Filed: May 10, 2007
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 06-0601 Bay Shore v. Kain 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2006 4 (Argued November 22, 2006 Decided May 10, 2007) 5 Docket No. 06-0601-cv 6 - 7 BAY SHORE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 8 Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, 9 v. 10 THOMAS KAIN, on behalf of his son, RYAN KAIN, 11 Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellee. 12 - 13 B e f o r e: MESKILL, WINTER and HALL, Circuit Judges. 14 Appeal from a final order and judgment of the United 15 States District Court
Summary: 06-0601 Bay Shore v. Kain 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2006 4 (Argued November 22, 2006 Decided May 10, 2007) 5 Docket No. 06-0601-cv 6 - 7 BAY SHORE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 8 Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, 9 v. 10 THOMAS KAIN, on behalf of his son, RYAN KAIN, 11 Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellee. 12 - 13 B e f o r e: MESKILL, WINTER and HALL, Circuit Judges. 14 Appeal from a final order and judgment of the United 15 States District Court f..
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06-0601
Bay Shore v. Kain
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
3 August Term, 2006
4 (Argued November 22, 2006 Decided May 10, 2007)
5 Docket No. 06-0601-cv
6 ---------------------------------------------
7 BAY SHORE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
8 Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant,
9 v.
10 THOMAS KAIN, on behalf of his son, RYAN KAIN,
11 Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellee.
12 ---------------------------------------------
13 B e f o r e: MESKILL, WINTER and HALL, Circuit Judges.
14 Appeal from a final order and judgment of the United
15 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
16 Weinstein, J., filed on December 29, 2005, confirming the
17 decision of the State Review Officer that Plaintiff-Appellant Bay
18 Shore Union Free School District provide Ryan Kain, the son of
19 Defendant-Appellee Thomas Kain, a one-to-one teacher’s aide at
20 his parochial school.
21 CHRISTOPHER VENATOR, Hauppauge, NY, (Ingerman
22 Smith, L.L.P., Hauppauge, NY, of
23 counsel),
24 for Appellant.
25 ROBERT E. FEKETE, Mineola, NY, (Kenneth A.
26 Gray, Bee Ready Fishbein Hatter &
27 Donovan, L.L.P., Mineola, NY, of
28 counsel),
1 for Appellee.
2 MESKILL, Circuit Judge:
3 This appeal asks us to decide whether plaintiff-
4 appellant Bay Shore Union Free School District (the School
5 District) has a legal obligation to provide defendant-appellee’s
6 son Ryan with a teacher’s aide during his classes at St. Patrick
7 School,1 the parochial school the child now attends. The New
8 York Department of Education Review Officer determined that the
9 School District must provide Ryan a teacher’s aide at St. Patrick
10 if his parents wish him to remain at that school for his regular
11 classes. The School District challenged the decision in the
12 United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
13 York, and the court, Weinstein, J., confirmed the State Review
14 Officer’s findings and recommendation. However, the parties
15 agree that the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education
16 Act (IDEA) does not confer on Ryan a right to a teacher’s aide at
17 a private school of his choosing, and therefore the obligations
18 of the School District turn on the New York Education Law. We
19 conclude that the district court improperly assumed jurisdiction
20 over this case. This appeal must be dismissed and the order of
21 the district court vacated.
1
Although the parties and the Impartial Hearing Officer
refer to Ryan’s school as “St. Patrick’s,” correspondence on the
school letterhead included in the record indicates that the
institution is called “St. Patrick School.”
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1 I.
2 At the time of his impartial hearing in September 2004,
3 Ryan was a seven-year old second-grader at St. Patrick School
4 (St. Patrick) in Bay Shore, New York. On November 4, 2003, one
5 of Ryan’s teachers referred him to the District’s Committee on
6 Special Education, observing that he “has extreme difficulty
7 following and carrying out oral directions [and] has yet to
8 master daily classroom routines.” A pediatric neurologist
9 diagnosed Ryan as suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
10 Disorder (ADHD).
11 IDEA requires participating states such as New York to
12 ensure that once a school district has made such a disability
13 determination, the needs of the student are adequately
14 accommodated. The “core of the statute . . . is the cooperative
15 process that [IDEA] establishes between parents and schools.”
16 Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005). For
17 each disabled child a school district must create an
18 “Individualized Education Program” (IEP), which “must include an
19 assessment of the child’s current educational performance, must
20 articulate measurable educational goals, and must specify the
21 nature of the special services that the school will provide.”
22 Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A). “If parents believe that an IEP
23 is not appropriate, they may seek an administrative ‘impartial
24 due process hearing’” conducted by the state or local educational
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1 agency. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 53; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). If the
2 impartial due process hearing is conducted by a local educational
3 agency, as it was in the instant case, the decision may be
4 appealed to the state agency.
Id. § 1415(g). IDEA expressly
5 provides that “any party aggrieved” by the final state decision
6 “shall have the right to bring a civil action” challenging the
7 decision “in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a
8 district court of the United States.”
Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
9 Pursuant to this elaborate process, the School District
10 developed an IEP designating Ryan to receive testing
11 accommodations, daily 40 minute sessions in a Resource Room, and
12 the services of a one-to-one teacher’s aide for three hours per
13 day in the classroom. The IEP also indicated that Ryan should
14 have the services of the one-to-one aide only at a public school
15 within the School District. Ryan’s parents requested an
16 impartial due process hearing to challenge the IEP’s
17 determination that Ryan must travel to a public school every day
18 to receive this benefit.
19 The Impartial Hearing Officer ruled that providing Ryan
20 a one-to-one aide at St. Patrick was not only a reasonable
21 accommodation for the School District, but was “necessary” for
22 the boy to receive the Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)
23 guaranteed by IDEA and the New York Education Law. See
id.
24 § 1412(a)(1)(A); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402 (McKinney 2006). The
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1 Hearing Officer concluded that requiring Ryan to travel from St.
2 Patrick to a public school every day to enjoy the services of a
3 one-to-one aide “would cause too much disruption in the child’s
4 school day and would take away from [his] academic experience.”
5 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the
6 Hearing Officer ordered the School District to “provide the
7 child’s [one-to-one] aide services indicated in his current IEP
8 at St. Patrick’s [sic].”
9 The School District appealed to the New York Education
10 Department’s State Review Officer (the Review Officer),
11 contending that it has no obligation under federal or state law
12 to provide a one-to-one aide to a student attending a private
13 school. The Review Officer determined that IDEA did not confer
14 on Ryan the right to enjoy all of the special services he would
15 receive if he attended a public school. However, the Review
16 Officer concluded, “[i]n contrast to the IDEA, New York State law
17 does confer an individual entitlement to special education
18 services and programs to eligible students enrolled by their
19 parents in nonpublic schools.” The Review Officer suggested that
20 a one-to-one aide offered at a location separate from Ryan’s
21 academic classes would not meet the child’s individual needs.
22 The School District’s appeal was accordingly dismissed.
23 The School District filed the instant suit in the
24 United States District Court for Eastern District of New York,
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1 challenging the Review Officer’s determination that the School
2 District is obliged to provide Ryan a one-to-one aide during his
3 academic classes at St. Patrick. The district court assumed
4 jurisdiction was proper, stating that “IDEA provides for
5 concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over claims arising
6 under its provisions.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. T. ex
7 rel. R., 405 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The court
8 acknowledged that federal law did not compel the School District
9 to offer educational services to Ryan at St. Patrick, but
10 rejected the School District’s argument that New York law
11 precludes it from doing so.
Id. at 249. Thus, the court
12 reasoned, it could not disturb the Review Officer’s determination
13 that anything less than provision of a one-to-one aide at the
14 location of Ryan’s academic classes at St. Patrick would fail to
15 meet the child’s academic needs.
Id. at 248. The court
16 confirmed dubitante the Review Officer’s decision and this appeal
17 followed.
18 II.
19 The parties concede that IDEA does not require the
20 School District to provide Ryan with a one-to-one aide at St.
21 Patrick. Thus, at oral argument we questioned whether the
22 district court properly exercised jurisdiction. We ordered
23 supplemental briefing. Both parties now contend that this suit
24 is properly before a federal court, but the parties’ consent
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1 alone cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.
2 See Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466
3 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 2006). We are not persuaded by their
4 argument that their dispute involves a federal question because
5 IDEA incorporates the New York Educational Law on which this case
6 turns.
7 IDEA frequently has been described as a model of
8 “cooperative federalism.” See
Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 52. The
9 statute requires participating states to establish a “basic floor
10 of meaningful, beneficial educational opportunity,” but states
11 may exceed the federal floor and enact their own laws and
12 regulations to guarantee a higher level of entitlement to
13 disabled students. See D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. New York City Bd. of
14 Educ.,
480 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2007), amending
465 F.3d 503,
15 514 n.13 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ.
16 for Comm. of Mass.,
736 F.2d 773, 792 (1st Cir. 1984)(holding
17 that “a state is free to exceed, both substantively and
18 procedurally, the protection and services to be provided to its
19 disabled children” under IDEA). The parties contend that IDEA’s
20 standard for a FAPE incorporates by reference all state
21 standards, even if the state regulations exceed the minimum floor
22 established by federal law. See
id. at 789. Thus, even though
23 Kain contends that New York law requires his son to receive a
24 one-to-one aide at St. Patrick, the parties argue this is a
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1 “civil action[] arising under the . . . laws . . . of the United
2 States” such that federal question jurisdiction is appropriate.
3 28 § U.S.C. 1331. We disagree.
4 IDEA incorporates some but not all state law concerning
5 special education. See Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 73 (2d
6 Cir. 1990). However, assuming that IDEA incorporates the
7 relevant New York Education Law, this does not provide an
8 independent federal question that would sustain the court’s
9 jurisdiction. A “federal statute is not a sufficient basis for
10 federal question jurisdiction simply because it incorporates
11 state law.” City Nat’l Bank v. Edmisten,
681 F.2d 942, 945 (4th
12 Cir. 1982). Edmisten was an action for a declaratory judgment
13 brought by seven banks seeking to challenge North Carolina’s
14 application of its usury law to a credit card service fee the
15 banks wished to introduce.
Id. at 943. The court acknowledged
16 that the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85, expressly
17 incorporated North Carolina’s usury laws by allowing banks to
18 charge rates up to the maximum permitted under state law.
Id. at
19 944-45. Nonetheless, regardless of how North Carolina law was
20 interpreted, the challenged practice would have remained legal
21 under federal law, and thus the resolution of the dispute did not
22 turn on a question of federal law.
Id. at 945. The Edmisten
23 Court concluded that the banks’ action did not raise a federal
24 question.
Id. at 946; see also Standage Ventures v. Arizona, 499
-8-
1 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (deeming no federal question to
2 exist where “the real substance of the controversy . . . turns
3 entirely upon disputed questions of law and fact relating to
4 compliance with state law, and not at all upon the meaning or
5 effect of the federal statute itself”).
6 A similar dynamic prevails in this action. The School
7 District’s suit does not turn on the interpretation of federal
8 law. The parties agree that regardless of whether New York’s
9 Education Law permits the School District or Ryan’s parents to
10 dictate where the child will receive the services of a one-to-one
11 aide, the IEP as drafted should afford Ryan the FAPE IDEA
12 demands. This case turns entirely on a state-law issue, and as
13 such it cannot form the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
14 III.
15 Nor does the IDEA’s explicit authorization of a cause
16 of action to be brought by “any party aggrieved by the findings
17 and decision” of the state educational agency ipso facto raise a
18 federal question that would confer jurisdiction in this case on a
19 federal court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
20 The Supreme Court generally has followed Justice
21 Holmes’ classic formulation that, “A suit arises under the law
22 that creates the cause of action.” American Well Works Co. v.
23 Layne & Bowler Co.,
241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). The Court has more
24 recently explained that, “A case arises under federal law within
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1 the meaning of § 1331 . . . if a well-pleaded complaint
2 establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action
3 or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on
4 resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Empire
5 Healthchoice Assur. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121, 2131 (2006)
6 (alterations, internal quotations, and citation omitted);
7 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for
8 Southern Cal.,
463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).
9 However, the Supreme Court has recognized a narrow
10 exception to Justice Holmes’ formulation where a formally federal
11 cause of action does not create ipso facto a federal question
12 “because of the overwhelming predominance of state-law issues.”
13 Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Thompson,
478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986);
14 see also Int’l Sci. & Tech. Inst. v. Inacom Commuc’ns,
106 F.3d
15 1146, 1154 (4th Cir. 1997). For example, in Shoshone Mining Co.
16 v. Rutter,
177 U.S. 505 (1900), the Court considered a federal
17 statute that expressly authorized “adverse suits” to determine
18 title to land.
Id. at 506. The statute provided that claims
19 were to be determined by “local customs or rules of miners in the
20 several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and
21 not inconsistent with the laws of the United States; or by the
22 statute of limitations for mining claims of the State or
23 Territory where the same may be situated.”
Id. at 508 (internal
24 quotation marks omitted). The Court observed that the mere fact
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1 that a suit “takes its origin in the laws of the United States”
2 does not necessarily make it “one arising under the Constitution
3 or laws of the United States,” lest virtually every dispute over
4 title to land “in the newer States” raise a federal question.
5 Id. at 507. Thus, the Court held that the federal cause of
6 action created by the mining statute did not confer federal
7 question jurisdiction over claims that turned entirely on state
8 law.
Id. at 513.
9 We conclude that the Shoshone exception is appropriate
10 in this case. We cannot discern a strong federal interest in
11 adjudicating whether the School District must provide Ryan a one-
12 to-one aide in the school of his choosing. Cf. Grable & Sons
13 Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308, 315 (2005)
14 (noting strong federal interest in prompt collection of
15 delinquent taxes). IDEA provides a floor of entitlement to
16 certain educational benefits, but the statute allows
17 participating states to impose additional requirements on their
18 schools if they so choose. See
D.D., 480 F.3d at 139. Congress
19 clearly did not intend to require a uniform level of special
20 education entitlements across the states. The determination
21 whether New York law compels the School District to provide the
22 one-to-one aide at a parochial school is a question best left to
23 New York courts.
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1 IV.
2 We further conclude that IDEA’s jurisdictional
3 provision cannot save the parties’ inability to establish federal
4 question jurisdiction. The mining statute at issue in Shoshone
5 differs from IDEA in one important respect. While the mining
6 statute provided that “the adverse claimant should commence
7 proceedings ‘in a court of competent jurisdiction[,]’ [i]t did
8 not in express language prescribe either a Federal or a state
9 court, and did not provide for exclusive or concurrent
10 jurisdiction.” Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 506. Thus, the Shoshone
11 Court could discern no basis for jurisdiction absent a federal
12 question. IDEA, however, expressly provides that
13 any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made
14 under this subsection, shall have the right to bring a
15 civil action with respect to the complaint presented
16 pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in
17 any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a
18 district court of the United States, without regard to
19 the amount in controversy.
20 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The subsection to which this
21 provision refers lays out in broad terms the procedures for
22 challenging an impartial due process hearing. This
23 jurisdictional language thus suggests that IDEA might provide an
24 independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
25 courts whereby any issue raised in the hearing may be reviewed,
26 even if it concerns exclusively a matter of state law.
27 We decline, however, to construe 20 U.S.C.
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1 § 1415(i)(2)(A) to permit an issue of state law to be challenged
2 in federal court independent of a federal question. Such a broad
3 reading of § 1415(i)(2)(A) might raise grave constitutional
4 concerns about IDEA’s jurisdictional provisions. Article III,
5 Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the judicial power
6 shall extend to nine different types of “Cases, in Law and
7 Equity.” Kain and the School District are both citizens of New
8 York, and the judicial power does not extend to suits between
9 citizens of the same state unless the case “aris[es] under this
10 Constitution [or] the Laws of the United States,” or involves
11 several other now obscure scenarios, such as the adjudication of
12 “Lands under Grants of different States,” which are not
13 implicated by the instant dispute. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2,
14 cl. 1. The broad reading of § 1415(i)(2)(A) that the parties
15 advocate raises the question whether Congress has conferred or
16 can confer jurisdiction on the federal courts beyond the judicial
17 power described in Article III of the Constitution, and, if
18 accepted, brings § 1415(i)(2)(A) into conflict with Article III,
19 § 2.
20 The jurisdictional language of IDEA “must be construed,
21 if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that
22 it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.”
23 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (quoting United States
24 v. Jin Fuey Moy,
241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916)); see also Merrell Dow,
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1 478 U.S. at 814 (recognizing “the need for careful judgments
2 about the exercise of federal judicial power in an area of
3 uncertain jurisdiction”). Therefore, we construe § 1415(i)(2)(A)
4 more narrowly than has been urged by the parties. We hold that a
5 federal court may not exercise jurisdiction over a civil action
6 brought under § 1415(i)(2)(A) if the claims asserted turn
7 exclusively on matters of state law and diversity of citizenship
8 is absent. Because the School District has raised no federal
9 question in this suit, jurisdiction under § 1415(i)(2)(A) cannot
10 be sustained.
11 Va.
12 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
13 district court did not properly exercise jurisdiction over this
14 action, and thus the appeal is dismissed and the decision below
15 is vacated.
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