Filed: May 25, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: 08-4350-pr Johnson v. Connolly UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORD
Summary: 08-4350-pr Johnson v. Connolly UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDE..
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08-4350-pr
Johnson v. Connolly
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER ”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL .
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 25 th day of May, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 ROGER J. MINER,
9 RICHARD C. WESLEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
12
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
14 JOHNATHAN JOHNSON,
15
16 Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18 -v.- 08-4350-pr
19
20 B. CONNOLLY, Doctor; MILES, Nurse; N.
21 SMITH, Nurse; JOHN BURGE,
22 Superintendent; LUCIEN LeCLAIRE, JR.;
23 BRIAN FISCHER; ATKINSON, Nurse;
24 MULVERHILL, Nurse; N. BEZIO; THERESA
25 KNAPP-DAVID,
26
27 Defendants-Appellees,
1
1
2 JOHN ALVES, Doctor, JOHN & JANE DOES,
3 CLASSIFICATION AND MOVEMENT,
4
5 Defendants.
6
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
8
9 FOR APPELLANT: Johnathan Johnson, pro se, Malone, NY.
10
11 FOR APPELLEES: Andrew B. Ayers, Assistant Solicitor
12 General (Denise A. Hartman, Assistant
13 Solicitor General, on the brief), for
14 Andrew Cuomo, Attorney General of the
15 State of New York, Office of the Attorney
16 General, Albany, NY.
17
18 Appeal from an order of the United States District
19 Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.).
20
21 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
22 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
23 AFFIRMED.
24
25 Johnathan Johnson appeals from an August 21, 2008 order
26 of the United States District Court for the Northern
27 District of New York (McAvoy, J.), which denied his motion
28 for a preliminary injunction. Johnson sought transfer to a
29 more secure facility based on his concerns about his safety
30 and the safety of his family members during prison visits.
31 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
32 facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for
33 review.
34
35 “We review the denial of a preliminary injunction for
36 abuse of discretion.” Lynch v. City of N.Y.,
589 F.3d 94,
37 99 (2d Cir. 2009). Ordinarily, “a party seeking a
38 preliminary injunction [must] show (a) irreparable harm and
39 (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2)
40 sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make
41 them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships
42 tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the
43 preliminary relief.” Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG
44 Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd.,
598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d
45 Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
46 also
id. at 38 (upholding this “venerable standard for
2
1 assessing a movant’s probability of success on the merits”).
2 However, a party seeking “a ‘mandatory’ injunction--that is,
3 as in this case, an injunction that will alter rather than
4 maintain the status quo--. . . must meet the more rigorous
5 standard of demonstrating a ‘clear’ or ‘substantial’
6 likelihood of success on the merits.” Doninger v. Niehoff,
7
527 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 2008).
8
9 Liberally construed, Johnson’s motion asserts a
10 violation of the Eighth Amendment based on purported
11 deliberate indifference to inmate safety. See Farmer v.
12 Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 857 (1994) (“The Eighth Amendment
13 guarantees each prisoner that reasonable measures will be
14 taken to ensure his safety.”). As explained in this Court’s
15 order denying Johnson’s previous motion for a preliminary
16 injunction in the same underlying action, Johnson v. Miles,
17 355 F. App’x 444, 446 (2d Cir. 2009), this alleged violation
18 of a constitutional right satisfies Johnson’s burden to
19 demonstrate irreparable harm, see Statharos v. N.Y. City
20 Taxi and Limousine Comm’n,
198 F.3d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 1999)
21 (“Because plaintiffs allege deprivation of a constitutional
22 right, no separate showing of irreparable harm is
23 necessary.”).
24
25 Nevertheless, we find no abuse of discretion in the
26 district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction, because
27 Johnson failed to demonstrate a clear or substantial
28 likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment
29 claim. “The test for deliberate indifference is twofold.
30 First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he is
31 incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
32 serious harm. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
33 the defendant prison officials possessed sufficient culpable
34 intent.” Hayes v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Corrections,
84 F.3d
35 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996). Even assuming that Johnson’s
36 allegations regarding the May 2008 incident demonstrate that
37 the prison visitation protocols pose “a substantial risk of
38 serious harm,” Johnson failed to demonstrate that any prison
39 official “possessed sufficient culpable intent.”
Id. “[A]
40 prison official has sufficient culpable intent if he has
41 knowledge that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious
42 harm and he disregards that risk by failing to take
43 reasonable measures to abate the harm.”
Id. We conclude
44 that reasonable measures were taken to abate any such harm
45 based on (i) the investigation of the May 2008 incident,
46 (ii) the monitoring of inmates and visitors during visits,
3
1 and (iii) Johnson’s designation to the secure Special
2 Housing Unit.
3
4 We have considered all of Johnson’s arguments on this
5 appeal and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the
6 order of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
7
8
9 FOR THE COURT:
10 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
11
4