Filed: Jun. 23, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 10-2732-ag Jin v. Holder BIA Chew, IJ A098 612 029 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA
Summary: 10-2732-ag Jin v. Holder BIA Chew, IJ A098 612 029 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTAT..
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10-2732-ag
Jin v. Holder
BIA
Chew, IJ
A098 612 029
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 23rd day of June, two thousand eleven.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 ROBERT D. SACK,
8 REENA RAGGI,
9 PETER W. HALL,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _______________________________________
12
13 CHUN ZHI JIN,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 10-2732-ag
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _______________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, New York.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENTS: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
26 General; Ada E. Bosque, Senior
27 Litigation Counsel; Jonathan
28 Robbins, Attorney, Office of
29 Immigration Litigation, United
30 States Department of Justice,
31 Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Chun Zhi Jin, a native and citizen of China, seeks
6 review of a June 14, 2010, order of the BIA affirming the
7 August 14, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) George
8 T. Chew, which denied his application for asylum,
9 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
10 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jin, No. A098 612 029
11 (B.I.A. June 14, 2010), aff’g No. A098 612 029 (Immig. Ct.
12 N.Y. City Aug. 14, 2008). We assume the parties’
13 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
14 in this case.
15 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
16 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA decision. See Xue
17 Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d
18 Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well-
19 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v.
20 Holder,
562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009). The only matter
21 properly before us is whether Jin met his burden of
22 demonstrating either past persecution or a well-founded fear
23 of future persecution.
2
1 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), an individual is not per
2 se eligible for asylum based on the forced abortion or
3 sterilization of a spouse or partner because “applicants can
4 become candidates for asylum relief only based on
5 persecution that they themselves have suffered or must
6 suffer.” Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d
7 296, 308 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Matter of J-S-, 24 I. & N.
8 Dec. 520, 536-37 (A.G. 2008) (adopting this Court’s holding
9 in Shi Liang Lin). In the absence of per se persecution
10 based on his wife’s abortions, Jin was required to show
11 “other resistance to a coercive population control program”
12 and that he was persecuted as a result of that resistance.
13 Shi Liang
Lin, 494 F.3d at 309-10. The agency reasonably
14 concluded that Jin did not engage in other resistance
15 because impregnating his wife, the only basis Jin asserted,
16 does not satisfy the other resistance requirement. See Shi
17 Liang
Lin, 494 F.3d at 314-15 (indicating that “other
18 resistance” requirement was not satisfied by impregnation);
19 see also Ru-Jian Zhang v. Ashcroft,
395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th
20 Cir. 2004) (“[M]erely impregnating one’s girlfriend is not
21 alone an act of ‘resistance.’” (emphasis removed)).
22
3
1 Moreover, as the agency determined, Jin was not
2 persecuted after his wife’s abortions, or after he rendered
3 medical treatment to his cousin. The harm Jin claims is a
4 one-month suspension of his salary on two occasions, not
5 receiving a year-end bonus on two occasions, and being fired
6 from his job after assisting his cousin. These harms do not
7 demonstrate the “deliberate imposition of a substantial
8 economic disadvantage” required to show persecution. See
9 Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 67 (2d
10 Cir. 2002). There is no evidence in the record that the
11 suspension of his salary caused Jin “a severe economic
12 disadvantage,” and he conceded that after his employment was
13 terminated in 1994, he obtained a position as a doctor at a
14 smaller hospital in China, and remained in the country,
15 working, for another five years. See Matter of T-Z-, 24 I.
16 & N. Dec. 163, 173 (BIA 2007); see also Guan Shan Liao,
293
17 F.3d at 67. Accordingly, as the agency concluded, Jin
18 failed to demonstrate that he was subject to economic
19 persecution.
20 Because the agency reasonably concluded that Jin did
21 not establish past persecution, he is not entitled to a
22 presumption of future persecution, and he makes no argument
4
1 concerning a fear of future persecution independent from the
2 incidents that occurred in the past. See 8 C.F.R.
3 § 1208.16(b)(1); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169,
4 178 (2d Cir. 2004). Consequently, the agency reasonably
5 concluded that Jin did not meet his burden of establishing a
6 well-founded fear of future persecution and did not err in
7 denying his application for asylum. See 8 C.F.R.
8 § 1208.13(b)(1), (2); Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey,
528 F.3d
9 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008). Furthermore, because Jin was
10 unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution
11 needed to make out an asylum claim, he was necessarily
12 unable to meet the higher standard required to succeed on a
13 claim for withholding of removal. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444
14 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006); Gomez v. INS,
947 F.2d 660,
15 665 (2d Cir. 1991).
16 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
17 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
18 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
19 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
20 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
5
1 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
2 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
3 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
4 FOR THE COURT:
5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
6
7
6
