Filed: Mar. 20, 2008
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 07-5468-cv Debbie Almontaser v. NYC Dep’t of Educ. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT _ August Term, 2007 (Argued: February 5, 2008 Decided: March 20, 2008) Docket No. 07-5468-cv _ DEBBIE ALMONTASER, Plaintiff-Appellant, — v .— NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION , JOEL KLEIN , INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHANCELLOR OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION , ROSEMARY STUART , INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMUNITY SUPERINTENDENT OF DISTRI
Summary: 07-5468-cv Debbie Almontaser v. NYC Dep’t of Educ. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT _ August Term, 2007 (Argued: February 5, 2008 Decided: March 20, 2008) Docket No. 07-5468-cv _ DEBBIE ALMONTASER, Plaintiff-Appellant, — v .— NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION , JOEL KLEIN , INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHANCELLOR OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION , ROSEMARY STUART , INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMUNITY SUPERINTENDENT OF DISTRIC..
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07-5468-cv
Debbie Almontaser v. NYC Dep’t of Educ.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
_____________________
August Term, 2007
(Argued: February 5, 2008 Decided: March 20, 2008)
Docket No. 07-5468-cv
_____________________
DEBBIE ALMONTASER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
— v .—
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION , JOEL KLEIN , INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS CHANCELLOR OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION , ROSEMARY
STUART , INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMUNITY SUPERINTENDENT OF
DISTRICT 15 AND HIRING MANAGER, MICHAEL BLOOMBERG , INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND DENNIS WALCOTT , INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DEPUTY MAYOR FOR EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT ,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________
Before: NEWMAN , WINTER, AND B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges.
___________________
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Stein, J.), denying a motion for a preliminary injunction.
AFFIRMED.
___________________
1
ALAN LEVINE , New York, NY (Cynthia Rollings, Melvin L.
Wulf, Clare R. Norins, Beldock Levine & Hoffman
LLP; and Arthur Eisenberg, New York Civil
Liberties Union Foundation, on the brief), for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
DRAKE A. COLLEY , Assistant Corporation Counsel (Edward
F.X. Hart, on the brief), for Michael A. Cardozo,
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New
York, NY.
___________________
PER CURIAM :
Plaintiff-Appellant Debbie Almontaser appeals the December 5, 2007 order of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Stein, J.), denying her motion for a
preliminary injunction. We affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
From 2005 to 2007, Almontaser, an Arab-American, has led the development of the
Khalil Gibran International Academy (“KGIA”), a New York City public high school offering
classes in Arab language and culture to foster multicultural understanding and to prepare students
for careers in international affairs and diplomacy. The record reflects that since the New York
City Department of Education (“DOE”) announced its approval of the school in February 2007,
certain groups have claimed that both KGIA and Almontaser are affiliated with radical Islam.
On August 3, 2007, an internet-based group called Stop the Madrasa Coalition issued a press
release alleging that Almontaser was connected to t-shirts bearing the words “Intifada NYC” that
were allegedly sold by a group known as Arab Women Active in the Arts and Media
2
(“AWAAM”). Although the record indicates that Almontaser is not affiliated with AWAAM,
New York Post reporter Chuck Bennett sought inter alia to interview her about the organization
and its t-shirts. Almontaser wanted to avoid the interview. DOE press officer David Cantor
instructed her to participate, but not to address the t-shirts.
On August 3, 2007, Bennett interviewed Almontaser by telephone with DOE press officer
Melody Meyer on the line. Almontaser told Bennett that she was not connected to AWAAM and
that AWAAM had nothing to do with KGIA. When Bennett questioned her about the meaning
of the Arabic word “intifada,” Almontaser accurately explained that the root of the word means
“shaking off.”1 She also stated that the word has been associated with violence and the
Palestinian/Israeli conflict and emphasized that she would never affiliate herself with an
organization that condones violence. Meyer interjected only once during the call to emphasize
that Almontaser does not believe in violence. Immediately after the interview, Meyer called
Almontaser to tell her that she did a good job.
The next day, the New York Post ran an article entitled “City Principal is ‘Revolting.’” It
featured a picture of Almontaser with the caption, “Furor: The Pro-violence shirt is being
1
“Intifada,” a gerund, means “to shiver, shudder, tremor.” Hans Wehr, Arabic-English
Dictionary (The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic) 1157 (J. Milton Cowan ed.,
4th ed. 1979). As a noun, “intifada” also refers to “[a]n Arab uprising or revolt,” specifically
“the Palestinian insurrection and unrest in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, which
began in late 1987.” Oxford English Dictionary Additions Series (Oxford University Press
1993), available at
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00293434?single=1&query_type=words&queryword=intifada
&first=1&max_to_show=10. “Na-fa-da,” the root word of “intifada,” means “to shake (s.th.),
shake off (s.th. from), shake out, dust, dust off (s.th.); to knock ashes [as from a cigarette], to
make (s.o.) shiver (fever); to recover, recuperate (from); to shake off one’s laziness.” Wehr,
supra, at 1157.
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defended by Principal Debbie Almontaser (above).” The article asserted that “[a]ctivists with
ties to the principal of the city’s controversial new Arabic-themed school are hawking T-shirts
that glorify Palestinian terror” and that Almontaser “downplayed the significance of the T-shirts.”
The district court found that the New York Post correctly attributed to Almontaser her
explanation that the root of the word “intifada” means “shaking off,” that the word has
“develop[ed] a negative connotation due to the uprising in the Palestinian-Israeli areas,” and that
she “[didn’t] believe the intention is to have any of that kind of [violence] in New York City.” It
is undisputed by the parties that the paper incorrectly and misleadingly added the phrase “and
shaking off oppression” to Almontaser’s statement, “I think [the t-shirts are] pretty much an
opportunity for girls to express that they are part of New York City society.”
The New York Post and other media subsequently published stories and letters to the
editor characterizing the statements attributed to Almontaser by the New York Post as a defense
of violence against Israel. Within days, the Deputy Mayor for Education and Community
Development, Dennis Walcott, met with Almontaser on behalf of DOE Chancellor Joel Klein
and insisted on her resignation. Under pressure from DOE officials, Almontaser issued an
apology drafted by the DOE and resigned from her position as KGIA’s acting interim principal.
On October 16, 2007, Almontaser applied for the position of permanent principal of
KGIA. Two days later, The New York Times reported that Cantor, speaking on behalf of
Chancellor Klein, stated that Almontaser “would not be placed as principal at the school.” The
office conducting the first level of review for the position forwarded Almontaser’s application to
Hiring Manager Rosemary Stuart with the notation that it was not recommended. Stuart did not
4
forward Almontaser’s application for the next level of review.
Almontaser sued, alleging, inter alia, retaliation in violation of her First Amendment
rights and infringement of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. She moved for a
preliminary injunction: 1) requiring the DOE to “afford[] [her] a full and fair opportunity to be
reviewed and considered for the position of [permanent] principal at [KGIA]” according to the
applicable hiring regulations by a “disinterested person,” and 2) “enjoining and restraining
defendants from proceeding pursuant to [these regulations] or to otherwise select, assign, or
appoint a principal at [KGIA] until [she] is afforded such consideration.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
After a two-day hearing, the district court denied the application. Almontaser appealed.
DISCUSSION
A party seeking a preliminary injunction “must show irreparable harm absent injunctive
relief, and either a likelihood of success on the merits, or a serious question going to the merits to
make them a fair ground for trial, with a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in plaintiff’s
favor.” Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2006).
In light of the DOE’s January 2008 hire of a permanent principal for KGIA, Almontaser seeks an
injunction “alter[ing], rather than maintain[ing], the status quo,” and must meet the more
rigorous standard of demonstrating a “clear” or “substantial” showing of a likelihood of success
on the merits. Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc.,
60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir.
1995). “The district court has wide discretion in determining whether to grant a preliminary
injunction, and this Court reviews [its] determination only for abuse of discretion.” Grand River
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Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A district court abuses its discretion when it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous
finding of fact or makes an error of law.
Id. While “the First Amendment protects a public
employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public
concern,” the Supreme Court has clarified that “when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.” Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 417, 421 (2006).
Based on the record at this stage of the litigation, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Almontaser’s application for injunctive relief. The district
court found that Almontaser’s statements to the New York Post “were manifestly made in her
official capacity” and therefore not constitutionally protected. It consequently concluded that she
failed to demonstrate a likelihood that she would succeed on the merits of her First Amendment
retaliation claim. Assuming that the threat of irreparable injury was present, the district court
noted that the DOE press office directed Almontaser to speak with Bennett, and structured and
oversaw her participation. Although Almontaser’s explanation about the meaning of the word
“intifada” “fell outside the topics on which she had been directed to speak,” the district court
found that this explanation was nevertheless made pursuant to her role as KGIA’s acting interim
principal. This finding was not an abuse of discretion.
The district court also found that even if Almontaser’s speech to the New York Post was
constitutionally protected, her removal as interim principal at KGIA and the DOE’s decision to
6
not forward her application after Stuart’s review was justified under the balancing test used to
determine constitutional limitations on public employees’ speech set forth in Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Having concluded that the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it found that Almontaser’s speech was not protected, we need
not address this finding. Nor are we now called upon to address the more complex issue
presented by this case, namely, whether a public employee, who is required by her employer to
speak to the press as a condition of her employment, may be sanctioned for speaking accurately
when her statement is, as her employer knows, inaccurately reported and then misconstrued by
the press. We believe the issue is best addressed in the first instance by the district court.
The Defendants-Appellees request costs from Almontaser in light of the “equities” said to
favor them. We deny this request as self-evidently frivolous.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order of December 5, 2007,
denying the preliminary injunction motion.
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