Filed: Oct. 06, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 15-10473 Date Filed: 10/06/2015 Page: 1 of 17 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 15-10473 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00046-WCO-JCF-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MARTIN IGLESIAS-CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (October 6, 2015) Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 15-10473 Date Filed
Summary: Case: 15-10473 Date Filed: 10/06/2015 Page: 1 of 17 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 15-10473 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00046-WCO-JCF-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MARTIN IGLESIAS-CRUZ, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (October 6, 2015) Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 15-10473 Date Filed:..
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Case: 15-10473 Date Filed: 10/06/2015 Page: 1 of 17
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10473
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cr-00046-WCO-JCF-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MARTIN IGLESIAS-CRUZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(October 6, 2015)
Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-10473 Date Filed: 10/06/2015 Page: 2 of 17
After pleading guilty, Martin Iglesias-Cruz appeals his 40-month sentence
for illegal reentry into the United States after previously being deported, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). On appeal, Iglesias-Cruz argues that his
40-month sentence, three months above the advisory guidelines range of 30 to 37
months, is procedurally unreasonable because the district court miscalculated his
advisory guidelines range and is also substantively unreasonable. After review, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
A. Two Prior Deportations and 1995 Drug Conviction
In 1989, Defendant Iglesias-Cruz, who is a citizen of El Salvador, illegally
entered the United States. After his asylum application was denied, Iglesias-Cruz
failed to report for voluntary departure and was ordered deported in 1990.
In 1994, Iglesias-Cruz was arrested in Washington, D.C. during an
undercover drug operation. Stemming from that arrest, in 1995, Iglesias-Cruz was
convicted of two counts of a felony drug trafficking offense in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia. 1 The district court imposed concurrent 12-
1
The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) stated at one point that Iglesias-Cruz was
convicted of two counts of unlawful distribution of cocaine base and at another point that
Iglesias-Cruz was convicted of two counts of unlawful possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of
a school. On appeal, the government states that the judgment of conviction indicates that the
convictions were for cocaine distribution. We need not resolve this issue because neither party
disputes that Iglesias-Cruz’s 1995 cocaine offenses, whatever their precise nature, qualified as
felony “drug trafficking offenses” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B).
2
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month sentences, followed by six years of supervised release. After his release,
Iglesias-Cruz was deported on November 22, 1995.
In May 1997, Iglesias-Cruz again was arrested in Washington, D.C, which
brought him to the attention of immigration officials. In December 1997, Iglesias-
Cruz pled guilty to illegal reentry of a deported alien and received a 40-month
sentence. In addition, Iglesias-Cruz’s supervised release as to his 1995 cocaine
convictions was revoked, and he was ordered to serve a 10-month sentence
consecutive to his 40-month sentence for the illegal reentry conviction. On March
16, 2001, Iglesias-Cruz was released and deported for the second time.
B. Indictment and Guilty Plea
On August 2, 2014, Iglesias-Cruz was stopped and arrested in Georgia for
vehicle-related offenses. After he pled guilty in state court to driving with a
suspended license, Iglesias-Cruz was sentenced to 12 months’ probation on that
charge, and served 10 days in jail before being transferred to Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody.
Iglesias-Cruz was held in ICE custody for 41 days before he was indicted for
the instant federal offense. 2 Iglesias-Cruz was charged with, and pled guilty to,
2
Although the parties and the PSI agreed that Iglesias-Cruz was held in ICE custody for
41 days, the PSI also stated that Igelsias-Cruz was transferred to ICE custody on August 21,
2014 and indicted on September 23, 2014, which is in fact 33 days.
3
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being found in the United States on or about August 2, 2014, after having been
deported.
C. Presentence Investigation Report
Iglesias-Cruz’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”) calculated a base
offense level of 8, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a). The PSI recommended a 12-
level increase, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B), because (1) Iglesias-Cruz
had been deported in November 1995 after his May 1995 convictions for drug
trafficking offenses, and (2) his May 1995 convictions were assigned three
criminal history points. The PSI applied a 3-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility, yielding a total offense level of 17.
The PSI assigned Iglesias-Cruz a total of six criminal history points, 3
criminal history points for his 1997 illegal reentry conviction and 3 criminal
history points for his 1995 cocaine convictions. The PSI explained that the 1995
cocaine convictions received 3 points, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1(a) and
4A1.2(k)(1), because although Iglesias-Cruz’s original prison term was for 12
months, he served an additional 10 months in prison after his supervised release
was revoked, for a total of 22 months.
The six criminal history points resulted in a criminal history category of III.
A total offense level of 17 and criminal history category of III yielded an advisory
guidelines range of 30 to 37 months.
4
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D. Objections and Request for Downward Departures
Iglesias-Cruz objected to the 3 criminal history points the PSI assigned to his
1995 cocaine convictions and consequently to the 12-level increase under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(B), which applied only if the 1995 cocaine convictions received the
3 criminal history points. Iglesias-Cruz relied upon recently amended commentary
to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, which defined the term “sentence imposed” to include only
those revocation sentences imposed before deportation. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt.
n.1(B)(vii). Although Iglesias-Cruz acknowledged that the amended definition
explicitly applied only to § 2L1.2’s offense-level calculation, he contended that the
amendment’s rationale should extend to the scoring of a defendant’s criminal
history under § 4A1.2 as well.
According to Iglesias-Cruz, if his 1995 cocaine convictions did not receive 3
criminal history points, his criminal history category would be II rather than III and
his offense level would be increased by 8-levels, rather than by 12-levels, resulting
in an adjusted offense level of 13, rather than 17. Thus, Iglesias-Cruz argued that
his correctly calculated advisory guidelines range was 15 to 21 months, rather than
30 to 37 months.
Alternatively, Iglesias-Cruz argued that the district court should depart
downward, pursuant to Application Note 7 to § 2L1.2, because his adjusted offense
level overrepresented the seriousness of his 1995 cocaine convictions and, pursuant
5
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to § 4A1.3(b)(1), because a criminal history category III overrepresented the
seriousness of his criminal history. Iglesias-Cruz asked the district court to depart
downward to the advisory guidelines range of 15 to 21 months he said would apply
if his 1995 convictions did not received 3 criminal history points. Iglesias-Cruz
asked for a further downward departure, pursuant to Application Note 8 to § 2L1.2,
to account for the time he was held in ICE custody before his indictment.
E. Sentencing
At sentencing, the district court overruled Iglesias-Cruz’s objections, denied
his requests for a downward departure, and adopted the PSI. The district court
found that the advisory guidelines range was 30 to 37 months.
Iglesias-Cruz requested a downward variance, pointing out that: (1) he had a
difficult childhood in El Salvador, where he was forced to fight as a child soldier in
the civil war; (2) he committed his last non-immigration offense 18 years ago; (3)
since his release from prison in 2001, he married, started a family and worked as a
house painter to support his children; and (4) he returned to the United States only
to care for his family.
The district court stated that the guidelines range was not going to be “a
controlling factor in [its] ultimate determination.” Instead, the district court
pointed out that deterrence was “an important factor to consider here,” Iglesias-
Cruz was already deported multiple times, and his previous 40-month sentence for
6
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his 1997 illegal reentry offense had not deterred him from returning to the United
States. The district court also noted that, based on the ages of his U.S.-born
children, Iglesias-Cruz returned to the United States “very shortly after he had been
deported the last time.” The district court admired “those who have the work ethic
to come here to work” and was “very hesitant to criticize those who come to
support their families and to work,” but stressed that in Iglesias-Cruz’s case it was
“in violation of the law.” The court said it was “giving rather great weight to the
fact that a [prior] 40-month sentence didn’t deter [Iglesias-Cruz] last time.” The
district court imposed a 40-month sentence, stating it was “certainly . . . not going
to go below that when it’s a repeat of the previous offense.”
Iglesias-Cruz reiterated his request for a downward departure for the time he
spent in ICE custody awaiting transfer to the custody of the U.S. Marshals. The
district court stated, “I generally do that. That’s a factor I’ve taken into
consideration, but under the circumstances as to the sentence I imposed, I’ll leave
the determination of what credit this defendant is to receive” to the Bureau of
Prisons. When Iglesias-Cruz stressed that the Bureau of Prisons would not credit
him for this time, the district court responded that it understood that fact.
II. PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS
Although the Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory after United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the district court still must calculate
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the advisory guidelines range correctly. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179,
1190 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence based on a miscalculated advisory guidelines
range is procedurally unreasonable. See Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51,
128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). 3
Iglesias-Cruz contends his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because
the district court erred in applying the 12-level enhancement under U.S.S.G
§ 2L1.2 and in assigning 3 criminal history points to his 1995 drug convictions.4
We first review the applicable guidelines used to calculate Iglesias-Cruz’s offense
level and criminal history score and then address his particular claims.
A. Offense Level Under § 2L1.2 After a Drug Trafficking Conviction
Under § 2L1.2, an illegal reentry defendant begins with a base offense level
of 8. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a). If the defendant was previously deported after a felony
drug trafficking conviction, his offense level is increased, but the extent of the
increase depends upon two things: (1) the length of the sentence imposed for the
3
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190. We review the sentencing court’s application of the
Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.
Dougherty,
754 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 1186 (2015). We
review de novo the sentencing court’s interpretation of a provision of the Sentencing Guidelines.
Id.
4
Iglesias-Cruz also argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the
district court denied his request for a downward departure under Application Notes 7 and 8 of
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 and under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1). We lack jurisdiction to review the merits of
these departure claims, however, because it is apparent from the record that the district court
understood it had the authority to depart downward on each ground, but declined to do so in
Iglesias-Cruz’s case. See United States v. Mignott,
184 F.3d 1288, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, to the extent Iglesias-Crus seeks review of these rulings, we dismiss his appeal.
8
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prior drug trafficking conviction; and (2) whether the conviction receives criminal
history points. Id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)-(B).
Specifically, § 2L1.2(b) provides that if a defendant was previously deported
after a drug trafficking conviction, and “the sentence imposed exceeded 13
months” for that conviction, a 16-level increase applies if that conviction receives
criminal history points; and a 12-level increase applies if it does not. U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). If “the sentence imposed was 13 months or less,” for that prior
conviction, a 12-level increase applies if that conviction receives criminal history
points, and an 8-level increase applies if it does not. 5
The commentary to § 2L1.2 explains that the phrase “sentence imposed” has
the same meaning as the phrase “sentence of imprisonment” in U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(b) and Application Note 2 (used to compute a defendant’s criminal history
score), “without regard to the date of the conviction.” See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt.
n.1(B)(vii). In 2012, the Sentencing Commission amended the definition of the
5
Section 2L1.2(b)(1) provides in part:
If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United
States, after—
(A) a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafficking offense for which the
sentence imposed exceeded 13 months . . . increase by 16 levels if the
conviction receives criminal history points under Chapter 4 or by 12 levels
if the conviction does not receive criminal history points;
(B) a conviction for a felony drug trafficking offense for which the sentence
imposed was 13 months or less, increase by 12 levels if the conviction
receives criminal history points under Chapter Four or by 8 levels if the
conviction does not receive criminal history points.
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)-(B) (emphasis added).
9
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“sentence imposed” in § 2L1.2’s commentary to clarify that “the length of the
sentence imposed” includes “any term of imprisonment given upon revocation of
probation, parole, or supervised release, but only if the revocation occurred before
the defendant was deported . . . .” Id. (emphasis added); see also U.S.S.G. app. C,
amend. 764. 6 Thus, when counting the length of the “sentence imposed,” post-
deportation revocation sentences of imprisonment are not counted.
On appeal, Iglesias-Cruz does not dispute that his 1995 cocaine convictions
were “drug trafficking offenses” within the meaning of § 2L1.2(b)(1) and that the
“sentence imposed”—that is, his original 12-month concurrent sentences without
reference to his later 10-month revocation sentence—was for “13 months or less.”
Iglesias-Cruz disputes only whether his 1995 cocaine convictions properly
received criminal history points under Chapter Four, the final requirement for the
12-level increase to apply. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that they did.
B. Criminal History Points for a Prior Drug Trafficking Conviction
Under Chapter Four, three points are added to a defendant’s criminal history
score “for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one
month.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). Otherwise, only two points are added “for each
6
The purpose of the amendment was to address a circuit split as to whether a revocation
sentence imposed after deportation should be counted when determining whether a sentence
exceeded 13 months and the 16-level increase applied. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 764
(Reason for Amendment).
10
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prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days” and one point is added for all
other prior sentences of imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b), (c).
In turn, a “sentence of imprisonment” is defined as “a sentence of
incarceration and refers to the maximum sentence imposed.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(b).
The commentary explains that although the defendant “must have actually served a
period of imprisonment,” the “length of a sentence of imprisonment is the stated
maximum” and “criminal history points are based on the sentence pronounced, not
the length of time actually served.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2.
Important to this appeal and for purposes of calculating criminal history
points, any additional term of imprisonment imposed because of a prior revocation
of probation, parole, or supervised release is added to the original term of
imprisonment, and the sum is used to compute the defendant’s criminal history
points under § 4A1.1. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)(1); see also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt.
n.11 (explaining that the original sentence and the revocation sentence are added
together and “the total should be counted as if it were one sentence”). If, however,
a sentence was imposed more than 15 years before the commencement of the
charged offense, it is not included in the criminal history score unless the sentence,
“whenever imposed,” resulted in the defendant being incarcerated during any part
of the 15-year period. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1).
11
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With this background about criminal history points, we conclude that under
the plain language of § 4A1.2, Iglesias-Cruz’s “sentence of imprisonment” for his
1995 cocaine convictions was 22 months. Although his original sentence in 1995
was for 12 months, Iglesias-Cruz received an additional 10-month sentence in
1997 when his supervised release was revoked. Moreover, Iglesias-Cruz did not
finish serving his 10-month revocation sentence until March 2001, because he was
ordered to serve it consecutive to his 40-month sentence for his 1997 illegal reentry
conviction. Therefore, Iglesias-Cruz’s incarceration for the 1995 cocaine
convictions extended into the 15-year period before the August 2, 2014
commencement of his charged offense. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1), (k)(1).
Put simply, for purposes of computing the number of criminal history points,
this additional 10-month prison term is added to the original 12-month prison term,
for a total of 22 months’ imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k). Given that
Iglesias-Cruz’s “sentence of imprisonment” for his 1995 cocaine convictions
exceeded one year and one month, the district court properly added three criminal
history points, pursuant to § 4A1.1(a). And, because Iglesias-Cruz’s 1995 cocaine
convictions received criminal history points under Chapter 4, the district court also
properly increased Iglesias-Cruz’s offense level by 12 levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(B).
12
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C. Iglesias-Cruz’s Policy Argument
Iglesias-Cruz argues that the Sentencing Commission, in amending the
commentary to § 2L1.2, “expressly prohibit[ed] the increase of a defendant’s
offense level for a post-deportation supervised release revocation,” and that “the
Commission would also oppose the increase of Mr. Iglesias-Cruz’s offense level
due to him receiving criminal history points for a post-deportation supervised
release revocation.” Iglesias-Cruz contends the district court “ignored the
expressed intent of the Sentencing Commission” by assessing those three criminal
history points and imposing the 12-level increase.
Because the plain language of §§ 4A1.1(a) and 4A1.2 is clear and expressly
addresses criminal history points, this Court need look no further to determine the
meaning of these two guideline provisions. See United States v. Campa, 529 F.3d
980, 1012 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that to determine the meaning of a
guideline, this Court first looks to the plain language, and where there is no
ambiguity, further inquiry is not needed). Section 4A1.2 explicitly requires all
revocation sentences, without regard to when they were imposed, to be added to
the original sentence when computing criminal history points under § 4A1.1(a), (b)
and (c). See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)(1) & cmt. n.11 (explaining that § 4A1.2(k)
“covers revocations of probation and other conditional sentences where the
13
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original term of imprisonment imposed, if any, did not exceed one year and one
month). This ends the matter.
Even if we were to inquire further, however, the definition of the “sentence
imposed” in the commentary to § 2L1.2 applies only to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1), not
to §§ 4A1.1 or 4A1.2. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B) (providing that the
definitions are “[f]or purposes of subsection (b)(1)”). Contrary to Iglesias-Cruz’s
assertion, Amendment 764, which amended the definition of “sentence imposed,”
did not expressly prohibit increasing a defendant’s offense level based on a post-
deportation revocation sentence. In fact, the amended language of Amendment
764 does not refer to offense levels at all. Instead, Amendment 764 excluded post-
deportation revocation sentences from “the length of the sentence imposed,” which
in turn determines whether a 16-level increase applies. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt.
n.1(B)(vii) (emphasis added); Id. app. C, amend. 764. Amendment 764 said
nothing about criminal history points, which determines whether a 12-level
increase applies, or about the meaning of the phrase “sentence of imprisonment”
found in § 4A1.1 and defined in § 4A1.2. In short, Amendment 764 applies only
to 16-level increases, not to 12-level increases.
Had the Sentencing Commission intended to exclude post-deportation
revocation sentences from criminal history scoring, and thus from counting toward
12-level increases, it easily could have done so. Yet, no such exclusion appears in
14
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Chapter 4. Rather, § 4A1.2 explicitly requires revocation sentences to be added in
calculating criminal history points.
In light of all of the above, we can glean no intent on the part of the
Sentencing Commission to exclude post-deportation revocation sentences when
computing criminal history points under §§ 4A1.1 and 4A1.2 or when determining
whether to impose a 12-level increase under § 2L1.2(b)(1). Accordingly, Iglesias-
Cruz has not shown that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable.
III. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS
In choosing the appropriate sentence, the district court must consider the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, but need not address each factor separately on the
record.7 United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). The weight
to be given any § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district
court. United States v. Clay,
483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). If the district
court decides to impose an upward variance, the court “must ‘consider the extent
of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to
support the degree of the variance.’” United States v. Williams,
526 F.3d 1312,
7
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9)
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to
victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
15
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1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S. Ct. at 597). The party
challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is unreasonable.
Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1189.
We examine whether a sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the
§ 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1190. In reviewing
the reasonableness of a variance from the advisory guidelines range, we take into
account the district court’s justification and the extent of the variance, but we do
not require extraordinary circumstances to justify such a sentence or presume that
such a sentence is unreasonable.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 47, 128 S. Ct. at 594-95. “We
must give ‘due deference’ to the district court’s ‘decision that the § 3553(a)
factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.’” United States v. Hayes,
762 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at
169) (alteration omitted). We will vacate such a sentence “only if we are left with
the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
States v. Shaw,
560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court imposed a 40-month sentence, three months above
the advisory guidelines range of 30 to 37 months. The district court explained that
a sentence below 40 months would not provide adequate deterrence. Iglesias-Cruz
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had already been deported two times and, after each deportation, he returned to the
United States. Moreover, Iglesias-Cruz had already reentered the United States
after being convicted in federal district court of illegal reentry and serving a 40-
month sentence. The district court’s reason for imposing a three-month upward
variance is sufficiently compelling to justify the extent of the variance and is
supported by the record.
There is no merit to Iglesias-Cruz’s claim that the district court failed to
consider his difficult life history or the fact that he had returned to the United
States to care for his family. The district court heard Iglesias-Cruz’s mitigation
arguments, and even acknowledged some of the mitigating circumstances
explicitly. As the district court explained, however, the court attached great weight
to the need for deterrence, which outweighed the mitigating factors Iglesias-Cruz
emphasized. See United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___,
135 S. Ct. 764 (2014) (explaining that the district court may
attach great weight to one factor over others). Iglesias-Cruz’s argument essentially
asks us to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors, which we do not do. See
Clay, 483 F.3d
at 743. Under the particular circumstances of this case with two prior deportations
and a prior 40-month sentence, we cannot say the district court’s decision to vary
upward by three months was an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.
17
