Filed: Feb. 04, 2009
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 07-1313-pr Jones v. West 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 4 – – – – – – 5 6 August Term, 2008 7 8 (Argued: December 1, 2008 Decided: February 4, 2009) 9 10 Docket No. 07-1313-pr 11 _ 12 13 WENDYLL JONES, 14 15 Petitioner-Appellant, 16 17 -v.- 18 19 CALVIN WEST, * 20 21 Respondent-Appellee. 22 _ 23 24 Before: McLAUGHLIN, PARKER, Circuit Judges, and KOELTL, District 25 Judge. 1 26 _ 27 28 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court 29 for the Western Distr
Summary: 07-1313-pr Jones v. West 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 4 – – – – – – 5 6 August Term, 2008 7 8 (Argued: December 1, 2008 Decided: February 4, 2009) 9 10 Docket No. 07-1313-pr 11 _ 12 13 WENDYLL JONES, 14 15 Petitioner-Appellant, 16 17 -v.- 18 19 CALVIN WEST, * 20 21 Respondent-Appellee. 22 _ 23 24 Before: McLAUGHLIN, PARKER, Circuit Judges, and KOELTL, District 25 Judge. 1 26 _ 27 28 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court 29 for the Western Distri..
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07-1313-pr
Jones v. West
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
3
4 – – – – – –
5
6 August Term, 2008
7
8 (Argued: December 1, 2008 Decided: February 4, 2009)
9
10 Docket No. 07-1313-pr
11 ________________________________________________________________
12
13 WENDYLL JONES,
14
15 Petitioner-Appellant,
16
17 -v.-
18
19 CALVIN WEST, ∗
20
21 Respondent-Appellee.
22 ________________________________________________________________
23
24 Before: McLAUGHLIN, PARKER, Circuit Judges, and KOELTL, District
25 Judge. 1
26 ________________________________________________________________
27
28 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
29 for the Western District of New York (Bianchini, Magistrate Judge)
30 denying Wendyll Jones’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
31 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner argues that the New
32 York state court unreasonably applied Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
33 79 (1986), in concluding that Jones had failed to establish a
∗
We retain in the caption the name of the original custodian of
Wendyll Jones, Calvin West, the Superintendent of the Elmira
Correctional Facility. Should the parties desire that the caption
reflect his current custodian, they may file a motion requesting such a
change, supported by documentation identifying the current custodian.
1
The Honorable John G. Koeltl of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
1
1 prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the
2 prosecutor’s strike of a black prospective juror.
3 REVERSED AND REMANDED.
4 ANNETTE GIFFORD (J. NELSON THOMAS, on the
5 brief), Dolin, Thomas & Solomon LLP,
6 Rochester, New York, for Petitioner-
7 Appellant.
8
9 KELLY WOLFORD, Of Counsel (WENDY LEHMANN, Of
10 Counsel, on the brief), Monroe County
11 District Attorney’s Office, Rochester,
12 New York, for Respondent-Appellee.
13
14 KOELTL, District Judge:
15 The petitioner, Wendyll Jones (“Jones”), appeals from the
16 judgment of the United States District Court for the Western
17 District of New York (Bianchini, Magistrate Judge), entered
18 February 16, 2007, denying his petition for a writ of habeas
19 corpus. Jones, who is black, was convicted in July 1998 on four
20 counts of robbery in the second degree after a jury trial in the
21 New York State Supreme Court, Monroe County, located in Rochester.
22 In 2003, after exhausting his state court remedies, Jones filed a
23 petition for habeas corpus against the respondent, Calvin West,
24 the Superintendent of the Elmira Correctional Facility where the
25 petitioner was incarcerated at that time. The district court
26 denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability on
27 the sole question of whether the state courts erred in concluding
28 that Jones had failed to establish a prima facie case of
29 discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), with
2
1 respect to the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of a black
2 prospective juror. We conclude that the state courts unreasonably
3 applied Batson and that the petition for habeas corpus relief
4 should be granted.
5 BACKGROUND
6 The state court before which Jones was tried employed a
7 modified jury box system for selecting the jury. Under that
8 system, a panel of twenty-one potential jurors was placed in the
9 jury box, given questionnaires, and interviewed by the court. The
10 parties were then given an opportunity to conduct fifteen minutes
11 of voir dire with the panel, after which the court considered
12 challenges for cause. The parties then exercised their peremptory
13 strikes in a first round with the first twelve members of the
14 venire, followed by successive rounds with the number of
15 prospective jurors needed to complete a jury of twelve. If a jury
16 was not selected from the first panel, a second panel of twenty-
17 one was placed in the box. Each party had a total fifteen
18 peremptory challenges to exercise across all panels.
19 Because almost all of the peremptory challenges were
20 exercised off the record, the record in Jones’s case does not
21 reflect the race of many of the venire members who were struck by
22 each party. However, the Batson challenges raised by defense
23 counsel were made on the record, and the facts relating to those
24 challenges are clear from the record.
3
1 The jury was selected after two panels. In the first panel,
2 three members of the panel were struck for cause, two of whom were
3 black. Of the remaining eighteen members of the venire, five were
4 black. These were Ms. Jefferson, Ms. Peters, Mr. Barry, Ms.
5 Hannah, and Ms. Benbow. The issue on this appeal is whether the
6 state court unreasonably applied Batson when it found that Jones
7 had not established a prima facie case of discrimination with
8 respect to the prosecutor’s strike of Ms. Peters.
9 During the first round of peremptories in the first panel,
10 defense counsel raised his first Batson challenge with respect to
11 Ms. Peters, who had been in seat number ten. The court turned to
12 the prosecutor, who responded that Ms. Jefferson, a black woman,
13 had been seated as the foreperson of the jury. The court appeared
14 to accept this explanation, noting: “It appears that we do have
15 one or more minority members on the jury, on the sworn jury.”
16 During the second round of strikes, the defense raised a
17 second Batson challenge: “[The prosecutor’s] selections in
18 respect to removing, in particular, Mr. Barry, who is number 15,
19 and Ms. Hannah, who is number 18, I would point out to the Court
20 and ask the Court to revisit the earlier Batson decision that now,
21 but [for] Mrs. Jefferson, all the black potential jurors have been
4
1 removed from the panel, three of them by [the prosecutor] for
2 peremptory challenges.” 2
3 The court again turned to the prosecutor for a response. The
4 prosecutor pointed out for a second time that the foreperson of
5 the jury, Ms. Jefferson, was black. With respect to his strike
6 against Mr. Barry, he explained: “Mr. Barry is of the same
7 general age as Mr. Jones, can relate as to that respect to Mr.
8 Jones. When questioning him, Mr. Barry did not appear to be
9 looking -- or looking in other directions.” He also explained
10 that he struck Ms. Hannah because she had both a son and a nephew
11 who had legal problems.
12 Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor’s proffered
13 reasons for the strikes against Mr. Barry and Ms. Hannah were
14 pretextual and that the prosecutor had offered no explanation for
15 the peremptory strike of Ms. Benbow. Regarding Mr. Barry, defense
16 counsel argued:
17 Judge, if I may, the first issue regarding Mr. Barry is
18 pretextual, in my opinion. His age has nothing to do with his
19 ability to deliberate. We have members of variant age who
20 have children, they have indicated, of the same age as my
21 client. Mr. Barry did not respond frequently to any
22 individual questioning as based upon my observations of the
2
The prosecutor had actually exercised four peremptory challenges
against black potential jurors, which included Ms. Peters, Mr. Barry,
Ms. Hannah, and Ms. Benbow. Two black potential jurors had also been
struck for cause, one by the prosecutor, and the other by defense
counsel. It is not clear whether defense counsel was referring to the
current round of strikes when he referred to three black potential
jurors having been struck by the prosecutor, or whether he was mistaken.
However, he later included Ms. Benbow and Ms. Peters in the same Batson
challenge, indicating that he was aware of all four peremptory
challenges and that he brought all four to the court’s attention.
5
1 jury. There were a number of individuals who, at some point,
2 either became bored with my questions, with [the
3 prosecutor’s] questions, and although they looked away, I’m
4 sure they weren’t bored with the Court’s questions, so the
5 mere manner, his physical appearance is not sufficient, in my
6 opinion to support that contention. Mr. Barry is being
7 removed, quite obviously, because he is of the same race as
8 my client.
9
10 Defense counsel then continued, objecting to the prosecutor’s
11 strikes of Ms. Hannah and Ms. Benbow. Finally, defense counsel
12 requested the court to reconsider its earlier ruling with respect
13 to Ms. Peters. Defense counsel elaborated:
14 I would indicate to the Court that Miss Peters has none of
15 these characteristics to which [the prosecutor] has related.
16 She is a retired employee of General Motors, she is involved,
17 and she, at my recollection, had -- no particular inquiry was
18 made of her regarding any circumstances. She has two
19 children whose ages were not indicated and there was no
20 inquiry of the circumstances regarding those children. And,
21 in point of fact, she distinguishes herself as a member of
22 the jury, quite frankly, and did so in all of her physical
23 demeanor in front of the Court, so I would ask the Court to,
24 first of all, grant my application regarding the current
25 Batson challenge and revisit the application regarding Miss
26 Peters.
27
28 The court responded:
29 The Court denies the application to revisit the challenge to
30 Ms. Peters. Regarding the three peremptory challenges
31 executed during this second round of challenges, peremptory
32 challenges, I’m going to disallow the challenge to Mr. Barry.
33 There has not been a satisfactory neutral explanation for
34 that challenge. I shall permit the peremptory challenges as
35 to the other two jurors, Ms. Benbow . . . [and Ms. Hannah].
36
37 Mr. Barry was the only juror to be sworn from the second
38 round of strikes, bringing the total number of jurors at that
39 point to eight. A second panel of twenty-one potential jurors was
40 then placed in the jury box. The prosecutor struck the first
6
1 black member of the second panel to come up for consideration, Ms.
2 Thompson, and defense counsel raised a third Batson challenge.
3 Defense counsel stated: “[M]y position is Mrs. Thompson is the
4 next available black female that we get on the list and we have
5 this recurrent issue arising every time we come to the next
6 available black candidate.” The prosecutor explained that he had
7 struck Ms. Thompson because she had a brother who had been
8 convicted in the last year, which the court accepted as a
9 satisfactory race-neutral explanation. The defense raised its
10 fourth and last Batson challenge when the next black member of the
11 venire, Ms. Seawright, came up for consideration and was then
12 struck by the prosecutor. Defense counsel argued: “And we are at
13 the next black potential juror and we now have this same issue,
14 Judge. My application continues and if this is not a pattern,
15 nothing is.” The court, however, accepted the prosecutor’s
16 explanation that Ms. Seawright’s nephew had been convicted of a
17 drug charge a year before. The parties then completed jury
18 selection and chose two alternates. Ms. Jefferson and Mr. Barry
19 were the only two members of the jury, including the two
20 alternates, who were black.
21 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict
22 finding the petitioner guilty of four counts of robbery in the
23 second degree. On July 2, 1998, the petitioner was sentenced as a
7
1 second felony offender to concurrent terms of fifteen years in
2 prison. His earliest release date is February 28, 2010.
3 The petitioner appealed his conviction to the New York State
4 Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department. In a
5 memorandum opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the
6 conviction, finding in relevant part that the trial court had
7 properly determined that the defendant failed to meet his burden
8 of presenting a prima facie case of discrimination. People v.
9 Jones, 738 N.Y.S.2d 260, 260 (App. Div. 2001). On May 14, 2002,
10 the petitioner’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of
11 Appeals was denied. People v. Jones,
772 N.E.2d 614, 614 (N.Y.
12 2002). On March 11, 2003, the petitioner timely filed this
13 petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
14 The district court denied the petition, Jones v. West,
473 F.
15 Supp. 2d 390 (W.D.N.Y. 2007), and the petitioner timely appealed.
16 We now reverse.
17 DISCUSSION
18 I.
19 We review a district court’s denial of a petition for a writ
20 of habeas corpus de novo. See Shabazz v. Artuz,
336 F.3d 154, 160
21 (2d Cir. 2003). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
22 Penalty Act of 1996, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court
23 may grant a writ of habeas corpus for a claim that has previously
8
1 been adjudicated on the merits by a state court only if the
2 adjudication of the claim:
3 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
4 an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
5 law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
6 or
7
8 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
9 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
10 in the State court proceeding.
11
12 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
13 A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application”
14 of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
15 Court when “the state court identifies the correct governing legal
16 principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably
17 applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.”
18 Will. v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). “While the precise
19 method for distinguishing objectively unreasonable decisions from
20 merely erroneous ones is somewhat unclear, it is well-established
21 in this Circuit that the objectively unreasonable standard of
22 § 2254(d)(1) means that petitioner must identify some increment of
23 incorrectness beyond error in order to obtain habeas relief.”
24 Sorto v. Herbert,
497 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
25 quotation marks and alteration omitted). That increment, however,
26 “need not be great; otherwise habeas relief would be limited to
27 state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial
28 incompetence.” Overton v. Newton,
295 F.3d 270, 277 (2d Cir.
29 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9
1 II.
2 In Batson, the Supreme Court held that racial discrimination
3 in jury selection in state courts violates the Equal Protection
4 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 476 U.S.
5 at 85-87. Under Batson, a claim of racial discrimination in jury
6 selection is evaluated using a three-step process:
7 First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by
8 showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to
9 an inference of discriminatory purpose. Second, once the
10 defendant has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts
11 to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion by
12 offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the
13 strikes. Third, if a race-neutral explanation is tendered,
14 the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent
15 of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.
16
17 Johnson v. California,
545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) (internal
18 quotations, citations, and alteration omitted). The parties do
19 not dispute that the state court never required the prosecutor to
20 provide a race-neutral explanation for striking Ms. Peters. The
21 issue in this case, therefore, is whether Jones met the first step
22 of the Batson inquiry so that the trial court should have
23 proceeded to the second step of the Batson inquiry and required
24 the prosecutor to state a non-discriminatory reason for his strike
25 of Ms. Peters.
26 As we noted in Sorto, the Supreme Court has indicated that
27 “[t]he first step of the Batson analysis, requiring the showing of
28 a prima facie case, is not meant to be onerous.” Sorto,
497 F.3d
29 at 170 (citing
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170). A defendant need only
10
1 produce “evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an
2 inference that discrimination has occurred.” Johnson, 545 U.S. at
3 170. In deciding whether the defendant has demonstrated a prima
4 facie case of discrimination, the trial court should take into
5 account “all relevant circumstances.”
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. In
6 Batson, the Supreme Court provided two examples of what
7 “circumstances” might establish a prima face case of
8 discrimination: “[A] ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors
9 included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference
10 of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor’s questions and
11 statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his
12 challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory
13 purpose.”
Id. at 97.
14 III.
15 When Jones raised his first Batson challenge against the
16 prosecutor’s strike of Ms. Peters, he failed to make out a prima
17 facie case of discrimination. At that point, the prosecution had
18 used a peremptory challenge against only one of the two black
19 members of the venire that had come up for consideration in the
20 first round, Ms. Jefferson and Ms. Peters, and neither the pattern
21 of strikes nor anything in the prosecutor’s recorded statements
22 provided any basis for a prima facie case of discrimination. See
23 United States v. Stavroulakis,
952 F.2d 686, 696 (2d Cir. 1992).
11
1 However, the record before the trial court was very different
2 when Jones raised his second Batson challenge to the prosecutor’s
3 peremptory strike of Ms. Peters. At that point, the prosecutor
4 had struck four out of the only five black venire members in the
5 first panel. Of those four, Ms. Peters was the only subject of a
6 peremptory strike for whom the prosecutor did not provide a race-
7 neutral reason. Most significantly, in response to the
8 prosecutor’s stated reason for using a peremptory strike against
9 Mr. Barry, the state court rejected that reason as pretextual. At
10 that point, the trial court had concluded that the prosecutor was
11 not only capable of racial discrimination in the jury selection
12 process, but had also provided an unsatisfactory pretextual reason
13 for a peremptory strike. Despite the significant pattern of
14 strikes and the finding that the prosecutor had provided a
15 pretextual reason for another peremptory challenge, the trial
16 court did not ask for any explanation of the prosecutor’s reason
17 for striking Ms. Peters. In light of these facts, we conclude
18 that the Appellate Division’s finding that Jones had not made out
19 a prima facie case of discrimination at the time of his second
20 Batson challenge was an unreasonable application of Batson.
21 The respondent contends that it is impossible for this Court
22 to conclude that the state court unreasonably applied Batson
23 because the record is too poorly developed to determine whether
24 Jones had established a prima facie case of discrimination with
12
1 respect to Ms. Peters. Without information about the racial make-
2 up of the entire venire, the demographics of Monroe County, and
3 the races of the other persons who were the subject of the
4 prosecutor’s peremptory challenges, the respondent argues that it
5 is impossible to perform the statistical analysis needed to
6 support an inference of discrimination. The respondent also
7 argues that Jones’s second Batson challenge was premature, and
8 that the state court did not act unreasonably by waiting to see if
9 a more discernable pattern of discrimination would emerge later in
10 the jury selection process. This is essentially an argument that
11 Jones had not adduced sufficient evidence at the time of the
12 second Batson challenge to raise an inference of discrimination.
13 The respondent’s arguments, however, conflate the variety of
14 patterns that can give rise to an inference of discrimination.
15 Discriminatory purpose may be inferred when a party exercises a
16 disproportionate share of its total peremptory strikes against
17 members of a cognizable racial group compared to the percentage of
18 that racial group in the venire. See, e.g., Brown v. Alexander,
19 543 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2008); Green v. Travis,
414 F.3d 288,
20 299 (2d Cir. 2005);
Overton, 295 F.3d at 278 n.9; United States v.
21 Alvarado,
923 F.2d 253, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1991). This rate is
22 sometimes referred to as the “challenge rate.”
23 However, an intent to exclude can also be inferred when a
24 party uses peremptory challenges to strike a disproportionate
13
1 number of members of a cognizable racial group from the venire.
2 In such a case, the Batson challenge is based on the party’s
3 “exclusion rate.” The distinction between the two types of
4 challenges is an important one. Cases involving successful
5 challenges to exclusion rates have typically included patterns in
6 which members of the racial group are completely or almost
7 completely excluded from participating on the jury. See, e.g.,
8 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 173 (prima facie case established where all
9 three black prospective jurors removed from jury); Batson,
476
10 U.S. at 100 (prima facie case established where all four black
11 prospective jurors removed from the jury); Harris v. Kuhlmann, 346
12 F.3d 330, 345-46 (2d Cir. 2003) (prima facie case established
13 where prosecutor used peremptory strikes to exclude all five black
14 potential jurors in venire); Tankleff v. Senkowski,
135 F.3d 235,
15 249 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he fact that the government tried to
16 strike the only three blacks who were on the panel constitutes a
17 sufficiently dramatic pattern of actions to make out a prima facie
18 case.”); United States v. Stewart,
65 F.3d 918, 925 (11th Cir.
19 1995) (in hate crime case, prima facie case established where
20 defendants struck three out of the four black venire members); see
21 also United States v. Battle,
836 F.2d 1084, 1085-86 (8th Cir.
22 1987) (prima facie case established where “[t]he government
23 exercised five of its six (83%) allowable peremptory challenges to
24 strike five of the seven (71%) blacks from the jury panel”).
14
1 When, on habeas review, a party argues that the state court
2 unreasonably denied a Batson challenge based upon the challenge
3 rate--that is, the percentage of a party’s total strikes used
4 against a cognizable racial group--the record should include, at a
5 minimum, the number of peremptory challenges used against the
6 racial group at issue, the number of peremptory challenges used in
7 total, and the percentage of the venire that belongs to that
8 racial group. Cf. Sorto, 497 F.3d at 171-72 (noting that when a
9 Batson challenge depends on a pattern of strikes, a sufficient
10 record would likely include, inter alia, the composition of the
11 venire, the adversary’s use of peremptory challenges, and the race
12 of the potential jurors stricken). When the record lacks one of
13 those facts, it is impossible for a reviewing court to conclude
14 that the state court should have drawn an inference of
15 discrimination. See
id. at 173 (absent information about the
16 composition of the venire, court on habeas review could not
17 conclude whether challenge rate established a prima facie case of
18 discrimination).
19 The district court computed the relevant challenge rate of
20 the prosecutor’s strikes against black potential jurors in Jones’s
21 case and found “a substantial statistical disparity” that would
22 have satisfied Jones’s burden of establishing a prima facie case
15
1 of discrimination. 3 Jones, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 408. Nevertheless,
2 the district court found that Jones’s failure to articulate the
3 numerical basis for his challenge was fatal to his Batson claim.
4 See
id. at 409-10.
5 However, Jones’s Batson challenge was not based upon a
6 disproportionate challenge rate, but rather on a disproportionate
7 exclusion rate. Defense counsel argued to the trial court that
8 the prosecutor had attempted to use peremptory challenges to
9 exclude all but one of the black prospective jurors.
10 When the asserted prima facie case is based upon the use of
11 strikes to exclude all or nearly all of the members of a
12 particular racial group, the record need only include how many
13 members of that group were in the venire, and how many of those
14 were struck. See
Harris, 346 F.3d at 345 (“[W]here every black
15 juror was subject to a peremptory strike, a ‘pattern’ plainly
16 exists.”);
Tankleff, 135 F.3d at 249 (finding prima facie case
17 based solely on the fact that the government tried to strike the
18 only three black potential jurors); see also
Johnson, 545 U.S. at
19 173 (finding prima facie case of discrimination where prosecutor
20 had struck all three black prospective jurors without requiring
21 analysis of other data). Information about the races of the
3
The district court calculated that the minority challenge rate,
which was 40%, was nearly twice the percentage of minorities in the
venire, 21.4%. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 408. This calculation was
based on the fact that over the entire jury selection process, the
prosecutor used six of his available fifteen peremptory challenges to
strike black potential jurors.
16
1 remaining members of the venire, beyond knowing that they do not
2 belong to the racial group that is allegedly being targeted, is
3 not necessary, nor is information about how the challenged party
4 used its other peremptory strikes.
5 The respondent is therefore incorrect to argue that the
6 record in Jones’s case is deficient because it does not include
7 the races of every venire member, the racial make-up of Monroe
8 County, 4 or how the prosecutor’s remaining peremptory strikes were
9 used. While the record did lack this information, Jones’s counsel
10 recited on the record which of the venire members were black, and
11 that the remaining members of the venire were white. 5 From this
12 information, it is clear that there were seven black potential
13 jurors in the first panel of the venire. Two of these were struck
14 for cause. The prosecutor then used his peremptory challenges to
15 attempt to strike four of the five remaining black members of the
4
The minority percentage of the population of the area from which
the venire is drawn can be used as a surrogate for the minority
percentage of the venire when the record on direct appeal lacks the
information about the actual minority percentage of the venire. See
Alvarado, 923 F.2d at 255-56. This information is used in calculating
the prosecutor’s challenge rate. However, the use of this information
is more dubious on a petition for habeas corpus where the issue is
whether the state court unreasonably applied Batson, where it is unclear
if the state court had this statistical information, and where the state
court can determine the racial composition of the actual venire without
turning to surrogate statistics. See Sorto, 497 F.3d at 172-73.
5
During voir dire of the first panel, defense counsel stated for
the record: “Mr. Barry, Ms. Peters, Miss Hannah, Mr. Jefferson, Mrs.
Dixon, Mrs. Hayward. You’re the black members of the proposed jury. At
this point my client is black. The other representatives of the jury
panel at this time are white.” Defense counsel did not mention Ms.
Benbow’s name at that time, but he clearly identified Ms. Benbow as
black when he raised his second Batson challenge. He stated: “Ms.
Benbow is the other black female who was involved.”
17
1 voir dire panel. It is beyond dispute that, where all members of
2 a racial group are excluded from a jury, a pattern is obvious
3 enough to draw an inference of discriminatory intent. See, e.g.,
4 Johnson, 545 U.S. at 173;
Batson, 476 U.S. at 100; Harris,
346
5 F.3d at 345-46;
Tankleff, 135 F.3d at 249. This Court has also
6 stated that a party “may not avoid the Batson obligation to
7 provide race-neutral explanations for what appears to be a
8 statistically significant pattern of racial peremptory challenges
9 simply by forgoing the opportunity to use all of his challenges
10 against minorities.”
Harris, 346 F.3d at 346 (quoting Alvarado,
11 923 F.2d at 256). Where a party has used its strikes to exclude
12 all or nearly all of several members of a racial group from
13 serving on a jury, such a pattern may give rise to an inference of
14 discrimination. See
Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (“[T]otal or seriously
15 disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires . . . is
16 itself such an unequal application of the law . . . as to show
17 intentional discrimination.” (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426
18 U.S. 229, 241, 242 (1976)) (internal quotation marks and citation
19 omitted)).
20 It is unnecessary to decide whether a pattern of striking
21 four out of five members of a single racial group would, on its
22 own, establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In this
23 case, in addition to the prosecutor’s pattern of strikes, the
24 state trial court also had the significant circumstance before it
18
1 that it had concluded that the prosecutor’s statements concerning
2 Mr. Barry were pretextual reasons for the peremptory strike. In
3 addition to a pattern of strikes, the other example of
4 circumstantial evidence that the Batson Court indicated could give
5 rise to an inference of discrimination is “the prosecutor’s
6 questions and statements during voir dire examination and in
7 exercising his challenges.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. These
8 circumstances were plainly sufficient to establish a prima facie
9 case that required an explanation for why the prosecutor exercised
10 a peremptory strike against Ms. Peters.
11 Here, defense counsel had argued that the prosecutor’s stated
12 reasons for striking Mr. Barry--that he was of the same age as the
13 defendant and had been looking in other directions during voir
14 dire--were pretexutal, and the state trial court agreed. However,
15 a trial court is required under Batson to take into consideration
16 “all relevant circumstances,” and a pretextual statement made by a
17 prosecutor in the course of jury selection is a highly relevant
18 circumstance. The state court nevertheless rejected defense
19 counsel’s application to reconsider the Batson challenge with
20 respect to Ms. Peters and did not require the prosecutor to give a
21 race-neutral explanation for having struck her.
22 The district court held that Jones missed his opportunity to
23 rely upon the disallowed challenge of Mr. Barry as circumstantial
24 evidence of the prosecutor’s improper motive in striking Ms.
19
1 Peters. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 410. The respondent also
2 argues that defense counsel should have explicitly told the state
3 trial court that it should have considered this circumstance in
4 evaluating the peremptory challenge against Ms. Peters. However,
5 in this case, defense counsel adequately brought its Batson
6 challenge to the attention of the trial court and explained the
7 basis for a prima facie case of discrimination. Defense counsel
8 pointed to the statistics, and in the course of the second Batson
9 challenge, asked the court to reconsider its rejection of the
10 Batson challenge to Ms. Peters and also argued that the reasons
11 given by the prosecutor for the additional peremptory challenges
12 were pretextual. The finding that the trial court then made which
13 found that the prosecutor had provided a pretextual excuse for the
14 peremptory strike of Mr. Barry should have been taken into account
15 by the trial court in connection with the strike of Ms. Peters
16 which the trial court was being asked to reconsider in the very
17 same set of challenges. It was not necessary for defense counsel
18 to ask for reconsideration yet again based on the circumstances
19 that were already before the trial court.
20 Taking into account both the prosecutor’s pretextual
21 justification for striking Mr. Barry and the prosecutor’s use of
22 strikes against four out of the five black members of the first
23 venire, we conclude that Jones had established a prima facie case
24 of discrimination at the time he raised his second Batson
20
1 challenge against the strike of Ms. Peters, and that the Appellate
2 Division unreasonably applied Batson in finding that Jones had
3 failed to do so.
4 Overton and Sorto are not to the contrary. Most importantly,
5 these cases did not involve an explicit finding by the state court
6 that the prosecutor had provided pretextual reasons for striking
7 another juror in the same jury selection process. Moreover, both
8 Overton and Sorto are principally about deficiencies in the
9 record. In Overton, defense counsel raised a Batson challenge at
10 the end of the second round of peremptory strikes based on the
11 prosecutor’s challenge rate against black prospective jurors. The
12 defense claimed that, by a “rough count,” the prosecutor had used
13 seven of nine peremptory challenges against black prospective
14 jurors. 6 Overton, 295 F.3d at 273. The prosecutor responded by
15 pointing out that three of the eight jurors who had been seated at
16 that point were black; however, there was no contemporaneous
17 record made of the races of all of the prospective jurors. The
18 state court denied the challenge. At the end of the third round,
19 the state court identified on the record the racial backgrounds of
20 the prospective jurors, but the defense did not renew its Batson
21 challenge at any point after the record was made. This Court’s
22 holding in Overton, therefore, was that when the defendant raised
6
The prosecutor had actually exercised seven of ten of his
peremptory challenges against black prospective jurors by the end of the
second round. Overton, 295 F.3d at 273 n.4.
21
1 his Batson challenge, the facts that would have been necessary to
2 raise an inference of discrimination had not yet been fully
3 established. Id. at 279-80.
4 In Sorto, the defense made two Batson challenges. The first
5 was raised after the prosecution used its first round challenges
6 to strike three minority venire members, although one challenge
7 was subsequently withdrawn. The second was raised after the
8 prosecution used a second round strike against another minority
9 venire member. The state court denied both challenges for lack of
10 a prima facie case, and also gave the alternative explanation for
11 its denial of the defendant’s second challenge that the prosecutor
12 had supplied, on its own volition, a non-pretextual and race-
13 neutral justification for the strike. At neither the time of the
14 first strike nor the time of the second strike did the defense
15 establish on the record the racial composition of the venire. On
16 habeas review, this Court held that the state court did not act
17 unreasonably when it denied the first Batson challenge as
18 premature.
Sorto, 497 F.3d at 171. This Court denied habeas
19 relief with respect to the second Batson challenge on the ground
20 that the record did not contain “the baseline factual
21 circumstances” necessary to find that the state court acted
22 unreasonably.
Id. at 171-72. The record did not contain clear
23 information about the races of other venire members struck by the
24 prosecution, or information about how many minority persons
22
1 remained on the venire after the challenged strikes, and this
2 Court declined to conclude that the state court acted unreasonably
3 on such an incomplete record. Id. at 172-74.
4 The record in this case does not suffer from the deficiencies
5 of those in Overton and Sorto. Although the record does not
6 disclose the specific races of the remaining persons on the first
7 panel, it shows that they were not black. Therefore, when Jones
8 raised his second Batson challenge, the record established that
9 four of the five qualified black venire members had been struck by
10 the prosecutor. Moreover, the trial court was presented with a
11 record that the prosecutor was providing a pretextual excuse for
12 striking another black potential juror, and the trial court agreed
13 that the prosecutor had indeed provided a pretextual reason.
14 There was thus more than a sufficient record for the trial court
15 to conclude that defense counsel had established a prima facie
16 case that required an explanation for the prosecutor’s peremptory
17 strike of Ms. Peters.
18 IV.
19 When a federal habeas court has concluded that the state
20 court unreasonably applied Batson, there are several remedial
21 options: 1) require the district court to “hold a reconstruction
22 hearing and take evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding
23 the prosecutor’s use of the peremptory challenges . . . ; 2)
24 return the case to the state trial court on a conditional writ of
23
1 habeas corpus so that the state court could conduct the inquiry on
2 its own; or 3) order a new trial.” Harris, 346 F.3d at 347
3 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
4 Over ten years have elapsed since Jones’s trial, and he will
5 be eligible for release in a little over a year. Jones argues
6 that he should be granted a new trial because an accurate
7 reconstruction of the prosecutor’s reasons would now be
8 impossible. However, the respondent has requested a
9 reconstruction hearing and represented at oral argument that the
10 court and the lawyers involved in the case are available. This
11 Court has noted that “there are cases where the passage of time
12 may impair a trial court’s ability to make a reasoned
13 determination of the prosecutor’s state of mind when the jury was
14 selected,” in which a new trial must be held. Brown v. Kelly, 973
15 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, this Court has also
16 recognized that the prosecutor should be allowed an opportunity to
17 present its reasons for exercising the challenged strikes at a
18 reconstruction hearing “if appropriate findings may conveniently
19 be made.”
Id. (quoting Alvarado, 923 F.2d at 256).
20 We are concerned about the significant amount of time that
21 has passed since Jones’s trial, as well as the fact that he has
22 already served almost the entirety of his sentence. These
23 concerns can be satisfied with a prompt remand to the state court
24
1 with instructions to hold a reconstruction hearing within ninety
2 days or grant Jones a new trial also within ninety days.
3 CONCLUSION
4 For the reasons explained above, we REVERSE the judgment of
5 the district court and REMAND with instructions to conditionally
6 grant the writ and order the respondent to release Jones unless
7 the state court holds a reconstruction hearing within ninety days
8 or, if it determines that such a hearing would not be possible,
9 grant Jones a new trial within ninety days of the date of this
10 decision. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
25
