PER CURIAM:
The equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel, also known as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions, "precludes a party from asserting a ... position that contradicts or is inconsistent with a prior position taken by the same party." 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 131.13[6][a] (3d ed.2015). The doctrine differs from the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion in that the policy animating it "is not [primarily] concerned with preserving the finality of judgments" but is concerned, instead, with "the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of court proceedings." Id. ¶ 131.13[6][c]. The doctrine may be invoked by a third party: that is, someone who was not a party in the adversary's prior proceeding and therefore would suffer no prejudice were the adversary permitted to go forward with the inconsistent position. Id. ¶ 134.33[1].
This is so in our circuit. We do not require that the party invoking the doctrine have been a party in the prior proceeding. "The doctrine of judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial system, not the litigants; therefore, ... [w]hile privity and/or detrimental reliance are often present in judicial estoppel cases, they are not required." Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir.2002) (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir.1996)).
The case at hand is an employment-discrimination action brought by Sandra Slater against United States Steel Corporation ("U.S. Steel"), her former employer.
Twenty-one months after bringing this lawsuit, Slater, represented by separate counsel, filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.
When U.S. Steel learned of the bankruptcy case — that Slater's Chapter 7 petition had not disclosed the employment-discrimination claims she was pursuing against it in the District Court and that the Chapter 7 Trustee was treating the bankruptcy as a "no asset" case
On receiving U.S. Steel's alternative motions, Slater immediately amended her bankruptcy petition to identify her lawsuit against U.S. Steel and the claims being litigated.
In her memorandum, Slater argued that invoking the doctrine of judicial estoppel would be inappropriate for three reasons, two based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001), the third based on the Fourth Circuit's decision in Folio v. City of Clarksburg, 134 F.3d 1211 (4th Cir.1998). First, Slater argued that judicial estoppel would be inappropriate under New Hampshire because she had not "`succeeded in persuading [the bankruptcy] court to accept [her] position'" that she had no claims pending against U.S. Steel, because she had not yet received a discharge of her debts by the Bankruptcy Court, and therefore had created "`no risk of inconsistent court determinations'" that could pose a "threat to judicial integrity." Second, Slater contended that judicial estoppel should not be invoked because allowing her employment-discrimination case to go forward would not give her an "`unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on'" U.S. Steel. And third, to be estopped, Slater argued that she "must have acted intentionally, not inadvertently" in failing to disclose the litigation against U.S. Steel in her Chapter 7 petition and, as indicated in her affidavit, her failure to disclose her claims and the litigation was inadvertent.
While U.S. Steel's alternative motions were pending, the following occurred. First, the Bankruptcy Court approved the application of the trustee of Slater's bankruptcy estate to employ the lawyers representing Slater in her case against U.S. Steel as special counsel for the bankruptcy
The District Court ruled on U.S. Steel's alternative motions while Slater's plan was being carried out. The court declared moot U.S. Steel's motion to dismiss the case on the ground that Slater lacked standing. A Chapter 13 debtor has standing to prosecute a claim of the bankruptcy estate as the debtor in possession,
The District Court concluded that the doctrine of judicial estoppel as formulated in Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.2002), and Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.2010), controlled its decision. In Burnes, we observed that
291 F.3d at 1285 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, 260 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir.2001), vacated on other grounds, 537 U.S. 1085, 123 S.Ct. 718, 154 L.Ed.2d 629 (2002)). In Robinson, we observed that "[w]hen considering a party's intent [under the second prong of our test]... the debtor's failure to satisfy its statutory disclosure duty is `inadvertent' only when, in general, the debtor either lacks knowledge of the undisclosed claims or has no motive for their concealment." 595 F.3d at 1275 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barger, 348 F.3d at 1295-96).
U.S. Steel was entitled to summary judgment, the District Court held, because it established both Burnes factors as a matter of law. The court summarily dispatched Slater's argument that U.S. Steel failed to establish the two New Hampshire factors she had cited in her memorandum in opposition to U.S. Steel's alternative motions with the statement that Burnes "[i]ncorporat[ed] those considerations" in "outlin[ing] [the] two factors whose presence call for the imposition of judicial estoppel."
The District Court viewed Burnes and Robinson as controlling its decision because, like Slater's case, they
Just like the plaintiffs in Burnes and Robinson, Slater took inconsistent positions under oath when she breached the duty to disclose her ongoing employment discrimination claims in her bankruptcy petition. So the question the District Court had to decide, in order to grant U.S. Steel summary judgment, was whether Slater's inconsistencies were "calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system." See Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Salomon, 260 F.3d at 1308). In the District Court's words, in answering that question, it had to "analyze [Slater's] intent, because the Eleventh Circuit requires intentional contradictions, not simple error or inadvertence." The District Court noted that, in Robinson,
The District Court stated, "The Eleventh Circuit emphasized, not only in Robinson but also in Burnes, that waiting until after being caught to rectify the omission is too little, too late." In Burnes, the District Court noted,
Because Slater amended her Chapter 7 petition "only after U.S. Steel caught and exposed her omission," the District Court concluded that "allowing her to do so without penalty would encourage rather than discourage debtors like her to conceal their assets unless or until they are caught." To avoid this consequence, and because it inferred that Slater's concealment of her claims against U.S. Steel when she filed her Chapter 7 petition was intentional and not inadvertent, the District Court concluded that she intended "to make a mockery of the judicial system" and granted U.S. Steel a final judgment dismissing her case.
Slater appeals the District Court's judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Slater seeks the vacation of the District Court's judgment and a remand of the case for further proceedings on two alternative grounds.
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine. We review a trial court's decision whether to apply the doctrine for abuse of discretion. Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court bases its ruling on an incorrect legal standard. Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir.2002)).
The overriding purpose of the doctrine of judicial estoppel as stated in New Hampshire and by the federal circuits is "to prevent the perversion of the judicial process," indeed "the essential integrity of [that] ... process, by prohibiting parties from changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment." See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 1814-15, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (citing the doctrine's purpose as expressed in various federal courts of appeal). The doctrine has been applied broadly to legal proceedings in various contexts before a variety of tribunals, including administrative forums. 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 134.30, at 69-70 (3d ed.2015).
The doctrine is ordinarily applied in two scenarios. The first is where the party asserting the doctrine was a party in the earlier proceeding in which the party's adversary took a position inconsistent with the position the adversary is currently advancing. New Hampshire presents this scenario. The second scenario is where the party asserting the doctrine was not a party in the earlier proceeding and thus did not have to deal with the position its adversary took in that proceeding. Burnes presents this scenario.
New Hampshire v. Maine involved a boundary dispute. New Hampshire brought an original action in the Supreme Court in 2000 seeking a decree fixing the New Hampshire-Maine boundary that follows the Piscataqua River. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 745, 121 S.Ct. at 1812. New Hampshire "contend[ed] that the inland river boundary `run[s] along the low water mark on the Maine shore,' ... and assert[ed] sovereignty over the entire river." Id. at 747, 121 S.Ct. at 1813 (second alteration in the original). Maine moved the Court to dismiss New Hampshire's complaint on the ground that "two prior proceedings — a 1740 boundary determination by King George II and a 1977 consent judgment entered by th[e] Court — definitively fixed the Piscataqua River boundary at the middle of the river's main channel of navigation" and thus should be given preclusive effect. Id. at 745, 121 S.Ct. at 1812. Maine argued that three distinct doctrines — claim preclusion, issue preclusion, and judicial estoppel — required the complaint's dismissal. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss and Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, New Hampshire, 532 U.S. 742, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) (No. 130), 2000 WL 35258927, at *20-30.
The Court granted Maine's motion. In doing so, it "pretermit[ted] the States' competing historical claims along with their arguments on the application vel non of the res judicata doctrines commonly called claim and issue preclusion." New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 748, 121 S.Ct. at 1814. Instead, the Court concluded that "a discrete doctrine, judicial estoppel, best fit[] the controversy." Id. at 749, 121 S.Ct. at 1814.
Id. at 750-51, 121 S.Ct. at 1815 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Court found the second and third factors dispositive, as the following passage of its opinion indicates:
Id. at 755, 121 S.Ct. at 1817 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. C.I.T. Constr. Inc., 944 F.2d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 1991)).
The factual predicate that prompted the Court to apply the doctrine was this: permitting New Hampshire to go forward would be unfair to Maine. New Hampshire got what it wanted in the 1977 consent decree. Now it wanted the Court to effectively undo that decree and afford it an additional advantage at Maine's expense. The Court dismissed New Hampshire's complaint because it could not give New Hampshire what it wanted without undermining the integrity of the judicial process.
Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc. involved inconsistent positions taken by a debtor in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case and in an employment-discrimination case.
In July 1997, Levi Billups petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
In October 2000, the Bankruptcy Court converted Billups's Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case and "ordered Billups to [submit] amended or updated schedules to the Chapter 7 trustee reflecting any financial changes since he first filed schedules with the bankruptcy court." Id. Billups filed the amended schedules, but he failed to update them to reflect the lawsuit. Id. In January 2001, after the bankruptcy trustee filed a "no asset" report, the Bankruptcy Court, acting on the report, ordered Billups's debts discharged. Id. Pemco learned of Billups's bankruptcy after his Chapter 7 case had closed. See id. After it discovered that Billups failed to disclose the Title VII litigation in his bankruptcy filings, it moved the District Court for summary judgment, asserting judicial estoppel.
The District Court granted the motion because the material facts before it fit hand in glove with the facts in Chandler v. Samford University, 35 F.Supp.2d 861 (N.D.Ala.1999). Mem. Op. at 5, Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., No. 2:99-cv-03280-WMA (N.D. Ala. June 4, 2001), ECF No. 53. In that case, the plaintiff, Joycealyn Chandler, filed a Title VII race-discrimination suit against Samford University, her former employer. Chandler, 35 F.Supp.2d at 862. After her Chapter 13 bankruptcy case had been converted to a Chapter 7 case, she failed to inform the Bankruptcy Court of the lawsuit. Id. at 862-63. The Bankruptcy Court, finding that she had no reachable assets, ordered Chandler's debts discharged. Id. at 863. Samford University, having learned of the bankruptcy and Chandler's failure to reveal her lawsuit during the bankruptcy proceedings, moved the District Court for summary judgment, asserting judicial estoppel. Id.
The District Court in Chandler considered the application of judicial estoppel "to be one of first impression for ... the Eleventh Circuit," but
Id. at 864. Finding that Chandler had been well aware of her duty to inform the Bankruptcy Court of her pending Title VII suit
The District Court granted Pemco's motion for summary judgment on June 4, 2001, six days after the opinion in New Hampshire came down.
Id. (citing New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-51, 121 S.Ct. at 1815). We noted that the Supreme Court had been quick to say that these factors did not constitute "`inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel,'" as "`[a]dditional considerations may inform the doctrine's application in specific factual contexts.'" Id. (quoting New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-51, 121 S.Ct. at 1815). We accordingly concluded that "the two factors applied in the Eleventh Circuit are consistent with the Supreme Court's instructions [in New Hampshire], and provide courts with sufficient flexibility in determining the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel based on the facts of a particular case." Id. at 1285-86.
We then held that each of the two judicial-estoppel factors spelled out in Salomon had been met. Id. at 1286-88. First, Billups took an inconsistent position under oath when he represented that he had no assets in the form of pending legal claims despite the fact that he was in the process of pursuing a Title VII claim against Pemco.
In an attempt to avoid the dismissal of his claims, Billups argued that he should be permitted to re-open his bankruptcy case to comply with the Bankruptcy Court's order that he inform the Chapter 7 trustee of his lawsuit against Pemco. Id. We rejected the argument and affirmed the District Court's judgment. Allowing Billups to re-open his case and amend his bankruptcy filings to reveal his lawsuit against Pemco, "would only diminish the necessary incentive to provide the bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure of the debtors' assets." Id.
The factual predicate that prompted this court to apply the doctrine was this: Billups intentionally concealed from the Bankruptcy Court his claim against Pemco thereby depriving the Chapter 7 trustee of the ability to intervene and prosecute his claim for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and his creditors. If this court permitted Billups to re-open his bankruptcy case, it would be condoning his behavior, and, to the extent that such behavior would be noised about, it would be encouraging future debtors to follow suit. In short, we would be undermining the administration of the bankruptcy law and the integrity of the judicial process.
We reiterated this concern in Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.2003). The City of Cartersville demoted Barger from her position as Personnel Director to customer-sales representative on January 8, 2001. Id. at 1291. On July 18, 2001, Barger sued the City in the District Court claiming that her demotion violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Family Medical Leave Act. Id. For relief, she sought reinstatement to her Personnel Director position. Id. On
On November 7, 2001, after negotiations with the City failed, her employment attorney amended her complaint against the City to add claims for compensatory and punitive damages. Id. The next day, at a meeting of creditors, Barger told her bankruptcy attorney, and in turn, the trustee, about her case against the City. Id. She told them that she was seeking reinstatement to her former position, as Personnel Director, but omitted to say that she was also seeking damages. Id. Despite this, no amendment was made to the Statement of Financial Affairs and Personal Property Schedule B to reflect the pending lawsuit. See id.
The Bankruptcy Court subsequently granted Barger a complete discharge of her debts; it was a "no asset discharge." Id. When the City learned that Barger had been in bankruptcy and had concealed her case against the City from the Bankruptcy Court, it moved the District Court for summary judgment, asserting that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Barger's claims. Id. Barger responded by moving the Bankruptcy Court to reopen her Chapter 7 case, so that the trustee of her bankruptcy estate could prosecute the pending lawsuit in her stead. Id. at 1291-92. The Bankruptcy Court, over the City's objection, granted her motion and reopened the case for that purpose, finding that Barger "`did not conceal the [discrimination] claim or attempt to obtain a financial advantage for herself'. In the Bankruptcy Court's estimation, the failure to list the discrimination suit in Barger's Statement of Financial Affairs was caused by her bankruptcy attorney's `inadvertence' and had no substantive effect on the bankruptcy petition." Id. at 1292 (alteration in original). Despite these findings, the District Court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. Id.
On appeal, we considered the trustee of Barger's bankruptcy estate the appellant since Barger's claims constituted property of the estate. Id. at 1292-93. But we attributed to the trustee Barger's conduct in determining whether the District Court had abused its discretion in invoking judicial estoppel to bar the claims. Id. at 1295.
In seeking the reversal of the District Court's judgment, the trustee focused on the District Court's rejection of the Bankruptcy Court's findings and its substitution for such findings the determination that Barger intended to manipulate the judicial system. Id. The trustee cited the following undisputed facts: (1) Barger's attorney failed to list her lawsuit against the City in the Statement of Financial Affairs despite the fact that she specifically told him about the suit; (2) Barger informed the trustee about her suit against the City during the creditors' meeting; and (3) the Bankruptcy Court reopened Barger's Chapter 7 case so that the trustee could prosecute the suit against the City. Id.
We upheld the District Court's determination notwithstanding those undisputed facts. As for the first fact, we attributed to Barger her attorney's failure to list the lawsuit against the City as an asset of the bankruptcy estate because she voluntarily hired the attorney and could not avoid the consequences of his acts or omissions. Id. Her "remedy is against the attorney in a suit for malpractice." Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 n. 10, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390 n. 10, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962)).
We discounted the second fact for the reason that when asked by the trustee for "the monetary value of the lawsuit, [Barger] informed him that she only sought reinstatement of her previous position with the City of Cartersville. Barger did not tell the trustee that she was also seeking backpay, liquidated damages, compensatory damages, and punitive damages." Id. As for the third fact, we said this:
Id. at 1297 (alteration in original and citation omitted) (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1288).
The policy the Supreme Court implemented in New Hampshire and this court implemented in Burnes was the same: the protection of "the integrity of the judicial process" by preventing "the perversion" of that process by parties who would "deliberately chang[e] positions according to the
New Hampshire's third factor is also not dispositive. That factor applies in the New Hampshire scenario but not the Burnes scenario, as is presented in the instant case. Allowing Slater's claims to go forward could not — in New Hampshire's sense of the words — give Slater an "unfair advantage" or impose on U.S. Steel an "unfair detriment" because U.S. Steel had not been burdened with opposing Slater's claims in the Bankruptcy Court. These words apply only in a two-case setting, where the party asserting the doctrine was a party in the earlier proceeding.
In sum, Slater's argument that the District Court erred in failing to give these New Hampshire factors appropriate weight, and thus abused its discretion in barring her claims on the judicial estoppel ground, fails.
Slater argues alternatively that the District Court erred in applying Eleventh Circuit precedent, namely Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002), and Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.2010). In both of those cases, the Bankruptcy Court had accepted, albeit tacitly, the debtor's failure to disclose as property of the bankruptcy estate claims the debtor was litigating in federal district court. That is, in each case, the bankruptcy proceeding had run its course. We find no merit in Slater's argument for two reasons.
First, this court's precedent in cases involving the non-disclosure in bankruptcy
Second, to condition the invocation of judicial estoppel on what transpires in the bankruptcy case after the debtor's failure to list the claim being litigated in the District Court has been discovered would, as the Burnes Court explained, "only diminish the necessary incentive to provide the bankruptcy court with a truthful disclosure of the debtors' assets." Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1288.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is
AFFIRMED.
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
I concur in the court's judgment because the result is dictated by Eleventh Circuit precedent. I write separately because that precedent, the doctrine of judicial estoppel as laid out in Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.
Sandra Slater filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition twenty-one months after bringing suit for employment discrimination against her former employer, U.S. Steel.
While U.S. Steel's motion was pending, the Bankruptcy Court first learned of Slater's nondisclosed suit during a hearing on a related matter.
The District Court then granted summary judgment to U.S. Steel. The District Judge, concluding — correctly — that Burnes and Barger eliminated the Bankruptcy Judge's reasoned discretion in such circumstances, found that judicial estoppel barred Slater's claim. Judicial estoppel requires the court to consider two factors: "First, it must be shown that the allegedly inconsistent positions were made under oath in a prior proceeding. Second, such inconsistencies must be shown to have been calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system."
The results of today's decision speak for themselves. U.S. Steel no longer faces a set of potentially meritorious employment-discrimination claims. Judicial estoppel disposes of Slater's claims, without examination on the merits; indeed, the doctrine blocks them altogether. U.S. Steel is free and clear from any liability it may have owed to Slater. Conversely, for Slater's creditors, there will be no recovery on the claims, which belonged, by operation of law, to the bankruptcy estate the moment Slater filed her bankruptcy petition. And, the Bankruptcy Court, despite expressing no concern about the late-arriving claim, receives no "protection" through the doctrine. Instead, its experience and discretion are disregarded in favor of the District Court's judgment.
This special concurrence proceeds in three parts.
The Eleventh Circuit's judicial-estoppel precedent to be applied by Article III courts in bankruptcy proceedings, which works instead against the structure and purpose of the bankruptcy system, fails to accord the broad deference to the bankruptcy courts that Congress intended. Before explaining why this is so, I begin with an overview of the relevant dynamics present in these proceedings for the those not already familiar.
The federal bankruptcy laws are designed to "give[] ... the honest but unfortunate debtor ... a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt."
The role of the bankruptcy judge is, of course, to resolve disputes that arise. But the bankruptcy judge's time is also often occupied in a broad supervisory manner, generally ensuring that the case is administered in a "just, speedy, and inexpensive" manner.
Filing a petition "creates an estate [that is] comprised of ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case," regardless of where such property is located or
A bankruptcy trustee
The district courts have jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases,
I now turn to the evolution of judicial estoppel, a supposedly equitable doctrine overlaying this intricately designed bankruptcy system, which has managed to strip the Bankruptcy Court of its broad discretion as the "ultimate custodian of the estate."
As Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 4477 observes, "[T]he number of federal appellate decisions grappling with [the
Each of these approaches is solicitous of one or more discrete interests. The "narrowest approach" protects a party who has relied on its adversary's former position from the injury it would suffer if the court allowed the adversary to abandon its former position and pursue a contrary position. This approach also protects the court's integrity, which may be called into question if it issues a decision that appears to be unjust. The "more open approach" protects the previous court's appearance of competence by not issuing a ruling the previous court should have made but did not. The "still more open-ended approach" protects the court from inconsistent pleadings that are not barred by the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion but are disrespectful of the judicial process. This Circuit's doctrine best resembles the "still more open-ended approach."
In the remainder of Part II., I trace the evolution of judicial estoppel in this circuit. In its first iteration, the doctrine required that the inconsistent positions at issue be taken under oath in separate judicial proceedings. To invoke the doctrine, a party had to show that its adversary was advancing a position in the District Court that
Over time, this formulation of the doctrine changed. The requirement of an oath in both the prior proceeding and the District Court was modified to exclude the oath in the District Court.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel first appeared in Eleventh Circuit precedent
The Johnson Service Court then explained that,
Thus, Wright, Miller & Cooper's "still more open-ended approach" gained its first foothold.
Having already been applied when the party asserting judicial estoppel was not a party to the prior proceeding, the next appearance of the doctrine involved the New Hampshire scenario
In 1988, this court, in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan,
Three years later, this court once again applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel as federal law in a case presenting the New Hampshire scenario. In McKinnon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama,
In Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Harvey,
Although the Salomon Court was applying a state-law formulation of judicial estoppel, in referring to "[t]his circuit's approach" the court created the impression that it was dealing with the doctrine as a federal, not a state, rule. This made the Court's quotation of the divergent-sworn-positions-and-mockery-of-justice rule problematic. The question was whether the juxtaposition of the divergent-sworn-positions-and-mockery-of-justice rule's description of "inconsistent pleadings" as "divergent sworn positions" with the two-element statement that the "inconsistent positions [must be] made under oath in a prior proceeding" merely reinforced the divergent-sworn-positions-and-mockery-of-justice rule's requirement that the first, as well as the second, of the "divergent sworn positions" be under oath, or instead whether it meant that only the first of the divergent positions needed to be under oath.
Without elaboration, the Burnes and Barger Courts would subsequently conclude, by implication and in the context here, that the two-element statement amounted to a proper interpretation of the divergent-sworn-positions-and-mockery-of-justice rule that only the position taken in "a prior proceeding" needed to be under
Judicial estoppel's next doctrinal development, in Burnes, occurred when this court changed its focus from protecting the integrity of the judicial system to punishing debtors who do not fully disclose their assets. Because Burnes followed directly on the heels of the Supreme Court's decision in New Hampshire v. Maine,
The court then considered whether basing the application of judicial estoppel on these two factors would comport with the Supreme Court's "instructions" in New Hampshire, and concluded that the two factors "provide courts with sufficient flexibility in determining the applicability of the doctrine of judicial estoppel based on the facts of a particular case."
Addressing the first factor, the Burnes Court focused solely on the debtor's position before the Bankruptcy Court,
Appearing to equate the phrase "calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system" with the phrase "intentional manipulation" of the system, the court observed that "several circuits, in considering the particular issue of judicial estoppel and the omission of assets in a bankruptcy case, have concluded that deliberate or intentional manipulation can be inferred from the record."
The court concluded that the record before it contained "sufficient evidence from which to infer intentional manipulation by [the debtor]"
That the debtor's failure to disclose the claim could be remedied if his Chapter 7 case were reopened was, in the court's view, irrelevant because
Shifting the focus of the judicial-estoppel inquiry from preserving the integrity of the judicial system to punishing the debtor for failing to fully disclose his assets, the Burnes Court set the stage for the doctrine's final extension in Barger.
Barger v. City of Cartersville
When the City discovered this it moved the District Court for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel, and the bankruptcy trustee intervened.
As indicated in the order, the court first decided that it had the authority to reopen the Chapter 7 case.
Assuming, however, that the debtor was at fault for failing to amend her schedules, the court noted that the bankruptcy law provided "punishments other than judicial estoppel that can be directed at a debtor, rather than the estate and creditors," to deter debtors from concealing their assets, including sanctions under Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
Moreover, "[a]ny advantage which Debtor may have gained by omitting the asset from her schedules is eliminated by reopening, amending the schedules and allowing the Chapter 7 Trustee to administer the asset."
The District Court then applied judicial estoppel and granted the City's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, this court applied the two-element statement in determining whether the City had established the defense of judicial estoppel.
The City, of course, could show that the claims Barger was asserting in the District Court were inconsistent with the claims she had presented to the Bankruptcy Court and that her Statement of Financial Affairs to the Bankruptcy Court was, by its very nature, under oath.
Having satisfied the first prong, the City still had to show that Barger filed the false statement with the intent to manipulate the judicial system:
The court affirmed the District Court's application of judicial estoppel because the City had satisfied the two-element statement's requirements.
Though the doctrine of judicial estoppel as expressed by Burnes and Barger continues to be binding precedent in this circuit,
Notably, though the Parker panel cited each New Hampshire, Burnes, and Barger multiple times, it never explained why Barger did not dictate the result.
In sum then, trying to reconcile this court's decisions applying judicial estoppel as a uniform doctrine proves problematic, to say the least. The vast majority of the decisions discussed above fall in the category Wright, Miller & Cooper labels the "still more open-ended approach."
Judicial estoppel first became this court's law in Chrysler Credit, which involved statements under oath in two forums, a North Carolina court and the Bankruptcy Court, and held that the doctrine's purpose was to prevent parties from "attempt[ing] to manipulate the court system through the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions in judicial proceedings."
In McKinnon, the court adhered to the Chrysler Credit formulation of the doctrine and said, in effect, that in attempting to manipulate the court system through the assertion of divergent sworn positions, a party was "making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings."
Nine months later, in Burnes, a federal-question case, the court treated Salomon as if it were a federal-question case rather than a diversity case and adopted the two-element statement as expressing the burden of proof a party must satisfy to invoke judicial estoppel before the District Court.
The Burnes Court would have realized, of course, that there is a difference between the requirements of the divergent-sworn-positions-and-mockery-of-justice rule and the two-element statement in terms of what a party must prove to establish the judicial-estoppel defense and that it was bound to apply the divergent-sworn-positions-and-mockery-of-justice rule, if applicable. I assume that the court considered the divergent-sworn-positions-and-mockery-of-justice rule inapplicable in the sense that Chrysler Credit (which McKinnon followed) set an example by formulating a version of judicial estoppel appropriate for the specific factual situation presented in that case.
So, the Burnes Court formulated a different version of judicial estoppel, one appropriate for the situation before it. Judicial estoppel can apply even though the debtor's inconsistent position in the District Court is not under oath. This no doubt explains why the Burnes opinion does not identify the position the debtor took under oath in that court.
As a practical matter, the evidence will yield neither inference.
Given this reality, a bankruptcy trustee has two options. The first assumes that the value of the debtor's previously undisclosed claim is such that it would be prudent to expend the funds necessary to seek en banc review of the Barger precedent. Two alternative routes to the en banc court would be available. The first would begin in the District Court. The trustee would intervene in the case the debtor brought in the District Court and suffer an adverse judgment there and in this court on appeal.
The second option, which the trustee would take if the value of the claim did not counsel taking the first option, would be to abandon the claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554,
In sum, as long as the Barger decision continues to be binding precedent, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate will be unable to step in for the debtor and prosecute the claim he tried to conceal from the Bankruptcy Court. By operation of law, due to a judgment based on judicial estoppel, the claim will be conveyed from the bankruptcy estate to the party potentially liable to the estate, or the claim will be abandoned to the debtor as a worthless asset.
Allowing the first of these two outcomes by continuing to apply a precedent that has long been detached from its moorings in equity only guarantees the very mockery of justice the doctrine of judicial estoppel was designed to avoid.
In Part III., having discussed the doctrine's historical underpinnings at some length, I begin unpacking the effect of the judicial estoppel mandated by Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.
Before explaining why applying judicial estoppel as required by Burnes and Barger fails to achieve that doctrine's purpose, it is first necessary to flush out exactly what that purpose is and what it is not. Judicial estoppel, properly understood, is concerned with the "integrity of the judicial system, not the litigants."
The doctrine's sine qua non in the context we're dealing with here is that the debtor's position in the Bankruptcy Court is under oath and is false.
Burnes and Barger involved two judicial systems,
The Burnes and Barger debtors failed to disclose the claims they were pursuing, so the dispositive question became whether they intended to mislead the Bankruptcy Court. In both cases, the District Court found the intent to mislead as a matter of law and, applying the doctrine, granted summary judgment.
The District Court does not need protection from a litigant's assertion of an inconsistent claim (or defense), even where, in another proceeding, the litigant denied under oath the existence of the claim or defense. In fact, the assertion of inconsistent claims (or defenses) is commonplace in district court litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit their assertion. As Rule 8(d)(3) provides, "A party may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of consistency."
Prior inconsistent statements made under oath are ubiquitous in litigation regardless of the forum in which they are made. They occur in all sorts of settings — on deposition or in sworn answers to interrogatories in the case being litigated or in previous proceedings. Prior inconsistent statements are the stuff of impeachment on cross-examination. If made by a party, the party's adversary may introduce them into evidence as admissions.
Striking a meritorious claim that has been pled as permitted by Rule 8 — because the claimant previously swore that the claim did not exist — in order to protect the integrity of the judicial process in the District Court is inconceivable to me.
In affirming the dismissal of the trustee's claims, the Barger Court acknowledged that the trustee was faultless,
The Bankruptcy Court in Barger read Burnes as using judicial estoppel as a means of punishing oath-breaking. In overruling the City's objection to the debtor's motion to reopen her Chapter 7 case, the court addressed the City's Burnes-based argument — that the debtor had to pay a penalty for concealing her claims — thusly:
Burnes and Barger imply that judicial estoppel's service is to stimulate the full disclosure, or deter the concealment, of debtors' assets, not to punish the debtor. I agree with the Bankruptcy Court. The doctrine's service is punishment.
Having described the subtle yet crucial shift in the motivating rationale behind judicial estoppel that occurred in Burnes and Barger, it should not be hard to understand why borrowing an equitable remedy specially fashioned for the preservation of the integrity of the judicial system to punish inconsistent pleadings will fail to achieve either the former or the latter. Debtors will be prompted to make full disclosure of their assets, instead of hiding them, when they realize, on reflection, that if they are caught hiding them, they will be penalized. The debtors in Burnes and Barger were caught, but were they penalized? They gave up property that wasn't theirs. But that was the extent of it.
Standing alone, relieving a thief of stolen property is unlikely to deter theft. If anything, it would encourage more theft. Applying the equitable remedy of judicial estoppel — to the exclusion of the extensive, but apparently inadequate, range of criminal and civil legal remedies for oath-breaking — would guarantee that all that would happen to debtors who get caught prosecuting undisclosed claims would be that those claims get dismissed. The only downside for the debtor, therefore, is the psychic cost to his conscience and the expense of bringing suit. There is simply no deterrence for the cold and calculating litigant, who stands to gain much and lose nothing.
Not only is the particular equitable remedy Burnes and Barger created ineffective, but resorting to an equitable remedy to punish oath-breaking debtors itself is inappropriate, given the extensive range of perfectly adequate criminal and civil legal remedies with which the logic and effect of judicial estoppel are at odds. I accept for the moment that the doctrine's objective is not to punish the debtor but to motivate debtors to make full disclosure of their assets
The full and complete scheduling of a debtor's assets as required by the Bankruptcy Code does not always happen. Omissions frequently occur in the Statement of Financial Affairs and Schedules of Assets and Liabilities a debtor files with his bankruptcy petition,
Sometimes a debtor's failure to disclose an asset of the estate is not discovered
This is what happened in Barger. Barger had not scheduled her claims for damages so she moved the Bankruptcy Court to reopen her Chapter 7 case to list them.
The court reopened the case because reopening is ordinarily granted for the benefit of the creditors — to enable the administration of assets of the estate that were not scheduled or abandoned by the trustee.
Barger has obstructed the Bankruptcy Court's ability to use the tools Congress has provided to motivate debtor compliance with the disclosure requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(1)(B)(i) and (iii) and Rule 1007 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
Barger nevertheless appears to be a de novo review of the Bankruptcy Court's decision to reopen. It also gives the appearance that this court was exercising its supervisory power
The District Court, following Burnes, estopped the estate's claims for damages because Barger's failure to schedule them after her complaint had been amended to seek damages against the City was neither inadvertent nor a mistake.
I translate the affirmance into a statement that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in reopening Barger's case because it based its decision on an error of law. This court held that the Bankruptcy Court erred in applying Burnes's test for determining whether the debtor's failure to amend her schedules amounted to a calculated attempt to manipulate the judicial system. That test, again, is whether the nondisclosure was inadvertent or a mistake. If Barger was unaware of the lawsuit or had no motive for pursuing it, the nondisclosure would be inadvertent and thus could not be considered a calculated attempt to manipulate the judicial system. But she failed the test: Barger was plainly aware of the lawsuit and had a motive for pursuing it; she would reap the benefit of any recovery the lawsuit might yield. Judicial estoppel accordingly applied
That said, I sense that the Barger Court did not view its decision as a review of the Bankruptcy Court's decision to reopen. If it did, the court would have discussed § 350 and Rule 1009 and the policies and the Congressional intent they implement. But neither § 350 nor Rule 1009 was mentioned. They didn't have to be. All that mattered was that Barger failed to amend her schedules to disclose the claims in litigation. The failure constituted a statement, under penalty of perjury, that she had no claims for damages pending against the City, a statement that Barger knew was false. Because it was, Barger, in making it, intended to manipulate the bankruptcy system.
However one views the Barger Court's § 1291 decision — whether it constituted a review of the Bankruptcy Court's decision to reopen or punishment for the debtor's false schedules — its negative effect on the ability of the Bankruptcy Courts to use the tools Congress provided to enhance full disclosure of assets is clear. As an initial matter, § 350 and Rule 1009, the primary tools for ensuring full disclosure, are for all practical purposes rendered inoperative. If a case has been closed, reopening the case under § 350 to allow the debtor to amend his schedules pursuant to Rule 1009 and list a previously nonscheduled claim will turn out to be a useless act once the party sued discovers the nondisclosure. The party will immediately move the District Court to dismiss the debtor from the case for lack of standing, and the court must grant the motion. If, after the debtor's schedules have been amended, the bankruptcy trustee persuades the District Court to vacate its dismissal and intervenes in place of the debtor or initiates an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court, the trustee will be confronted with judicial estoppel.
If a case remains open and the debtor amends his schedules to reveal the nondisclosed claim, the trustee will similarly be faced with judicial estoppel. Even if suit has not been filed, if the debtor's claim is cognizable (and ready for suit) and the defendant potentially liable learns of the claim and informs the bankruptcy trustee, the defendant will have set the stage for invoking judicial estoppel to bar the trustee's appearance in the District Court or before the Bankruptcy Court in an adversary proceeding.
Moreover, the secondary tools Congress has provided to enhance full disclosure of assets are also rendered practically inoperative.
In addition to rendering all but inoperative the tools Congress has provided to enhance the full disclosure of a debtor's assets, Barger has created a serious dilemma for a Bankruptcy Court presented, as was the case in Barger, with a debtor's motion to reopen in order to schedule an unscheduled claim after the District Court has dismissed the claim because the debtor
An immediate consequence of denying reopening is that the court may have sanctioned the violation of the automatic stay.
If the Bankruptcy Court disregards Barger's dictates and reopens the case, the consequences are those that flow from a debtor's amendment of his schedules in a bankruptcy case that has not been closed. The trustee can move the District Court to vacate the dismissal of the debtor's claim and obtain intervention or he can initiate an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court. Assuming that granting judgment
Despite this court's assertions to the contrary,
The doctrine of judicial estoppel, as formulated first in McKinnon v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama
The position the litigant is pursuing in the District Court is a prepetition claim. It existed before he petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for relief. If he files suit before repairing to the Bankruptcy Court, that is his first position; he has a claim for damages. If he then files for bankruptcy and denies the existence of the claim, that is his second position; he has no claim for damages. Under the doctrine as formulated in McKinnon, the second position is rejected. Under the Burnes-Barger doctrine, however, the first position is rejected.
If the litigant files for bankruptcy first and schedules no claim (because it does not then exist), and then files suit (because it does exist at some later point), the question becomes whether the claim was cognizable
In sum, it doesn't matter which of the two inconsistent positions is the "second" position, that is, the one the divergent-sworn-positions-and-mockery-of-justice rule would reject, because the Burnes-Barger doctrine is not concerned with inconsistent pleadings. All that matters is that the debtor falsified his bankruptcy position under oath, and that cannot be tolerated.
The Burnes-Barger doctrine is not an equitable doctrine because its application produces at-least-inequitable results, if not manifestly unjust ones. A debtor deprives his bankruptcy estate of an asset by concealing it. Then the District Court, acting as a court of equity, furthers the deprivation by giving the asset to the defendant, who owes the claim's value to the bankruptcy estate, as a pure windfall. The estate's creditors, who are totally innocent, provide the windfall. The explicit rationale for doing this is that the deprivation deters future debtors from concealing assets of the bankruptcy estate. The implicit rationale is that the bankruptcy courts are either unwilling or incapable of providing such deterrence.
All of this aside, I will assume that the Burnes-Barger doctrine is indeed an equitable doctrine and examine it in the light of the traditional maxims of equity.
The Bankruptcy Court, in contrast, is a party because the integrity of its processes and its reputation for competency are implicated. Likewise, the trustee is a party because, as part of his fiduciary duties, he must marshal and administer the assets of the bankruptcy estate. The trustee does that for the benefit of the creditors, so they, too, are parties. The debtor was a party, but he has exited the stage because his claim has, by operation of law, been transferred to the administration of his estate. His interest is in obtaining a discharge of his debts, and that is a matter the Bankruptcy Court will handle.
The District Court is also a party, and it also has at stake its integrity. Inconsistent pleadings, however, whether or not under oath, are of no concern. Rule 8(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits inconsistent pleadings, and in my view, equity would not countenance a judge-made rule to negate that feature of Rule 8. Neither is the fact that the trustee's likely key witness in the suit, the debtor, lied under oath. Prior inconsistent statements, whether or not under oath, are grist for the litigation mill.
Additionally, applying judicial estoppel in the circumstances depicted in Barger and in the case at hand necessarily precludes the bankruptcy courts from exercising the case-specific discretion that Congress intended. I focus on the situation in Barger because the Bankruptcy Court's interest in that case is a matter of record, as discussed in the In re Barger Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The District Court in Barger nevertheless estopped the trustee's claims to punish Barger for failing to amend her schedules and list her claims against the City. But the Bankruptcy Court had already considered the matter of punishment. It was well aware of the sanctions the law provides — the criminal law and the bankruptcy law — and concluded that none applied. If the court had "reasonable grounds for believing" that Barger had committed perjury, it would have reported the matter to the U.S. Attorney, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3057.
In the end, the parties with the most at stake, the Bankruptcy Court and the creditors, ask the District Court to withhold the judicial-estoppel remedy. Rather than make them whole, it will cause them irreparable harm. In applying the doctrine notwithstanding their request and against the clear thrust of governing law, the District Court undermines its own integrity in the eyes of the public and implies that the Bankruptcy Court is either unwilling or incapable of overseeing debtor compliance with the law.
The only solution to this unfortunate predicament is the en banc court.
† This visual aid should be read as follows. The arrows show that the language in the case at the tail of the arrow was adopted in the case at the head of the arrow. For example, Johnson Service's "calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions" language was adopted in Chrysler Credit, indicating that two oaths were required for the application of judicial estoppel. Similarly, Johnson Service's "made under oath in a prior proceeding" language was adopted in Salomon, and McKinnon's inheritance of the "calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions" language was adopted in Salomon, making it unclear whether one or two oaths were required. The cases proceed in roughly chronological order from the top-left corner to the bottom-right corner. The text inside each case box indicates whether there was federal-question or diversity jurisdiction in the case, whether it cited the language for one oath or for two oaths, and whether the case presented either a Burnes or a New Hampshire scenario. See note 1 of the Timeline of Judicial Estoppel Cases in the Eleventh Circuit for a brief explanation of these scenarios.
[
Case name Citation Date Jurisdiction Burnes or One oath or NH? † two? ‡ Johnson Serv. Co. v. 485 F.2d 1973 Diversity Burnes Either Transamerica Ins. Co. 164 Am. Nat'l Bank of 710 F.2d 1983 Diversity NH Two Jacksonville v. Fed. 1528 Deposit Ins. Corp. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. 842 F.2d 1988 Federal NH Two Rebhan 1257 question McKinnon v. Blue Cross & 935 F.2d 1991 Federal NH Two Blue Shield of Ala. 1186 question Talavera v. School Bd. of 129 F.3d 1995 Federal Burnes Two Palm Beach Cty. 1214 question Taylor v. Food World, Inc. 133 F.3d 1998 Federal Burnes Two 1419 question Salomon Smith Barney, 260 F.3d 2001 Diversity NH Either Inc. v. Harvey 1302 Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, 291 F.3d 2002 Federal Burnes Either Inc. 1282 question Barger v. City of 348 F.3d 2003 Federal Burnes One Cartersville 1289 question
The following is a list of court of appeals, district court, and bankruptcy court decisions within the Eleventh Circuit that cite Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.2002), Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003), or both as of February 22, 2016. I have included only cases that cite Burnes or Barger for judicial estoppel purposes. The first four columns indicate the year the case was decided, the court that decided the case, the case name, and the case
In Count Two, Slater alleged that U.S. Steel retaliated against her, in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, when it laid her off after she complained about (1) "racial and sexual discrimination" and (2) U.S. Steel's decision to retain a white woman with less than three years of service at U.S. Steel, while laying off more-senior African-American employees during a round of layoffs supposedly restricted to employees with three years of service or less.
In Count Three, Slater attempted to recast each of the previous allegations as "racial and sexual discrimination," in violation 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Slater also argues that Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-78, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2672-73, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009) (discussing the prohibition on disparate-impact discrimination), applies to her claim for racial discrimination. Because this argument was raised for the first time on appeal, we decline to address it. See, e.g., Reider v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 793 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir.2015).
The other claims disposed of on summary judgment that Slater has not appealed are affirmed by operation of law.
Additionally, Slater argues that judicial estoppel is inapplicable to a claim for injunctive relief. Because this argument was raised for the first time on appeal, we decline to address it. See, e.g., Reider v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 793 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir.2015).
Id. at 807, 119 S.Ct. at 1604.
We note that the Supreme Court did not cite Cleveland in its New Hampshire decision. In New Hampshire, the Court recognized that judicial estoppel applies in a variety of contexts and then went on to articulate factors particularly relevant to cases involving the same parties in two proceedings. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749-51, 121 S.Ct. at 1814-15. From this, one might infer that the Supreme Court considers the New Hampshire scenario and the Burnes scenario to involve entirely different settings.
Although the panel did not estop Smith Barney — because it had not pursued inconsistent positions in the two cases — it described judicial estoppel thusly:
Id. Salomon was decided on August 9, 2001, three days after the Supreme Court denied rehearing in New Hampshire, and thus, quite understandably, did not cite the New Hampshire decision.
By way of historical background, the quotation attributed to McKinnon was taken from American National Bank v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 710 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11th Cir.1983). American National Bank cited Johnson Service Co. v. TransAmerica Insurance Co., 485 F.2d 164, 174 (5th Cir.1973), a diversity case based on Texas common law, as the authority for the doctrine. "Judicial estoppel is applied to the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions. The doctrine is designed to prevent parties from making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings." Am. Nat'l Bank, 710 F.2d at 1536 (citing Johnson Serv., 485 F.2d at 174).
The Salomon Court relied specifically on two cases in articulating the elements of judicial estoppel. The first case was Taylor v. Food World, Inc., 133 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1998). Taylor presented a Burnes scenario. Gary Taylor's guardian sued Taylor's employer claiming that the employer had terminated Taylor in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and seeking reinstatement. Id. at 1421. While the suit was pending, the guardian obtained supplemental security income benefits on Taylor's behalf. Id. The District Court, applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel, dismissed the ADA claim. On appeal, we described judicial estoppel in the words the court in McKinnon used: "Judicial estoppel `is applied to the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions ... [and] is designed to prevent parties from making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings.'" Id. at 1422 (quoting McKinnon, 935 F.2d at 1192). We reversed the dismissal on the ground that "[t]he medical records [Taylor] submitted to the SSA do not clearly contradict his assertion that he is `qualified' under the ADA." Id. at 1423.
The second case was Johnson Service. In that case, the former Fifth Circuit applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel as formulated by Texas common law. 485 F.2d at 174. In Chrysler Credit Corporation v. Rebhan, which presented a New Hampshire scenario, this court cited Johnson Service in formulating for the first time in the Eleventh Circuit the doctrine of judicial estoppel as a matter of federal law. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir.1988), abrogated on other grounds by Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) ("The policy interests [which gave rise to the doctrine] are simply stated by the doctrine itself. The doctrine of judicial estoppel `is directed against those who would attempt to manipulate the court system through the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions in judicial proceedings.'" (quoting Johnson Serv., 485 F.2d at 174)).
In Ajaka v. BrooksAmerica Mortgage Corporation, 453 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir.2006), we considered the debtor's failure to "amend his Chapter 13 reorganization plan to reflect his contingent [Truth in Lending Act] claim" as taking an "inconsistent position[] ... under oath in a prior proceeding." 453 F.3d at 1344 (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285). "Because ... Ajaka failed to assert his TILA claim as an asset in the bankruptcy proceeding, the first [factor] of our judicial estoppel test is satisfied. See [Burnes, 291 F.3d] at 1285 (finding similar failure to disclose in bankruptcy proceeding to satisfy the first factor)." Id.; see also Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir.2010) ("By failing to update her bankruptcy schedule to reflect her pending claim, Robinson represented that she had no legal claims to the bankruptcy court while simultaneously pursuing her legal claim against Tyson in the district court. These actions, both taken under oath, are clearly inconsistent. Therefore, in accordance with Ajaka, Robinson took inconsistent positions under oath and the issue of judicial estoppel centers on her intent.").
In contrast, Barger held that the trustee was bound by the debtor's failure to disclose in her bankruptcy filings that the claims she was prosecuting were assets of the bankruptcy estate.
Under our prior-panel-precedent rule, United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir.2015), we are bound to follow Barger and to disregard Parker's holding to the contrary.
H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, at 88 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6050 provides:
(footnotes omitted). As a caveat, the above language is in reference to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which was superseded by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, which in turn was held unconstitutional. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-88, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2880, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (plurality opinion); see also Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2620, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011). The sentiment still holds generally true.
Tampa Bay Water, 731 F.3d at 1182; Riviera Beach, 649 F.3d at 1273.
As the late Judge Robert M. Hill subsequently observed in USLIFE Corp. v. U.S. Life Insurance Co.,
560 F.Supp. 1302, 1305-06 (N.D.Tex.1983) (footnote omitted).
The former Fifth Circuit had used the phrase "mockery of justice" but only in habeas cases. Williams v. Beto, the seminal case for the phrase, expressed it in these words:
354 F.2d 698, 704-05 (5th Cir.1965) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The District Court granted the School Board summary judgment on the ground that Talavera was "judicially estopped from claiming she was a `qualified' individual with a disability under the ADA, having certified to the SSA that she was totally disabled." Id. Applying the divergent-sworn-positions-and-mockery-of-justice rule, we reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings because the statements Talavera made in support of her SSA application "d[id] not rule out the possibility that she could perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation." Id. at 1221.
We said, in the words of McKinnon, "Judicial estoppel `is applied to the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions. The doctrine is designed to prevent parties from making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings.'" Talavera, 129 F.3d at 1217 (quoting McKinnon, 935 F.2d at 1192).
Id. (citations omitted). On the record before us, we found that the statements Gary Taylor made in the application to the SSA did not rule out the possibility that he was a "`qualified' individual ... who can perform [his] job `with or without accommodation.'" Id. at 1425.
The court quoted McKinnon in describing the doctrine: "Judicial estoppel `is applied to the calculated assertion of divergent sworn positions ... [and] is designed to prevent parties from making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings.'" Id. at 1422 (alteration in original) (quoting McKinnon, 935 F.2d at 1192).
Johnson Serv., 485 F.2d at 175 (footnote omitted). Johnson Service also says that there must be "divergent sworn positions." Id. It does not describe the second of the divergent sworn positions, which is the statement that triggers application of judicial estoppel. See id.
Under Burnes and Barger, it is always the case that judicial estoppel is triggered in a situation where the debtor files for bankruptcy, omits to list an actionable claim as an asset either in his initial bankruptcy filings (if the claim is then cognizable) or in an amendment to the filings (when the claim becomes cognizable or he sues on the claim in the District Court), and his adversary discovers the omission. If, as is the situation here, the debtor pursues the claim in the District Court before filing for bankruptcy, the application of judicial estoppel depends on when he lists the lawsuit in his bankruptcy filings. If he lists the lawsuit in conjunction with the filing of his petition, the doctrine does not apply. If he lists the lawsuit after his adversary discovers that it has not been listed, the doctrine applies.
In United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121 (11th Cir.2006) (en banc), a criminal prosecution, one of the defendants' arguments was that "the government's subsequent legal position in the Ramirez case constituted prosecutorial misconduct that warrant[ed] a new trial." Id. at 1152 (emphasis added). We thought the argument was essentially a claim of judicial estoppel and said this, citing Burnes:
Campa, 459 F.3d at 1152 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285). We then held that judicial estoppel was inapplicable
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The fact that Burnes and Barger, which the court did not cite, treated a subsequent proceeding as "a prior proceeding" — because the subsequent proceeding was the only proceeding in which a position was taken under oath — was not mentioned. Given the court's silence on the point and the Supreme Court's statements in New Hampshire that "Courts have observed that `[t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle,'" and that it was "not establish[ing] inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel," New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750-51, 121 S.Ct. at 1815 (alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982)), I do not view Campa as having overruled by implication any aspect of the holdings of Burnes or Barger. Rather Campa confirms that the Burnes-Barger formulation of judicial estoppel extends beyond the bankruptcy context.
Judicial estoppel is triggered when the debtor breaches the duty of disclosure (and his adversary in the district-court action discovers the breach). The time of the breach is critical. See ante at 1205-06 & n. 18; see also Love v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 677 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir.2012) (observing that "whether Love had a financial motive to conceal his claims against Tyson at the time Love failed to meet his disclosure obligations ... is the relevant time frame for the judicial estoppel analysis."); Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir.2010) ("When reviewing potential motive, the relevant inquiry is intent at the time of non-disclosure." (emphasis added)).
Id.
When the City opposed the debtor's, Barger's, motion to reopen her Chapter 7 case on the ground that the trustee would be estopped to pursue the claims that she had been litigating in the District Court, the City was engaging in an "act to obtain possession of property of the estate." That act was a nullity. See United States v. White, 466 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir.2006) ("It is the law of this Circuit that `[a]ctions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void and without effect.'" (quoting Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Hall, 685 F.2d 1306, 1308 (11th Cir.1982))). In the same vein, if the City initiated an adversary proceeding in the Chapter 7 case to obtain a declaration that the claims at issue belonged to the City via the operation of judicial estoppel, that proceeding would be a nullity as well.
Fed. R. Bankr.P. 5010.
The Bankruptcy Court "has broad discretion to reopen to permit administration of assets." 9 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 5010.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.); In re Faden, 96 F.3d 792, 796 (5th Cir.1996); In re Bianucci, 4 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir.1993); see also In re Upshur, 317 B.R. 446, 451 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.2004) ("Although a motion to reopen is addressed to the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court, the court in fact has a duty to reopen the estate whenever there is proof that it has not been fully administered. The proper focus is on the benefit to the creditors, so that if the action has any value, the case should be reopened.").
If the Bankruptcy Court granted the debtor's motion to reopen, the debtor could amend her schedules as a matter of right under Rule 1009 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, "Amendments of Voluntary Petitions, Lists, Schedules and Statements." Rule 1009, "General Right to Amend," states, in pertinent part: "A voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed. The debtor shall give notice of the amendment to the trustee and to any entity affected thereby." Fed. R. Bankr.P. 1009(a).
11 U.S.C. § 554. "[P]roperly scheduled assets that are not administered at the time the case is closed are deemed abandoned." 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 350.03 (emphasis added). While the Chapter 7 case was ongoing, the trustee was unaware of the claims against the City and, thus, could not have abandoned them.
11 U.S.C. § 727.
In re Lopez, 283 B.R. 22, 30 (9th Cir. BAP 2002) (citation omitted).
Id.
Gee v. Pritchard, (1818) 2 Swans. 402, 414.
I posit that this is what this court did first in City of Riviera Beach v. That Certain Unnamed Gray, Two-Story Vessel Approximately Fifty-Seven Feet in Length, 649 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir.2011), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 735, 184 L.Ed.2d 604 (2013), and then in Tampa Bay Water v. HDR Eng'g, Inc., 731 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir.2013); it formulated a version of judicial estoppel appropriate for the circumstances at hand, although in neither case did it invoke doctrine. Riviera Beach was an in rem proceeding in admiralty. Riviera Beach, 649 F.3d at 1262. The appellant, Lozman, argued that Riviera Beach was judicially estopped from bringing a maritime claim against the defendant vessel because its position was allegedly inconsistent with its position (neither of which was under oath) in an earlier lawsuit between the same parties. Id. at 1265. In rejecting the estoppel argument, the court cited McKinnon, with the exception of the "divergent sworn positions" element of the divergent-sworn-positions-and-mockery-of-justice rule, id. at 1275, and Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006), which adhered to the elements of the doctrine New Hampshire invoked:
Riviera Beach, 649 F.3d at 1273. In Tampa Bay Water, Tampa Bay argued that HDR Engineering was estopped because of an inconsistent position it had taken in an earlier phase of the same case (not under oath). 731 F.3d at 1177. The court did not apply the doctrine because the positions were not inconsistent. Id. at 1182. Though it did not cite Riviera Beach for the version of the doctrine it considered, the court repeated Riviera Beach's version verbatim. The Tampa Bay Water Court also cited this Circuit's earlier recitation of the three New Hampshire elements (which Zedner reiterated) in Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir.2010), but not the Burnes formulation, which the Robinson Court actually applied in these words:
See id. at 1273 (citation omitted) (quoting Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285). Neither Riviera Beach nor Tampa Bay Water has been cited in any of our reported opinions in cases presenting the Burnes-Barger context and the situation here.
11 U.S.C. § 554. After the District Court issued an order dismissing the debtor's claim for lack of standing, the trustee would inform the District Court that he was opting not to intervene, in which event the court would enter a final judgment dismissing the case without prejudice. At this point, the claim would be sitting in the bankruptcy estate subject to administration by the trustee.
The substance of Rule 8(d)(3) has been in effect since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937, when the then-current version provided that "[a] party may... state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(2) (1937).
Barger, 348 F.3d at 1296.
I note in passing that In re Barger was referred to the Bankruptcy Court under the umbrella of 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). Section 157(d), gives the District Court the authority to "withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of any party, for cause shown." Id. § 157(d). In light of Reynolds, Piambino, and in particular, In re Furlong, one might posit that the relationship between this court and the district and bankruptcy courts could provide for the exercise of supervisory power with respect to a bankruptcy court's practices.
1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 2.3(4) n.7 (2d ed.1993).
11 U.S.C. § 3057(a) (emphasis added).