Filed: Jun. 03, 2009
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: 07-1758-cv O'Connor v. Pierson 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2008 4 (Argued: March 9, 2009 Decided: June 3, 2009) 5 Docket No. 07-1758-cv 6 - 7 THOMAS O'CONNOR, 8 Plaintiff-Appellant, 9 - v - 10 LYNNE B. PIERSON, ELLEN C. HEALY, CHRISTOPHER A. DUMAS, PATRICIA 11 M. STRONG, CHRISTINE T. FORTUNATO, DONNA H. HEMMANN, STACEY 12 HODGES, JOHN F. MORRIS, FREDERICK E. PETRELLI JR., PENNY H. 13 STANZIALE, and WETHERSFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION, 14 Defendants-Appell
Summary: 07-1758-cv O'Connor v. Pierson 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2008 4 (Argued: March 9, 2009 Decided: June 3, 2009) 5 Docket No. 07-1758-cv 6 - 7 THOMAS O'CONNOR, 8 Plaintiff-Appellant, 9 - v - 10 LYNNE B. PIERSON, ELLEN C. HEALY, CHRISTOPHER A. DUMAS, PATRICIA 11 M. STRONG, CHRISTINE T. FORTUNATO, DONNA H. HEMMANN, STACEY 12 HODGES, JOHN F. MORRIS, FREDERICK E. PETRELLI JR., PENNY H. 13 STANZIALE, and WETHERSFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION, 14 Defendants-Appelle..
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07-1758-cv
O'Connor v. Pierson
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
3 August Term, 2008
4 (Argued: March 9, 2009 Decided: June 3, 2009)
5 Docket No. 07-1758-cv
6 -------------------------------------
7 THOMAS O'CONNOR,
8 Plaintiff-Appellant,
9 - v -
10 LYNNE B. PIERSON, ELLEN C. HEALY, CHRISTOPHER A. DUMAS, PATRICIA
11 M. STRONG, CHRISTINE T. FORTUNATO, DONNA H. HEMMANN, STACEY
12 HODGES, JOHN F. MORRIS, FREDERICK E. PETRELLI JR., PENNY H.
13 STANZIALE, and WETHERSFIELD BOARD OF EDUCATION,
14 Defendants-Appellees.
15 -------------------------------------
16 Before: WINTER and SACK, Circuit Judges, and COGAN, District
17 Judge.*
18 Appeal from an order of the United States District
19 Court for the District of Connecticut (Robert N. Chatigny, Chief
20 Judge) granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We
21 agree with the district court that the plaintiff's claims, which
22 are based on an alleged denial of his right to substantive due
23 process, are barred under the doctrine of res judicata inasmuch
24 as they were or could have been brought in the parallel suit
*
The Honorable Brian M. Cogan of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by
designation.
1 based on the same facts that were litigated to a final judgment
2 in Connecticut state court.
3 Affirmed.
4 LEON M. ROSENBLATT, Law Offices of Leon
5 Rosenblatt, West Hartford, CT, for
6 Appellant.
7 MICHAEL J. ROSE, Rose Kallor, LLP
8 (Johanna G. Zelman, Melinda A. Powell,
9 of counsel), Hartford, CT, for
10 Appellees.
11 Sack, Circuit Judge:
12 Plaintiff-appellant Thomas O'Connor pursued parallel
13 lawsuits against the defendants in federal and state court.
14 What became the federal lawsuit was first filed in the
15 Superior Court for the State of Connecticut. Based on O'Connor's
16 assertion of, inter alia, causes of action under federal law, the
17 action was removed by the defendants to the United States
18 District Court for the District of Connecticut. When the case
19 stalled, the plaintiff filed a second complaint in Superior Court
20 in which he limited himself to the assertion of state law claims
21 only. This lawsuit went to trial. A state-court jury found in
22 O'Connor's favor on one of his claims, but against him on the
23 others. Both sides appealed.
24 Shortly after the state trial court judgment was
25 entered, the district court in the pending parallel federal
26 action (Robert N. Chatigny, Chief Judge) entered judgment for the
27 defendants on all of O'Connor's federal claims, and remanded the
28 pendent state claims to state court. The district court did not
2
1 reach an issue raised by the defendants: whether the state court
2 judgment had a res judicata (or "claim preclusion") effect on the
3 claims pending in the federal action. That district court
4 judgment was appealed to this Court.
5 While the federal appeal was pending here, the
6 Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the judgment based on the
7 state-court jury verdict with respect to the one claim on which
8 O'Connor had been successful -- invasion of privacy –- and
9 affirmed the remaining claims on which the defendants had
10 prevailed. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied O'Connor's
11 petition for certification for appeal. All of O'Connor's claims
12 in the state-court lawsuit were therefore unsuccessful.
13 Shortly after the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled, we
14 vacated the district court's decision in the federal case in
15 part, and remanded for further consideration of O'Connor's
16 substantive due process claims. We declined to reach the
17 defendants' res judicata argument, concluding that it had not
18 been sufficiently presented to the district court. O'Connor v.
19 Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2005).
20 Following our remand, the district court granted the
21 defendants' motion for summary judgment on O'Connor's substantive
22 due process claims on the ground that in light of the state court
23 decision, they were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
24 O'Connor v. Pierson,
482 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D. Conn. 2007).
25 The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
3
1 BACKGROUND
2 On January 26, 2000, O'Connor brought this action in
3 Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford,
4 against the Wethersfield Board of Education, members of the Board
5 in their official capacities, and Lynne B. Pierson, the
6 Superintendent of Schools, in both her individual and official
7 capacity. O'Connor v. Pierson, No. CV-595721-S (Conn. Super. Ct.
8 January 26, 2000). O'Connor, a public-school teacher, alleged
9 that the defendants had acted unlawfully by conditioning his
10 return to work following administrative leave on his agreement to
11 undergo a psychiatric examination and to release all of his
12 medical records to the defendants. He contended that these
13 conditions violated his rights under both the United States
14 Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Connecticut.1
15 He also asserted state common-law claims for negligent and
16 intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of
17 privacy, and intentional interference with beneficial and
18 contractual relations. The defendants removed the action to the
19 United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on
20 the basis of federal question jurisdiction arising out of
1
These state and federal constitutional claims were later
amended to clarify that they were brought under the Due Process
Clause. They were ultimately construed by the district court as
assertions that the defendants had violated O'Connor's rights to
both procedural and substantive due process. See O'Connor, 482
F. Supp. 2d at 229. O'Connor has not challenged the district
court's interpretation.
4
1 O'Connor's assertion of federal constitutional claims. See 28
2 U.S.C. § 1441.
3 In February 2001, Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez
4 filed a Recommended Ruling in the removed case, concluding that
5 summary judgment should be granted in favor of the defendants on
6 the federal constitutional claims and that the court should
7 dismiss the pendent state law claims without prejudice. See 28
8 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The following month, the district court
9 adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation in part, dismissing
10 O'Connor's federal procedural due process claim but declining to
11 dismiss his federal substantive due process claims and deferring
12 decision on that claim pending further briefing. In light of the
13 fact that a federal claim remained before it, the district court
14 declined to dismiss the pendent state law claims. See O'Connor,
15 482 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
16 In June 2001, O'Connor initiated a second action in
17 State Superior Court against the Wethersfield Board of Education.
18 O'Connor v. Wethersfield Bd. of Educ., No. CV-01-0808376-S (Conn.
19 Super. Ct., June 11, 2001); see also
O'Connor, 482 F. Supp. 2d at
20 229. It was based on the same facts as the first, previously
21 removed, action, asserting many of the same state-law causes of
22 action along with several new ones. The second action contained
23 no claims under federal law and was therefore not subject to
24 removal on that basis.
O'Connor, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 229.
25 Later that year, the Board unsuccessfully moved in
26 state court to dismiss the pending state-court action based on
5
1 the pendency of this case in federal court. See O'Connor v.
2 Wethersfield Bd. of Educ., 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 621, 621,
2003 WL
3 21299644, at *1, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1581, at *1 (Conn.
4 Super. Ct. May 20, 2003) (unpublished opinion) (discussing denial
5 of the motion to dismiss in 2001). After several of the claims
6 in the state-court action were dismissed by the trial court in
7 its decision on a motion for summary judgment by the defendants,
8 Mem. of Decision on Def's Mot. for Summary Judgment, O'Connor v.
9 Wethersfield Bd. of Educ., CV-01-0808376-S (Conn. Super. Ct.,
10 July 7, 2003), three claims remained: 1) tortious invasion of
11 privacy, 2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 3)
12 a statutory claim based on Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31- 51q, which
13 prohibits employers from disciplining or discharging employees in
14 retaliation for exercising their right to free speech. They were
15 tried to a jury beginning in September 2003.
16 In October 2003, the state-court jury returned a
17 verdict in favor of O'Connor on his claim for tortious invasion
18 of privacy, awarding him $162,500 in damages, but in favor of the
19 Board on the other two claims. See
O'Connor, 482 F. Supp. 2d at
20 230 (describing state-court proceedings). The trial court
21 entered a judgment based on the verdict. Both parties appealed
22 from the judgments against them.
23 On July 5, 2005, the Connecticut Appellate Court
24 decided that the judgment for O'Connor on his invasion of privacy
25 claim was barred by the Board's governmental immunity. It
26 therefore reversed the judgment of the Superior Court insofar as
6
1 it had been in O'Connor's favor. O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 90
2 Conn. App. 59,
877 A.2d 860 (2005). It affirmed the remainder of
3 the judgment against him.
Id. On September 12, 2005, the
4 Connecticut Supreme Court denied O'Connor's petition for
5 certification for appeal. O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ.,
275 Conn.
6 912,
882 A.2d 675 (2005).
7 Soon after the state-court jury reached its verdict,
8 the defendants in the action that remained pending in federal
9 district court -- the one now on appeal before us -- submitted a
10 letter to the federal district court requesting a conference
11 regarding their intention to file a supplemental motion to
12 dismiss based on a theory of res judicata. O'Connor,
482 F.
13 Supp. at 230. The letter complied with a provision in a previous
14 district court order regarding case management, which required
15 the parties to request a conference before filing dispositive
16 motions.
O'Connor, 482 F. Supp. at 230.
17 On December 12, 2003, the district court held a
18 conference as requested. In the course of the conference, the
19 court orally granted summary judgment to the defendants on the
20 remaining substantive due process claims. Later, in a ruling and
21 order, the court explained its rationale for this dismissal.
22 O'Connor v. Pierson, No. 00 Civ. 339 (D. Conn. Dec. 17, 2003).
23 It decided, inter alia, that the Board was both justified and had
24 a legitimate interest in requesting the medical records and
25 therefore did not violate O'Connor's substantive due process
26 rights. Id.; see also
O'Connor, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 230. The
7
1 issue of whether the state court judgment precluded a federal
2 judgment on the claims based on res judicata principles was
3 unnecessary to the resolution of the motion, and the district
4 court did not reach it.
5 On December 16, 2003, a final judgment was entered in
6 favor of the defendants on all of the federal claims against
7 them, and the pendent state claims were remanded to Connecticut
8 Superior Court. On January 6, 2004, O'Connor appealed the
9 judgment of the district court to this Court.
10 We affirmed the judgment with respect to O'Connor's
11 procedural due process claim, but vacated it as to the
12 substantive due process claims. O'Connor, 426 F.3d 187. We
13 concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
14 whether, in insisting that O'Connor release his medical records,
15 the Board "acted out of spite, or to keep O'Connor from teaching
16 by whatever means necessary," such that the Board's action would
17 "shock the conscience."
Id. at 204. Such a finding of fact
18 could have served as a basis for a viable substantive due process
19 cause of action. See
id. at 200-04. We declined to address the
20 issue of res judicata because it had not been preserved for
21 appeal.2
Id. at 194-95 ("A motion by the Board raising the
2
We do not read our prior decision to hold, as O'Connor
asserts, that the defense of res judicata had forever been waived
by the defendants. And as the district court observed, "even if
the Second Circuit's statement about waiver is binding, res
judicata can still be applied at this stage because a court has
authority to invoke the doctrine of res judicata on its own
initiative, even when the defense has been waived." O'Connor,
482 F. Supp. 2d at 233; see Salahuddin v. Jones,
992 F.2d 447,
449 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ("The failure of a defendant to
8
1 claim-preclusion defense when it became available would have
2 preserved the issue for appeal; a letter asking for a briefing
3 schedule, which was not followed up, did not.").
4 On remand, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on
5 the ground that the remaining substantive due process claims were
6 barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On March 31, 2007, the
7 district court granted that motion, concluding that:
8 there can be no doubt that plaintiff's
9 substantive due process claims are barred by
10 the judgment in the state court action. To
11 prevail on his substantive due process claims
12 under § 1983, plaintiff must prove that the
13 defendants' insistence on obtaining his past
14 medical records was arbitrary and oppressive.
15 See O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d at 204.
16 The Board's insistence on obtaining these
17 records, and its intent in doing so, were
18 central to the invasion of privacy and
19 intentional infliction of emotional distress
20 claims that were tried in state court.
21
O'Connor, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 232; see also
id. at 235.
22 The district court again entered judgment against
23 O'Connor.
Id. at 235. O'Connor appeals.
24 DISCUSSION
25 I. Standard of Review
26 "We review de novo the district court's application of
27 the principles of res judicata." EDP Med. Computer Sys., Inc. v.
28 United States,
480 F.3d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
29 quotation marks omitted).
30 II. Res Judicata (or "Claim Preclusion")
raise res judicata in answer does not deprive a court of the
power to dismiss a claim on that ground.").
9
1 "[A] federal court must give to a state-court judgment
2 the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under
3 the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered." Migra
4 v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984);
5 see also Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp.,
456 U.S. 461, 466 ("[28
6 U.S.C. §] 1738 requires federal courts to give the same
7 preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments
8 would be given in the courts of the State from which the
9 judgments emerged.").
10 Under Connecticut law:
11 [A] former judgment on a claim, if rendered
12 on the merits, is an absolute bar to a
13 subsequent action on the same claim. Claim
14 preclusion prevents the pursuit of any claims
15 relating to the cause of action which were
16 actually made or might have been made. The
17 judicial doctrine of res judicata expresses
18 no more than the fundamental principle that
19 once a matter has been fully and fairly
20 litigated, and finally decided, it comes to
21 rest. The doctrine of res judicata applies
22 as to the parties and their privies in all
23 other actions in the same or any other
24 judicial tribunal of concurrent
25 jurisdiction . . . . [T]he appropriate
26 inquiry with respect to claim preclusion is
27 whether the party had an adequate opportunity
28 to litigate the matter in the earlier
29 proceeding . . . . [T]he scope of matters
30 precluded in the subsequent suit necessarily
31 depends on what has occurred in the former
32 adjudication.
33
34 Joe's Pizza, Inc. v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co., 236 Conn. 863, 871-
35 72,
675 A.2d 441, 446-47 (1996)(citations, internal quotation
36 marks, emphasis, and alterations omitted). "The claim that is
37 extinguished by the judgment in the first action includes all
10
1 rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with
2 respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of
3 connected transactions, out of which the action arose." Comm'r
4 of Envtl. Prot. v. Conn. Bldg. Wrecking Co., 227 Conn. 175, 189-
5 90,
629 A.2d 1116, 1124 (1993) (internal quotation marks and
6 alterations omitted).
7 It is undisputed on appeal that the claims in the
8 instant case and the state-court case arose out of the same
9 transaction, or series of connected transactions, and are
10 therefore the same for purposes of the res judicata inquiry. Cf.
11
O'Connor, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (relying on Conn. Bldg. Wrecking
12
Co., supra, and deciding for the defendants on the "identity of
13 claims" issue). O'Connor does dispute, however, that: (1) the
14 judgment in the state court was rendered on the merits; (2) the
15 parties in the state and federal actions are the same or are in
16 privity with each other; and (3) O'Connor had an adequate
17 opportunity to litigate his claims in the state court action.
18 For the reasons that follow, we conclude in the affirmative as to
19 each issue, and that the district court therefore correctly
20 decided that O'Connor's federal lawsuit was barred by the
21 judgment in Connecticut state court.
22 A. Whether the State Court Action Was Decided on the Merits
23 O'Connor argues that because the state-court action was
24 ultimately decided on appeal in part on statutory immunity
11
1 grounds, it was not decided on the merits. We find this argument
2 unhelpful.3
3 The invasion of privacy claim was the only claim on
4 which the jury ruled in O'Connor's favor. The Appellate Court
5 reversed, however, concluding that the trial court "improperly
6 failed to set aside the verdict because the plaintiff's claim
7 against the defendant for invasion of privacy was barred by
8 governmental immunity [under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a)(2)]."
9 O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 90 Conn. App. at 63. There is divided
10 authority as to whether a judgment based on an immunity defense
11 is a judgment on the merits for the purposes of res judicata.
12 Compare Lommen v. City of East Grand Forks,
97 F.3d 272, 275 (8th
13 Cir. 1996) (finding that, under Minnesota law, a decision based
14 on governmental immunity is considered "on the merits" for the
15 purposes of res judicata) and Flores v. Edinburg Consol. Indep.
16 Sch. Dist.,
741 F.2d 773, 775 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984) ("summary
17 judgment on grounds of sovereign immunity is a judgment on the
18 merits for purposes of res judicata") with Wade v. City of
19 Pittsburgh, 765 F.2d 405, 410 (3rd Cir. 1985) (stating, with
20 regards to a state-court judgment based on statutory immunity,
21 that "we predict that under Pennsylvania law, if a judgment is
22 entered before development of the merits and is based on a
3
We note also that this argument may have been forfeited,
inasmuch as it is not at all clear that it was made before the
district court. Because we find the argument unpersuasive in any
event, we need not address whether it was forfeited.
12
1 collateral defense applicable only to the first action, claim
2 preclusion would not apply.").
3 In light of the disposition of the claim for
4 intentional infliction of emotional distress on the merits,
5 however, we do not think it matters whether the claim for
6 invasion of privacy was decided on the merits or not. The
7 district court's conclusion that the substantive due process
8 claims could not be pursued under principles of res judicata
9 would have been valid even if it had been based on the state
10 court's decision on the merits of the intentional infliction of
11 emotional distress claim alone. To paraphrase the district
12 court's opinion, for the plaintiff to succeed on his remaining
13 claim in federal court -- whether defendants violated his right
14 to substantive due process -- he would have had to prove that the
15 defendants' insistence on obtaining his past medical records was
16 arbitrary and oppressive. See O'Connor, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 232.
17 The Board's insistence on obtaining these records, and its intent
18 in doing so, were central to the intentional infliction of
19 emotional distress claims that were tried in state court. Under
20 the transactional test that the Connecticut Supreme Court has
21 adopted to determine whether an action is barred by res judicata,
22 the decision on the merits in the state court against O'Connor on
23 his intentional infliction claim therefore bars his pursuit of
24 the substantive due process claims in federal district court.4
4
With the possible exception of the invasion of privacy
claim, all of O'Connor's other claims were also indisputably
13
1 See Comm'r of Envtl. Prot., 227 Conn. at 189-90, 629 A.2d at 1124
2 (judgment in first action extinguishes all other claims "with
3 respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of
4 connected transactions, out of which the action arose.").
5 B. Privity
6 In the state action, only the Board was a defendant.
7 In the federal action now before us, O'Connor brought suit
8 against not only the Board, but also several Board members, all
9 of whom are being sued only in their official capacities.5
10 "[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way
11 of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
12 agent -- at least where Eleventh Amendment considerations do not
13 control analysis . . . ." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City
14 of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978). "As long as the
15 government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond,
16 an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to
17 be treated as a suit against the entity." Kentucky v. Graham,
18
473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). We therefore agree with the district
decided on the merits by the state court. Because we hold that
the intentional infliction of emotional distress decision alone
was sufficient to preclude the case at bar, we need not and do
not reach the issue of whether the resolution on the merits of
these other claims, viewed in isolation or in combination, would
be sufficient to bar the present action.
5
Lynne B. Pierson, the Superintendent of Schools, was
originally sued in both her individual and official capacities.
However, O'Connor did not appeal the district court's 2001 ruling
that Pierson is entitled to qualified immunity and therefore
cannot be sued in her individual capacity. See O'Connor, 482 F.
Supp. 2d at 231 n.3. Therefore, all the individual defendants
are now being sued solely in their official capacities.
14
1 court that the parties in the two actions are in privity for
2 purposes of res judicata. See O'Connor, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 231-
3 32.
4 C. Adequate Opportunity to Litigate
5 Under Connecticut law, a party has not had an adequate
6 opportunity to litigate a claim, and res judicata therefore does
7 not apply, if "the court in the first action would clearly not
8 have had jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory or
9 ground or, having jurisdiction, would clearly have declined to
10 exercise it as a matter of discretion ." Conn. Nat'l Bank v.
11 Rytman,
241 Conn. 24, 44,
694 A.2d 1246, 1257 (1997) (quoting
12 Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 25 cmt.(e) (1982); internal
13 quotation marks, emphasis and parentheses omitted). But the
14 Connecticut courts clearly had jurisdiction to hear all the
15 claims O'Connor brought in the federal lawsuit, including those
16 brought under federal law. See Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose,
17
496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990) ("Federal law is enforceable in state
18 courts . . . ."). O'Connor does not argue otherwise. Neither
19 does he argue that the Connecticut courts would have declined to
20 exercise that jurisdiction.
21 O'Connor contends instead that he did not have "a fair
22 and adequate opportunity to litigate all his claims in a single
23 lawsuit,"6 Pl.'s Br. 20, because had he brought his federal
6
O'Connor appears to cite Gladysz v. Planning and Zoning
Comm'n of Town of Plainville, 256 Conn. 249, 262,
773 A.2d 300,
308 (2001), for the proposition that res judicata principles
should not bar this suit if he has not had an opportunity to
15
1 claims in state court, the defendants would have removed the
2 action to federal court, and, according to O'Connor, the state
3 court claims would then have ultimately been remanded to state
4 court. This might all be true, but it is beside the point.
5 O'Connor cites no authority, nor are we aware of any, for the
6 proposition that the specter of removal or subsequent remand,
7 which may result in a plaintiff's state law and federal law
8 claims being heard in different courts, deprives him or her of an
9 adequate opportunity to litigate his or her claims. We agree
10 with the district court that O'Connor had "a fair and adequate
11 opportunity" to litigate his claims, even if they may eventually
12 have been separated from one another, some heard in state and
13 some in federal courts.
14 CONCLUSION
15 We have considered the other arguments advanced by
16 O'Connor and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing
17 reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
litigate all of his claims in a single lawsuit. Pl.'s Br. 20.
But Gladysz, which addresses primarily the doctrine of collateral
estoppel (or "issue preclusion"), stands for no such proposition.
16
