Filed: Jul. 02, 2020
Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 19-14575 Date Filed: 07/02/2020 Page: 1 of 8 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 19-14575 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cv-01944-MHH TAMMY JEANEASE REEVES, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama _ (July 2, 2020) Before MARTIN, LAGOA, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges. Case: 19-14575 Date Fil
Summary: Case: 19-14575 Date Filed: 07/02/2020 Page: 1 of 8 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 19-14575 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cv-01944-MHH TAMMY JEANEASE REEVES, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama _ (July 2, 2020) Before MARTIN, LAGOA, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges. Case: 19-14575 Date File..
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Case: 19-14575 Date Filed: 07/02/2020 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-14575
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cv-01944-MHH
TAMMY JEANEASE REEVES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(July 2, 2020)
Before MARTIN, LAGOA, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
In this social security case, Tammy Reeves appeals the district court’s order
denying Reeves’s motion -- under sentences four and six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) --
to remand her case to the Commissioner of Social Security. No reversible error
has been shown; we affirm.
I. Background
In September 2014, Reeves applied for a period of disability, disability
insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. In support of her claim of
disability Reeves submitted, in pertinent part, the opinions of two one-time
consultative medical examiners: (1) an October 2012 opinion of Dr. P and (2) a
June 2013 opinion of Dr. T.
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on Reeves’s claim of
disability. In February 2017, the ALJ denied Reeves’s applications for benefits.
The ALJ noted that Reeves had four severe impairments: degenerative disc
disease, degenerative joint disease, obesity, and depression. The ALJ then
determined that Reeves had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
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sedentary work with certain limitations. Considering Reeves’s age, education,
work experience, and RFC (together with the vocational expert’s testimony), the
ALJ found that Reeves could perform work in the national economy and, thus, was
not disabled. The ALJ summarized the opinions of Drs. P and T but afforded those
opinions little weight: the opinions were unsupported by objective medical
evidence in the record.
The Appeals Council denied Reeves’s request for review of the ALJ’s 2017
decision. Reeves then sought review in the district court, Reeves claimed that the
ALJ’s 2017 decision was not based on substantial evidence. Reeves argued that
the ALJ (1) failed to consider adequately Reeves’s testimony that her medications
made her drowsy; (2) failed to state with sufficient clarity the grounds for affording
little weight to the opinions of Drs. P and T; and (3) posed a hypothetical question
to the vocational expert that failed to reflect Reeves’s drowsiness or the limitations
supported by the opinions of Drs. P and T.
While Reeves’s appeal was pending in the district court, Reeves moved to
remand the case to the Commissioner pursuant to sentences four and six of section
405(g). Reeves asserted that a sentence-four remand was warranted because the
ALJ had “repudiated” the medical opinions of Drs. P and T and, thus, the ALJ’s
decision was unsupported by substantial evidence. Reeves also asserted that a
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sentence-six remand was warranted based on new evidence: (1) a March 2019
favorable ALJ decision finding Reeves disabled as of 13 October 2017; and (2) a
2018 medical opinion of Dr. O.
In September 2019, the district court issued the order that is the subject of
this appeal. The district court first denied Reeves’s motion to remand. The district
court then reviewed the ALJ’s 2017 decision on the merits and determined that the
ALJ’s denial of benefits was supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Reeves now appeals the district court’s decision. In her appellate brief,
Reeves raises no challenge to the ALJ’s 2017 denial of benefits or to the district
court’s determination that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s 2017 decision.
Reeves, instead, challenges only the district court’s denial of her motion to remand.
II. Discussion
We review de novo the district court’s decision. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court reviewing the Commissioner’s
final decision in a social security case has available two methods -- under
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“sentence four” and under “sentence six” -- for remanding a case to the
Commissioner. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1261.
A. Sentence-Four Remand
Sentence four of section 405(g) authorizes the district court “to enter, upon
the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To remand under
sentence four, “the district court must either find that the decision is not supported
by substantial evidence, or that the Commissioner (or the ALJ) incorrectly applied
the law relevant to the disability claim.” Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1092
(11th Cir. 1996). A sentence-four remand order must “accompany a final
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the administrative decision.”
Melkonyan v. Sullivan,
501 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1991).
On appeal, Reeves argues that the district court committed a legal error by
assuming that the court lacked authority to remand under sentence four absent a
final judgment. We disagree. In denying Reeves’s motion for a remand under
sentence four, the district court said these words: “Reeves asks the Court to remand
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before reaching a substantive decision, so sentence four does not provide a vehicle
for remand.” The district court’s statement -- that a sentence-four remand is
unavailable without a substantive decision on the merits -- is correct as a matter of
law. See id.
Reeves also asserts that she in fact sought a sentence-four remand in
conjunction with a substantive ruling on the ALJ’s denial of benefits. To the
extent the district court misconstrued the relief sought by Reeves, however, Reeves
has still failed to establish that a sentence-four remand was warranted in this case.
The district court addressed the merits of Reeves’s arguments challenging
the ALJ’s 2017 decision. The district court determined that the ALJ’s 2017
decision was supported by substantial evidence: a determination Reeves has not
challenged on appeal. Nor has Reeves (in the district court or in this Court)
contended that the ALJ or the Commissioner applied incorrectly the applicable
law. Absent a conclusion that the ALJ’s decision was unsupported by substantial
evidence or that the ALJ applied incorrectly the law, Reeves was unentitled to a
sentence-four remand. See Jackson, 99 F.3d at 1092.
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B. Sentence-Six Remand
Under sentence six of section 405(g), a district court may remand a case to
the Commissioner for consideration of newly discovered evidence. To obtain a
remand under sentence six, a claimant must demonstrate that “(1) there is new,
noncumulative evidence; (2) the evidence is ‘material,’ that is, relevant and
probative so that there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the
administrative result, and (3) there is good cause for the failure to submit the
evidence at the administrative level.” Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 808
F.3d 818, 821 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Caulder v. Bowen,
791 F.2d 872, 877 (11th
Cir. 1986)).
The district court denied Reeves’s motion for a sentence-six remand based
on new evidence. First, the district court explained -- correctly -- that the ALJ’s
2019 favorable benefits determination constituted no new evidence for purposes of
section 405(g). We have said that a later favorable ALJ decision constitutes no
new and material evidence warranting a sentence-six remand. Id. at 822
(explaining that “the mere existence of a later favorable decision by one ALJ does
not undermine the validity of another ALJ’s earlier unfavorable decision or the
factfindings upon which it was premised.”).
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The district court also determined that Dr. O’s 2018 medical opinion -- that
Reeves was disabled in January 2018 and that her conditions had worsened -- was
no material evidence warranting a sentence-six remand because nothing indicated
that Reeves’s functional impairments (observed by Dr. O in 2018) existed before
the ALJ’s 2017 decision. In reviewing an ALJ’s decision about whether a claimant
is entitled to benefits, we consider only evidence of the claimant’s condition before
the date of the ALJ’s decision. See Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th
Cir. 1999) (explaining that a doctor’s opinion about the claimant’s condition one
year after the ALJ’s decision was not probative of whether the claimant was
disabled during the pertinent time). Nothing evidences (nor does Reeves argue)
that the functional limitations observed by Dr. O in 2018 existed before February
2017. The district court thus determined correctly that Dr. O’s 2018 opinion was
not pertinent to the ALJ’s 2017 determination about whether Reeves was disabled.
We conclude that a remand under either sentence four or sentence six was
not warranted in this case; we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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