, the
United Nations Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, and the Nuremberg Code; his rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments; federal laws prohibiting torture and sexual abuse, see 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340A, 2241–44; and Florida law, see Fla. Stat. §§ 777.04, 794.011,
794.027, 950.09. Qamar alleged that a nurse and jail officials denied him access
to medications prescribed by physicians to treat his Raynaud’s Disease and the
symptoms of his drug withdrawal, and he later suffered a “string of seizures.” He
also alleged that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to drug, rape, and torture
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him; subjected him to “enhanced interrogations”; planted drugs on him; and gave
some of his former acquaintances improper “access[] [to] the Jail.” Qamar alleged
that the defendants tortured him by convincing him to sleep on the floor to watch
Spann pretend to masturbate; allowing him to be raped in order to “plant evidence
anally on [him]”; injecting him with crack cocaine; allowing Webber to enter
Qamar’s cell dressed as a jail officer; giving an inmate housed in the next cell an
“earpiece that fit in the ear from a box” that projected “Dr. Lippman’s voice
threatening to rape [Qamar] with different objects”; subjecting him to constant
talking and yelling between two female officers; and allowing a “former manager”
to tell Qamar through the intercom in his cell that he should be killed. Qamar
described his condition at times as being “bar[el]y conscious” and “slip[ping] in
and out of [a] coma,” and he recalled being told that he had crack cocaine in his
system.
Qamar alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in the
conspiracy to mistreat him. Qamar identified three reasons why he thought the
Agency was “involved” in his mistreatment: 1) he was given injections; 2) the
Agency denied his request for information under the Freedom of Information Act
“on the basis that classified information is exempt”; and 3) the jail employed
“known tactic[s] of [the Agency] [in] enhanced interrogations.” Qamar alleged
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that the “tactic[s]” used by the defendants involved giving him injections;
threatening to give him an enema; providing a false reason for his arrest; allowing
inmates to ask him “questions implying that [he] was responsible for things [he]
[had] never done”; housing him in a cell kept extremely cold; and threatening to
give him truth serum; and playing through the loudspeaker some music with a
“reverb sound effect saying [repeatedly] the word trip.”
We review the dismissal of a pro se complaint as frivolous for an abuse of
discretion. Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002). “Discretion
means the district court has a range of choice, and that its decision will not be
disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake
of law.” Zocaras v. Castro,
465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed as frivolous
Qamar’s complaints involving enhanced interrogation, torture, rape, the
administration and false planting of drugs, and the admission of non-authorized
individuals inside the jail. A court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous when the
facts alleged “rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible” or lack an
“‘arguable basis either in law or in fact.’” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33,
112 S. Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 327–28,
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109 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 (1989)). The district court was entitled to find that Qamar’s
factual allegations were fantastical and implausible, particularly in the light of his
admissions about being unconscious; denied access to medication used to treat the
symptoms of drug withdrawal; and under the influence of crack cocaine. Qamar
alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in his mistreatment, but
Qamar failed to explain why the Agency would intervene in the operations of a
county jail or have any interest in Qamar. Qamar alleged that he was raped and
that jail guards were present before and after the rape, but it is impossible to
determine from his complaint who he thought committed the offense and whether
he was alleging that the guards sexually assaulted him or were deliberately
indifferent to the risk that inmates would assault him. Qamar’s allegations that he
was raped for officials to plant evidence of drugs and that he was mistreated as a
form of enhanced interrogation by the Agency are incredible.
But the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed as frivolous
Qamar’s complaint about being denied access to his medication. Deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and prison officials
act with deliberate indifference if they knowingly interfere with treatment
prescribed by a physician. Washington v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir.
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1988). Qamar’s allegations that he was denied access to medications prescribed
by his physicians were plausible. Qamar alleged that a “nurse in intake” refused to
administer his prescription medication until he was seen by a doctor; the “jail
medical report and . . . doctors own words” suggested he would suffer a seizure
without the medicine; and he suffered a “string of seizures” before he met with Dr.
Lippmann. We VACATE that part of the order that dismissed Qamar’s complaint
about his medication.
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Qamar’s complaint except his claim
involving interference with his prescribed medication. We VACATE the part of
the order that dismissed Qamar’s claim about that interference, and we REMAND
for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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