Filed: Jun. 26, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 14-14505 Date Filed: 06/26/2015 Page: 1 of 16 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-14505 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-20387-KMM-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JAMES COLUMBUS CLAYTON, JR., Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (June 26, 2015) Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: In this direct appeal, Jam
Summary: Case: 14-14505 Date Filed: 06/26/2015 Page: 1 of 16 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-14505 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-20387-KMM-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JAMES COLUMBUS CLAYTON, JR., Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (June 26, 2015) Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: In this direct appeal, Jame..
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Case: 14-14505 Date Filed: 06/26/2015 Page: 1 of 16
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-14505
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-20387-KMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMES COLUMBUS CLAYTON, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 26, 2015)
Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this direct appeal, James Columbus Clayton, Jr., appeals his conviction
and 24-month sentence for assault on a federal employee resulting in bodily injury,
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in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b). Following a careful review of the record
and briefs, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Offense Conduct
On May 19, 2014, at about 12:50 p.m., defendant Clayton, a 64-year-old
Army veteran,1 arrived at the Veterans Administration Medical Center (“VAMC”)
in Miami, Florida, for a 1 p.m. appointment at the pain clinic. Clayton was under
treatment to manage pain resulting from claimed injuries to his back, hip, and neck
while in the Army.
Upon arrival, Clayton inquired whether his appointment would be on time.
An office manager, who also served as the receptionist, told Clayton that the
doctors were running a few minutes behind schedule.
The office manager checked Clayton in and provided him a pager to alert
him when the doctor was ready. A nurse triaged Clayton. Clayton left the
reception area.
Fifteen to twenty minutes later, Clayton returned, upset that he had not yet
been called to see the doctor. The office manager instructed Clayton to go ask the
nurse how much longer the wait would be, and Clayton again left the reception
area.
1
Clayton served in the Army from October 1969 to May 1972 but was never deployed
overseas.
2
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A few minutes later, Clayton came back to the reception area, acting “very
belligerent and very combative.” He began yelling and cursing profusely,
demanding to be seen by a doctor, and complaining that the doctors expected him
to be on time even though “the mother fucking doctor always [is] late.” The nurse
told Clayton to go into the hallway.
Concerned for her own safety and that of the nurse, the office manager
retreated into her office, closed and locked the door, pressed the panic buttons on
her computer, and called the police. In the hallway, Clayton continued to curse
and speak in a raised voice.
Dr. Constantine Sarantopoulos was in an exam room with a patient and a
resident physician when he heard Clayton “yelling and screaming” obscenities in
the hallway. Dr. Sarantopoulos stepped out into the hallway to investigate the
situation, at which point Clayton, who appeared to be “very, very angry,” started
directing obscenities at Sarantopoulos. Clayton began to move toward Dr.
Sarantopoulos in a threatening manner, causing Sarantopoulos to retreat into the
exam room for protection.
As Dr. Sarantopoulos tried to close the door to the examination room,
Clayton reached the door and attempted to force his way inside. Clayton pushed
the door with significant force into Dr. Sarantopoulos’s right arm and shoulder.
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Dr. Sarantopoulos managed to close and lock the door, activated a panic alarm, and
told the resident physician to call the police.
At this point, Clayton was kicking and banging on the exam room door in an
effort to enter the room. Clayton kicked the door with enough force to leave shoe
marks. Clayton also slammed the entire weight of his body against the door.
When the police arrived and told Clayton to leave the VAMC, Clayton
continued to act combative and speak in a raised tone, stating that “he wasn’t afraid
of no mother fucking cop,” that “[the police] can’t do shit to him,” and that “he
wasn’t going to go until he had been seen by the doctor.”
Clayton then lunged at one of the police officers, who sprayed Clayton with
pepper spray. Clayton became angrier, started “[going] after anybody who was in
sight,” and began “grabb[ing]” and “fighting” the police officers. Ultimately, it
took three officers to subdue Clayton.
After Clayton was subdued, Dr. Sarantopoulos emerged from the exam room
and went to the emergency unit to have his right arm examined. As a result of the
attack, Dr. Sarantopoulos suffered a minor muscle sprain. Although Dr.
Sarantopoulos was able to return to work the day of the attack, he continued to feel
pain in his arm for three to four days and had physical difficulty performing his
duties. Clayton was the angriest patient with whom Dr. Sarantopoulos had ever
interacted, and the encounter made Dr. Sarantopoulos very afraid for his safety.
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B. Indictment
A grand jury indicted Clayton on one count of forcibly assaulting a federal
employee, Dr. Sarantopoulos,2 while Sarantopoulos was engaged in the
performance of his official duties, thereby inflicting bodily injury, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b). The indictment specifically alleged that Clayton “in the
commission of the offense did inflict bodily injury” on Dr. Sarantopoulos,
exposing Clayton to sentence of up to 20 years’ imprisonment under § 111(b).
C. Jury Trial
After Clayton, through counsel, entered a plea of not guilty, the case
proceeded to a one-day jury trial on July 14, 2014. At trial, the government’s
witnesses testified as to Clayton’s offense conduct as described above.
During the jury charge, the district court, over defense objection, provided
the following instruction on forcibly assaulting a federal employee with the
infliction of bodily injury:
A defendant can be found guilty of the offense of assaulting a
Federal employee only if all the following facts are proved beyond a
reasonable doubt:
First, that the defendant forcibly assaulted, impeded,
intimidated or interfered with Constantine Sarantopoulos.
2
Dr. Sarantopoulos is a federally employed physician at the VAMC and director of the
pain clinic.
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Two, that Constantine Sarantopoulos was a Federal employee
as described above, then engaged in the performance of an official
duty.
Three, that the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally.
Four, that the defendant inflicted bodily injury upon
Constantine Sarantopoulos.
The term “forcible assault” can include either an assault which
results in physical contact or an intentional display of force that would
cause a reasonable person to expect immediate and serious bodily
harm or death, regardless of whether the act is carried out or the
person is injured.
...
Though a forcible assault requires an intentional threat or
attempt to inflict serious bodily injury, the threat or attempt does not
have to be carried out and the victim does not have to be injured.
But in this case, the Indictment alleges that bodily injury
actually occurred, so that is the fourth element that the Government
must prove.
(Emphasis added).
Clayton’s trial counsel objected, in relevant part, to the inclusion of the
language stating that forcible assault can occur “regardless of whether the act [of
physical contact or display of force] is carried out or the person injured.” Clayton
argued that it would confuse the jury to instruct them both that forcible assault can
occur regardless of whether the victim is injured and that, in this case, they are
required to find bodily injury.
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The district court’s instruction largely matched and was consistent with this
Court’s pattern jury instruction on forcible assault of a federal employee resulting
in bodily injury in use at the time of Clayton’s jury trial. See 11th Cir. Pattern Jury
Instructions (Criminal), Offense Instruction 1.2 (2010).
This Court’s pattern instruction then included the phrase “regardless of
whether the act is carried out or the person is injured,” although the instruction has
since been amended to omit that phrase. See Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal),
Offense Instruction 1.2 (2015 Revisions). However, the instruction still includes
the sentence: “Though a forcible assault requires an intentional threat or attempt to
inflict serious bodily injury, the threat or attempt doesn’t have to be carried out and
the victim doesn’t have to be injured.” Id.
D. Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Clayton guilty as charged.
The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) recommended a base offense
level of 10, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4. The PSI added to that base offense
level: (1) a three-level increase because the offense involved physical contact,
§ 2A2.4(b)(1); and (2) a two-level increase because the offense involved physical
injury, § 2A2.4(b)(2).
Clayton’s total adjusted offense level was 15. Based on this total offense
level and a criminal history category of I, Clayton’s advisory guidelines range was
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18 to 24 months’ imprisonment. The statutory maximum for Clayton’s offense
was 20 years’ imprisonment.
At sentencing, Clayton’s attorney requested a sentence of probation with
mandatory participation in anger management classes. Clayton’s attorney
acknowledged that Clayton’s guidelines range was correctly calculated but argued
that the circumstances of Clayton’s offense fell outside the “heartland of what is
contemplated” by the Sentencing Commission for cases of assault against federal
employees. Clayton’s attorney pointed out that Clayton went to the VAMC on the
day of the assault originally for a lawful purpose, was dealing with pain that
resulted from his service in the Army, and had since written a letter of apology to
Dr. Sarantopoulos.
Clayton addressed the district court and apologized for his actions,
indicating that he was out of pain medication at the time of the attack and his
actions resulted from the pain he was in.
The government requested a 21-month sentence, emphasizing the
seriousness of Clayton’s offense and the fear Clayton caused Dr. Sarantopoulos
and the other witnesses at the pain clinic. The government urged the district court
to consider “[w]hat would have happened if Dr. Sarantopoulos had not been able to
lock [the exam room] door” and Clayton had “been able to get inside that door at
Dr. Sarantopoulos.” The government argued that a 21-month sentence would
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provide adequate deterrence to help ensure the safety of both veterans and
employees in VA medical centers. The government noted, “The veterans of World
War II, Vietnam, the Gulf conflict, Afghanistan, Iraq, deserve to be able to seek
treatment in a violence-free environment.”
The district court then read Dr. Sarantopoulos’s statement to the probation
officer, in which the doctor recounted the pain he experienced after the attack and
the serious emotional impact the experience had on him, including “unpleasant
recurrent memories” and “frequent flashbacks.” Dr. Sarantopoulos and his wife
became concerned about his safety in the workplace after the attack and about the
possibility of retaliation against his family after he testified at trial. Dr.
Sarantopoulos’s colleagues at the VAMC also were “very apprehensive and
worried” following the attack.
Before imposing sentence, the district court stated that it had considered the
parties’ statements, the PSI, and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). The district court sentenced Clayton to 24 months’ imprisonment, a
sentence within Clayton’s advisory guidelines range. Clayton objected to the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Jury Instructions
On appeal, defendant Clayton argues that the district court erred by
instructing the jury both that bodily injury was an element the government was
required to prove and also that forcible assault can occur “regardless of whether
. . . the person is injured.” Clayton contends that the inconsistent instruction on
whether forcible assault required an actual injury confused the jurors, such that
they may have convicted him on an invalid legal theory.
We review the legal correctness of jury instructions de novo but defer to the
district court’s phrasing of the instruction absent an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Wilk, 572 F.3d 1229, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2009). District courts have wide
discretion in the style and phrasing of instructions, so long as the instructions
accurately reflect the applicable law. United States v. Williams,
526 F.3d 1312,
1320-21 (11th Cir. 2008). When a jury instruction accurately expresses the
applicable law without confusing the jury, “there is no reason for reversal even
though isolated clauses may, in fact, be confusing, technically imperfect, or
otherwise subject to criticism.” See United States v. Gibson,
708 F.3d 1256, 1275
(11th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted).
Forcible assault against a federal employee is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)
as an offense in which a person “assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or
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interferes with [a federal employee] engaged in or on account of the performance
of official duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Subsection (b) of the statute provides
for an enhanced penalty if the perpetrator “inflicts bodily injury” during “the
commission of any acts described in subsection (a).” Id. § 111(b).
Thus, in order to convict a defendant for a violation of § 111(b), the
government must prove all the elements of a violation of § 111(a) and the
additional element of actual bodily injury. See United States v. Gutierrez, 745
F.3d 463, 471 n.9 (11th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Siler,
734 F.3d 1290,
1296 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 1563 (2014) (holding “that § 111
establishes three separate crimes” each consisting of the elements of the preceding
category of crime, but adding an element or elements that must be proved to the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in an increased penalty).
Here, defendant Clayton fails to show any reversible error in the district
court’s jury instruction on forcible assault. As noted above, the jury charge was
consistent with this Court’s pattern jury instruction in use at the time of Clayton’s
trial. See 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal), Offense Instruction 1.2
(2010). More importantly, the language of the actual jury charge given accurately
reflected that, under § 111, the offense of forcible assault against a federal
employee generally does not require actual injury, but that the government must
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prove that element where it seeks an enhancement for an assault resulting in bodily
injury. 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1), (b); see Gutierrez, 745 F.3d at 471 n.9.
In particular, the jury charge made clear that, “in this case, the Indictment
alleges that bodily injury actually occurred, so that is the fourth element that the
Government must prove.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the language to which
Clayton specifically objected—“regardless of whether the act is carried out or the
person is injured”—was not unduly confusing in light of the jury instruction as a
whole, which clearly instructed the jury that it was required to find that Clayton
had inflicted a bodily injury.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Defendant Clayton next contends that the district court imposed a
substantively unreasonable sentence in imposing a 24-month sentence of
incarceration and failing to grant a downward variance to a sentence of probation.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 764
(2014). We consider whether a sentence is substantively unreasonable under the
totality of the circumstances and in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
Id.
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In determining a sentence, a district court must evaluate all of the § 3553(a)
factors but can attach “great weight” to one factor over others. 3 Id. The weight
given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the
district court. United States v. Clay,
483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). As to
variances, we have recognized that a “district court has considerable discretion in
deciding whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance and the extent of one that
is appropriate.”
Cubero, 754 F.3d at 892 (quotations and alteration omitted). “We
give that decision due deference because the district court has an institutional
advantage in making sentencing determinations.”
Id. (quotation omitted).
The party challenging the reasonableness of a sentence on appeal bears the
burden to show that it is unreasonable. Id. at 893. “We may vacate a sentence
only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving
at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.”
Id. at 892-93 (quotations omitted). We have held that two
indicators of reasonableness are a sentence within the advisory guidelines range
3
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9)
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to
victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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and a sentence well below the statutory maximum penalty. Id. at 898; United
States v. Hunt,
526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008).
Here, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing
Clayton to 24 months’ imprisonment and declining to vary downward from his
advisory guidelines range of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment to a sentence of
probation. The district court listened to the parties’ arguments as to the appropriate
sentence and stated that it had considered those arguments, the PSI, and the
§ 3553(a) factors. The evidence showed that Clayton’s crime was serious, as he
was belligerent, violently attacked Dr. Sarantopoulos, and caused Dr.
Sarantopoulos and multiple others to fear for their safety. When police officers
arrived, Clayton refused to leave the VAMC, attempted to attack the officers,
resisted arrest, and could not be subdued without the participation of three officers
and the use of pepper spray.
Although Clayton attempts to downplay the seriousness of his offense by
arguing on appeal that Dr. Sarantopoulos’s injury was only “minimal,” Dr.
Sarantopoulos’s statement to the probation officer described not only his physical
pain following the attack but also the attack’s serious emotional impact on him, his
wife, and his colleagues.
Further, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in finding a
sentence of incarceration was necessary to provide adequate deterrence. The
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government argued at sentencing that a sentence of probation would not adequately
deter Clayton and others from violent and threatening behavior in VA medical
centers that compromises the safety of others and the right of other veterans to
receive treatment in a violence-free environment. Additionally, while on appeal
Clayton emphasizes his lack of criminal history points, his medical issues, and the
pain he was in on the day of the assault, this Court does not reweigh the § 3553(a)
factors. See Clay, 483 F.3d at 743.4
Finally, the 24-month sentence imposed by the district court was within
Clayton’s advisory guidelines range and was one-tenth the statutory maximum of
20 years for a violation of § 111(b). See Cubero, 754 F.3d at 898;
Hunt, 526 F.3d
at 746.
In sum, Clayton has failed to show that the district court abused its
discretion by deciding that a 24-month sentence, and not a sentence of probation,
was appropriate in light of the § 3553(a) factors.
4
On appeal, although Clayton concedes the advisory guidelines range was correctly
calculated at 18-24 months under the Sentencing Guidelines, Clayton also advances several
policy arguments for why his advisory guidelines range was excessive in his case. For example,
he argues his status as a veteran meant he had to go to a VA facility where federal employees
worked, as opposed to a private pain clinic which did not have federal employees. It is
questionable whether Clayton ever fairly presented these arguments to the district court. Instead,
Clayton argued only generally that his case was outside the “heartland of what is contemplated”
by the Sentencing Commission for cases of assault on federal employees. In any event, nothing
in Clayton’s policy arguments shows the district court abused its discretion in sentencing.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant Clayton’s conviction and
sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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