Filed: Sep. 30, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 14-15118 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 1 of 9 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-15118 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket Nos. 1:11-cv-04015-WBH, 1:08-cr-00041-JEC-JFK-2 BOYD SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (September 30, 2015) Case: 14-15118 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 2 of 9 Before TJOFLAT, WILSON
Summary: Case: 14-15118 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 1 of 9 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-15118 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket Nos. 1:11-cv-04015-WBH, 1:08-cr-00041-JEC-JFK-2 BOYD SMITH, Petitioner-Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (September 30, 2015) Case: 14-15118 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 2 of 9 Before TJOFLAT, WILSON ..
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Case: 14-15118 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-15118
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket Nos. 1:11-cv-04015-WBH,
1:08-cr-00041-JEC-JFK-2
BOYD SMITH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(September 30, 2015)
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Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Boyd Smith, a federal prisoner proceeding with the assistance of counsel,
appeals the District Court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, and
the court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered
evidence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.
We granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) as to the following issue
only:
Whether the District Court erred in denying, without an evidentiary
hearing or ordering discovery, Smith’s claim of prosecutorial
misconduct in failing to inform Smith that Sandeo Dyson was
involved in an information-for-sale scheme during the time that he
testified in Smith’s trial?
Smith raises two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the District
Court erred by denying his § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing or
discovery, as the government violated his due process rights under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
83 S. Ct. 1194,
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v.
United States,
405 U.S. 150,
92 S. Ct. 763,
31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972 ), by failing to
disclose that an essential witness, his codefendant Sandeo Dyson, was involved in
an ongoing information-for-sale scheme at the time of his trial. Second, he argues
that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for new trial
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based on newly discovered evidence. For ease of reference, we address each point
in turn.
I. Smith’s § 2255 Motion
In a § 2255 proceeding, we review a district court’s legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings for clear error. Devine v. United States, 520 F.3d
1286, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008). We review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary
hearing in a § 2255 proceeding for abuse of discretion. Winthrop-Redin v. United
States,
767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014). Likewise, we review a district
court’s denial of § 2255 movant’s request for discovery for an abuse of discretion.
Bowers v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, Warden,
760 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2014). A
district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies
the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in
making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.
Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1215. In the context of an unsuccessful § 2255
motion, the scope of our review is limited to the issues specified in the COA.
McKay v. United States,
657 F.3d 1990, 1995 (11th Cir. 2011).
An evidentiary hearing must be held on a motion to vacate “[u]nless the
motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is
entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). The petitioner is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing if the § 2255 motion alleges specific facts that, if true, would
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warrant relief. Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 714-15 (11th Cir. 2002).
However, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing if the
petitioner’s allegations are based upon unsupported generalizations or are
affirmatively contradicted by the record.
Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1216.
A habeas petitioner is not entitled to discovery as a matter of course.
Bowers, 760 F.3d at 1183. However, the district court retains discretion to grant
discovery upon a showing of good cause.
Id. A petitioner may demonstrate good
cause by making specific allegations that “show reason to believe that the
petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is
entitled to relief.”
Id. Good cause for discovery cannot arise from mere
speculation, however. Arthur v. Allen,
459 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2006).
In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at
1196–97. Thus, to prevail on a Brady claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that:
(1) the government possessed evidence that is favorable to him, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) the government suppressed that
evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued. Allen v.
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
611 F.3d 740, 745-46 (11th Cir. 2010). Prejudice
exists—and evidence is material as to guilt or punishment—if there is a reasonable
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probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Id. at 746 (quoting United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S.
667, 682,
105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383,
87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985)).
In Giglio, the Supreme Court addressed a particular subset of Brady claims,
and held that, when the prosecution solicits or fails to correct known false
evidence, due process requires a new trial where the false testimony could in any
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153, 92 S.
Ct. at 766; see also Trepal v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
684 F.3d 1088, 1107 (11th
Cir. 2012) (summarizing the requirements of Giglio). Thus, to prevail on a Giglio
claim, a petitioner must establish that: (1) the government knowingly used perjured
testimony or failed to correct what it subsequently learned was false testimony; and
(2) such use was material. Guzman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
663 F.3d 1336, 1348
(11th Cir. 2011). A falsehood is material under Giglio if there was a reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment.
Id. Because
the Giglio materiality standard requires a petitioner to show only that the
government’s non-disclosure “could have affected” the jury’s judgment, it is less
stringent than the standard for materiality under Brady, which requires a petitioner
to demonstrate “a reasonable probability” that the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different.
Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1108.
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The District Court did not err by denying Smith’s § 2255 motion without an
evidentiary hearing for two reasons. First, all of Smith’s factual allegations, taken
as true, do not demonstrate that the government knew or should have known that
Dyson was involved in an information-for-sale scheme at the time of Smith’s trial.
See Aron, 291 F.3d at 714-15. The government did not charge Dyson for his
participation in the scheme until 2010, and the indictment alleged that he
committed the first overt act in furtherance of the scheme in May 2009, after
Smith’s trial. Although the government knew of the Watkins-Lumsden scheme in
2008, there was no indication that the government was aware of Dyson’s
participation in this scheme prior to February 2009. Although Smith now asserts
that Dyson’s tenuous references to Bird and Shorty Mark demonstrate that the
government knew of Dyson’s participation in the information-for-sale scheme, he
does not allege facts supporting this conclusion, and the District Court was not
required to hold an evidentiary hearing based upon his own speculative
generalizations. See
Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1216.
Second, the District Court did not err by denying Smith’s § 2255 motion
without an evidentiary hearing because the allegedly undisclosed information
would not have impacted the jury’s verdict. In his § 2255 motion, Smith alleged
that the jury could have reached a different verdict, had it known about Dyson’s
involvement in the information-for-sale scheme. However, this information,
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unrelated to the events surrounding the Club Onyx fire, only implicates Dyson’s
credibility as a witness; it does not exonerate Smith from participation in the arson.
Even assuming the jury completely discounted Dyson’s testimony, there was other
evidence in the record demonstrating Smith’s involvement in the Club Onyx fire.
For instance, Smith’s second codefendant, Thrower, testified unequivocally that
Smith participated in planning to burn down Club Onyx. Likewise, several other
witnesses testified for the government, describing incriminating statements made
by Smith which demonstrated his knowledge and involvement in the arson.
Finally, although Smith himself denied all knowledge of the plan to burn down
Club Onyx, the jury plainly disbelieved his testimony. Accordingly, because
Dyson’s involvement in the information-for-sale scheme would not have impacted
the jury’s verdict, it was not material under either Brady or Giglio, and the court
did not err by denying Smith’s § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Finally, based on the aforementioned reasons, the District Court also did not
err by denying discovery, as Smith relied on his own speculative conclusion that
the District Court knew of Dyson’s involvement in the information-for-sale
scheme, without making the requisite specific allegations necessary to demonstrate
good cause. See Bowers, 760 F.3d at 1183. Thus, we affirm in this respect.
II. Smith’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 Motion
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We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence, or based on a Brady violation, for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 2002).1
Under Rule 33, a court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial “if
the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). However, a motion for
a new trial grounded upon newly discovered evidence must be filed within three
years of the verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1). Furthermore, to succeed on such a
motion, a defendant must establish that: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial;
(2) the failure to discover the evidence was not due to a lack of due diligence;
(3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence is
material; and (5) a new trial would probably produce a different result. United
States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). Motions for a new trial
are highly disfavored, and we have advised that district courts should use great
caution in granting such a motion based on newly discovered evidence.
Id.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Smith’s motion for
a new trial. In this case, the jury convicted Smith on February 25, 2009, and Smith
1
We note that while Smith’s Rule 33 motion is not mentioned in the COA, a COA is not
required to appeal from the denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion for a new trial. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c). Moreover, the notice of appeal, filed in both the underlying criminal prosecution as
well as the civil habeas proceedings, designated the District Court’s order denying both the
§ 2255 motion and the Rule 33 motion as the subject of this appeal.
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filed his motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence on October
19, 2012, more than three years after the verdict. Accordingly, the District Court
did not err by dismissing Smith’s motion as time barred under Rule 33(b)(1). Fed.
R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1).
Moreover, even assuming Smith’s motion for appropriate relief relating to
his § 2255 motion can be construed as a motion for a new trial under
Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, his motion does not succeed. Here, the newly discovered
evidence related to Dyson’s involvement in an unrelated information-for-sale
scheme. Throughout habeas proceedings, Smith argued that the result of his trial
would have been different had he been allowed to impeach Dyson regarding his
involvement in this scheme. Thus, Smith failed to establish that the evidence
discovered after trial was not impeachment evidence, and the District Court did not
err by denying his motion. See Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1287.
AFFIRMED.
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