Filed: Jul. 02, 2020
Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 19-14117 Date Filed: 07/02/2020 Page: 1 of 7 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 19-14117 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cr-00087-TPB-MRM-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SALVADOR AGUILAR-GIL, a.k.a. Salvador Aguilar, a.k.a. Pedro Aguilar, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (July 2, 2020) Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH and LAGOA, Circuit Jud
Summary: Case: 19-14117 Date Filed: 07/02/2020 Page: 1 of 7 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 19-14117 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cr-00087-TPB-MRM-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SALVADOR AGUILAR-GIL, a.k.a. Salvador Aguilar, a.k.a. Pedro Aguilar, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (July 2, 2020) Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH and LAGOA, Circuit Judg..
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Case: 19-14117 Date Filed: 07/02/2020 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-14117
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cr-00087-TPB-MRM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SALVADOR AGUILAR-GIL,
a.k.a. Salvador Aguilar,
a.k.a. Pedro Aguilar,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 2, 2020)
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 19-14117 Date Filed: 07/02/2020 Page: 2 of 7
Salvador Aguilar-Gil appeals his within-guidelines 34-month 1 prison
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to illegal reentry after being deported
and convicted of a felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). Aguilar-
Gil did not object to the sentence during the district court proceedings. On appeal,
he argues that his sentence is (1) procedurally unreasonable because the district
court failed to state in open court the reasons for imposing its sentence as required
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1)2 and (2) substantively unreasonable because the
district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors. 3 We address each
1
Aguilar-Gil’s applicable advisory guideline range was 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment.
He faced a statutory maximum of ten years’ imprisonment.
2
Section 3553(c)(1) provides that:
The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its
imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence—
(1) is of the kind, and within the [Sentencing Guidelines] range, described in
subsection (a)(4), and that range exceeds 24 months, the reason for imposing a
sentence at a particular point within the range.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). The parties do not dispute that § 3553(c)(1) applies here.
3
Section 3553(a) mandates that the district court “impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary” to: (1) “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; (2) “afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct”; (3) “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”; and (4) “provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D). In addition, the court
must consider: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant”; (2) “the kinds of sentences available”; (3) the guideline
sentencing range; (4) any pertinent policy statements; (5) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities; and (6) the need to provide restitution to any victims.
Id. § 3553(a)(1),
(3)–(7).
2
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argument in turn and conclude that Aguilar-Gil’s sentence is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable. We therefore affirm his sentence.
I.
Aguilar-Gil’s central argument on appeal is that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because it did not comply with § 3553(c)(1). We review de novo
whether the district court complied with § 3553(c)(1) regardless of whether the
defendant objected below. See United States v. Cabezas-Montano,
949 F.3d 567,
608 n.39 (11th Cir. 2020).
At the time of sentencing, a district court must state in open court the
reasons that it imposed a particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). “In doing so,
the district court should ‘tailor its comments to show that the sentence imposed is
appropriate’ in light of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.” To meet its obligations
under 3553(c)(1), “the district court need only set forth enough to satisfy us that it
considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own
legal decisionmaking authority.”
Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 609.
Where a party presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different
sentence, the district court “will normally go further and explain why [it] has
rejected those arguments.” Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007).
Nevertheless, a brief explanation may be legally sufficient when the sentence
imposed is within the guideline range, the arguments before the court are
3
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“straightforward [and] conceptually simple,” and the record establishes that the
court considered the § 3553(a) factors.
Id. at 356. We consider the record as a
whole to determine if the district court did, in fact, consider the evidence,
arguments, and § 3553(a) factors, as required by § 3553(c).
Id. at 359; Cabezas-
Montano, 949 F.3d at 608–09.
Here, the district court met its obligations under § 3553(c)(1) in imposing
Aguliar-Gil’s sentence. Prior to sentencing, Aguliar-Gil filed a sentencing
memorandum, in which he discussed § 3553(a) factors—specifically, his history
and characteristics, and the advisory guideline range—and requested a downward
variance of 24 months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the court confirmed that it
had reviewed Aguilar-Gil’s sentencing memorandum. And it heard Aguilar-Gil’s
argument as to why a below-Guidelines sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment was
appropriate, as well as the government’s argument for a 30 months’ sentence. But
the court expressed its concern with Aguilar-Gil’s criminal record, specifically his
history of resistance to law enforcement, which goes to his personal characteristics
and lack of respect for the law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Before pronouncing
its sentence, the court cited 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 and 3553 and stated that it had also
considered “the presentence report and the advisory guidelines.” And after
pronouncing the 34-month sentence, the court concluded “[a]fter considering the
advisory guidelines and all the factors identified in Title 18 U.S. Code Sections
4
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3553(a)(1) through (7), I find the sentence imposed is sufficient but not greater
than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing.” This explanation is
sufficient for purposes of § 3553(c). See
Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 609
(holding that district court provided a sufficient explanation for the sentence
imposed where the “district court judge expressly articulated that it had considered
the parties’ arguments, the PSRs containing the advisory guidelines ranges, and the
§ 3553(a) factors”). Accordingly, because the record clearly establishes that the
court “considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its
own legal decisionmaking authority,”
Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d at 609, Aguilar-
Gil has not shown that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable.
II.
Aguilar-Gil also raises in passing a substantive reasonableness challenge,
arguing that because the district court did not provide any reasons for the sentence
it imposed, it “failed to afford consideration to the relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors that
were due significant weight, gave significant weight to an improper or irrelevant
factor, and committed a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.”
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. 4
United States v. Carpenter,
803 F.3d 1224, 1234 (11th Cir. 2015).
4
Although Aguilar-Gil did not object to his sentence, by advocating for a downward-
variance sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, he preserved his argument that the 34-month
sentence imposed was substantively unreasonable. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140
5
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The weight given to each § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court, and this Court will not substitute its judgment in
weighing the relevant factors. United States v. Clay,
483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir.
2007). A district court abuses its discretion by: (1) failing to consider relevant
factors that were due significant weight; (2) giving an improper or irrelevant factor
substantial weight; or (3) committing a clear error of judgment by balancing proper
factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010)
(en banc). That said, the district court is not required to discuss each of the
§ 3553(a) factors.
Id. at 1195. It is sufficient for the district court to acknowledge
that it has considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors.
Id. at
1194-95. Moreover, this Court ordinarily expects a sentence within the guideline
range to be reasonable. United States v. Croteau,
819 F.3d 1293, 1309−10 (11th
Cir. 2016). That the sentence imposed falls well below the statutory maximum
penalty also indicates reasonableness.
Id. at 1310.
Nothing in the record supports Aguilar-Gil’s contention that the district
court failed to consider certain factors or gave weight to improper or irrelevant
factors. The district court properly considered Aguilar-Gil’s criminal record,
specifically his history of resistance to law enforcement, which goes to his personal
S. Ct. 762, 767 (2020) (holding that a defendant sufficiently preserved a challenge to the
substantive reasonableness of his sentence by arguing at sentencing for a shorter sentence).
6
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characteristics and lack of respect for the law and it then § 3551. See 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2). Moreover, the 34-month sentence was within the middle of the
guideline range and well below the statutory maximum of ten years, which are
indicators of reasonableness. See
Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1309–10. Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and Aguilar-Gil’s
sentence is substantively reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
7