Filed: Sep. 13, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: Case: 19-10654 Date Filed: 09/13/2019 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 19-10654 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cv-63165-BB ERIC WATKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus WILSON DEJESUS, BSO Deputy, THOMAS HINTON, BSO Deputy Supervisor, Defendant-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (September 13, 2019) Before WILSON, JORDAN and HULL, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
Summary: Case: 19-10654 Date Filed: 09/13/2019 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 19-10654 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cv-63165-BB ERIC WATKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus WILSON DEJESUS, BSO Deputy, THOMAS HINTON, BSO Deputy Supervisor, Defendant-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (September 13, 2019) Before WILSON, JORDAN and HULL, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: ..
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Case: 19-10654 Date Filed: 09/13/2019 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-10654
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cv-63165-BB
ERIC WATKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WILSON DEJESUS,
BSO Deputy,
THOMAS HINTON,
BSO Deputy Supervisor,
Defendant-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(September 13, 2019)
Before WILSON, JORDAN and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 19-10654 Date Filed: 09/13/2019 Page: 2 of 6
Eric Watkins, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and sua sponte dismissal of his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. First, Mr. Watkins argues that the district court
erred because it misinterpreted his allegations and improperly dismissed his
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim without discussion and without
permitting amendment. Second, he argues that the district court erred because it
dismissed his defamation claim as barred by the statute of limitations.
I
Mr. Watkins filed a pro se § 1983 civil rights complaint against Deputy
Wilson Dejesus and Deputy Supervisor Thomas Hinton of the Broward County,
Florida, Sherriff’s Office (“BSO”), in their individual capacities, for alleged
violations of his constitutional rights. The complaint included a defamation claim.
Mr. Watkins alleged the following:
On December 29, 2014, Mr. Watkins engaged in a “verbal confrontation” with
three women in the parking lot of a shopping center. The women were throwing
stones at his car. The parties called the police. When Deputies Dejesus and Hinton
arrived, they observed Mr. Watkins arguing with the women and “took the females’
side.” The officers told Mr. Watkins that he could no longer patronize the shopping
center. Mr. Watkins overheard Deputy Dejesus tell someone on the phone that Mr.
Watkins was “crazy” and a “registered sex offender.” When Mr. Watkins told
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Deputy Dejesus that he was not a registered sex offender, Deputy Dejesus responded
that he was. Mr. Watkins protested that the officers lacked authority to order him
off the property, but Deputy Hinton showed him a posted sign that stated BSO
deputies have authority to advise any person to leave and may arrest someone for
trespassing if they fail to abide. Deputy Dejesus showed Mr. Watkins the area from
which he was prohibited, but Mr. Watkins denies that he was located on the property
where the sign was posted.
Mr. Watkins moved for leave to proceed IFP. The district court denied his
motion and sua sponte dismissed the complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The court concluded that there was no basis for the complaint
to proceed and that any amendment to Mr. Watkins’ complaint would be futile. The
court dismissed the due process claim because he had not established a right to
trespass on private property. The court also dismissed the defamation claim because
it was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Mr. Watkins timely
appealed.
II
We review the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo, accepting the allegations in the
complaint as true. See Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). A
district court is obligated to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it determines
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that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “Dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same
standard as a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017). Thus, to survive
dismissal, a complaint must contain facts sufficient to support a plausible claim to
relief. See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Mr. Watkins relies on Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266
(11th Cir. 2011), which recognized a constitutionally-protected liberty interest to be
in parks or other city properties that are open to the general public. He asserts a
liberty interest in remaining on the parking lot because it is “quasi-public property.”
Catron is inapplicable, however, because the parking lot here was private property
and the BSO deputies were authorized to instruct Mr. Watkins to leave. See Fla.
Stat. § 810.09(1)(a)(1). The district court did not err in determining that Mr.
Watkins’ Fourteenth Amendment due process claim was not legally cognizable.
There was also no error in the district court’s denial of Mr. Watkins’ motion
to amend his complaint. We review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint for
an abuse of discretion, see Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d
1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007), and there was no abuse of discretion here. Dismissal
with prejudice may be appropriate if granting leave to amend would be futile because
the complaint as amended would still be properly dismissed or be immediately
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subject to summary judgment for the defendant. See Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d
1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007). The district court correctly concluded that Mr.
Watkins’ inability to articulate a constitutionally-protected liberty interest is fatal to
his due process claim. Any amendment to his complaint would therefore prove
futile.
III
Mr. Watkins also argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
defamation claim as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. He maintains
that the limitations period should be tolled because the alleged defamatory
statements from Deputy Dejesus—that Mr. Watkins is “crazy” and a “registered sex
offender”—are still part of the public record and have caused him ongoing injury.
We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the
applicable statute of limitations. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453
F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006). Under Florida law, the tort of defamation
(whether libel or slander) is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Fla. Stat.
§ 95.11(4)(g). See also Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth, Romano, Erikson & Kupfer,
P.A. v. Flanagan,
629 So. 2d 113, 115 (Fla. 1993). A defamation claim based on a
single publication, exhibition, or utterance accrues on the date of publication. See
Fla. Stat. § 770.07. See also
Wagner, 629 So. 2d at 115.
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About four years elapsed between the time the alleged defamatory statements
were made (December 29, 2014) and when Mr. Watkins filed his complaint
(December 28, 2018). This places Mr. Watkins’ claim well outside the statute of
limitations and the district court did not err in dismissing it. Moreover, we find no
basis in law for tolling the limitations period based on Mr. Watkins’ allegation of
ongoing injury. Cf. Ovadia v. Bloom, 756 So. 2d 137, 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(limitations period on defamation claim against television station, reporter, and
anchorpersons was not tolled while plaintiff pursued the action in federal court
despite that court’s lack of jurisdiction over his claims).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying Mr.
Watkins’ IFP application, dismissing his § 1983 and defamation claims, and denying
leave to amend.
AFFIRMED.
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