Filed: Apr. 16, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 12-13162 Date Filed: 04/16/2014 Page: 1 of 5 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 12-13162 _ D. C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-20519-JLK-3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SPENCER SAINT-ELOIDE, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (April 16, 2014) Before MARCUS, Circuit Judge, and COOGLER * and BOWEN,** District Judges. PER CURIAM: * Honorable L. Scott Coogler,
Summary: Case: 12-13162 Date Filed: 04/16/2014 Page: 1 of 5 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 12-13162 _ D. C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-20519-JLK-3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SPENCER SAINT-ELOIDE, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (April 16, 2014) Before MARCUS, Circuit Judge, and COOGLER * and BOWEN,** District Judges. PER CURIAM: * Honorable L. Scott Coogler, U..
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Case: 12-13162 Date Filed: 04/16/2014 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
______________________
No. 12-13162
______________________
D. C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-20519-JLK-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SPENCER SAINT-ELOIDE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
____________________
(April 16, 2014)
Before MARCUS, Circuit Judge, and COOGLER * and BOWEN,** District Judges.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable L. Scott Coogler, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama,
sitting by designation.
**
Honorable Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., United States District Judge for the Southern District of
Georgia, sitting by designation.
Case: 12-13162 Date Filed: 04/16/2014 Page: 2 of 5
A jury convicted Spencer Saint-Eloide of one count of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine and one count of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, violations of 21 U.S.C. § 846(a) and § 841(a)(1), respectively.
Upon determining that Saint-Eloide’s advisory guideline range was 78 to 97
months imprisonment, the district court sentenced him to serve 78 months on each
count to run concurrently. On appeal, Saint-Eloide argues that the district court
denied his right of allocution at sentencing. 1
Where a defendant does not object to the district court’s denial of the right
of allocution, we review for manifest injustice. United States v. Quintana,
300
F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (11th Cir. 2002). The manifest injustice standard is equivalent
to plain error review.
Id. at 1232. Under the plain error standard, we will reverse
only if: (1) there is error (2) that is plain, (3) that affected the defendant’s
substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of a judicial proceeding. United States v. Perez,
661 F.3d 568, 583
(11th Cir. 2011).
1
In denying Saint-Eloide’s appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw after filing an Anders brief,
see Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738,
87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967), this Court directed counsel to
brief three issues. In brief and at oral argument, Saint-Eloide’s counsel abandoned two of the
three issues: (1) the reasonableness of his sentence given the district court’s failure to discuss the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and failure to hear from Saint-Eloide’s personal witnesses; and (2)
the denial of a minor role reduction under the sentencing guidelines.
2
Case: 12-13162 Date Filed: 04/16/2014 Page: 3 of 5
At sentencing, the district court must “address the defendant personally in
order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the
sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). For purposes of this appeal, assuming
arguendo that Saint-Eloide has established the first two prongs of the plain error
rule, Saint-Eloide nevertheless has the burden of demonstrating that the error
affected his substantial rights. See
Perez, 661 F.3d at 585.
We have held that the denial of the right of allocution presumptively affects
a defendant’s substantial rights only where the possibility of a lower guidelines
sentence exists.
Id. at 586 (cited sources omitted). Here, Saint-Eloide was
sentenced at the bottom end of the applicable guideline range. Therefore, no
presumption of prejudice arises. Saint-Eloide claims nonetheless that the Supreme
Court’s opinion in United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005),
requires us to presume prejudice even in cases where a defendant receives the
lowest possible guidelines sentence. Saint-Eloide points out that his guideline
range is advisory, whereas the guideline range in pre-Booker cases was mandatory
for district courts. He further argues that in a post-Booker world, the bottom of a
guideline range is no longer the lowest term of imprisonment permissible. We do
not think this makes any difference.
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Case: 12-13162 Date Filed: 04/16/2014 Page: 4 of 5
Saint-Eloide’s request that we presume prejudice in his case fails for a few
reasons. For one thing, we have held in binding post-Booker precedent that, on
plain error review, “it is the defendant rather than the government who bears the
burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” United States v. Rodriguez,
398
F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005) (alterations omitted). In the second place, even
before Booker, a defendant who received a bottom-end guidelines sentence could
demonstrate, under certain circumstances, that the denial of his right of allocution
affected his substantial rights. Pre-Booker, in cases where a defendant who was
not permitted to allocute nevertheless received the lowest possible guidelines
sentence, the burden was on the defendant to demonstrate manifest injustice.
Quintana, 300 F.3d at 1232 (concluding that the defendant could not show
manifest injustice “because he was sentenced to the lowest term of imprisonment
permissible under the guidelines and he is unable to articulate anything that he
could have said that could have driven the sentence below the lowest end of the
guideline range” (emphasis added)). Post-Booker, the burden remains on the
defendant to show manifest injustice, that is, that the district court would have
sentenced below the advisory guideline range. Prejudice is only presumed when
the defendant is not sentenced at the bottom end of the applicable guideline range.
In this case, Saint-Eloide has not presented evidence or argument to show
that the district court might have been inclined to sentence below the bottom of the
4
Case: 12-13162 Date Filed: 04/16/2014 Page: 5 of 5
advisory guideline range. Accordingly, he has failed to show that any error in
denying his right of allocution affected his substantial rights.
Because Saint-Eloide has failed to demonstrate plain error, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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