Filed: Jul. 21, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 14-15747 Date Filed: 07/21/2015 Page: 1 of 7 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-15747 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-00546-CAS UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH MONASTERY STOREHOUSE INC., a Washington Corporation, GEORGE FREEMAN, an individual, Plaintiffs - Appellees, versus MICHAEL J. CAULEY, Registered agent for Universal Life Church World Headquarters, Inc. UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH WORLD HEADQUARTERS INC., a Florida Corporation, De
Summary: Case: 14-15747 Date Filed: 07/21/2015 Page: 1 of 7 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-15747 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-00546-CAS UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH MONASTERY STOREHOUSE INC., a Washington Corporation, GEORGE FREEMAN, an individual, Plaintiffs - Appellees, versus MICHAEL J. CAULEY, Registered agent for Universal Life Church World Headquarters, Inc. UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH WORLD HEADQUARTERS INC., a Florida Corporation, Def..
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Case: 14-15747 Date Filed: 07/21/2015 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-15747
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-00546-CAS
UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH MONASTERY STOREHOUSE INC.,
a Washington Corporation,
GEORGE FREEMAN,
an individual,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
versus
MICHAEL J. CAULEY,
Registered agent for Universal Life Church World Headquarters, Inc.
UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH WORLD HEADQUARTERS INC.,
a Florida Corporation,
Defendants - Appellants,
JANE DOE CAULEY,
Husband and wife,
Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(July 21, 2015)
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Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Universal Life Church World Headquarters, Inc. (“ULC HQ”) and Michael
Cauley (collectively, “Cauley”) appeal from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse, Inc. (“ULC
Monastery”) and George Freeman (collectively, “Appellees”) on their claim that
Cauley violated a mediated settlement agreement between the parties concerning
prior and ongoing defamation (the “Settlement Agreement”). On appeal, Cauley
argues that: (1) the district court failed to provide him with notice that he could file
affidavits or other responsive materials and the potential consequences if he failed
to do so; and (2) even if the district court provided notice, summary judgment was
improper because material facts were in dispute. After careful review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as the district court. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v.
Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003). We view the material presented
and draw all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala.,
446 F.3d 1160, 1161-62 (11th
Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A mere scintilla of evidence supporting
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the nonmoving party’s position will not suffice.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121
F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (alteration adopted) (quotations omitted). Summary
judgment is also proper if the evidence “is so one-sided that one party must prevail
as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
A party moving for summary judgment bears “the initial responsibility” of
pointing to the pleadings and other record evidence to “demonstrate the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta,
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F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993). Where, as here, the movant bears the burden of
proof at trial, the nonmovant “must come forward with evidence sufficient to call
into question the inference created by the movant’s evidence on the particular
material fact.”
Id. Because of this burden on the nonmovant, “[a] motion for
summary judgment should only be granted against a litigant without counsel if the
court gives clear notice [at least ten days prior to ruling] of the need to file
affidavits or other responsive materials and of the consequences of default.”
United States v. One Colt Python .357 Ca. Revolver,
845 F.2d 287, 289 (11th Cir.
1988). See also
id. (“When a litigant moves pursuant to [R]ule 56 for summary
judgment or when the district court converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment, the ‘bright-line’ ten-day notice requirement is stringently
enforced.”).
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First, we reject Cauley’s argument that the district court failed to provide
him, a pro se litigant, with adequate notice that he could submit affidavits or other
responsive materials and of the potential consequences of his failure to do so.
“[W]hen a pro se litigant is involved, we have interpreted Rule 56[] to require that
the district court specifically inform the litigant (1) of the need to file affidavits or
other responsive materials, and (2) of the consequences of default.” McBride v.
Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962, 968 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The district court fulfilled its
obligation here. As the record shows, Cauley moved for summary judgment on
June 5, 2014, and Appellees moved for summary judgment on June 11, 2014. On
July 14, 2014, the district court entered an order providing “[p]ro se Defendant
Cauley” with “the notice requirements mandated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c),”
including his “right to file affidavits or other material, and the consequences of
default.” In fact, the district court specifically warned Cauley “that final judgment
may be entered without a trial and that the moving party’s evidence may be
accepted as true if not contradicted by sworn affidavits.” Accordingly, the district
ordered that “[t]he parties should file affidavits or other material in opposition to
the opposing party’s summary judgment motion on or before August 12, 2014
[when the court took the motions for summary judgment under advisement].”
The district court’s order clearly and plainly warned Cauley that he would
have to submit affidavits or responsive evidentiary material to prevent the district
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court from accepting the Appellees’ evidence as true and granting summary
judgment in their favor without a trial. Our precedent does not require a district
court to provide that notice at an oral hearing. See Griffith v. Wainwright, 772
F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“[I]t is well settled in this Circuit that
[the Rule 56 notice] requirement does not of necessity require that such notice be
given at an oral hearing . . . .”). Since the district court provided Cauley with the
required notice, it could then “properly take [Appellees’] motion under advisement
. . . [and] rule on the motion consistent with the dictates of procedural fairness
required by Rule 56,” even though Cauley was proceeding without the assistance
of counsel.
Id. Thus, the district court committed no error when it provided
Cauley with notice before it ruled on the motions for summary judgment. 1
As for Cauley’s alternative claim that there are disputed, material facts that
rendered improper the grant of summary judgment, Cauley did not raise this issue
in his opening brief before this Court. Rather, he argued it for the first time in his
reply brief. “It is well settled in this [C]ircuit that an argument not included in the
appellant’s opening brief is deemed abandoned. And presenting the argument in
the appellant’s reply does not somehow resurrect it.” Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling
1
Because we find that the district court committed no error, we need not address the Appellees’
argument regarding harmless error. See Trustmark Ins. Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 299 F.3d 1265, 1268
(11th Cir. 2002) (noting that insufficient Rule 56 notice is harmless where notwithstanding any
error, “the nonmoving party [has had] an opportunity to marshal its resources and rebut the
motion for summary judgment with every factual and legal argument available” (alterations
adopted) (quotation omitted)).
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Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 972 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Thus, Cauley
has abandoned this argument and we need not consider it.
However, even if we were to consider the argument, it would still fail on the
merits. Cauley claims that the district court erroneously found as a matter of law
that he violated the terms of the Settlement Agreement -- since, he says, the
Settlement Agreement declared only that the parties had to remove “anything about
one another or their respective churches from all websites under their control,” but
that the specific violations the district court found involved content that was not
within his control to remove. He claims that the offending statements were posted
on accounts that he could no longer access because they had been disabled by the
host. But drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Cauley, the record evidence
still demonstrates that he retained control over the offending statements after the
Settlement Agreement mandated their removal. The district court detailed
undisputed evidence provided by Appellees showing that Cauley himself originally
posted the statements on ULC HQ’s web sites and on “RationalWiki.” Further,
Appellees’ evidence clearly demonstrates that Cauley posted and made revisions to
offending statements as late as September 12, 2013 -- nearly eight months after the
removal date dictated by the Settlement Agreement. And all of the challenged
statements were either posted or remained in existence beyond the January 15,
2013, date dictated by the Settlement Agreement.
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In the face of this evidence, and to claim that he did not have control over
the offending statements, Cauley relies solely on a printout of a Google support
page that he attached to his motion for summary judgment. The support page
provides guidance in the event that a user’s account has been disabled. However,
the support page printout does not state the date that any particular account may
have been disabled. Nor is it linked in any way to Cauley’s own account.
Moreover, the printout expressly says that “[y]our account has not been deleted[;]
your data is still intact and it might be possible to regain access to your account.”
Appellees provided sworn affidavits from persons “familiar with internet and
website postings” who averred that even if Cauley could not immediately access
his account, he could “regain access . . . by following the [host’s] requirements,”
or, alternatively, he could “request that the post[s] be removed by the host.” Stated
simply, the undated, generic support page provided by Cauley does not create a
genuine issue of material fact, and the district court committed no error when it
granted summary judgment in Appellees’ favor.
AFFIRMED.
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