Filed: Dec. 05, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: Case: 19-11010 Date Filed: 12/05/2019 Page: 1 of 4 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 19-11010 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-00204-ODE JAMES HENRY BANKS, Petitioner – Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF GEORGIA, Respondents – Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (December 5, 2019) Before MARCUS, JILL PRYOR and HULL, Circuit Judges. Case: 19-11010 Dat
Summary: Case: 19-11010 Date Filed: 12/05/2019 Page: 1 of 4 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 19-11010 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-00204-ODE JAMES HENRY BANKS, Petitioner – Appellant, versus UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF GEORGIA, Respondents – Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _ (December 5, 2019) Before MARCUS, JILL PRYOR and HULL, Circuit Judges. Case: 19-11010 Date..
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Case: 19-11010 Date Filed: 12/05/2019 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-11010
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-00204-ODE
JAMES HENRY BANKS,
Petitioner – Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
STATE OF GEORGIA,
Respondents – Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(December 5, 2019)
Before MARCUS, JILL PRYOR and HULL, Circuit Judges.
Case: 19-11010 Date Filed: 12/05/2019 Page: 2 of 4
PER CURIAM:
James Banks, a Georgia parolee proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his federal habeas corpus petition as an unauthorized second or
successive § 2254 petition. Because Banks failed to obtain authorization from this
Court before filing his current petition in district court, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal.
Banks filed the present § 2254 habeas corpus petition in federal district court
to challenge his Georgia state court convictions for robbery and possessing a
firearm during a crime. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court
dismiss the petition as second or successive. The magistrate judge explained that
Banks had previously filed a § 2254 petition challenging his state convictions,
which the district court had denied and then dismissed with prejudice. Because
Banks failed to obtain authorization from this Court before filing his current
petition, the magistrate judge concluded, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider
his petition.
After considering Banks’s objection to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation
and denied Banks’s petition. This is Banks’s appeal.
This appeal requires us to consider whether the district court properly
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Banks’s petition because it was
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Case: 19-11010 Date Filed: 12/05/2019 Page: 3 of 4
second or successive.1 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, requires that before a prisoner
in custody pursuant to a state court judgment can file a “second or successive”
federal habeas petition under § 2254, he must “move in the appropriate court of
appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). In general, a “district judge lacks jurisdiction to decide
a second or successive petition filed without our authorization.” Insignares v.
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
755 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2014). But the phrase
“second or successive” is “not self-defining and does not refer to all habeas
applications filed second or successively in time.” Stewart v. United States,
646 F.3d 856, 859 (11th Cir. 2011).
To determine whether an inmate’s petition is second or successive, we look
to whether the petitioner previously filed a federal habeas petition challenging the
same judgment.
Insignares, 755 F.3d at 1279. If a previous § 2254 petition was
dismissed as premature or for failure to exhaust, the dismissal was not on the
merits and a later petition is not considered second or successive. See Dunn v.
Singletary,
168 F.3d 440, 441 (11th Cir. 1999) (“When an earlier habeas corpus
petition was dismissed without prejudice, a later petition is not ‘second or
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We review de novo a district court’s determination that a petitioner’s habeas application
was second or successive. See Stewart v. United States,
646 F.3d 856, 858 (11th Cir. 2011).
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Case: 19-11010 Date Filed: 12/05/2019 Page: 4 of 4
successive’ for purposes of § 2244(b).”). Here, Banks does not dispute that he
filed a previous § 2254 petition challenging the same judgment or that the district
court denied his earlier petition and dismissed his case with prejudice.
Banks nonetheless argues that he was not required to obtain prior
authorization from a court of appeals before filing his petition because § 2244 does
not require a petitioner to obtain prior authorization when his petition presents a
claim that relies on a new rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has
made retroactive. We disagree.
The plain language of § 2244 required him to receive prior authorization
from our Court before filing his second or successive petition in the district court.
Under AEDPA, a petitioner may be permitted to bring a second or successive
petition when his claim is based on a new rule of constitutional law that the
Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on collateral review. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2). But AEDPA bars a petitioner from filing a second or successive
petition raising such a claim directly in the district court. See
id. § 2244(b)(3).
As a result, we agree with the district court that Banks’s second § 2254
petition was properly considered an unauthorized second or successive habeas
corpus petition. Because Banks failed to seek approval to file that petition, the
district court properly dismissed it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
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