Filed: Apr. 20, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 10-2591-cr U.S.A. v. Akapo UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A
Summary: 10-2591-cr U.S.A. v. Akapo UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A ..
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10-2591-cr
U.S.A. v. Akapo
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
"SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY
PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United
States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on
the 20th day of April, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE,
ROGER J. MINER,
DENNY CHIN,
Circuit Judges.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
-v.- 10-2591-cr
TEMILOLA AKAPO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: DARRELL B. FIELDS, New York, New
York.
FOR APPELLEE: CHRISTOPHER C. CAFFARONE, Assistant
United States Attorney (David C.
James, Assistant United States
Attorney, on the brief), for
Loretta E. Lynch, United States
Attorney for the Eastern District
of New York, Brooklyn, New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York (Ross, J.) entered on
June 29, 2010, following a jury verdict convicting defendant-
appellant Temilola Akapo of possession of counterfeit checks, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.
We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and
procedural history of the case, which we summarize as follows:
In March 2008, officials of United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") learned that a package of
counterfeit checks was addressed to Akapo at his home. On April
10, 2008, ICE agents went to Akapo's apartment and spoke to him.
He made incriminating statements, admitting his involvement in a
counterfeit check scheme. He was arrested, given Miranda
warnings, and made further incriminating statements. In Akapo's
apartment, the agents found counterfeit checks and electronic
devices that contained templates of counterfeit checks.
Prior to trial, Akapo moved to suppress his pre-arrest
statements as well as the physical evidence seized from his
apartment. The district court denied the motion.
Following a two-day jury trial in June 2009, Akapo was
convicted of possessing counterfeit checks. The district court
sentenced him principally to six months' imprisonment and six
months' home detention.
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Akapo's only contention on appeal is that his pre-
arrest statements should have been suppressed on the theory that
he was "in custody" at the time of his statements and had not
been read his Miranda warnings. We review the district court's
factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de
novo. United States v. Irving,
452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006).
The warning requirements of Miranda apply only to
"'custodial interrogation.'" United States v. Newton,
369 F.3d
659, 669 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S.
436, 444 (1966)), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 947 (2004). The test
for determining whether an individual is in custody is an
objective one that asks (1) "what were the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation," United States v. Badmus,
325 F.3d
133, 138 (2d Cir. 2003)(internal quotation marks omitted); (2)
"would a reasonable person [in those circumstances] have felt he
or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave," id.; and (3) if not, "whether [the defendant's] freedom
of action ha[d] been curtailed to a degree associated with [a]
formal arrest,"
Newton, 369 F.3d at 671 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Absent a formal arrest, "interrogation in the familiar
surroundings of one's own home is generally not deemed
custodial."
Id. at 675.
As the district court found, the interview occurred
just outside of Akapo's apartment, he was not handcuffed or
frisked, he consented to a search of his apartment, he never
indicated that he wanted to leave, and was not told that he could
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not leave. Although two of the agents asked Akapo to stand near
the doorway while three other agents searched the apartment, this
was a reasonable request given the small size of his apartment,
and on balance did not result in a custodial situation. See
Badmus, 325 F.3d at 138-39 (finding no custody where agents asked
defendant and his wife to stay seated in the living room during
the search of their apartment and did not allow free movement
about the apartment). On these findings, which Akapo has given
us no reason to disturb, the district court properly denied
Akapo's motion to suppress.
Even assuming, without deciding, that it was error to
admit Akapo's pre-arrest statements because he was "in custody"
for Miranda purposes, the error was harmless. These statements
merely were duplicative of the admissions he made in a post-
arrest, post-Miranda-warnings interview, which were plainly
admissible. See Rollins v. Leonardo,
938 F.2d 380, 382 (2d Cir.
1991)(per curiam)(concluding that error was harmless where
defendant's un-Mirandized confession was cumulative of subsequent
confession and other evidence of guilt).
CONCLUSION
We have considered all of Akapo's other contentions on
appeal and have found them to be without merit. For all the
reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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