Filed: Jun. 12, 2020
Latest Update: Jun. 12, 2020
Summary: Case: 18-14527 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 Page: 1 of 9 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 18-14527 _ D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20323-MGC-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus NELSON NEGRIN, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (June 12, 2020) Before WILSON, MARCUS, and BUSH, * Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM: * Honorable John K. Bush, United States Circuit Judge for the S
Summary: Case: 18-14527 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 Page: 1 of 9 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 18-14527 _ D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20323-MGC-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus NELSON NEGRIN, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (June 12, 2020) Before WILSON, MARCUS, and BUSH, * Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM: * Honorable John K. Bush, United States Circuit Judge for the Si..
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Case: 18-14527 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-14527
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20323-MGC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NELSON NEGRIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 12, 2020)
Before WILSON, MARCUS, and BUSH, ∗ Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
∗ Honorable John K. Bush, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
Case: 18-14527 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 Page: 2 of 9
Nelson Negrin pled guilty for failure to appear for sentencing, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1). In calculating his sentencing guideline range, the district
court applied a six-level increase in Negrin’s offense level under U.S.S.G. §
2J1.6(b)(2)(B). 1 Negrin appeals his sentence, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A grand jury charged Negrin with one count of conspiracy to commit access
device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2) (Count 1), and two counts of
aggravated identify theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (Counts 12 and 13).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Negrin agreed to plead guilty to Count 12 only. In
exchange for his guilty plea, the government agreed to dismiss Counts 1 and 13 of
the indictment after Negrin was sentenced. But Negrin failed to appear for his
sentencing hearing. Later, a grand jury charged Negrin with failure to appear in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1); he pled guilty to this charge.
Section 2J1.6 of the Sentencing Guidelines enumerates the sentencing
considerations for a defendant’s failure to appear. Generally, the base offense
level for failure to appear is six. U.S.S.G. § 2J1.6(a)(2). Courts must add levels
for specific offense characteristics. Id. § 2J1.6(b)(2). If the “underlying offense”
for which the defendant failed to appear was punishable by a term of imprisonment
of five to 15 years, courts must increase the offense level by six.
Id.
1
All Sentencing Guideline citations are to the November 1, 2016 Manual.
2
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§ 2J1.6(b)(2)(B). But if the underlying offense is punishable by a term of less than
five years, courts must increase the offense level by three. Id. § 2J1.6(b)(2)(C).
In Negrin’s presentence investigation report (PSR), Probation applied the
base offense level of six under § 2J1.6(a)(2). It also added three levels for a
specific offense characteristic under § 2J1.6(b)(2)(C), as Count 12—the count
Negrin pled guilty to—was punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of
less than five years. After applying a two-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility, Probation’s suggested guideline range was 15 to 21 months.
The government objected to Probation’s calculation. It argued that the
underlying offense for purposes of § 2J1.6(b)(2) is the charged offense for which
Negrin would receive the most severe possible sentence. Since Count 1—a count
punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment—was not yet dismissed when Negrin
failed to appear, the government requested that the district court apply a six-level
increase under § 2J1.6(b)(2)(B).
Before the sentencing hearing, Probation explained that “underlying
offense” is defined by the Guidelines as “the offense in respect to which the
defendant failed to appear.” See id. § 2J1.6, comment. (n.1). So, because Negrin
pled to Count 12 and was to be sentenced on that count, the underlying offense was
Count 12. Negrin agreed with Probation. He further argued that although Counts
1 and 13 had not yet been dismissed, he was no longer subject to prosecution for
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either count, as the government was bound to dismiss them when he pled to Count
12 and the district court accepted his plea. Negrin also asserted that his failure to
appear for sentencing could not have violated the plea agreement because the
agreement was silent on this matter and the plea agreement’s integration clause
barred any implicit agreements.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court remarked that although a
defendant is typically adjudged guilty at the time a plea is accepted, the plea and
agreement could each be vacated until the judgement was entered. Further, the
court noted that Negrin’s bond contract required him to appear before the court for
sentencing on the indictment, which included all counts. The court accepted the
government’s argument and directed that the specific offense characteristic include
the six-level adjustment under § 2J1.6(b)(2)(B). Negrin’s recalculated guideline
range was 24 to 30 months. Ultimately, the district court sentenced Negrin to 22
months’ imprisonment, to be served after his 24-month sentence for aggravated
identity theft. Negrin renewed his objection to the six-level adjustment, preserving
it for appeal.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing
Guidelines de novo. United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 959 (11th Cir. 2015),
cert. denied sub nom. Huarte v. United States, ___ U.S. ___,
136 S. Ct. 268 (2015).
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We interpret the Guidelines “in light of their Commentary and Application Notes,
which are binding unless they contradict the Guidelines’ plain meaning.” United
States v. Dimitrovski, 782 F.3d 622, 628 (11th Cir. 2015). And we review a district
court’s findings on the scope of a plea agreement for clear error. Raulerson v.
United States,
901 F.2d 1009, 1012 (11th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Section 2J1.6(b)(2) of the Guidelines provides for an enhancement to a
defendant’s base offense level for a failure-to-appear conviction. The extent of the
enhancement is based on the term of the imprisonment for the “underlying
offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.6(b)(2). The Application Notes clarify that the
underlying offense is “the offense in respect to which the defendant failed to
appear.” Id. § 2J1.6, comment. (n.1). If the underlying offense was punishable by
five to 15 years’ imprisonment, six levels are added, but if the underlying offense
was punishable by less than five years’ imprisonment, three levels are added.
Id. §
2J1.6(b)(2)(B)–(C). We have said that the term “punishable” in § 2J1.6(b)(2)
refers to the statutory maximum sentence for an offense, as opposed to the actual
sentence imposed. United States v. Gardiner,
955 F.2d 1492, 1498 n.11 (11th Cir.
1992).
Penalties for failure to appear under § 2J1.6(b)(2) “reflect the severity of the
punishment that [the defendant] faced if convicted as charged”; “[o]therwise, the
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penalty for failure to appear will not provide an accused with sufficient incentive to
face the judicial music.” United States v. Williams, 932 F.2d 1515, 1516–17 (D.C.
Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Nelson,
919 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1990)
(affirming the trial court’s use of an offense for which the defendant was later
acquitted to increase defendant’s failure-to-appear enhancement, because a
defendant “facing a potentially longer prison term has more of an incentive to flee,
and thus a longer sentence [for failure to appear] could be seen as necessary to
deter him”); 2 United States v. Muhammad,
146 F.3d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 1998)
(recognizing that the Guidelines account for “the likelihood that a defendant who is
facing a more serious charge with a longer possible jail term has a greater incentive
to flee” than one who faces a less-serious charge and jail term).
To that end, for purposes of § 2J1.6(b)(2), the “underlying offense” is found
among the offenses charged in the indictment. See United States v. Magluta, 198
F.3d 1265, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that “underlying offense” under §
2J1.6(b)(2) is “the most serious of the counts referred to in the indictment”),
vacated in part on other grounds,
203 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2000); see also
Williams, 932 F.2d at 1516 (affirming the trial court’s decision to base defendant’s
2
Nelson cites to an older iteration of the Guidelines’ failure-to-appear provision. Though the
provision has since been amended, the relevant portions are the same. Compare United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2J1.6(b)(2) (Nov. 2016) with United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2J1.6(b) (Nov. 1989).
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enhancement for failure to appear on the offense of his indictment rather than the
offense of conviction because “the enhancement under section 2J1.6(b) depends
. . . on the severity of the potential penalty”).
Turning to the case before us, the application of § 2J1.6(b)(2) is fairly
straightforward. Through a plea bargain, Negrin agreed to plead guilty to Count 12
and, in exchange, the government agreed to dismiss Counts 1 and 13 after Negrin
was sentenced. But Negrin failed to appear at his sentencing hearing, and the
government had not yet moved to dismiss Counts 1 and 13. So when Negrin failed
to appear, he committed a new offense. And under the Guidelines, that offense’s
penalty must “reflect the severity of the punishment that he faced if convicted as
charged.” Williams, 932 F.2d at 1516–17. The district court properly recognized
that “underlying offense” under § 2J1.6(b)(2) refers to the most serious count of an
indictment. It thus used Count 1—the count with the highest statutory maximum
sentence—to apply § 2J1.6(b)(2)(B) and increased his base offense level by six.
See
Magluta, 198 F.3d at 1282;
Gardiner, 955 F.2d at 1498.
Even so, Negrin argues that his case has an added wrinkle: though the
government had not yet moved to dismiss Counts 1 and 13, Negrin contends it had
no choice but to do so because the district court had accepted his guilty plea and,
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therefore, also accepted the terms of the plea agreement. We reject this argument
because the district court had not yet accepted Negrin’s plea agreement. 3
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court may accept or reject
a plea agreement at the plea colloquy or defer its decision until it has reviewed the
PSR. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A); see also U.S.S.G. § 6B1.1(c). Moreover, when
a district court accepts a plea agreement that includes the dismissal of charges, the
district court must inform the defendant that “the agreed disposition will be
included in the judgment.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4).
Although the district court was silent at the plea hearing about accepting,
rejecting, or deferring a decision on the plea agreement, two facts convince us that
it deferred that decision for a later date. First, the district court did not inform
Negrin that the disposition to which he and the government agreed—a guilty plea
to only Count 12 and dismissal of the others—would be included in the judgment,
as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(4) requires. And second, the district
court told Negrin at his plea hearing that it could not determine his sentence until it
had a chance to review his PSR. With those facts in mind, we conclude that the
3
We express no opinion as to how the district court’s acceptance of the plea agreement would, if
at all, change our analysis. And since we conclude that the plea agreement has no bearing on our
disposition, we do not address the parties’ other arguments related to it. We also do not address
Negrin’s Double Jeopardy argument, because he raised that argument for the first time in his
reply brief, and “[a]n appellant in a criminal case may not raise an issue for the first time in a
reply appellate brief.” United States v. Fiallo-Jacome, 874 F.2d 1479, 1481 (11th Cir. 1989).
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district court had not accepted the plea agreement and therefore all charges were
still outstanding.
CONCLUSION
Because the district court properly applied § 2J1.6(b)(2), Negrin’s sentence
is AFFIRMED.
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